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ABSTRACT 
Until recently, Institutional reforms implemented under the so-called "cil)ertura" econoniic 
,, trategy had emphasized the correction of macroeconomic imbalances through I)cCific 
policy ineasures (i. e., privatization, open trade, fiscal balance, stable exchange rates). A,, 
overall imbalances have been corrected, policy makers are considering the introducilon of' 
a second generation of "Institutional reforms". Consequently, the focus of reforni wmild 
into the promotion of productivity. cornpetition, and innovation ý11 the 
entrepreneurial level. These institutional oals presuppose a new regulatory franicwork, 9 tr) 
arnenýtble to nnarket functioning. Antitrust policy is one example arnom, niam' rc, _, ulaI(w\ 
initiatives being advocated to support market reforms. b 
This thesis shows how the broad misconccptions about the nature of rnai-ket" still 
pervades poficy-making throughout the i-c, -, Ion. Antitrust policies could threatcii to tý bI 
i-cproduce, under powerful new forms, the former interventionism that chai-actenzcd 
"development" policies of the 1960s and 1970s. Paradoxically, this intervention ism would 
be JUStIfied in the name of preserving market transparency. 
Advocate,,, of antitrust policies often share a subtle anti-market bias: Markets al-C 
wý! arded StrUCturcs, where density of concentration deterinines how competitivc the\/ arc. 
Following the welfare implications drawn froni the neoclassical models of equilibrium, 
cconornic exchange is examined under severely constrained conditions: individuals 11-C 
&, sunicd to possess con-iplete information and transactions are "timeless". The aftermath 
of this perspective is that all business arrangements are regarded "restrictions to 
competition", some of these suspected of sheltering monopolistic purposes. 
'The effects of these policies in the region could hc particularly harmful in Latin AnIerICII. 
aS [-)Ll', IIICS, CS IIItCI-aCtIII, -, in the 
domestic markets of the region have developed ()\, ci- tinic I- 
Ijunicrous fornis of unofficial institutional (lc\, icc,,,, most of them addressed to 
conipicnient the lack of transparency of the enforcement of the official legal franicwork. 
in the wakc of apcrtura, these institutional dcviccs. coupled with hi-gh le\, cls of econonil(-' 
concentration, appear to favour monopolistic conducts, but in fact thc\, attempt to con-cci 
the advcr,, e effects of clecades of dirigisme and uncertainty of a stable rule of lm\ up(, iý 
bLi,, Ine,,,, activities. 
Latin markets are undergoing a fast transformation since apo-titi-ei began. Due to the L- 4: ) 
liftiiio, of trade reaulations, there is a significant wave of mergers and acquisitioils. tn 
privatization processes, setting up joint ventures, selling undervalued asscl,,. aiid L- 
proliferation of new corporate forms and other forms of efficient associatioii reshapiiii(-, 
old Mefficient structures and replacing theni with new ones. YOUno Latin AnIencall 
antitrust agencies have already challenged many of these undertakings as sheltering some 
I'Orm of monopolistic endeavor. 
t Jnder a perspective emphasizing the evolutive iiýtture of market interaction, thesc 
conducts appear simply is modalities by which the economic knowledge of eýich market Z: ) 
participant is passed on to others in the system. These seemingly monopolistic' attcrnptý, 
are in fact efficient arrangements allowing businesses to plan in advance their activitic,, ý 
rclatincy to conjectural future business scenarios. These arranoements sometime encourýq-, c 
mergers, vertical integration, and even collusion, but they are also responsible fOl- ilCNA, 
market discoveries, innovation and increased production. To support this conclusion. till, -. 
thesis IS Supported on the heuristic process view of markets initiated by the School of 
Subjectivism in econonuc science. 
To promote competition and innovation within Latin Arnerica's weak institutional sell iiii, -, - 
a strong policy of deregulation, and firnitation to covernment intervention throw-di L- bbI 
political accountability and judicial review is advocated in place of conventional antitrust 
policy, which Would retain a marginal role. 
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"Creativity ofleii, alid perhaps itsitedly, coii. 4ýi. ý ol lookilig at taindiar thiiigs oi- 
I d"to 111 0 HCH, WaY. 
(Geor-e Stigler, Memolr,, of an Unre-ulated Economist, p. 79. ) 
In his extraordinary work on the evolution of the Western le(, a] systcm. Harold 
Bcrman explains the role of legal studies in the context of chanae. He 
the following: "It is a task of a contemporary social thcory of law to study the 1'atc ()I' Lm tý 
in periods of revolutionary change, not so much in oi-dcr to examine the rapid suh,, titunon 
of ncw laws for old but rather in order to examine the ways in which foundations are ()I- 
ai-c not laid for a stable and Just legal order in the future, after the revolution has , cilic(I 
Cl o \N, 11. -I 
Institutional reVOILItIOll is underway today in Latin America, and this dic iiccýl 
tI or dctern-iining whether the foundations are beiii(-- laid for a *ust and stable legal order. t, -i L- 
-)rm began in the mid-1980s, the legal systems. of LatM Amcvi, --aii Smcc cconornic i-efc ZD L- 
countries have come Lmder increasing pressure to adapt to change. In the realm of public 
law, the notion of "Public Interest", which used to underlie legislation enacted III PrCVWLPý 
(Iccýi(lcs to foster devclopi-nent goals, has started to be questioned in Latin Arncricý111 
countric,,. Individual i-ights are acquiring an unprecedented significance in the comcxt ot Ib 
H. Berman, Law and Revolution: T-11c ()I I. cLal Traditio-n. (London. 
Harvard Umversitý 1983), p. 45 
I () 
legal discussion. Court,, are improving and extending the mechanism.,, of legal rcvicw oii C, Z7 Z7 
decisions takeii by governments which affect private emitlerneivs. 2 L- 
This is no coincidence-, today, much of the weight of -o),,, crnment Inter\ ciitioii iý, ni in Z-- 
the clc,.,, icn of "development policies"3 has lost Its appeal as the preferred tool for thc t-- 
ccononilc and social dcvelopment of the repon. The failurc of ccntrali,,, c(-l -mci-nniciii 
planning eventually persuaded Latin government officials of the hitherto Linseen vlrtuc, ý 
markci-oriented policies in ensuring efficient social resource allocation, thus ci-cating, the 
right conditions for sustained economic growth. 
However, acknowledging market superiority over government planning has not t-1) zn t-- 
made policy choices easier. Much of the initial awareness that emerged immediately aher t: ) 
economic reform began in the mid-1980s was eclipsed after the consolidation of the fir"t 
stage of reform. Today, the region has be un a second wave or "generation" of refoi-ni.,,. b9b 
aimed at consolidating the first generation through the restructuring of government and b z: I ZD 
markets, and the creation of proper conditions for sustained growth in the FC(21011.4 
2 See A. Brewer, Judicial Review in Comparative Law, (Carnbridge: Cambridge UnIvcr,, Ity 11rc,,,. 
1989) 
3 In this work, "development policies" are the set of government strategies attempted in Latin 
America since the end of the Second World War, aimed at developing an industrial bask for 
1, Clf-SLIfficiency In the region through regulatory controls. promotional instruments and trade 
restrictions to spur Industrial development. (C. Frischtak, B. HadjImichael and U. ZdCIIAIý 
Conimition Policies for Industrial izi ng, Countries, Policy and Research Series, No. 7, Indusirv 
and Energy Department [Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1989], p. 2. ) 
4 For more than ýt decade now, the region has undergone econornic and trade reform, commonIN C. - Z-- - 
known as opertiti-o ("opening"). The new dcvc1opment strategy, implemented since the mid- 
1980s, was justified by the need to foster modern economies in the region, thereby inCILIC11IL' 
Latin American governments to adopt, some more reluctantly than others, pro-market measure" 
that were unthinkable in the past: inflation control., trade and foreign exchange liberalisation. 
lifting of regulatory measures and price controls and elimination of restrictions oil foreign Z-- 17- 
mvcs'tment, -,, to name a few. Today, the fir,, t generation of macroeconomic rc, ýIructurinL, - 
consP, tim, of trade reform, correcting liscal Imbalances, privatising state Lissci,, ; ind 
implementiriL, sound monetary policy has been achieved in many Latin countries. Gomez 
C\plaffl" tile 1111plicatioll", of this policy turnaround. "Latin Arnerica's economic ýind ": ()illille1c1L11 
reform, common1v known as apertilra, h&s been applied by k: ountries throughout the 1ý()i 
in výtrying dc, -, rec,, of depth, with 
Chile performing the two role,, of pioncer and chmiiploil. 
The ino,, t strikim-, clfect of deploying the opcaitro s4r, ilct-Tv he,, in cornrnerciýfl and e\J1m1L'e 
J)()1IC\. 11111101-t (11.01'C, \\CI-C ý: Llt dranwticallý. froili ýin a%crt,,, c of 50 pci-L-cm (W va/orem 1( 
pci, ccrit in onlý five years. Most notably, these cuts \\ere applied unilaterally. \\ith no deriland, " 
for reciprocity. %viping out at the same time a wide range of non-tariff barrler, ý. E\chan! -, c 
conti-OF, long III Li'lle \\'el, c scrapped or pýired to curb capital outflow,, " (H. G6nicz. "The 
However. no matter how much scholars proclaim the importance of thesc rclorjliý,. HIC 
Fact rcmains that they arc little understood. The Economist has described the curi-cm "'talc 
of policy-making in the following terms: "the debate [on the convenience of market" 1 1)11- 
moved on [but] motion does not necessarilv bring clLiritv... Views ýtill differ n-ia: -IXW%, 
iIhOLIt hovv, and hovv niuch, the state should interfere in the functioning of economic,,,. " 
(Author's itafics)5 
In short, today there is as much confusion as ever about the role of governi-nent,, L- 
social affairs. Much of the discussion about policy-makinp, for transition ecoriomieý, iý, ýnl! 
dominated by an ideological bias that ernphasises quantitative over qualltativC 
oovernment involvement. Policy-makers still concentrate their debates on how much thc 
state should' intervene in the economy (i. e., how maiiY state-owned firms should bc 
privatised, hovtý maii-y sectors should be regulated, hoviý maii-N, sectors should be frccd 1'rom 
state interference), rather than on the regulatory instruments that could be implemented 
to improve the overall performance of the economy. Not surprisingly, niýirket,, im! 
oovernment iritervent on are still seen as alternati II 1-1 1 polari ves which policy-niiillci-, irc 
cxpected to choose between for regulating market transactions and achieviii(i s(wi; d 
oaIs. 
Much of the liability for this lack of understanding comes frorn the fornialktic 
approach which dominates the analysis of those regulatory reforms iicccssm-v I () 
implement structural changes in the region. Such iiialysls shows a poor understandin, -, of Z7) -I 
those sources of economic development which form a sensible guide for the desigil 
regulation. This work attempts to explain how the ultimate reason for this appraisal iv"(ý' 
on the rnispfaced ernphasis of conventional economic theory on the analysis of efficiclit 
rcsourcc allocation in market interaction, with a corresponding analytical neglect ()I' tli(- 
institutional reasons behind the discovery of new knowledge. innovation and econoimc 
Globalization oI BUSIlle'SS in Latin Arnerica", ')9 The International Lxecutive [ 1997 1,1). 22, ýý'. ) A 
SLIIIIIIIal'V Of the meýi,, ures comprising the "second Lcneration of reform, " k l'ound HI \1 NIIIII). 
Latin America's Journey to the Market: From Macroeconomic Shocks to Institutional Tllerýtpyý 
Occasional P; tl)ci-,,. No. 62, (San Francl,, co. International Center for Economic Gio%\ih. 191)1-ý). 
pp. 1-7. 
-S 
"Economic Freedom: ot'Liberty, and prosperltv", The Economi,, t. 13 January ]996,1). -11. 
I: 
growth M social s-ett'nL,,,. Not surprisingly, the formalism of regulatory design has hccome 
a SOLIrce of. frustratIon for policy-makers , mcc the -first gcncration- ()t' rcforms h&, 
reached completion. 
Perhaps these limitations are most ohvious in the analy,, P, of the type ()f ()I)Ilimll 
I'C (TLI 
I 
ýIt I Oil that could i rnprove market functioning and enhance 111110N, A1011, 
criti-eprencurship, and economic growth. Great uncertainty dominates the discu,,,, ion ()I 
the haý, i,, for those institutional measures which Latin American -, o%, crnincnI,, shoult] 
implement as a second generation of reforms to ral,, e the productivity of each I, win 
Aineric(m, and more generally to encourage each production unit to become moi-e 
I)i-odL[CtlVf, -, innovative and entrepreneurial. Policy-makcr, ý, are gradually arrivin- ýtl the 
conclusion that low productivity is more closely associated with poor Organisation in the Z: ý 
production process which adversely affects the performance of entrepreneurs, rather than 
the correction of exchanae and trade disequilibrium. This brings to the foi-e a di, CLI', SIOII Z: ) Z: ) 
on the capaýity Of Current legal structures to organise human capital and exploit its 
potential, to (-I(-,, v, elop entrepreneurship and the legi. slation ticccled to) atiam 
II(MIS. 
In this regard, the experience gained since the introduction of antitrust policy in 
niany Latin American countries is particularly Illustrative. This policy is currently 
as a component of the new institutional framework that should be implemented in ()i-(Ici- 
to inake markets inorc competitive. The purpose of this work is to explain lio\, \' PLIhIIC 
liolicy can promote competition and entrepreneurship within the context ()I' cconoi-nic 
wforin in Latin Anierict, and to examine whether ýintitrust policies contribute to this m, ký 
In other words, this work attempts to define a competition policy which is compatihic 
with i-narkets, technologoical innovation and entrepreneurial creativity. 
I 
How did policv-i-nAcrs come to ý,.,., sunie that antitru., -, t policv could proniotc 
competition in Latin Aincrica? To answer this CjLICStIOI) \\'c must ]()()k ; -a the 
hl.,, torlcal ý111(! 
intclicctual , cttin(-, in which this policy has emerged in Latin America. 
13 
I. - THI- 01ý JrlISTITUTIONAL REFORM ON THF F-('ON('. N'11(' LANDSCAPF OF LATI 
By the end ()f the Second World Wm-, n-)wt Latin American courltricý, 
essentKilly exporters of primary goods in the mining and agricultural sector. s. Thl.,, madc 
their domestic economics particularly vulnerahic to price fluctuations on the intcrnati(mal 
commodity markets. 
This situation w&, taken up by the political clite, ,, vho endoi-, scd dirigisic ccoiioniio, 
pi-ogranii-nes in the hope of overcoming what they regarded w, "dependency- oil 
international markets. To do so, they attempted to build self-sufficient industries capahlo: 
of meeting growing consumption in Latin American economies. Development policic, ý, b 
were used to create capacity in specific sectors and to promote the growth of infant fil-lil". 
As Frischtak et al. ai-gue, these policies were perceived by policy-makers as neces'sary to 
lielp an incipient entrepreneurial class, facin(-i i-elatively thin market,, with scm-cc cipitýd 
wsoul-ccs. "Capacity licensing was used to i-c-ulate entry Lind balance supply and denland. 
Investnient incentives and trade barriers raised profitability and attracted resources to the 
industrial sector. Procurement policies made usc of public sector demand to support 
local producers. Cost-plus pricing policies accommodated inefficient firms. RestrictiVe 
lahOL11- legislation, complex bankrupt procedures and financial bailouts discouraged cxit in 
an attenipt to conserve capital and protect workers frorn unemployi-nent". 6 
Accordingly, policy-makers afforded extensive protection to local indu, "tric. 1-, 
dirough import substitution policies-, in essence, these policies erected tariff barriers aiid 
other obstacles to international competition. 7 Table No I shows the level of trýldc 
protection in the region in the mid- 1980s. 
C. Frkchtak, et al. Op. Cit., p. 
7 \V. Baer, "Changing Paradigms: Changim-, interpretation,, of the public sector in Latin I 't, , 
Anierfca's economies- 88 Public Choice [19961: 305-379. Borner et al. hiLhli,,, ht the importance 
of these liolicic,,, in the region: "Under the intellectual leadership of the U. N. Economic 
Commi,, ýIori for Latin America, the protective h,, trriers aLTmn,, t imports gre\\ and with them ý-Ivw 
iniport-suhstituting industne,, ". S. Borner. A. Brunetti and B. Weder, 1wtitutiomil ()h,,, Iaclc,, to 
14 
Table No I 
TRADE INDICATORS MID- I 980s 
Source: Dean, Desai and Riedel (199 
ColliltrY High toriffý Stringent Exporr Foreign Multiple 
quantitative rcs/r/ ('11 . oim Exchangc Exchali,,,, c 
restrictioii. ý restrictions INYIN 
Ar-entina 
Brazil 
Ch IIe 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Mcx]C() 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Along with import substitution, domestic trade regulation was also regarded as ari b 
essential step toward!,; internal development; in essence, the implemcntatioii of 
development policies meant that social demands could be rnet through trade rcgukitioll ýIt I 
the expense of competition. 8 This process occurred in scvera] ways. 
Firstly, extensive nationalisation programmes for development purposes inevltahlý' 
entailed the creation of legal monopolies and ownership exclusions in many "strategic"' 
industries on the basis of political considerations. As Coate et al. put it: "In nurnerous 
Latin American Growth, International Centel- for Econornic Growth (San Francisco. 1992). p. 7. 
Latin American policy-makers predicted that import substitution would enable the 
industrial sector to expand and to reduce its costs through econornies (4scale and -1cm-nlnL, h\/ 
doin, -, ". Export pessimism, 
in terms of market acces,. and unfavourable terms ()f tr; idc. 
played some role in persuading them to P1.11-SUC ýin import-ýLibstmltlon strategy. See M. K(, Il\ ; m'! 
A. K. McGuirk, Trade Policies of Developiný., Countries, in 'Issues and Development, in 
International Trade Policy', World Economic and Financial Surveys, Appendix 11, (WashlnLrton. 
DC: International Monetary Fund, 1992), pp. 40-41. See also M. Agosin and D. TusMc. 
-Globalization. Re-ionalization and New Dllemrnasý in Trade Policy for Development", 15 
World Competition [ 1992]: 37-63. 
Local elite,, quickly understood the political clout they gained, by granting monopolw,, mid 
cconornic privileýi(-, ý through these policie, ý. over different ýocml groups. Coate et 11. it, 
thk re, -, ard- "Generally price controls are intl'OdUced to protect ýclected Lroups in the ecol-imm 
For cxample. in N, lc\ico and numerous other Latin counti-ic,,. the Urban pool- are OfICII proic"Ied 
1)\ controlý,, on tood and other neces,, itic,, while somc COL111ti-ICII PrOteCt the rich hý limmný- the 
pricc of gasolinc. In other cases. selected industries are protected bv price controk oil i-; I\\ 
materials and cven financial capital". M. Coate, R. Bustaillante and A. Rodriguez. Aniltru,, t 
I. atm America: ReLulating Government and Business (Washington. DC: Federil Tradc 
Coniniký, ion, Bureau of Economics, 1993). p. ',. 
Iý 
Latin Arnerican economics. nationalisatlon has lon(-, been a standard respon,, c of file 
, government to perceived economic problems. Initially reserved for natural I-c"OHI-CC 
industries such as oil (Mexico, Venezuela) and mining (Brazil, Chile), govcrnnicni 
ownership expanded to airlines (Mexico, Aroentina, Bolivia), bankina and insunince Z71 Zý 
operations (Mexico, El Salvador), the telephone industry (Argentina) and evell ILIXLII-\' 
hotels (E] Salvador)". 9 Secondly, many sectors left out of nationalisation \\'c], C 
nevertheless subject to severe regulation that curtailed any chance for the spoilt mlCoLl. ý' b 
growth of competition. Industrial policies discouraged competit' b ion arnon, pn\, aic 
produccrs by means of price controls, and barriers to entry and exit from tile 111ý11-kct. 
Price controls generally sheltered the most inefficient producers, thus restrictino PrICC 
competition in the regulated industry. Thirdly, foreign investment regulations forced the C) 
local subsidiaries of multinational enterprises to comply with many specific performance 
requirements-, these legal barriers limited the capacity of these firms, particularly the more 
aggressive or more resourceful ones. Finally, exit barriers (i. e. bankruptcy procedure,, ) Z7) 
were airned at protecting certain groups which were regarded as especially vulner; thle O'oi 
example, labour) and ensuring their permanence in the market, notwithstandin(-, theil, Cý I 
complete lack of competitiveness. 
The effects of these measures on Latin American firms and markets were two-fold: 
Firstly, local markets and industries tended to become more concentrated. Economic 
concentration in the re-Ion reached significant levels in the years immediately prior to 
aPertura. Table No. 2) siiows these levels in sclcctecl Latin Alllel_ICý111 COLIMIACS. 
k) Coatc at al., at 3 
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Tah1c', () 2) 
CON(TNTRATION OF PRODUCTION IN I ATIN AMERICA BEFOREA PERTUR. A. 
Smlrccý F'luml(mllc comm)""wii toi- kitin America and the Caribbean. 
StatvticLtl Yearbook foi 1-0111 'Aillerica aild tile 
Caribbean, 1ý)90. 
roh, b. \ w*, -. c (ýf csl(lb1l. s1l1llcll1ý 
(100 or more employees) 
ARGENTINA 1984 43.7/ý 
1985 58.2 (-/r 
('01, M]BIA 1970 61 
COST/\ RICA 1975 51.0 
ml: xl(, o 1988 0 4.8 'Ic 
URUGUAY 1987 39.4(4 
Secondly, development policies imposed severe restrictions on the capacity ()I'Latihi 
firms to compete, innovate and create econornic growth. Frkchtak et al. give a L, ()()d 
summary of these effects: "In some countries. x, the industrial sector matureci. 
(Yovernments removed protective barriers and increased domestic firms' cxposurc to 
competitive forces. But in most countries, barriers to entry and exit solidified. Capac1tv 
licensinc, and other reoulations concerning the establishment and expansion of firm..,, 
effectively deterred the growth of capacity and the entry of new firms. Inve,, ý41-nent 
incentives and procui-ernent policies prevented entry hy skewing tI-1c ruIcs In favour of 
clominant producers. Price controls pre-cnipted competition and helped lc,,,,,, efficient 
firms survive. ( ... ) 
The infant market rationale [allowing for tariff and non-tariff 
protection] was turned upside down; relief from import-competition continued to hc 
provided for matui-e and declining sub-sectors while new activities were penallsed"'. I() It 
became clear that protective measures had a negative Impact on the entreprencurshiii. p. 
competitivericss and inventiveness of most Latin firms. 
Naturally, Latin firms tended to develop their business strategies based on the fakc z! ) 
cxpectations ci-cated hy government protectionism, which in the long-run provccl Z: 7) 
Only firm,, of considerable size could match the costs imposed by the weh ()I' 
rc(_, ulations, -hence the poor records for si-nall and rnediuni enterprisc,,. Firms alm) haci I 
Incentlvcs to spcciall"C In SCCtors whosc profitability depended on 1xii-nei-s to 
c()nipctitorý, The situation changed drai-naticAlý, for local husfflc, ý, scý, when market harricr, 
I () FrIsclitak et al., it 2. 
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were rernoved its a result of apertura, which eritafled operilrig local iiiarkel" 1() 
iriterriational competitiori. As G6mez explain,,. -B\ (lie ciicl ofthe 197(). ý,. Latiii Aiiici ictt'., 
highly protected rnariufacturing firms had more thari ,, aturated the 1111POrt ý, Llh', ML11101_1 
iiiarket for their ongirial products and diversified irito different industrics. Soiiie I d\ mircd 
vertical integration, such as moving backwards from the retail sale of building materlal, ý 1() 
the production of cement, ceramic tiles, and sanitary fixtures, followed by niariLlfacturIM-1 
the sacks, cartons, and tape required for packing. Other firms combined the productioll ()I 
chernicals, for example. with packaging materials arid food prodUCI. S. For the iiiosl pm-l. 
howevcr, manufacturing plants were small iri scaie and dependent ori inij)orts, C7 
machinery and even processed inputs. Once local-tariff and non-tariff barriers wcrc 
rernoved in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the undersized plants proved uneconomic, to 
operate in competition with world suppliers. Erstwhile conglomerates shed product altcr 
product and focused on their basic line. The stronger Latin American firms, too'ether with b Z7) 
ii-xiltinational firms from outside the region, scrambled across borders to ýIccjuin- t-I 
discarded plants suited to their business and buy into local brands". II 
Apertura brought decisive changes in the corporate landscape of the lvgioll. 
shattering many local firms unable to compete on the new playing field. The sweephi, -, 
process of corporate change in the region since apertura has led, in many casc, ", to 
i-clatively more efficient firms; it has also prompted the restructuring of many donic'ýIiic 
firms throuah take-overs and acquisitions by foreign firms attempting to gain a foothold 
in these ernercyina markets. lt! 5 b 
However, despite increased competitiveness in the business environment, a 11cvv 
kind of resistance is growing among poljcy-niaker, ý M the region. Trideed, everymw h: i" zD Z: > t) - 
not welcomed these changes. Obviously, the arrival of newcomers is unpleasant 1'()I, 
cstablished firms e *oymo, entrenched privileges, as it threatens to drive them out of the Rl tl t, 
market. However, Liside from these practical implications, apertura is perhaj-), ý iii0n, 
ciidam-, cred by the conventional perception of social phenomena shared by iiltellecluýlk. 
scliokirs and policy-makers, who may still be committed to their old ways of vicwiii,, 
pohc\ -makino. This perception is far from bein. (2 overcome, and is respoiisible foi- lcýi(liiio I Z7 
G(imez, p. 228. 
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thern to frequently endorse policy initiative,, which run against the logic of rnarka,.. 1! iý, L) - 
here that "competition policies" implemented in the region of-ler an interesting C'. I, ', C "ILOV, It) - 
on how ideas and perceptions governing policy-i-nakincy may have endured de..,, pitc thc 
best efforts to open up markets and liberalise the economy. 
1- INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION POLICY INTOTHE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM ()I- L vrr, ' 
AmHRICA: FROM SYMPATHY TO CONFUSION'ý 
Many policy-i-nakers view competition policy as a too] l'or ensuring the SLIC-C-C',., ()I 
f 
apertura and economic reform in Latin America. Increased industrial concentratioil 
therefore accrued in the region before upci-titra cultivated the perceptioll th. 11 I 
government policy targeted to the promotion of competition was nccc, ý..,, ý11-y. 
Consequently, "during the 1980s virtually every developed nation strengthened W,, t-71 
competition laws while some countries enacted new laws designed to ensure that barriers I-- 
to trade and competition, once removed by the state, would not be resurrected by privatc 
action". 12 
In general, it has been suggested that antitrust policy is needed to ensure the t) 
dismantling of trade barriers which would otherwise be restored by I)LISIIIC. 1-1ý1 L- 
manipulation. There is a growing conviction that antitrust policy is needed to prevent 
anti-con-ipetitive business practices as firms struggle to preserve their prero(-, Mi%, C,,, 
-ranted Linder previous industrial policies through tariff,, and non-tariff hm-ncr, ý 1, 
12 R. Boner and R. Kruc, -ýer, 
The Basics of Antitrust Policy: A Review of Ten Natimi,,, md thc 
European COMIIILIIIitieS; World Bank Technical Paper Number 160; (WashinLton, D('- Thc 
World Bank, 199 Ij at ix. 
The concern that government barriers may be substituted by private ones has been a comilion 
thread throughout all discussions concerning the liberalisation of domestic markets and thcir 
integration in regional (or- international) ones. The Commission of the European Corriniunitic, 
stated in a note submitted to the OECD: "The ti-an,, Ition from a series of national marko,,. ýý ith 
bLiSineS'S aCtIVIIN' ortianised predominantly on national lines, to an open and conipetiti\c ituatioll 
within a single market, requires that particular attention be paid to practices which \\0LI1d ha\C C7 
the eft'Cct of perpetuating the existence of national boundaries to economic activity an(] the lo"t 
economic opportunities resulting from such frapientation of' markets". (Commission of' the 
European ('01111111.11111 iies. The Objectives of Competition-P01.1cv, -Note , ubmitted 
to thc Mccti]IL, ot 
tile Committee in Competition Law and Poljcýý, Ma\ 1991 Parl,, ý 
DAH 1 "(11 T 
(922) UEEC-Restricted Document). The proclairned antitrust goals in reLional 'urisdictions such 
as the European Union or the Andean Pact provide a good example of the need for thk polic\ to 
countcract the fear that new private barriers to trade will substitute official one,,,. On the Andcm 
19 
Antitrust enforcement is also sought to prevent privatised firms frorn being acqUired I-)\ 
potential or actual competitors, thus reinforcing a dominant position in the local market. 
De-socialising without de-i-nonopolisinc, confers little benefit on the reforni 
Thus, "there is an important role for competition policy in the privatization proce. s,,, -to 
ensure that state monopolies are not simply transformed into private ones". 15 Other" 
regard antitrust as necessary for the prevention of pre-eminent or dominant positions in 
the local market arising from foreign investments made by multinational enterprise,.,. i(, 
Finally, antitrust has been regarded as important for the development of a new I-M, ýHICY; 
culture, for this reason, antitrust authorities have insisted upon the pedagogic Li,, c ()I' 
antitrust statutes as tools to combat economic guilds, set up by chambers of cornniel-cc, Z-1) 
business associations and trade unions, which had been openly encouraged by former 
government policy. 17 
Pact experience, see Junta del Acuerdo de Cartýigena, Elementos de Juicio para la revisl6n cle 1ýi 
Decisi6n 230, JUN/dt 289 - (Lima, 1990), p. 6. For a comparative appraEsal, see P. Muchlinski, 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. ) On the interface between 
trade and competition policies see F. M. Scherer, Competition Policies for an Integrated-World 
EcongDiy, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994). Z71 47- 
14 Following this view, competition is generally enhanced if existing state-owned enterprise,,, are 
split into smaller, viable firms before privatisation. Unrelated unprofitable activities caii he 
jettisoned, and monopolies can be split into separate competing firms. The activity of antitrust tn' 
agencies in the privatisation process is to restructure existing public enterprises, facilitating the 
entry or establishment of new firms. See, UNCTAD Secretariat, La funci6n de la polftica de 
defensa de la competencia en las reformas econ6micas de los pafses en desarrollo y otros pafsesl 
Estudios relativos a las Disposiciones del CoRjunto y Consultas sobre PrLicticas Comerciale.,, 
Restrictivas, TD/B/RBP/96/Rev. 1. Geneva, 10 Aug. 1994, pp. 36-4 1. Z_ 
15 Conclusions, Seminar on Competition Policy and Economic Reform, OECD, World Bank, 
CADE, IBRAC, and the Fundaqdo Get6lio Vargas, RiodeJaneiro, 10-13 July 1997. Many Latin 
American antitrust agencies have extended their surveillance over the privatisation procc, 'ýý'. Thc 
Colombian Superintendencia de Industria 
'v 
Comercio can provide advice on the privatisation 
proceA; similar provisions exist in the Mexican scherne. In Venezuela, Superintendem-la Pro- 
Con7petencto has developed a scheme whereby the agency advises other public entities involved 
in privatisation. The emphasis placed on this particular activity by antitrust scholars in reference 
to competition in developing countries is significant. See for example, R. Khemany. The Role 4: ý t 
and Importance of Competition Advocacy in Promoting, Competition, paper presented at the 
"Ernerging Market Economy Forum: Workshop on Competition Policy and Enfoi-,: enient". I Z-- 
BLk-nw, Aires. Oct. 28-30,1996. 
I () UNCTAD Secretariat, La funci6n de ja polftica de defensa de la compete icia ..., pp. 
42-48. 
17 Id., pp. 14-15. In this regard, Willic, contends: "Competition, and the consumer benefit it 
require a code of business conduct to assure that apparently rival offers are truly independent". 
(Wilh, -,, Anti-Monopoly 
Policies and Institutions (n/p) (n/d), p. 3. ) Otherwise, is natural to 
expect that no competition will spontaneously develop because. as Ordover and Pitman ý1, k: 
"How much more of a tendency to collude will exist amon- newIv-formed firms in economicý, 
20 
To surn up, antitrust policy may be necessary to overcome potential dela%-, in the 
irnplenientation of MýJltutlonal reforn-is. The delay,, experienced in the introductwil (ý; ci 
reformed institutional framework could prevent competition from flourishinLI 
spontaneously. Antitrust would then be needed to fill the regulatory G'ap, " left 1)\ 
tincon,, 'tralned deregulation. For example, Boner ind Langenfeld claim (lint tll(- b 
11heralisation of trade which would otherwise foster competition, is slmv and 
cumbersome: "Certainly, liberal trade does not contficL with anmfust-, ycL, fjociai Liaýic, 
though often touted, is seldom fully applied ( ... 
) Thus, though liberal trade can cnlai-, -, c 2-ý Z: ) I 
the commercial options available to buyers and sellers. this does not alway, ý occur III 
practice. In regional or local markets, liberal trade policies do little to enhancC 
competition , '. 18 
These authors hold that a "shock therapy" approach, brought about by a lihcral b 
policy, could in fact have the opposite effects by creating, stiff domestic opposition. In tlIP-1 
context, antitrust could play a political role in the transition by attacking casc, ý of price 
fixing, monopolisation of markets, and so on, without the hardships of "closed I'actori'L-,. 
ran-ipant unemployment and rising economic rrusery" resulting from suddeii 
liberalisation. 19 This gradual approach may provide a more stable means 01' 111,11-SUIIIý 
reform because it addresses the distortions before ,, ub*ect*no the domestic econonIN to the 
massive shocks that accompany fully liberallsed trade. Guash and Rajapatirana argue thill Z7 
althouA trade liberallsation in the 1980s and I 990s has strenathened import competitioii . Z71 t 
these policies alone cannot create a competitive economic environi-rient. Indcccl. thcý 
believe trade policy as an instrument of competition policy has been constrained hy the 
disproportionate amount of non-traded goods, vertical integration, and distributioii r__ tn 
where competition, far fi-om being encouraged for vcar,, ý 
haý, been (Ordovcr and 
Pittillall, Op. cit. ) 
18 R. Boner and J. Langenfeld, "Liberal Trade and Antitrust in Developing Countric"", (', \I() 
kcvic\\, of Business & Government-Regailation, [Spring, 1992]: 5-6. 
I () - C7 11 Boner aild 
Langenfeld, p. I Following the.,, ame lo-, -ýic. cc 
Ordo\ er and Pittman, 1). 
nionopolies. In their opinion, this is the reason why competition policies can prevcrit 
excILISIOniffy practices, collusion among conipetitoi-, and the ýIhLlse of i-narket 1ýower. 20 
From the viewpoint of normative economics, these diveraent opinions can hc L- 
-roupcd Lis follows. On one side there are thosc who think that antitrust POIIC\' \VIII 
promote economic efficiency in the allocation of social resources. On the other side, thcrc 
are those who believe that there are profound inequalities and econornic conccntration 
c, xisting in the region, and who therefore see in antitru-,, t policy an in.,, tfunient Lo o\ci, comc Z. 7 Z: ) 
these ineqUalitleS, cven if this means the sacrifice of efficient resource allocation In the 
long run. In practice, achieving equality could be achieved through regional devc1opnicni. L- L- t-I L- 
the promotion of small business, export promotion, the decentralisation of decision- 
making, or the integration of regional markets. 21 Finally, there are those who endorse an 
"eclectic" approach towards Latin American antitrust enforcement which combines 
cfficiency concerns with more interventionist structural initiatives whenever required. - 
These scholars are inclined to believe that by pursuing a more varied andflexible policy 
l'ocused on structural imbalances within the market, efficiency can be achieved in the lonL, 
rLin. In this regard, -thc laws on competition in the (Latin American region) slmw Ilic 
ovcrall objectives of promotion and defence of competition, with the aim of prol-notin- 
freedom of initiative, economic efficiency, fair and equal participation for small and 
IIIC(IILIIII enterprise, dilution of economic power and distribution of economic opportunity, 
pi-cvcntinc, creation of monopolies and improper LISC of position of domination to the 
10 J. L. Guasch and S. RaIjapatirana, The Interface of Trade, Investment and Competition POICICIIý 
Issues and Challenges for Latin America, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1393), 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1994. ) 
21 See N1. Ro-vvat. Competition Policy in Latin America: Le, -, al and ln, ýtitutional 1). '-ý ý&"o. 
lition Policy and Law in Latin America: From Distributi\e to Ethcicn -- 
L. Thico, Compe 
-i 
Mar-kci 
Re'-'Llkltion'ý. PapCi presented at the Emerging Markct Lconoiuý Forum \Vork, liky iiii 
Competition llollcv and Enforcement, OECD/World Bank/Government of Ar, -, entina. Bueno, 
October 1996. 
1- \Vhitc. Aimtrusl in a Developim-, Country. The Cx,, c of ý, "cnezuela, Intermil 
Paper, Latin Ailicrica and the Caribbean Region, The World Bank, Washington, DC. Amwýt 
1990, pp. 4-6. Also. A. Jatar, "Polftica de Competencla v legislacl6n anti monop6l ica", 9 Rc\ 
dc la Fundacion PrOCUraduria General de la Rep6blica de Venezuela, [ 1994]: '57-'0(). 
henefit of consumerý ýind users, by rneýin, ý ()f lncrea, ýed (11%, cr,, Ity of product,, 
competitive prices". 23 
ThLIS, thcre i,, a consensus on the need for the implementation of ant, tru"I pollc\' &I 
a health\, initiative for safeguarding the commitment to economic liberalu,, ation. Thrlý 
policy is regarded as the proper device for encouraging an "optli-nal" resource all()catioii 
directed a(minst business rrianoeuvres which attempt to impose unilateral conditi0ii,, Lý 
thrmigh the "markct poN., vcr" gained by the i-cmit libcrýih.,, ation of markets in the i-c-ion. 
The fo ri-ner reasons explain why policy-makers feel the need for a policy which Jý, 
consciously oriented to the promotion of competition. As Jatar and Tineo contend: 
"Effective competition is expected to develop by exposing the highly concentrated and tý) 
protected markets of the region to international competition. Competition [VIZ., aIItItI-LIStj 
policy plays three irnportant roles in this process: Firstly, it enhances market acces.,, foi- 
new competitors. Secondly, it protects the competition process from business restrictivc 
I)racticcs. Thirdly, and most importantly, it fosters economic efficiency and consunicr 
welfare. "24 
From a legal perspective, antitrust legislation has also been hailed Lis a device wilicil Z: ý LI 
ensure,,, the proper exercise of individual economic rights. For this reason, it ha,, hecii t) 
closely linked to the protection granted in relation to property rights in almost all 
COIlSt]tLItIOII, Q. of the reLion. 25 The fact that this legislation did not evolve in the rcgioii C, 17, 
3 OAS, Inventory of Domestic Laws and Re, ('Lllations relating to Competition thc 
Western Hemisphere (Preliminary Report)-, SG/TU/COMPOI, /DOC. 1/96/Rev. 1, Trade týllit 
(Washington, DC: Organization of American States. October 1996), pp. 1-11. Neverthelc'ý, ". Z- Z7 
White seerns to suggest that, notwithstandim-, the several and differinc, goals, antiti'l-114 III 1, M111 It, C- - tý 17, America is aimed at enhancing efficiency. (L. White. Antitrust in a Developim-, Country-) L- 
`4 A. latar and L. Tineo. Competition Policy in the Andean Countries: The Ups an 
-d 
D(m ns of a 
Policy in Search of its Place, Paper presented at the conference "U. S. - Andean Tradc and 
ln\c, ýtment Relations: Policy Is,, ue,, ) and Choices" sponsored hý the Andean 1), -, \c1opment 
Corporation. Organization of American Suite,, and Inter-American Dialogue, Septemher 3-A 
(Washington, DC- Brookings InstItLition, 1997), p. I 
AI-ItItRISt I-LIIC,, M-e i-cferred to as a development ()I cow,, titutional cconomic rule,. Scc 101' 
c\ample. 1. De Lc6n, Inflaci6n, Prkticas Monop(ilica, ý v Especulacl6n: La,,, amenaza,, it 1(),, 
Dcrcchos (lei Consumidor en una Econonifa Ahierta". in Inflaci6n y Derecho XIX Jorriadas I. M. 
l)ojjjin, juc7 F, ýcovm- (Barcluisimeto: Cole, -, Io de Ahogado.,, del Estado Lara. 1994) al"(). A 
Bi-c\\ci-. Polfticas y constituclonalc", (Cal"Icý1.1,., Univer,, iclad Cat6lIca Andi-C, BcIlo, 
Until relatively recently i,, not regarded as evidence of a lack of consistencN, betwecii 
antitrust statutes and such constitutional principles, but is related to the circumstantWI 
tact that the former regulation of prices and competition frustrated all attempts to 
antitrust laws effectively. 
Following these ideas, - several countries in the region have adopted modern 
antitrust schemes in the last decade, as Table No. 3 shows. 
Table No. 3 
ANTITRUST LAWS IN LATIN AMERICA. 
SOURCES: ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INVENTORY OF DOMESTIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
RELATING TO COMPETITION POLICY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (PRELIMINARY REPORT). 
COUNTRY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
ARGENTINA * Law on Protection of Competition No. 22,262, July 7,1980. 
0 Decree No. 2.284 of 1991 on Deregulation of Domestic Trade in Goods and 
Services. 
BRAZIL 0 Law for the Prevention and Repression of Infringements Against Economic 01-del- 
No. 8,884, June 11 1994, arnended in 1995. (Grants the Conselho Adminr"'tratiVo 
de Defesa Econ6mica [CADE] administrative independence, and sets forth the 
relevant provisions on the prosecution of offences against "economic order". ) I- 
0 Law No. 9021 of 1995. (Regulates the activities of CADE) 
0 Law No. 7347 of 1995. (Regulates legal liability for civil offences resulting 1'rom 
restrictions on free competition. ) 
0 Resolution No 186 of the Ministry of Justice of 1992. (CADE's internal structure. ) 
CHILE 0 Decree No 511 of 1980, amending Decree-Law No. 211 of 1973 (Law on 
Protection of Competition. ) 
COLOMBIA 0 Law on Restrictive Business Practices No. 155, December 24,1959. 
0 Decree No. 2153 of 1992 restructuring the Superintendence of Industry and 
Commerce. 
0 Decision 285 of the Andean Commission on the rules to prevent or correct 
distortions of competition caused by Business Practices restricting Free 
Competition. 
COSTA RICA 0 Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Protection of Consunler, ý. No. 
7472, December 1994. 
* Decree No. 24234-MEIC of 1996 (Regulations of the Law) 
MEXICO Federal Law on Economic Competition, December 24,1992. 
PANAMA * Law No. 29,1996 on Protection of Competition and Other Measures. 
PERU 0 Law to Eliminate Monopolistic Practices that Control and Restrict Frcc 
Competition, Decree-Law No. 70 1, November 7,199 1. 
0 Decree Law 788 amending Decree Law 701. 
0 Decree Law 807 amendi ng Decree Law 70 1. 
1982), pp. 495-499- Also, Informe Anual 1993-1994, Cornisi6n Federal de la CoilipetenciLl. 
Mexico, pp. 54-55. In the landmark decisions Northern Pacific Railivays v. United States, 35(-) 
U. S. 1,6,8-9,10 N. 8 (1958) or U. S. v. Topco Associates Inc. 405 U. S. 596,610 (1972). the U. S. 
Supreme Court regarded the Sherman Act of 1890, which epitomizes antitrust policy In tile It, - United States, as the "Magna Carta of Economic Rights". C- C, 
24 
0 Dccision 285 of the Andean Cornmis, ion on the rules to pre\ent (Nr corlc-., 
distortions of competition caus'ed h\ Business Practices restriictinL, 1,1A, 
VENEZI TLA * Law lor the Promotion and Protection ()I Free Competition, Deceniher I()() I- 
* Regulation No I of 1993 on the IAcniptions reLirne. 
0 Re-ulation No 2 of 1996 on Economic Concentration,,. 
0 Rcsolution No 036-95 on Glohal Exemptions trom Fxclusl\c DistrIbUtiOll 111d 
Supply. 
* Decision 285 of the Andean Commission on the rules to prevent ()r correcl 
dktortions in competition caused h\ Busliies,, Pracilces re,, trictln, -, 
Competition. 
, irt frorn making formal statements, it is necessary to carrv polic\ However, ap, 
, inalysis beyond conventional assumptions and exarnine in descriptive terms whether 
antitrust policy does, in fact, promote competition, or whether there are alternative MeMIS 
of achieving this objective. Our hypothesis is that antitrust policy is a self-defeating policy 
that belongs to the same breed of interventionist policies which were implemented witil 
disastrous consequenccs in the past. Even il'the need t'()i- cornpetition policy Is undeniah1c, 
it should be construed along different lines to conventional antitrust policies. 
To explain why antitrust policy has been adopted in Latin America as a tool to 
proi-note competition, it is important to explore the intellectual soil in which such poficic.,,. 
found conditions favourable enough to flourish. It is therefore necessary to ýihaiidoii 
superficial explanations, which only look at the stated purpose of law-making, and focus 
oti the institutional incentives which lead policy-i-nakers to shape policies in a giveii 
fashion. Only in this way is it possible to foresee the likely consequences arisin"', froill 
ciAoi-cei-nent of these initiatives. 
This provides the clue for understanding the essence of many regulations issued z: _- Z: ) 
ýiftcr aperiura. Some of these, like antitrust recrulation, may run counter to the logic of 
niarket functioning, but are nevertheless adopted on the assumption that they %\,, III correct 
pci-cci%'cd market fýulurcý, aiid are therefore needed. Policy-niakers havc adoptcd Mlliltlli, 'ýl 
policy in Latin Anierica Lit face value, assui-ning that it will promote business conipetition. 
willic Ignoring its effects on the behaviour of firms and rnarkets. In particular, the\, hýivc 
w, iiorcd that its rallonalc runs cowiter to market logic. and that it could therefore Iianipcr 
1-athcr than 1-CInforcc thcil- functioning. They Iii\'c also ovcdooked the fact that t1ii,, I,,, ýi 
policy which requires considerable levels of accoutimbility, which the weak Mst] tul Wnýll 
settings of Latin Americýi are Unable to provldc. 
This work analyses whether antitrust enforcement promotes business competition. 
The perception that this is indeed the case can be traced back to conventional Kica. " aboul 
ý4public interest" regulation, social welfare and well-intentioned (govCI-11111cilt 4-- 1 
intervention. 26. This appraisal has biased the perception of both unfettered market 
functioning and government intervention: while the former is regarded suspicioudy. thc tn - 
latter is viewed as a "corrective" device against the rn i sal location of social rcsourccs t) 
resultina from market malfunction. In the minds of Latin American technocrat,; -ind t__ 
economists, most of them educated in the conventional tradition of "public 1111civ, 1" 
regulation, the achievements of trade liberalisation are insufficient to ensure competition. 
It seerns as if deregulation and trade liberalisation, rather than promoting the cause of r7l r7) 
markets, could undermine them by favouring, a few do"m7ant firms to take colltrol 0' 
Uttin American markets in the instance of government retreat from market surveillance. '-)7 b 
Market concentration does not appear as the natural process of adaptation to nc%v 
opportunities, in which more efficient firms gain increasing market shares and dl.,, plýicc zn tý 
6 "Public interest theories of why regulation emerges are based on normative rationales for Z-- 
optimal intervention. In these theories regulators are ýissurned to i-naximise social welfare. 
Empirical analysis of regulatory effects beconic t Icst of Miethcr or not rcgulatoi-ý M. '-diti-111011S 
arc successful in achievina their welfare-maxii-nising obýjectives and a basis for quantifying the 
costs and benefits of regulations. - (P. Josko\\,, and Nancy Rose, The effects ()f Economic 
lZc, ýiulatlon, Handbook of Industrial Orgganizýition, Vol. 11., R. Scmanlensee and R. D. Willi, -, 
(eds. ) Elsev ler Science Pub., Boston, 1989. p. 145-2. ) 
7 Following this opinion, Frischtak et al. have argued that antitrust policy complements the 
failures of reforms in removing trade barriers: "When natural and strategic barriers to Z__ 
competition are significant, the removal of policy generated barriers might not be enough to Z__ Z__ 
, stimulate an efficient supply response. 
Policy-makers need to provide a structure of incentives 
and an institutional settmo to stimulate entry and competition in industries where dominant 
incumbents need to be challenged to improve their performance. These policies should help 
entrant,,, overcome large natural barriers -sLich as hi-nited access to fixed facilities, ýind Lick of 
technicA and rnarketin.,! information. MerLcrs should be dIscouraLed if there is a significýint 
probability that the new company would have the market power to deter entry, engage in Linfair 
trade practices and keep price,., above competitive levels. The legal and regulatory frarne\mrk 
and curb anti-competakc hehýi\ i0tir-. should define the limit of acceptable market conduc( L 
(Frischtak et al.. p. 3. ) Ordover and Pittman also ai-Lue: "it is simply not the ca,, c that open 
horders or lar, _, c numbers of competitors oi- eitsy entry or ensconced competitive valuc\, 
hwc 
l-- 
prevented the forination of cartels". (Ordo\ er and Pittman, p. 2. ) 
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inefficient smaller competitors. Rather, they seem to be manipulatim-i the ýItuýjtwii I I- 
order to reap the bencliis (#'deregulation. 
In this work we will examine how these ideas emerge from the analysis ot 
conventional industrial organisation theorie,, on Latin America's Industrial , tructm-c, 
under which the latter always appears as highly concentrated. 28 Not surprIsHILdv. 111c I,, 
reduction of industrial concentration through regulatory policies Such as antitrust hilý, 
quickly become a top priority of regulatory agencies throughout the region. In tlil,, IP-dil. 
Jatar concludes: "The transition from protectionism to international competiti\, clic. 1-11, 
requires a pi7ofound structural adjustment to encourage con-ipetition and efficlciicy. Ir, 
doina so, the development of common rules to organise business transactions and trade 
arnonc, countries is a major challenge. Antitrust policy I,,, a key Instrument In th)" b 
effort". 29 It is not surprising that antitrust policy has been perceived as a natural ally in 
the process of opening up markets. 
Theories are useful tools which enable social scientists to make sense of reality. 
However, the firnitations of their founding assumptions are seldom reallsed by policy- 
inakefs, who are often inclined to derive policy implications from them without much 
thought. Loasby warns about the risks of such over- confidence: "If the basic principics ot 
[thesc] philosophical systerns are treated, not as inventions of the imagination but as true b 
axiorns, then the Pursuit of abstract rigour may easily be mistaken for an increýoc ol 
understanding. "30 Such unawareness has led scholars to endorse antitrust policy \N"Ithout 
Industrial concentration is a feature often emphasised by antitrust scholars in Latin Arnerica. &' 
clearly evidenced in Jatar's words: "after following for decades inward looking straie,,,, ics. [Lýmn 
American countries] show highly concentrated markets. This characteristic ha,, imporiani 
implication,,; for antitrust enforcement. Fir,; t, the probability of cartelized behýi\ iour vN 
particularly high under these circumstances, thus surveillance and prosecution of horizoniil 
, wreci-nents anion- competitors represent a high priority for competition agencles. Similark, 
dominant firms iimv exert market control after prices are liberalised by government. Thi, iý' 
particularly the cýt.,, c in non-tradables, and in sector,, where potential foreign competition 1ý1 
hampered by high barriers to entry in diStrIbUtion" A. Jatar, Competition Policy in Lai' 
, i\iiici-iczt-. -Tlic--Pi-oiiiotioii 
of a Social Change, paper presented at the meetin,, -,, s of the Aiiiericin 
Economic As, ýociation, January 1995. pp. 5-6. 
A. hitcli-, c0nn)etitioll Policy in the EUropean Fconomic Community7 for I.: mIl 
fo rt 11 c0 111111 "') 
B. Loashy, EtLuilibrium and Evolutl0n: An c\ploratlon of connecting principlc, ý in economicN. I () 
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exaniinim-, first whether , uch regulation i,, cornpatible with the proi-notion of col"Petitw". 
a,, expressed in the intensity of market exchan(-, cs. business innovation, increx, 'in, -! returný 
and the discovcry of new information, which are the most obvious signs of ,, Lich 
phenoniena. The lack of a fully developed econonilc theory explaining these plicnomcii,! 
accounts fOr much of the current misunderstanding in this field. t, 
Indeed, there is no settled meaning for the term "competition". This conccpt hit,, 
chanoed over time, making it difficult. if not impossible, to define its c,,,,, ciicc ý111(! t-- L- 
thei-efore that of' the policy designed to protect it. In the legal tradition of Common Lm , t) - 
competition was regarded as the antithesis of legal privileges, monopolies and roý, al 
prerogatives. However, the introduction of antitrust schemes at the turn of the centurv 
changed th(it concej)t (ýfcomj)etltion. Since then, the term has become linked to some 
vague standard of market performance, which neo-classical economic models attenIptcd 
to represent without much success, as we shall ,, cc. 
Therefore scmantics matter; and it is important to dig beneath the ()I' ilic 
statutory "public interest- objectives pfoclaimed by alled "compeLition" 11) k)l oll I 
to ýcizc their essence, which in turn enables a proper appraisal on whethei it cOj,,, j,., jcjjt 
with the goals sought by apertura. Z-ý 
This work challenges the view that antitrwt policy i,, a new form of regulation tImt L- C, 
is- qualitatively different from the interventionist policies applied in the past in the region 
It contends that in fact antitrust represents the reinstatenient -albeit ýi disguised one- ()f ýi 
new breed of interventionism, which will stifle not spur competition, innovation and 
cconomic growth in the rc(Tion. This is not an unfounded clairn. coil siderl il'-, that 11 1ý - 
till-OLI(IIIOLlt its history, Latin America's policy-making has akvays in one wýiv oi- anotlici 
been pervaded by a strong tradition of centralist, bureaucratic, anti-mai-kct bias, whicli 
has tcridcd to favour distribution mechanisms ýicros,., society over wcýilth creatlon.. ')i It i,, 
(Manchester- NI. inclicster University Press. 191)1 ), p. 24. 
.3I 
Scc In eneral C. Vellz. Tlie Centralist Tradition of Latin Ainerica, (Ili-iiicctoii: Princcion 
Pressý 11)SO. ) 
ýs 
not uni-calistic to expect that those who have pl-wate jntere., -&ý affected hy the In,, tjtutIt)n; t! 
reform brought about by apertitra will reslst ýinv chmigcs to the status quo mid i%()i(I Z7, 
cornpetition by reproducing old policies in ýi new -and paradoxical- Roth 
prevaiihing ideas on the conduction of polilcy-i-nakiing and the protection of vested intcrc. "k I zn 
have worked 'ointly against market reinforce me n t, and todav thev arc %vorkin,,, ii, -, miisi 
institutional chancre in Latin America. 0 
3. - THEROLE OF PARADIGMS FOR UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC'POLICYAND R-I,, G-U'I-A I 
What, then, is the essence of competition? The answer to this seenungly , inylc C) I 
question is more complex than appears at first sight. Competition is a social phenoniciia. 
and therefore possesses no single objective interpretation, but is linked to our perception 
and understanding of markets and social reality. 
This leads us to consider the importance 21ven in this work to the prob1cm ()I 
conflicting points of view in the appraisal of reality. This is an essential kictor in 
uiiderstandidg, the methodology that we shall use to examine the problems of enforcHII-I Z7 
antitrust policy in Latin America. 
In respect to this question, we will avowedly avoid the traditional method of I 
science to examine the implications of enforcing antitrust regulations in Latin Anicncýi. Z7) 
The traditional method of legal science is formalistic, in the sense that it views soclýtl ru1c,, 
formally acknowledged as law-makillL ,, Is simple instruments emerging from those bodi 4: ý 11 
entities. This method is based on the literal interpretation of written rules enacted throm), h 
codification. It has emerged as a by-product of the influence of logical positivism In 
sciences since the mid-nineteenth century to this day. 32 The method inadequately ct,, t,, 
From this period, social science lost all sq,,: nificant conlact with political philosophy and , ocial 
sclenti,, Is concentrated on achieving value-neutrality in science. A more precise C()Ilccpti()Il ()I 
sc, c emer--cd. k)cusin- on causal la\vs, and quantitative methods. Separate disciplinc,, of mic. t-- III 
political economy, hi, ýtory, philosophy. and Iým emerged within more precke icclwicýil 
boundaries. MakmL, positive law the central 10CLIS for study required a change in legal method. 
A, s a result of this intellectual influence, the niethodolo,. 1y of 
legal science changed drarnaticalIv. 
from an historical, sociological and e\planatory approach to a mechanical one. mo,, 11ý- 
concerned with explaining legal rules in terms of "facts": "Since science was encraged \\ ith the I- L- t- Iractuall realm of inquiry a science of law would, it wa,,, assurned, need to be erected on i 
19 
fight on the reality of developing countries, where official authoritie,, c1carly 1)(i., oc, 
Ilmited legitimacy in their law-makincy activities. x, ý thvý i,, fi-equently 'ýLlrpas,, cd 'Nocl. d 
interaction. 33 
In addition, the conventional legal method k unable to explain the coniplcvtv of' 
,, ()cial interaction in creating market rules. Adopting, a formalistic approach to the 
, 1,1 1 of social reality is not only inconvenient but also improper, since it leaves cc h\ 
(lefinitloii the noii-legal substratum of lclexs Mipleiiiemecl thi-oLigh 
mechanisms. Hence, legal institutions may be more fully understood by using a methocl ol 
analysis which enables the observer to apprehend the richness of those ideas ill 
government, in a way that a -formal appraisal cannot reveal. As Baldwin contends, arguim-, 
the 'legal' nature of government rules is irrelevant for the purposes of exploring their L- 
normative force, and their implications within SoCiety. ')4 It is necessary to traii.,, ccii(l ilic 
limitations imposed by the positivistic distinction between "fact" and "value", particularly 
in the realm of law. 
Understanding social rules properly requires an alternative interpreLiti\, c 
approximation to reality. This is particularly useful in the analysis of public law becausc it 
overturns the vacuum of conventional legal analysis, which merely focuses on 
determining what internal connections the observcr can construct betwCen 1111C'ý 
hclongino" to a predefined set of legislation. In this way, an alternative method could 
provide a clearer understanding of public regulations by exploring more closek, theff 
N,, alues", thus linking their legitimacy to their implications within society. 
foundation of fact. This objective became the cluest of legal positivism, which was pioneewd hý 
Bentharn and refined by John Austin". (Loughlin, p. 20. ) Consequently, fornialism wmame(l. m 
the sense of law being "a self-contained body of rules which operates by means of a distinctive 
ficatorv appi sys, tern of the conceptual thouoht". (Loughlin, p. 22. ) The for-nal classil i -()aCh to 
Public law that enicrLco. ] had achieved a pre-eminent status 
by the turn of the centur\ and hýv, 
L_ tics "althou-Ii ALi,,, t inian remained the clonimant method e\'er since. ýV, L(w-him st. L_ 
It I,, no longer the primary theory. Austin's method rernahis dominant. " (Loughlin. p. 
paradigmatic \\, a\ of understandinL, social rule,, that the conventional le-al method ta\ k)ured and 
\\, hIch pr(wided the setting for the emergence (4iintitrust rqulanons- 
On thk question, scc Chapter IV, below. 
R. Baldwin, Rules and Government, (Oxford: Clarendon Prcss, 199ý), P. 7. 
30 
In our alternative appraisal, the knowledge required to design ývclfare-enh, 1nC-;,,,,,, --, L- b 
government rules does not arise from empirical obsei-vation. organised intt) cci, iciir, 
44patterns" or "laws" which are formally bound according to certain basic "rules (-)I 
recognition". 35 Instead, it is given shape and acquires meaning through the develollilicill 
of conceptual structures or interpretative frameworks. % Therefore, this alterniitivc 
rnethod of social rules analysis explores the realities of government and the functions 
which the law is expected to perform in relation to the political system, using historical 
and sociological perspective. 37 
The analysis of regulation, around which the discussion of competition policy 
revolves, cannot avoid linkin the analysis of reality to certain guiding values. Tlli, ý' 1, 'ý 9 t: ) 
inevitable, if the aim of the scientific quest is to explore the logical basis for the 
interpretation of social facts. As Demsetz contended, it is ideas that provide the tools for 
the interpretation of facts rather than facts that shape ideas. This is clearly so M 
economics, and particularly in discussions on competition. 38 In other words, beliefs are 
not mere subjective states, but they are constitutive of our actions; therefore, in the 
35 On the role of the rules of recognition in providing legitimacy to legal rules, see R. Cotterell. 
The Politics of Jurisprudence: a critica. 1 introduction to legal philosophy, (London: Buttei-worths. 
1989), pp. 97- 100. 
36 As Weber observed, reality is infinitely complex; it cannot be conceptualised in a definitive 
inanner. (M. Weber, Economy and Society, G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds. ) (New York, 1968), pp. 
19-22. ) One way in which we might obtain an understanding of society is by constructing ideal 
types of social action. These ideal types are not constructed by generalising the reality through 
inference. Instead, they are drawn from deductions made by certain assumptions about conduct. 
In this manner Weber was able to develop models for understanding certain social phenomena, 
such as economics or law, without denying the variety of activity encompassed within thesc L- 
practices. On the influence of Weber in social sciences, see L. M. Lachmann, Tile Leg'acy N 
Max Weber, (Berkeley: The Glendessary Press, 197 1) 
37 M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), . 
35. p 
38 H. Demsetz, "Two Systems of Belief about Monopoly" in Industrial Economics 0. Williamson 
(ed. ), (London: Edward E]Crar, 1996). p. 359. In this field. it is not possible to dissociate fact 
from value, since, as Berlin stressed, human beings (whose interaction constitutes the subj Z- ject 
matter of the social sciences) are self- 1 nterpreti ng creatures: "Men's beliefs in the , pheic ()I 
conduct are part of their conception of themselves and others as human beiilL, ý'. ýInd this 
conception in its turn, whether conscious or not, is intrin, ýic to their picture of the \ýorld-- 0 
Berlin, "Does political theory still exist"" in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds. ). Phi-losop-hv. 
Politics and Society (Second series), (Oxford. 196"), p. 1. ) 
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absericc of' final "truth" the best that policy-makers can do to regulate ,, ()cial pheiiomcii, i 
(such as business competition) is to try to understand them by present,,,, --y , 1, anc ()I L- - 
alternative explanatory l'i-ai-neworks. 39 This show-, that public Ia\A and rcgulaiioii aic 
nothing but the expression of a particular epistemology applied to social phenomena. -In Z7 Z7% 
MoreoveF, this epistemology combines varied and complex sources, all of dicni 
givirl- shape to goverriniental processes withirl %\, 'hich regulation is adopted. Sinillarly. thc 
multiplicity of these values which provide such governmental processes their legithnac\. 
ccM only be fully appraised though a non-legalistic approach. 41 For this reason, this work 
focuscs on the impact of the evolution of economic theory thinking (i. e. the theory of thc 
firrn and the market) on government regulation and on the understanding of social rulc,, - C) 
Indeed, notwithstanding that law-making proccsses entail a complexity of valuc,,,, it iý, 
necessary to acknowledge the special persuýtslve force of normative ecorlonllc'ý ill thc 
design of go-vernment replation. 42 As Joskow and Rose contend, "I`e(UlýItOl_%! ýWtl% ItICý' 
share common foundations in welfare econornics and political econoniy arld nlay 
affect the same economic variables. "43 In this i-cspect, this work emphasisc,, how 
contrasting ways of understanding drawn from economic theory affect our percel_-)tioii oii b 
the role of regulation with regard to markets, which is an alternative and rigorous wýw of b 
19 Developing ideal types of business competition to _, am Lt clearer analv,,, is of the mo,, t expediew 
ways to promote it through government rules P, ultimatelý dependent upon our pcicption-., k)l 
reality. These perceptions are dependent on criteria found outside the mere examination of 
As Kuhn stated: "No natural history can he interpreted in the ahý-encc of at least some implicil 
body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, eviluatlon, and 
criticism. If that body of belief is not already implicit in the collection of facts -in which ci,, c 
more than 'mere facts' are at hand- it must be externally supplied, perhaps by a current 
metaphysic, by another science, or by personal and historical accident. " (T. Kuhn, The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicaoo: The Uni vcr, ýity of Chicago Press. 1970. ), pp. 1()- 17. ) 
40 In this sens'e, Loughlin argues, "there is no neutral language of public law. We can understand 
what a writer i,, sayin, -, only of we understand the political tradition within which the ýýritei 
works. - (Loughlin. p. 
ý30. 
) 
41 Bald\\ in. pp. 16-5,, 'ý- 
42 Scc A. Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economlcý, 94 Michigan Law Rc\-ic\\ 
1996). pp. 
43 1(), ýko%\ and Ro,, c. p. 1450. 
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approaching the dialectic relationship between government Intervention and cconomli( 
i-](-, hts. L 
Consequently, this work identifies two alternative paradigms of understandHiL, that 
explain social phenomena, and subjects theni to rational exanu I In the llu'lit nat on 
empirical understanding of the functions of government and the law. 44 The fir,,! 
understanding visualises markets through the conceptual structures and HitclIcciulil 1- zn 
premises of neoclassical economic theory, which has become conventional in cý: (moniic 
analysis. Markets are portrayed as close-ended entities that social analysts can appraii, -, c 
thoroughly due to their assumed omniscience of all the conditions influencing the coildLict 
of market participants. In this paradigm regulations fulfil an instrumental role-, that Is, I licy 
are designed to achieve goals which are deemed socially beneficial, as devised h\ the 
ruler, who commands all the interstices and information required for reachilig ýIlch 
conclusions. In other words, regulation entails "orders", which are either foi-niulated iii 
narrow terms, or provide flexible space for the enforcement authority to use Its discrctioll 
to achieve "social goals". The ruler is assumed to possess sufficient information to gml (i 
full understanding of social processes, and to identify welfare-enhancing social tn Cý - 
44 In social science, paradigms are a particular irmý ot rationallsing reality. They repi-c"cni 
conceptual frarnework within which scientific tl ieories are constructed; they are closed , \,, Icnis 
of knowledge whose parts are related to each other as well as to the whole structure. Thev focw, 
attention on the object of research as a systeniý somethim, that exists 'out there' as iin integrýiwd 
self-contained entity or as a bounded structure. " (M. Addleson, "Competition". in The I`ILar 
Companion to Austrian Economics, P. Boettke (Ed. ) (Hants: Edward E10'ar Publishin- Ltd., 
1994), p. 98. ) According to Kuhn, they give rise to iiornial scieiice, which is inipo,, ed hy the 
scientific community "through the standard textbooks and through education". (LOLIghlin, p. 
3 1. ) This notion provides us with a mental construction for visualising the kind of problems that 
the conventional perspective of regulation presents us with, for which particular solution,, are 
devised. These problems, as well as the proposed solutions, result in a better understanclim-, of 
dispersed facts. Viewing reality as a set of types or paradigms is useful because it facilitaic" 
classification, and enables a better understanding of an otherwise unintelligible realit%. Kuhn 
clearIv ýaw the e. -, sential feature of paradigm,,,, its presenting "new problem,, " to be solved. rather 
than "new solution.,., " to the problems raised h\, it given prevailing paradigm. In his "Onc 
of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion lot- cho(), mý, 
problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assurned to have solutiort, ý. To ;i 
great e\tent these are the only problerns that the community will admit a,, , clentific or encouralLe 
its members to Undertake. Other problem,,.,, including many that had previously been , tandard. 
are rejected its metaphysical, as the concern (W another discipline, or sonienine,,, ý t,. 111 Just too 
problematic to N, worth the time. A pat-adigin can, tor thca tnatter, evcti insidate the coininumt-) 
11-oln those sociallY 1'1111)ot-tant problems that are not i-educible to the foi-In, becattse theý 
comiot be stotetl M ternis of the conceptrial mid iturnirnentot toots the parcidigin vttppheý. - 
(cniphasis's IS aUthor's) (Kuhn, p. 37. ) 
which Could be achieved through government policy. This particukir in,, jght of 
phenornena has prevailed overwhelmingly in public policy, thus reachincy a status quo. -4ý:, Z71 
The second perspective presents a different outlook of rq; ulatlon. Fojl()\\111, -, rlcý\ 
appraisals drawn from economic theory about the open-ended nature of markets ancl thc 
-rowth of knowled(-, c, It holds that the nature and purpose of Lý()vcrnment re, -! uLition.. " iýl 
to reinforce Individuals' interaction in the social settino. Indeed, this appraisal cxaminel., 
the basic pPoblern of sheer uncertainty, faced by entrepreneurs in their productlivc 
ýictivltles, which constantly drives them to stick to routines in their business actlvltlc, ý M 
order to make their investments' yields more predictable. The impossibility for 
entrepreneurs to do away with these business routines embodies the very core of their 
legitimacy, namely, that they fulfil a stabilising role in the expectations that entfePI-CrICLIPS 
share with their involvement in market activitics. Mo,,, t importantly, these cxpcctations 
create the ebb and flow, of productive activities, because they stimulate entrepreneurs to 
Innovate and compete in discovering new product,,, and markets. Therefore, the , týibihsiw, Z7 
role of social rules examined under the recent de\1elopments of economic thcoi-\ -ivcý, an 
I rnportant alternative measure for judging the legitimacy of government regulation, which 
conventional economic analysis cannot provldc, Much less a legalistic appraisal. 
In this work we therefore attempt to explain how economic science may I)i-()\, Idc 
two opposing views by which government real-IlatIon is understood and enforced, ýIs' 'ýccn t) t) L- 
in the case of competition policy. 
4. - CONTPASTING APPROACHES IN THE STUDY OF COMPETITION POLICY. 
These paradigms will enable us to visualise rnore clearly the complex 111tellectual 
proccss NN-hich gives rise to the regulatory policiCS attempted in Latin America, aiicl of 
whicli antitrust policy is merely an example. Iri particular, it is u. scful to visualisc liow 
4.5 Interestill-'Ov, Loil". "hy notes that ideas and theories. very much like the conventional \, vsuah,,; m()i1 
of markets. tend to icýich settled equilibria once they have been challenged hy opposite vlcw, In 
this Ic'-'ard out- Coll vC11tional paradigni-i of rcL_, ulation ,, Inipl\, foll()\\,,,, ideas about 111C the 
markci and Ilic role ot institutions which ha\c alread\ hccomc comcimonal in the rcýilm oi 
cconol'111C thOL11111t. (,, CC 1, (MSb\, Equilibrium and Evolution, pp. 1-20) 
collipetillm 1)()Ijc\! M Latiti America is idemified \vith one particular wa\ of 
realltv, mid therefore. wliv the abstract dkcussloii of' competitloii pollc\ -, oak Is 
I'Litl1c. 
wid caii Only faVOLff"ashrill cacophony of divergent opinions". 46 
Understanding competition policy requires awareness frorn the observcr th, 11 the t) 
notions of "competition" and "monopoly" remain cmifined to the prenil, ýeý, withM 
the current paradigm confines the discussion. t- 
For this reason, we propose an examination of the intellectual foundatIon ()I' the 
paradigrn that supports antitrust regulation and an inquiry into how satisfactorily thv, 
characterises competition as the social phenomenon which it purports to reý)-Ulatc. \, Ve 
sliall then present an alternative paradigm for conceiving rcgulation in the liglit ()f an L- Z7 
alternative Understanding of competition. Otherwise, if we limit ourselves to cxl)l()i-c 
competition "within" the boundaries of a particular pai-adicm this will provide no reýd 
answer to the problern of the ability of the policy to promote corripetition, because it %\, III 
confine the solution to the contrived definition of competition supported by the paraclwni. I 
It is Hiterestin(T to note that the concept of competition has not remained unclianoccl Z7ý ý7 
()vei- time. Prior to the introduction of antitrust policy with the U. S. Shcrnian Act, 
competition had been regarded as a process of ri\'Ary linked to the Lindi,, turhcd exerci, -'c I- 
of individual economic rights. Monopolies wcrc &, s()ciatcd witli the artil'Whil tn I 
p1-1\1le-cs granted by governments to favour the interests of certain individuals mcr 
others. 47 Le0ally, it was easy to identify such artificial restrictions, and to cornhat thc 
privilegcs they created, which were a part of everyday life. One person's privilego: to 
Undertake an economic activity meant another person's exclusion from it. By contrast, the 
cnicr, -, cncc of antitrust policy 
linked both competition and i-nonopolics to the '4111CWI-C M' I 
niarkcts. It made positive economic analysis indispensable in dcteri-nining the IcLA6, 
46 W. Adams and . 
1. W. Brock, Antitrust Economics oil Trial: A Dialogue on the Nc\\ 
(Princeton: Princeton University Pres, ý,. 19()l ), p. \1. 
47 oil this question. , cc G. Stider Memoirs .... 
Frank Machovec al.,, o highlights how the Ztý Z- 
ncocia,, mcal rc%olution in cconornic theory dkpiaced the former attention paid to -procc's'ý-. and 
ft)cused instead ()n "equilibrium". See F. Nkichm-C-C, Perie"'t C01111)etltion and tile 
Transt'()rmation of 1'. conornics. (London: Routic&, c, I c)9ý) 
Iý 
husincv, behaviour in the marketplace. The significance of legal as detk2rrent,,, ()I Z-- 17, 
competition vanished and this was replaced by ýi willingness to preserve ýi niininiuni 
IlUrnber of independent actors in the market, a,, a precondition for LISSUrn-ing the c\istencc 
of competition. As the ideas on the essence of competition changed, so did the vic\\-, ()n 
the most expedient wiv, ý, to ensure it, but this chanae was not alwavs clearly pci, (vived h\, 
scholars and policy-makers. As Machlup observed, "competition in the scnsc of cýl,, ý 
entry into the industry, and competition in the sense of many sellers in the Industry [is] 
frequently confused one with the other, or even confounded ýis one and the \, milc 
thino. "48 They were all embodied in what this work terms as *'the convcwl()nýd 
paradium" of competition, which is exemplified hy antitrust re(-, Ulation. 
Increasingly, however, new findings made the growth of knowled, (, c on the nalul-c t: ) tý' ZD C, 
ot'niarkets and firms lead to a whole new Understanding of competition and regulath)n. In 
IN,, appraisal, regulation initiatives for the promotion of competition are linkcd to the 
icica of evolutionary processes that are frarned by social institution,, such as the marko 
ýind can be seen to move towards socially productive goals. The conventional vicv" A' 
competition linked to a particular state of affairs in the market is increasingly hcin(-, 
replaced by another that emphasises the process of discovering new, unforeseen, VdLKIl-)IC 
niarket information which enables firms to inci-case profits, create new product,, ýind rnýikc 
new investments. 
To choose between these competing insights of competition and regulýition mic ý7' Lý 
underlying Such paradigms. In particular, thc"'C must cxamine the ýtssuii-iptions I 
ýI, SSL]rnptions and conceptual structures must be subject to rational review in order to 
determine whether they are consistent and coherent, or contradictory. The interpivkilivc 
incthod of public law should cast light on the relationships and featurcs oI' thc,, c 
StRICtUl-CS and the plausibility of their underlying assumptions. 41) In this way. \k, c hopc to 
ýS, 1:. Machlup, "C(mipetition, Phopoly and Profit", 1) Fconomica. No. 1194-11.1). 1ý \I,, ()- 
StiLdcr c\plaM.,, evolution in the ,,, ensc attributed to market phenomena like n-ionopol\ Mid 
competition: "Until 1850 in England the word mofiopol-v was usually restricted to dc"crihin.,; the 
c\dusive to trade which were conferred hv Parliament. IThen] toward the end of tile 
thi, ivord changed its memibig. " (Sce G. StiLder Memoir,, (A' in UnrcLýLilated 
JýIcoimmi, ýtý (Ne\\, York: Basic Books Inc.. Puhlishers, 1988) pp. 91-9-2. ) 
49 LouLdilln, p. 36. 
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reveal why antitrust is it self-defeating policy hccau,, e it promote., -. cxýtctly the oppo,, itc ()I 
its , tated purpose. 
Many scholars assume too quickly that Implementing antitrust policy , hould wi 
forth hI(-, hci- marks of innovation, entreprencurial dynamisni, and ccononiiý -)1*()\k'h 
However, their conventional stahonai-Y sense of competition, linked to ý[ Pal-tICUL11- "ItIte 
ofaffairs in the market, Icads them to endorse policy measurcs that paradoxlcýillý' prc\-k-nt 
thcsc dwitunic phenomena to materialise in practice. In this rcgai-cl. no matter Its siated 
goals, it is quite revealing that antitrust enforcement constantly drives entrepreneurs to 
revise their business plans and to adapt them to certain predetermined outcomes regarded 
soc i a] Iy benefic] al. 
Business stratecTies regarded in colloquial language as "competitive" ýIrc Olus t) bb 
condemned on the basis that they either climitiate rivals from the niýirket or impo,, c 
LlhU. Slve- conditions mi consumers. By focusim, on the past -objectivc- situatioii ot- tlic 
rclevant market where entrepreneurs interact, antitrust attempts to shed light upon tilc 
future "subjective" conduct of entrepreneurs. As Li result, antitrust schernes have scored a 
verhal coup" by confusing the meaning of cornpetition. 50 
Such "confusion" higlilights the core problem addressed in this work, narnely, ll()\\. 
reoulatory policies are linkcd to a particular pcrsl)ccn\, c ol' , ocial phenonicii. i. It i,, 
cs,, cntial to take this into account if one is to understand the likely effects of antitrust 
policy in Latin American economies. A conventional legal appraisal of antitrust 
cannot (, Jve us a proper understanding of the nature of such links because it does not 
consider the deepei- epistemological essence of the problem. An examination of thl, 111 
cp1stcniological qLICStiOll should tell us a great deal about the way in which policies ýiirned Z-- Z: ) 
at promoting competition should be desianed and enforced. 
Ultimately, policy enforcement has to do with the capacity of the conccptu. d 
.. \, 
so\\cll lndicatcs, they discus,, competition ir, if thc, ýc condition,, referred to pr(), pCct, \c 
hCha\10ur rather than I_etrOspeCtI\C IlUmhcr,,. Scc T Sowell. Kn_o\\IcdLc and 1\(, \\ 
Y()rk: Ba,, Ic li()ok,,,. P. 205 
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, ýt! -uctuj-c,, to defiver an ýidequate characten,, ýtllon ()I' i-eality. Kirzner 
judge adequately any Ltspcct of social reality fi-om the ethical perspective cLills, ()I' coui-ýC, 
foi- ýt valid framework of ethical criteria to , erve ts the evaluative ýai-dsnck. But ýLich 
ludgennent also require,,, perhaps even more importantly, a valid positive understanding ol 
the particular slice of social reality being ethically apprýtised ( ... ) 
To *udge the nioi-ýilll\ oi 
a particular econoi-nic ti'an,, -, action requires that we fully understand the niotivc,, and the 
likely consequences of that transaction. To Jud, -, c the justice ol .a niarket ývstcni i-ccluirc,, 
that we fully, understand the workings of that system. Two judges who share the 
of ethical values may judge the morality of the market system quite differently fron-i cýtdl 
other, if one does and the other does not, understand how markets work. These are 1-ather 
obvious observations, but are often overlooked. It is frequently assurned that in ordcr to 
defend the market systeni against its ethical detractors, the defender should with I 
his adversaries more or less profoundly on ethical standards. Of coui-. sc, "Licli 
disaareements on standards may be responsible for quarrels about the i-norality ()I' thc b- 
niai-ket. But very frequently this is not the cxsc. The qUarrels over the morality ol' niark-el, 
rnerely reflect different views concerning econoi-nic reality". 5 I 
After criticisino the conventional regulation implernented to promote competition, L- 
this work defines the flicoretical framework kw ýtn "institutional" competition poii( 
Under this appraisal, several areas are identified where governments can and "llould 
ciriphasise the promotion of competition. 
Ultimately, this work attempts, through this analysis, to arrive at a different view of 1-1) 
the rolc of the law in reaulating economic behaviour in society, which is a long-,,., tandim-, t: 5 Z: ) I 
concern for those who have examined the special role of the law in developing countrie, ý. Z7ý 
5. - THE STRUCTURE OF THIS WORK. 
Our analysis of contrasting approaclic,, to competition policy i,, , tructurccl as I- 
1. Kir/ner, 0icmcr\. Capita 1\C JLJ I C: C, 11 B ILI,: k\\ jjý I 1ý ý -Lisii), 
DlStl-]bLlt C (I ý, ý pp. 
1,0 11() ýý ": 
Chapter 11 examines the intellectual trait.,, of the conventional paradigm ol 
regulation underlying antitrust policy in Latin America. The chapter links the intellectual Z: ) Z-) 
roots of this paradigni to the influence of positivism in legal and economic , cicnce, which 
was especially Sub ect to ideas about society and individual rights, amono poficy-niakcr" 
iii the region. Followin(i these ideas, Latin American policy-makcrs often prcachcd the 
R', "UlatlOn of trade and restrictions of foreign competition in the name of vague 
or "public interest' I reasons. Antitrust policy is thus presented as a new version ol' such 
"public interest" regulation, where policy-makers are assumed to possess all the relevant 
information necessary to achieve these goals and markets are depicted through models of 
equilibrium, against which reality is contrasted and compared. In the context of theý, C 
ideas, this chapter describes the main features of Latin American antitrust regulation. its 
institutional settinu and the areas of active etil'orcenient. L_ 
Chapter III highlights the theoretical inconsIstencles of the conventional approach 
to reclUlation on which antitrust precepts are founded. It points out the difficulties of the 
policy in developing legal rules which distinguish between "anti -competi ti vc- aiid Z: ) 1ý tý 
cfficict-it" restrictive practices, and its conscquem shortconlintys iii (Iccidin- whdt ,, hotild Z-71 I- 
or should not be permitted. This chapter illustrates how the internal logic ot' ýIlitltrust 
policy crodes the expectations of market participants, which constitute the backhoiic ol' 
market functioning. It does so with reference to the Latin American experience, ý, vhcw L- 
oovcrnment intervention is pervasive. I 
Chapter IV presents a proposal for an alternative institutional appraisal of markc(, ý 
ai-Id i-cgulation. It cxpl()i-e,,, how economic orpnisation pro,,, ides entreprencurý with ýi 
predictable framework of routines and rules to develop their activities. This appro,,, ich 
market interaction as an evolutionary proceý, s where individual, " dcvc1t)p 
HIN '- challeng-c. " thc , titLitioll" to 
limit their uncertainty about the future. The chaptei 
convcritional perception of markets, as closed-end entities whose outcome,,, are ýiccuratcl\ 
predicted 1-)ý, policy-makers as they are ýVSIUrned to posscs, ý the relcvýiiit inforniation. 
('()Ijjl-)Ct1hO1I In OLIr ýIIICI-Mltl\-c approýich 
IS LI 11dC I-S t (, ()(I to 
hC 
MI ()11-(-To1M-' PR)CCS", \01CI-C'n". 
f-h-nis fitid new infori-natimi hidden in the systeni which enables theni to gathei- kiiOwled, L'C 
ahout business opportunities. Firms are assumed to adopt routines or patterns ol 
hehaviour that enable thern to seize business opportunities which "'()LIICI othei-\\'],, c 
LiiiattaMahle. 
Consequentl, y, the role of public policy in this ýipproach is to protect the \vIII )I 
entreprencurs in undertaking these routines which will induce thern to invest ýi (-, i\cn 
M11OLInt of rcsources for productive purposes in the cxpectation of a I'Liture outcomc. Tlw, 
chapter emphasises how the logic of antitrust policy leads to precisely the oppositc, ()I I tile 
(1(--ýIred (,, oals. Indeed, because of concern that antitrust achieves some form ol 
predetermined "socially efficient" equilibrium, any business conduct in a market that fall" 
to rneet the standards required by this optimum P, ImmediatcIv suspected of hcmg 
"monopolistic", including the very routines that enable tO fUnction. 
Next, Chapter IV attempts to define certain guidelines for an alternati%v 
institutional policy for the promotion of competition and entrepreneurship in Latin 
America. It explores the problems that may arise from attempting to reform the official 
institutional framework. It evaluates the limitations of such an attempt in a democratic 
s'Cttin(,,. (T*ven the constitutional principle of ",, cparation of powers". The chaptcr clcvcloj)ý, 
the agenda for promoting competition according to the institutional guidelines Outlined in 
earlicr chapters, emphasising that the role of governments in this field is to ensure that the 
cxj-)cctat1ons of firms are not frustrated. To do this, it takcs into account the InstitLaWnal 
difficulties that Latin American policy-makers face in pushing through reform. 
Lastly, Chapter V summarises the concluslon, ý of this work. 
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CHAPTER ii. - rHE CONVENTIONAL REGULATORY APPRAISAL OF 
MARKETS AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION: THE CASE OF ANTITIMST 
REGULATION IN LATIN AMERICA. 
"Until the 1920s most economists vievved competition as a ... ri . volons process that 
woidd ýe stý/Ied b. v mititrust laws. Once the pet. -fect competitimi model -which 
largely ignores rivedry - was accepted, economi . srs ' opiliions of antitrust grew morc 
lovottrable. To the extent that antitrust lnterlcrcý with rivalry and entelprim'. the 
compett . ti . vc model has very likel-v misdirected the prolc, ý, w'oii, at least as tar as 
ontitrilst policl, i. ý ( olicerned. " 
(Di Lorenzo and HiLh, Antitrust and Competition, lwioricalk cOnsidered. ) 
I. - THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONVENTIONAL PARADIGM OF MARKET REGULATION. 
To understand the essence of antitrust rules as tools for regulating markets onc 
to look at the intellectual sources influencing social science at the turn of the CCIItLIFy, III 
particular, the pervasive influence of logical positivism in legal and economic C111tUIV. 
These influences were echoed in the policy-makinc, tradition, and in Latin Anienciln 
attitudes towards the law, individual rights and the promotion of social welfare. They play 
a rn. 'or part in understanding the social role attached to government rules, which cxplain,, -, Lýl j t--) t) 
the ncccssity of antitrust reGUlation in ensurino transparent markets in the re-ion. L- I- L- 
1.1. - The interface between law and neo-classical economic science in the 
Le gu lat i on. conventiomil market ir 
Social have long striven to establish a science of le, -Tislýmon, which coul(I 
(, i\,, c thern guidelines for enacting social rules. By the eighteenth century a science pi-olect 
ci-icompassim, social, political, and legal thought had emerged. whose purji0, -, c wa,,, to z: 1 C) L- Z-) 
make connections between facets of social character such as property, opinions, manncrs 
and 'usticc, and to derive (Teneral conclusions fi-orn these. It was not, however, ýt scicncc JI t-- 
In the modern scI1"c of strivin- for value neutrality. On the contrai-%, its 0[)jeCLI%c wa'ý' to 
dcvc1op 
guidelines for &, scssing the laws and institutions of society. 
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Nevertheless, this multidisciplinary social research disappeared a centurv hiwr 
because by then "a much more lirMted conception ol the boundarlies ()I the ,, Li[)jcct hiw 
heen crected, and this more restrictive sense of the subýject has remained with us until OIC 
present day. "52 The advance of scientific positivism in the philosophy of science ", &, ýI 
primary cause of this development. 53 The study of the interface between the "()CIA 
sciences was influenced by the positivist epistemology, which has hccomc donllný1111 
within ý()cial science in the twentieth century. 
The c6mplexity of reality became formallsed in "models" which simplified realitv. 
These models explained how market forces would operate in the event of some chantgc 
introduced by the analyst. Empiricism became essential to demonstrate the truthftllnes, ý ()I' 
these hypotheses. This new perspective used by political scientists aimed at estahlishino 
44an empirical discipline based on an inductive methodology, which would perillit thc 
testing of hypotheses and thence the identification of regularities which would pernlit 
scientifically valid generalizations to be drawn. "54 These generalisations could, in turn, 
embody the core of "social laws", the understanding of which would enable socUil 
scientists to improve the welfare of society. To sum up, the analysis of the politic, 11 
constituency's behaviour and that of anonymous firms became the main obýject of study, 
whilst the attention given to the structure of social rules and constitutlolllý 
abandoned. 
Striving to establish a science of legislation was above all an atterript to expL1111 III(, 
world rationally, that is, to avoid super-rational explanation,,. In general, the 
'-positivc science" of the last quarter of the nineteenth century bore the imprint ()I' ýi ii-iorc 
cxtensive reaction against the classical thinking embodied in the all-encompassing field ()I Zý 11: 1 1 
I-OLIkThlln, p. 10. t- 
suggesti, two different meaning-, In one , cwsc. it ep-e The term "positiv 
cp,,,, tcmo1o., ica! \\, i\, of appraising reality. ýýhereas a second embodies a pli*l().,, ()1)11\. 
(NI. De la Vclgýi. L%olucionismo vcl", Uý, 1'01,16V]1,1110ý [Caraca,,: Monte A\11a 1-dilow', 
Latinoamericana. 19931, pp. 50-51. )Inthk \\()i-k. wcu, ýctheterm in thefii-,, t , ense. i,, a 111CIII(O 
fol- K-C]UH-ing kno\v1c(1,,., c. w-hich js acquired through the "ell"es. I Zý 
54 Louý-111111. p. 
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Political Philosophy and Nlorals, which had prcvailed h1thcrto. Thus. theology -, ýi\c \\,, iy 
to social philosophy, theories of divine right wcre i-eplaced by utilitarian thcoric. " of' 
overnment, and natural law theories were challenged by an emerging positivist oLitl()()k. 
In their efforts to preserve the purity of their newly developed science from the "alicii" 
111ti-LIS1011S of Ethics and Metaphysics, the new generation of social scientists bellevc(i that 
(mly cmpirical "facts", ýis perceived through experience, could 
appropriate explanations for social behaviour. Any appraisal of reality by "api-Wristic"" 
methods would be contaminated with pi-ecoiiccl\, cd ideas ai-id valucs about the 
thus rendering them "Lli-iscientific". Positivist science PUI-SLIed -value neutral" explaiiahon., ý, 
of social relations and therefore substituted quantitative measurement for qLIaIIUItIVC 
analysis, a feature which was particularly noticeable in the explanation of nial-kof 
causalities. 
The perception of scientific Inquiry brought about by logical positivism had uncwn 
cfTects in both legal and economic science. Compared to legal theorists, econon-iists \\, ci, c tý, tl 
more willing to endorse the cultural distinction between facts and valLics. SLIch 
differentiation provided them with a transparent method of inquiry for examinino s()cial 
phenoinena. De Alessi contends that -[the positivistic approach] provided a 
henchniark for economists' growing interest in empirical research Positivi". 1111 
continues to receive broad acceptance within the economics profession although it 11() 
longer reflects Current thinking among philosophers of science. Nevertheless ( ... ) It still 4: ) L- 
provides ýI Unifying theme for examining the niethodology in economics". 55 By contra"I. t1- L- L- - 
legal scholars have never fully endorsed the distinction between facts and values. even if 
they have tacitly acknowledged, to some extent, the instrumental appraisal of posim"isn') 47) 
over legal rules in order to mark their own professional boundaries. As Katz contends. 
-jPJaI'tICIPaI1tS ill OLIr lellýll Culture recard la\N,, a,,, i-nore than the commands of an arhiti-ýti-N/ Z71 Z: ) - 
sm, crci-n- \\, c expect law to be principled. Positivism is controversial (anion(-, le-al 
1-, ChO1,1I', S) hCCUISC It SLI(-111cStS, that we i-night 'in soi-ne sense be oblioated to ohc\, 
unprincipled laws--50 
SO Katz. v]sill 
4 
A,, it was, positivism succeeded in shaping the views of , oclal III III(, \\; I\ 
they percelv. ed their object of research and it therefore becarne ýt major forcc Ill 111c 
making of the "science of legislation". This influence is particularly noticeable in three 
aspects: first, in the methodological objectivism employed for the appralsal of the rcal 
world-, second, in the v1sualisation of real market,, through formalistic illocIck of 
ecludibrium, which eliminate institutional analysis by way of postulation, and fimilly, ill it,, 
peculiar normative appraisal of reality. All these features combine with the IIII-icrent 
instrumentalism of legal analysis to producc regulations of which antitrust rulcý, ýirc 
merely an example. 
a) The influence of "ohjectivism" in the analysis of soCMI phenomena. 
The conventional paradigm of regulation is defined by the assumption tlim the 
-alsal is a by-product of th(- analyst is omniscient to appraise the social sv, ýtcni. This appi 
epistemological idea that knowledge can only be scized through the scnscs. Hericc, (lie Z: ) t) 
observer must detach himself from the feelinas and values of those whose behaviour he 
cxamincs. In this way, "objective" market causalities can be identified. 
Bernstein contend,,, that objectivism presupposes 11 intersubjective staii&rck ()I' 
rationality or norms of inquiry by which we attempt to distinguish personal biaI-1. 
SLIpel-StItion, or false beliefs from objective clairns. "57 In his opinion, objectivisn-i d0c,, ii0i 
rc(luli-c "a simple or direct way of stating the norms of the appropriate inquiry, or thýit 
there cannot be disagreement about these norms and their application, or even whether 
what counts as obj ii one domain of inquiry can do so in another". 58 histcad, it jective in II 
i-cl-Crs to the impartial perspective that the observer of the social ýystern must possc,, s 
tow, ards scientific InqUIry. 
57 R. Bernstein, The Rc-st-l-jIC-tLIl-ill,, -l of 
Social and Political Theory, (Philadelphia, 1976), p. I11. 
Bern,, tclil, Id. 
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In the realm of market relations, whether objective knowledge rnaterialise,, depend,, 
on whcther "the actual cost-revenue relationship k mi objective something in the 
that it can be scrutinised, in order to discover whether it conforms to the de,, li-Cd 
i-elationship, by an ad hoc authority external to the industrial unit concei-ned. ". "C) SLICII 
appraisal allows US to VISUalise the marketplace ýts a closed-end static world, compi-kc(l nt 
different strýctural relationships between firms, where both individual and social co,,, t,, ýirc 
clearly identifiable and measurable, since what we know about them issimply drawn fi-oill 
our assumptions about the conduct of individUal ýtctors. 
Objectivism demanded that social scientists follow a value-neutral fi-amework as ;i 
means of separating economic "facts" from "values" in policy-i-naking. This was a way of' In t-ý - 
, guaranteeing that the franung of social rules by 'Authority' would be subýject to rational 
bounds, by providing stability in the interpretation of , ocIal phenomena, and conscqucnfly 
cnýiblincy the emergence of a "rational" rule of law to enhance social welfare. 60 t) 1-71 
The emergence of ob' II jectivism in economic science was mostly evident in the transit 
I rom "classical" to "neo-classical" economics, particularly in the latter's tI ormalist versioti 
which has prevailed since the second half of this century. 61 This evolution introduced a 
quantitative 'view of the causalities affecting social relations which was entirely rie-ý, \- iri 
cconomic analysis. Classical economists had seen markets as changing processcs of ýn 
G. F. Thirlby, "The RLIler-, In L. S. E. Fs,, ýt\ ý, on Co,,, t, J. Buchanan and G. Thir1hy 
York: New York University Press, 198 1), p. 165. 
60 In fact, obýjectlvity is essential for some antitrust legal scholars, who would consider that the use 
of neo-classical price theory provides a much-required certainty in the rule of law. As Bork 
contends: "To read antitrust literature or to participate in the numerous conferences convened to 
CIISCLISS Policy is to become convinced that antitrust is less a discipline than a buzzing confusion C7 
of unrelated opinion. Even agreement on conclu. sions is usually superficial, paperino ()\ci- L- Z-7 
fundaniental disýiLrecrnent about reasons. One cau.,, e of this ei-ninentl\, unsatisfactory sLite oi 
affairs lie,,, in a failure to focus and settle the question of the form of reasonmg, or ar. -Liiiient, 
proper to thc stihJect matter. The inode of correct ýintitrust analv, ýis is determined hv the 
, ýtrcllý(-., ths ; ind kvclkliesses of price theory. Once the, ýc are Undcr,, tood and re,, pected, \\c should 
, ichic\c Llrcatcr igircement on substantive issueN 
(Bork, p. 1 16). In hi,, work, Bork did n0i 
cow, ider the disaLi, ccinents on econonijc theor\ itself, %vhich seein -, reater and moi-C relc\ant 
than those found in the field of lav\. 
NLichovcc C\PkIllis the elliff. 1, 'ence of the neo-clasmcal perception In economic science. and \\hv 
it repoesented a tI-LIC rcvolution of thou-ht (a Kuhnian paradigm) in this field. Scc F. Machmec. 
pel-t, cci ('ompention and the Transformation of 1-conomic, -, (Lonclon- Routledge, 1995). ZI 
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economic interaction between producers and consumers. These processes were 
determined by non-quantifiable elements of entrepreneurial action, . such a..,, - foresiIhI M 
satisfying consumers and cost-appraisal of available resources. 'Therefore, the social 
scientists focused their attention on explaining how these relations were, in qualitative 
terms. By contrast, positive economics proposed a "rigorous" understanding of socUll tý ltý 
behaviour through abstract formal models of economic behaviour aimed at discoverinLI 
the regularities of human behaviour. From then on economic analysis left aside its focus 
on explaining past phenomena, and became concerned with making quannuitivc t) 
predictions of the possible outcomes of the social interaction represented in the niodel.,,. 
Objectivism conveys the assumption that social systems are closed-ended becaLISC 
they encapsulate information that can be fully appraised by the observer for social 
resource allocation. The possibility of acquiring objective knowledge about the coriditlollý' 
governing social interaction inevitably invites a hierarchical view of the economic system, 
where the observer placed at the top makes omniscient decisions about the allocation ol" 
goods amongst market players. Closed-end systems feature a sort of interaction whicli 
combines hierarchically designed commands with multiple interactive elements. "NII 
example of this is typically found within firms which combine labour, manpower, 
technology and other resources into production processes. These structures should hc 
distinguished from social interaction, which is typically open-ended. 62 Let us now see 
how objectivism has influenced positive and normative views of market functioning. 
62 R. Cordato, Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open-Ended Universe: A Modern 
Austrian Perspective, (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992). pp. 5.11 1.1 16. cordlw 
borrows his classification from Hayek, who distinauishes between "Economy" and "Catalla\y". 
He describes "Economy" as a system where ýi sIngle hierarchy of values dominate.,., , ocial 
decisions. By contrast, in a "Catallaxy" each participant's values competes with the rest to frame 
social outcomes; there is no single hierarchy imposed from the top. In this regard, ýCc F. A. 
Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order, Vol 1. (Chicago: The Un1vcr,, It%, ot' 
Cljicjj, -, () 
Pre,,, s, 1973) 
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b) Idealisation of market functioning in formal models of - equilibrium: 
The 
.,,; ti-LictLire-conduct-perfoi'lliýince (SCP) paradigg-m. 
i) The epistemolo'gical role of "homo economicus'" and -eýilibriurn- In the aiialysjiý, 
ofmarket functioning. 
Objectivism in neo-classical economic analysk is conveyed throuLTh simplilled C, 
iISAIniptions about the conduct of individuals and the behaviour of markets. These arc 
expressed by heuristic notions of "homo oeconomicus" and "equilibrium". The first 
notion refers to the set of assumptions made about the conduct of each individual 
interacting within the social system (i. e. markets), whereas the second refers to thc 
overall functioning of the social systern. 
In the first place, the homo oeconomicus is merely a mental device for sirriplifyim-T 
the complexity of hurnan action into a few traits which enable an easy explanatloii of Ilic 
CaLISCS of social phenornena. Homo economicus reduces human action and sjýcclficallv 
reduccs the choices undertaken by individuals in the market to a determinate exercist., 
within a given ends-means framework, very much like the conduct of an autornatori. o) lil 
this way, market players are detached fi-orn their natural ignoraricc ahoi-It the 
circumstances that Would otherwise influence their behaviour. 
In the second place, equilibrium is also a heri-neneutic construct used a,,, a devicc k)i 
tinderstanding n-iarket interaction. ()4 The concept of equilibrium expresses i-cality h\ 
(1c. scribing, what the world would be like in the absence of fuzzy notions like "InstItUtIO111"' 
or "social culture" whose inclusion in the models would make them too complicatecl to 
adapt reality for the pUrpose of analysis. Under this ideal, economic interaction is 
P. Boettke, 'AVhcrc (lid Economics go Wron, -, " 
Modern Economics as a Flight from RealliC, II 
CrmcA Re\--ic%\ ( 1997), p. 20. 
04 On the notion of e(JUilibriurn in general. ýcc F. Hahn, EcLudibl-luill Lilld MaCT(wColloillics. 
(CýIjilbrick, e., Mýv NI. I. T. Press, 1984), pp. 43 et , eci. Also, P. Earl. Microcconomic,, for C- 
and NltrkctmL,. (Hants. Eci\\'ardEl,, ai-PLibliý, liiilLLt(i.. 1995). pp. 309-312) 
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portrayed as tending towards a state of stability, which can be sorted out in acivmce 1), \ 
Lhe ohserver through predetermined calculation., -,. 
Hence, equilibriuni is characterised by two essential conditions: first]\,. Lill 
participants in the systerri are assumed to posscss all the relevant information llccc., _. ý, arv 
I'Or theni to maximise then- utility-, they havc irifori-nation of the present condilion,, in 
which economic actors interact (costs of availablc resources, endowment,,, pricc-1-1, 
alterriative offers, consumer tastes), as well as future conditions (opportunity costs. futurc 
events, future consumer preferences). Consequently, the competitive lor 
information on this data is irrelevant, because the neo-classical models take it as a 
,, given". Markets are thus regarded as closed-end entities where the size and compositioll 
of the "pie" is anticipated, and entirely irnplicit in all given resource endownicrits. 
preference rankings, and relevant technological pos, ýIbilities, which serve as datýt for the 
systern at any specific time. 65 Secondly, the episternology of equilibrium rejects the ldcý) 
of "on-going changc" within the system. Priccs, for exaniple, are viewed as "parainctric Z7) Z7 
as they convey only ptist information of existing resources in need of allocation. 66 
Equilibrium theories of markets assume that they clear out instantaneously; hence 
the passage of time and endogenous change and flux is denied ex dýfinitionc. Appraisin(-, Z7) bb- 
econoi-Yi1c chanae from this perspective is only possible by comparing the initial ýInd finýll b 
eql-llfibrium end-states, the conventional analysis does not explain how the transition 
ýWtUally takes place. Indeed, such changes ai-e viewed as being induced by exo(-, enOUS b- 
causes. Therefore, at both the initial and final states, where equilibrium is pi-c, ý'cnt, 
Oý As Kirzner indicýitcs: "The emergence of this aigregatc output is seen inevitable. ! Iven tlIPI 
data. This is the cx,, c becAlSe the outcome of cýich I)Ll\'in(,,, selling. and PI'MILICtIOn CICC11,10n IS, as I- 
noted completely determined by thesc data. These outcornes are, for each decision-maker, 
merely those bundles (of inputs or output..,, ) ranked highest among the respecti%, e ranLes ot L- - 
alternativc.,, spelled Out by the known price,, and known budget constraints". (Kirzner. 
14. ) 
00 Lýi\mc mitial1v argucd the non-parametric nature of the informatiol, conveyed bý, prices in hill 
discussion about the "socialist calculation debate. " (See D. Lavole, Rivalry and Ccntril 
Planning: The socialist calculation debate reconsidered, Cambrid, -, e 
Unkersity Press, Ncw York, 
1985. ) Also. Thomsen undertakes an e\tensive comparison between parametric and non- 
pýj, -ajjjetrjc price,,. (E. Thomsen, Prices and Kno\vIed, -, c. 
Routledge. London, 1992- Chapter 3) 
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decisions made by market participants have somehow all been made to fit in %\,, tli cýicli 
othel-. 67 
As Addleson notes, this epistemology draw's the theorist away from undcrLiml, 1 
the world around him, simply because it postulates his omniscience. 68 A perception which 
Avocates a close-ended perception of social phenomena, under which the obser\'cr call 
measure the pxtent to which these forces influence social outcomes because he is assume(I 
to possess all the relevant knowledge and information on their importance anci ýiicmwiL,. 
does not really demand any endeavour frorn the analv, -, t to apprehend its esselicc, ollk' I() 
calculate its outcomes as he would anticipate all the possible moves in a orame of chess. L_ 
Moreover, the assumption of omniscience leads the analyst to presume iiot oifly 
knowledge of all. disclosed information shared by market players, but also knowleduc ()I r-) L- 
information that is missincy amonast them. In this way, market players would be cxpectc(I bb 
to work their way through the best contractual arrangements to eliminate any informýmon C) Cý 
67 In the words of Kirzner: -[Under neo-classical equilibrium models], market activity 1, ý, seen ; 1., N 
made Lip of innumerable independently made buying and selling decisions, each of which, in 
effect. more or less correctly anticipates and lakes account of, all the other decisions beinL, m,, ide 
in the market. Even thou,, h it is not claimed that cach decision-maker is aware of all im-Tko 
prices and thus in cflect correctly taking into account all relevant decision,,., (since market piicc,, 
; irc held to reflect those decisions), what an individual chooses, in this view of thinys. Ps the 
Out of an array of clearly perceived alternatives. These alternatives are, so to speak, hy 
the market. Given the prices of all available goods, each decision-maker can trail"Lite Ills 
available budget into an array of alternative marýet baskets. These baskets are, a,,, it were. laid 
out in front ifeach decision-maker, available for his choosing. These alternatives are known t, ) 
he 'there'. They arc not discovered to be there-, they are Implicit in the known budget constraintý, 
and known arrays of market prices. From these alternative market baskets available to him, each 
decision-maker selects the one he most prefers. This selection constitutes the set oI purcha,, c,, 
and sales that he then makes in the market. ( ... ) 
Every attempted purchase is succesdul, cvcrý 
attempted sale I,, succe,, sful. All items for which a possibility of sale exists at a price that wil. 1 
make both buyer and seller better off(In theil- own prospective Judgement) are in fact , () mflcl. In 
thVs picture oI the market there are no )uj-pj-j,, c.,,, no pure profit., ), and iw puic Picic o 
nothing that is not, in ctlect, fidlY known at till times: there is no scope. for disco very". (ALIthOr" 
Italics) (Kirzner, pp. 10,1 ')-14. ) 
68 M. Addleson. E(JUilibrium versus Undqr. standmg: towards the restoration of economic,, s all t 
, ýocla science, (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 4,3. 
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asvil-imetry since it is assumed that they know how far real markets arc from 
ccl Lt III bi-I Ll Ill. 69 
Finally, it is necessary to recall that as a mental device, equilibrium docs not I 
neces,, arily represent a unidimensional focal point fi-orn which the oh, ýervcr call exmiiine 
reality. It can also denote multiple focal points, which stratealc Interaction L- I 
niarket player, ý may lead to. In these cases, the analysis ýis.,, Lirnes the possibility of imiltil)IC 
C(ILIHIbria. 70 More recent developments in i-nitinstrean-i econornic,,, point in thýit (firectioli 
thus brinoing a sen,, k: of motion into the analym, " of static equilibria. 71 Howc\cr. it iý, 
necessary to insist that in neither case k the conventional epistemology altercd: 
equilibrium remains Lin ideal focal point (or points) of reference from which reality i,, ý 
contrasted. Hence, the formation of befiel',,, amongst individuals which Is ultimatek, 
responsible for inclucin- cntrepreneurial action and therefore brings about cham-, c with'', L- t-I I 
the systcm, remains left aside. 72 
All human conduct as it exists in real life is disregarded for the , ýikc 
concentrating the analysis on the anonymous interactive forces of supply and demand. L- 
Entrepreneurs are replaced by a group of contrived perfect forecýtster, ý who ýtre ýihlc 
calculate utility niaxii-nization at every moment in an ideal world of given constraims. This z: I 
theory of choice iic,,, Iccts all considerations with rcuard to human action, as wc1l ý1" the 
'ict that individuals ýtct to achieve certain goals and obýjectives for which they makc pkiw, 
that are irnplernented in the context of irreversible tirne changes. Z7ý 
69 On this question. ýcc N. Foss, Firms and the Co-ordination of Knowledge: some Au,, irian 
Insights, DRUID Working Paper No. 98-19, Department of Industrial Economics and StrmcL, \ 
Copenhagen BLIS111e', 's School, Copenhagen. 1998. pp. 9-1 1-ý Z- 
70 Fos,, c\Plains how Game Theory today rcpre.,, cnr,, the dominant trend in the development ol 
mainstream cconomics during the last two dccýides. In his words, "[Gleneral equilibriun-i thcoiý 
(fied and Lamc thcorv to a verv large e\tent took ovcr a.,, the foundational approach 0 rnoder- I--I 
mainstream economics. " (N. Foss, Austrian Economic and Game TheM, DRVll) WorkiiiL, 
Paper No. 98-218, Department of Industrial Economics and Strate, -: \/, 
Copenhagen lluiincýv' Z7 
School, copenhagen, lQQ8' P. 1. ) 
71 l'o, "', Id. 
16. 
Thc vicw of markets and economic orgAamsation through the appml,, al of lhe 
SCP piradicy-i-n* 
We have so far higlilighted how the use of the word -individuals- and "i-narkets" ii) I 
neo-classical equilibriuni models could be quite i-nisleading: how no real nidividuiik ýirc Z: ) 
considered, only mathematical relationships which express the interaction of monvniow, 
market forces. 
Similar caveats apply in the appraisal of economic orgýinisation and the iwtitLItIOII': N 
created Linder conventional analysis. This analysis, including the understanding of the la\v 
and firms which it evokes, is discarded as a source of unnecessary complications to the 
"clean" conclusions drawn from market interaction under the neo-classical premisc,, of 
complete information. Institutions can only be explained as ri-iechanisnvs deviscd to cope 
with uncertdinty and change, both of which are denied in the neoclassical analysis*, 
therefore, their presence in models of equilibrium is disturbing. Hence. the neglect ()I' the 
t"irin, which remained a "black box" within econornic analysis. Nor it is surprising that the 
study of social institutions by mainstream economics was delayed for so long. 73 By 
separating "facts" froni "values" conventional economic analysis had to sacrifice much of L- 
what is present in real markets. 
Thesc considei-ations are particularly i-elevant for understanding what exact]v is 
involvcd in the appraisal of neo-classical econornics and conventional regulation towm-&, 1ý 
the hcliavlour of firrns in the market. The peruption of interactive firms in this apprýusal 
7 It is po. ýsiblc to trace this research project back to Ronald Coase's seminal work "The Nature of 
the Firm", (4 Econornica n. s. [Nov. 1937]: 380-405) later restated in "The Problem of Social 
Cost"'(3 R- )urnal of' Law and Economics, [ 19601: 1-44. ) Coa-, )c ernphasised that the origi of 
market and le, -, al 
institutions could be dcrived from the transaction cost,, of using, niarkel 
mechanisms. With no transaction costs. there would be no need for firms, as spot markcts %ML11d 
co-ordinate production. Similarly, property law would be Llnnece,,, ýary in a zcro-trawsýictj()Jj-cwýl 
world, , mcc a,, long, as individual,,, are free to transact, resources would 
he allocated ýimonL-d 
those who valucd thern the most. (Oil thIS LILIeStion, scc Boettke, What Went \Vi-o11(-1 \\1th 
Economic,, '. ' at -) 
IA In addition, Foss argtic,, that the rca, ýon for the neglect of the firill theorý, (a Z7 t- - 
\6despread attitude that extended until the 1970s) is e\plained in the shared conviction that tile 
purpose of economic theory is to primarily explain market level phenomena, while the firm k at 
11jost an intermediate step in the price theoretic lo,, ic. (See N. Foss, Austrian Economic,, and the tý 
Theory ofthe Firm. DRUID Working Paper No. 98-13. Department of Industrial E,,: onoin1c,,, Mid r-- 
Sjj-, jjcI, \, Copenha, -, en 
Busine,,,, School, Cope n ha L,,, c n. 1998,1). 2) 
ýI 
i,, mideading, for what i,, implied in the analy,, i, ý is ()nly an ideallsed inier; ictio!, N 
calculated variables which possess no resemblance whatsoever to what i,.,, actually Loimg 
on in real markets. However, perceptions are essential for understanding reahly. iý, 
Loasby contends. What, then, is the conventional understanding of markets arisin, from 
the perception of equilibrium? 
hi the conventional analysis, markets are v1suallsed as more or Ics. " defined 
strucitired enlitics, whose outcomes depend oii the way M which busiiiess iiitcriQ tioil dMI 
corporate stratecFies combine within concentrated structural market settings. This idea Is b t: ý 
epitornised in the so-called "Structure-Conduct-Performance" (SCP) paradigm. This r-I 
notion provides a theoretical base from which it is possible to appraise how the 
interaction between market structure and business conduct influences market outconies. 74 
It is difficult to conceptualise the SCP paradigm, given its theoretical reformulatiori t) tý 
over time. But the basic thrust of the paradium rests on the idea that firms aim to acqL11re ID 
market power or a doininant position from which they can comfortably make an attempt 
at monopoly'. 75 In this appraisal, the presence of significant entry barriers is crucial, ýis it t) 
74 The coiuluct of firms within the market refers to the various strategies firms may pursue, eitlier 
independently or collusively, in order to achieve their business goals. These include alternativc 
profit-maximP, ing strategies with respect to prices, product differentiation, and researcli and 
development as well as the possible pursuit of a variety of objecti, /es other thm-t pr()I', i 
maximisation. The structure of markets de ends on the number of firms, diversity of 'ýi p I/c. 
market share, level of product differentiation as determined by price elasticity of market 
dernand, level of integration among firms, as well as their conglomerate divers] ficati on, and 
finally the presence or absence of entry barriers. Finally, peifoi-niance refers to the overall goal, " 
of the economic organisation, namely the pursuit of allocative efficiency. To a lesser extent, the 
notion of performance also covers other sorts of efficiency. (R. Clarke, Industrial Economic,, 
(Oxford: Ba,,, 11 BLickwell. 1985), p. 2. ) 
75 "Market power" and "clorninance" denote a situation in the market where a market actor, CILIC tO 
its economic [night, may disregard any potential or actual competition from other participaw". 
However, there ýire shaht differences between these two terms. Most commonly "domimince" i, 
associated with the freedom enjoyed by it firm from the constraints of competition, or the control 
it Wields ONTr upstream or downstream trading partners. Generally, competition laws relviril-I ()Il 
this cQncept do not prevent suppliers from holding i dominant osition but merely from abl-l"Ino p C, 
that position. Monopolists do not have to achieve a pure or quasi-pure monopoly in the nwi-kci 
concerned, they oifly have to eliminate sufficient competition to be able to impose a inonopoli,,, tic 
price increase. Moreover, dominance is a concept influenced by political cons I derati oll ,, ()I 
--fairnes, s", hence the antitrust schemes that follow the criterion of dominance tend to , tres.,, the 
need to preservc multiple independent outlets rather than to achieve economic efficlenuý'. which 
CoUld c\ciitually dirninish multiplicity in favour of tn\er, vet more efficient firms in the iii, ii ket. 
allows incumbent firm, ý to undertake restrictive practices. and maintain ýupra-compctw,,,, 
(i. e. monopolistic) prices, either separately or jointly. with other firms, aided h\, market 
power. Under this perspective, firms within competitively atomistic, structured niark-etý, 
have \, Irtually no conduct options; they are "price takers". A competitivc market ,, tructurc 
determincý, that the firms will be price takers and cost-minimisers (or profit-maximiser., '). 
This price-taking behaviour in turn results in superior market performance. Howcvcr. 
firms in highly concentrated markets can take advantage of a ý, ariety of conduct oj)tionlý, 
many of which may yield very poor mai-ket pej-1-oi-mance. Collu,, )iý; c ouiput III 
scarch of higher profits would be a prime example. 
The pervasive influence initially attached to entry barriers would suo-est that III 1-117, 
concentrated markets, incumbents would be easily able to impose monopolistic Conduct 
without the threat of' facing new competition. Under the influence of this appralsill. 
antitrust doctrines had been developed under the assumption that certain market 
Structures, due to their concentration (induced by the presence of considerable cnlrý' 
barriers), encouraged firms to restrict output. A firm could grow indefinitely until it zn 
became a "i-nonopoly", thus developing "market power". Once a monopoly position was 
ýichieved, the firm would be able to restrict output, increase prices, or harm rivals. Thus. 
market concentration was made primarily responsible for market coITIpetitI%/C1Ics'-.. III 
other words, a connection was developed that linked overall market performance with the 
resistance of the market in question to the entry of potential newcomers ýIs determine(] hv 
the existing entry barriers. 
Later version,, of the paradigm emphasise "dynarruc" factors, such ýis finns Z: ) 
strategies, ýis valid explanations for market performance. These "dynamic" models ()I 
conipctition prescnt rnore flexible hypotheses about the interaction between niarkctý, an(] 
stratc, 21cs, wilich attempt to incorporate the numerous casc,, showing an appýircnl I I- 
13%, CmItra, 4. tile concept of "Illarket po\ver- ha, ý been fully developed under indu,, tiMl 
orl-'allu, "at loll tllc()I-\ and P, therefore politically -morc- neutral. Boner and KrucLer define mm-kel 
powel 1. ', "the abilliltv to \zll-\; price without suffering lai-,,,, e variations in , des. fundamentally (ILIC 
to a lack of aitcrnati Nc products". (Boner and KrucLcr, p. 10. ) FI(m ever. the difterence,, bet\\ cen 
tile notion.,, ot mm-ket po\\er and doillinance are more apparent than real and in pnicticc the\ 
tend to illel, e 
3 
kick of connection between concentration in mi indwory and the lev-1 of pmfii, ý ol' llltý 
mostsignificant firms. 76 t) 
In particular, the new evidence has shown that there is no fatalistic connection 
between market concentration and business rivalry, as seen in cases where the mo,, t 
concentrated industries m*e not necessarily the most profitable. 77 These conclu, ýiow, mv 
76 For example, Caves and Porter analyse the strategic behaviour of incumbent firms in the market. 47 According to their view, the "deterrent" to new firms is not simply the result of barriers to enti*N L_ - that ailow incumbent firms to use pricing limit strategies. Firms displayed a complex arrýiy ol Z__ - dissuasive techniques to impede newcomers from entering the market, ci-eating ncw entr\, 
barriers. The new theory admitted that the conduct of incumbent firi-ris could altei- niai-kci 
structure. Under this appraisal the role of strate. gic groups in the structure of markets I,,, decisivc. Cý 1ý, Therefore, the concept of barriers to entry has been broadened to include barriers to mohility. 
The theory holds that modelling the entry pi-ocess in oli-opolistic industnes will be a,, difficult tl L_ 
as niodelling the pi-ice and output behavl()ui- of enterim, fii-nis. Interdependencc bcwccil 
incumbent firms and potential entrants 'ust as It does among incumbent firms. EnicrIn, 2 I 
and potential entrants must second-guess one another and make significant decisions based 
solely on conjecture. Theoretical game approaches are, therefore, as central to explainin. - the 
entry process as they are to explaining behaviour amon(Tst entering firms. Foi- this reason. 
considerations of conduct must be broadened to include more detailed investigation, of entry- 
cleterring strategies. (Burton, Competition.... pp. 1-23. ) For example, experience curve pricing a, ý, 171 t7 
an entry-cleterrin IT strategy shows that firm conduct determines market structure. The OWCOMC N' 
this strategy is to -am a dommant position in the market concemed. zn t_ 
77 For example, Hay and Wei-den contend: "It is desirable to have an empirical basis for nicrz, ý, ci- 
policy, and until the mid-1970s most economists probably believed that inter-Inclustr% 
concentration profit,, studies provided that basis. Thcse sludic,,, have been iiiýickckl -1; 
many fronts, and few economists continue to believe that such studies provide a substantial hwi, 
for merger policy". (Hay and Werden, G., Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, and Economics. 8' 
American Economic Review, [1993] at 174. ) According to Werden, the overall thrust N 
empirical literature on market concentration and the level of prices shows that there is ýi 
relationship that is positive and statistically significant, but "typically not particularly important tý - 
quantitatively". (G. Werden, A Review of the Empirical and Experimental Evidence oil the 
Relationship between Market Structure and Performance, United States Department of Justicc, 
Antitl_Llst Division, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper, EAG 91-3, Washington, DC 
May 1991, p. I) Carlton and Bishop consider that: "There is indisputable evidence thai pricc,, ý 
kill as entrants enter a previously monopolised market. The real debate is how, fast pricc fiilk 
with entry. Studies of individual industries seem to indicate that competition often \\()i-k,,, \ci-, 
quickly, with lai-, --c price effects caused by entry ot a second or third firm, but much lm\ci (aild 
sometimes zero) effects to; - subsequent entry". See C. Carlton, and W. Bishop, "Merger Policý 
and Market Definition Under the EC Merger Reaulation", in Antitrust in a Global Economy, B. 
Ha\\,, k. (ed. ), (Irvington-on Hudson: Transnational Juris Publications, Inc., 1994). p. 415. In 
Short, tile i1cw Cvidence shows the following,: firstly, there is no Iong-run empirical relationship 
between high profit and high industry concentration; secondly, accounting profits are a pool- 
indicator of monopoly or resource misallocation: and finally, long-run profits are a return to 
lon, --rull 
innovation and risk taking. In other words. it is reasonable to e\pect that lc,, ý cl I iý ient 
will more dowly than their more efficient 1-1\ als. 
5) 
supported by further empirical evidence of the behaviour of rivalry itself, which diows 
that cm-tels are not as stable and profitable as they were thought to bc. 78 b 
Furthermore, new explanations for entry barrier,, arose, whereby they were vc\\'cd 
as efficiencies that ought to be protected, rather than discouraged by blind interventwil. 79 
Finally, the theory of Contestable Markets eroded the significance formerly attached to 
entry barriers as determinants of performance and the contestability of rilark-cls ý1. " 
deterrninants of market outcomes. 80 
M short, these more recent models induced aiintrust enforcement to become inorc 
sophisticated, incorporating business behaviour explanations to justify the working ol' the 
SCP paradigm on modelled situations which were assumed to be closer to real mýii-kct. s. Z: ) 
78 The alleged readiness of firms to enter into these ii-rangements is more hn-ii1cd than 
thought. Indeed, firms are unlikely to join these agreements due to their unstable character, and 
prefer to co-operate by other means. Due to the financial risk, ý involved, the empirical c\, idencc 
presented sti-gests that this form of co-operation is seldom profitable. Asch and Senecit made an 
empirical analysis on the role of collusion in the 1ýrofitability of American 
corporations during the period 1958-1967. Although they were cautious about the implications 
of their evaluation, they concluded that the collusive firms are consistently less profitable than 
non-colluders. (See P. Asch and J. J. Seneca, "is Collusion Profitable? " in The (. 'ýw -ses and 
'tive. F. McChesne\ a Q)nsequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choicc PersNctiv nd W Shm-fliart 
(eds. ) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995). pp. 107-117. I- t7 
79 For example, Stigler excluded economies ()f , calc fi-om the concept 0' barrier,, to ejjtj-ý, 
argued that these include any feature of ýt market thýit iinip(), se., ý, co, ýt, ý on ontrani,,, which 
incumbent suppliers did not face when they entered the market. See G. StIgler. The 
Orpnization of Indugg, (Chicago: The University of Chicaý, () Press', 1983), Chaptei- 6. A, 
Rothbard contended, the fact that these barriers were not present at the time the first entrani, 
penetrated the market, does not necessarily invNve a higher cost foi- incoming firms. (Rothkird. 
"Monopoly... ") 
80 W. Baurnol, Parizar and R. Willi-, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Market Structure. 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich. Inc.. 19821). W. Baurnol and A. Blindcl 
Microeconornics- Principles and Policy, 5th. Ed. (New York: The Dryden Press, 1991 )ý pp. 32-4- 
325. Market Performance will be "competitive" (i. e. cost-efficient market structure will 
- -n zero economic profits in the long-run) re,! ardless of the &Lree of , ind firm,, will cýii 
concentration in the market, as long as it remains "contestable", that is. as Iong as barrier,, to 
entry are low. Contestable markets, like competitive ones, exist in the absence of entr\ harrici-, 
or exit. In contestable markets incumbent firms will be forced to charge price,, which reflect 
their costs of' production due to the threat of competition from outside, as Ion, -, it,, enirv 
condition.,., are insignificant. A distinctive si-ri of contestable markets. therefore, is that the\ niC 
be highly concentrated due to significant economic,, of scale or economies of scope. and still be 
open to competitive pressure from potential competitors. The theory of' Contc,, Iable Markeiý, i, 
close[\, related to the theory of Competitive Nlirkets. 
Nevertheless, the new models explainin, -, the ciwsilltv of niarkct phenonicn,, i iin(lor 
the SCP paradigni share a similar closed-end appraisal of market interaction with the old 
ones. Both assume that the policy-maker is fully informed in understandin(a the \Nm In 
which the Integrating elements of the SCP paradiurn allegedly influence one another, a" t- tý Z: ) 
well as the wcial efficiency which is assumed to accrue hy the manipulation ol' tlic,,, e 
clerrients according to a predetermined pattern. 
These "clynarnic" models relax the assLiniption of perfect inforniation Lindcr ýi iii, -, Ic 
equilibrium, by exploring situations in which there is asyimietric information aillom4st 
economic agents which leads to multiple equilibria. In recent models, for instancc, the 
tools of Game Theory are used to examine the likely response of firms to the anticipated 
strategies of other market participants. 81 t-- 
Nevertheless, in thesc models it is still assurned that the decision-n-laker hx" 
to Lill the information necessary to predict the market outcomes resulting 1'r()III thc Z: 7' 
interaction, and to anticipate 11 interactin, -, firnis outcomes, regardless of whether the 
possess asymmetric or perfect information. 8? 
In conclusion, the counterfactual use of positivc model.,, led to believe ftit 1-cality 
would be located at sorne intermediate point between the two extreincs depictcd by the 
Pure Monopoly and the Perfect Competition models. If these two polar reference.,, wcl-L, 
oppositc ideals, could it be possible that rnodcls which possess none of their cxtrcrnc 
assuniptions (i. e., perfect information) be closer representations of "real" markets" 
For cxample, current antitrust analysis ganic-theorv modelling to demonstrate how fjj-jjjlý iliziN, 
"co-operate" through tacit collusion. (E. Ullmann-Mai-Lallt, The Emergence of Norms, 
Clatendon Prcv-,. 1977): also. Burton. Competition.... pp. ]-23. ) In Leneral, , cc L. Phlip,,. 
Compctition Poh( I Hn I-. I Pre""'. cy: A Game Theoretic pci-, sl)ccti\c. bri(k, c ('ambrid, -, c 
-\cs flint "the new garne theoretical IIICILISti-lal ori-, ankation (10) ma\ be ýccn ýi, ' an l'o', " Ob"Cl Z- 
advmice relative to the old-fashioned , ti-uctui-e-coiiduct-pei-foi-iiiýiiice" (Foss, Nustrian Economic 
-\ . pp. 
1-2) Nevertheles,,,. he r, , ind Game 
I'licoi , verv careful in pointing that the neý\ appral"al 
(1()c,, not realk repre,, ent a paradigmatic departure frorn mainstream "equilibrium" cconoilllcý'. 
hUt Slýllpl\ I "dN'llMllIC- 1111PI-ovenient over the former static bix,, dominating the c\pkmation ()i Z-- 
conventional market behaviour. 
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Not surprisingly, scholars developed intermediate models to express the manv 
in which -asymmetric information" (i. e., imperfect information) caused market,, to hchavc 
with the characteristics of neither polar extreme. Strongly influenced by their po"ItI \, ],, [ ic 
perspective, scholars never questioned whether the theories were accurate. logical 
(lescriptions of reality. 
c) Normative implications of the "market failurc- logic on the view of nmrkcl, ý mid 
economic organisation. 
Initially, the positive method induced scholars to make counterfactual expci-1111clits 
whereby the positive function of real world market institutions was contrasted with (lic 
perfectly competitive market. The contrast of the iniaginary world ot' equillbl-ILIIII i12d111, -, 1 L- I 
the real world of firn-is and markets showed how these institution,, have some sciisc in 
enabling market participants to cope with inconiplete information. In this way, they could 
draw "factual" conclusions on market functioning, by avoiding the treatment ol 
institutions in the analysis, which centred on "values". 
However, it was a short step before economists would deduce norniativc 
Conclusions frorn this counter-factual use Of eCILIllibi-lum. They soon reallsed that ()ptinlal 
effIcIcncv in the allocation of resources would prevail in markets Under perfect 
conipention, 'and tlmi this state of equilibriurn within tile System WOUld prevall. ýý') Undci 
these conditions markct forces would allocate social resources amongst individuals \\, -hci-c 
they Would obtain their maximum value. "Resources gravitate to those uses where their 
cconornic value is orcatest. " 84 
ako, Vc1lanovski, p. 20. 
84 VC1 -ld of equilibrium thl,, reference ýka,, ineviuiblv linked io janovski, p. 10. In the closed-end woi 
FCý, OLKCC ý1110CMIOII. As Richardson state, ý- "Formal welfare theory is concerned Cs"Clitial1v with 
the IoLic of re,,, ource allocation-, it , ct,, it,, elf to find what distributions of rc.,, ourcc,, "ali"I\ ;i 
', tlj)Llla1ed CIACIA011 W1111C bellh! consistent %ýith certain po,, tulatcd objective condition,,,. , Lich I,, 
picferencc-, production functions and the like". (G. B. Richardson. Information and Imc,,, tmellt. 
(I. ondon: Oxford Ulmersity Press. 1960). 1). 1 -1.1. ) In thi,, way, allocative efficiencv. as cnihodled 
in the Pareto optimal formulation. gained a Pl-al"Ount po,, ition amongst , ocial ýcienwýtý, ý1,, the 
l-L PI St! n, On Ethic _d 
Fconom' 
, 
(()\fol II Lvs o 'ý111'Slll -111CIPIC Of 1101-mative econonlic,,. an lics 3 11 
)7). p. 33. ) IMick\\cll. 19,8 
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Thu, s, the neo-classical view not only hi-OLIght about a positive pcr,, pc(: ti\, c ()I Z-- 
market Corce,,, but al,, () provided a normative reference from which market perforimuice 
could he *udged. Economists either idealised reality itself, so that it approxirnýttcd the 
i-nodel, oi- made reality a dystopia, with utopian properties attributed to tho, ýc 
intervention,, designed to make reality match the model. 85 
Achieving equilibrium thus became crucKil to the norniýitive apprajsýd of the notion 
of market cornpetition. If the appropriate conditions of equilibriuni hold (i. e. j)cr1'cct 
information, decentralised markets, many buyers and sellers) the market mechanisill \, 'Ic]Cls 
the best possible welfare results. As Boettkc explains, this created the setting foi- the Z 
"niarket failure" logic, because "unless the strict conditi red 1'or k)cnci-al ýý I ions requi ý7' 
cornpetitive equilibrI'LIIII were met, the economic theory could not, with any confidence. 
inake pronouncements about the efficiency of market allocations. In fact she could he 
confident that the niarket would yield , tiboptli-nal re, ýLilts that (ici-niinded c()i-rec1iv(, 
governnient action. "8o Equilibrium is only possible in decentralised market structures 
where competition is so "perfect" that individual firms, unable to manipulate nlarkct 
conditions to their own advantage, behave as "price takers". That is, no one cýln act 
independently but only in reaction to price chaiwc,,,. Under this vicw, dei-nand 
provides markets with their particular shape. 
The idea that 1-111del' equilibrium resOUFCC'ý, COUld be allocated ,, () w, to maximr,, c 
Consumer welfare to the lirynt of current budget constraints, was too tempting to hc 
iicglected. It , soon 
became a normative reference for measuring how *'\N,, cll" n. c. 
cfficlciitly) a market was structured. Economists were lured into the idea that niai-kct.,, 
ýilonc cannot fulfil a socMl welfare function. confcri-im-, benefits on ,, ociety tý, a wholc. 
hecause they can nc\, cr attain equilibrium or perfect competition. Any ltaLC Of 
disequilibrium , cci-ned a "failure", even to those who did not ýharc the norm; wvc 
Boettke. -W'hilt Wclit NVI th Economic,, "" at 20. 
, ý,, 01 (1, 
properties of the economic efficiency standard. "Market failure simply nieýins ilic 1'ailtilv 
of real world markets to achieve the standards of the imaginary market. "87 It is Liticrk' 
impossible to achieve an efficient resource allocation outside positive equilibrIUM 
models. 88 In particular, it presents the idea that markets can reach a "social optimum" It' 
they move towards equilibrium. This idea haunted policy-makers, who naively helievvd 
that through appropriate legislation they could make "reality" approximate ancl Cvell 
replicate such an optimal state. 
These considerations are important because they laid the path of research ill tile 
study of competition. Initially, Pietro Sraffa argued that markets had obstacles to 
competition which made it impossible to attain competitive equilibrium in the loll()-rull. 
These obstacles were not simply "frictions", as defenders of the competitive illodel 
dismissively claimed. Instead, they represented irnportant forces with lasting effects. His 
approach to these obstacles to competition (viz., possession of unique natural resources. 
87 W. Mitchell and R. Simmons. Beyond Politics: Markets, Welfare and the Failure of 
Bureaucracy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 6. 
88 Here, it is essential to refer to the influential work of Arthur Pigou on social costs and neoative 
externalities created under market functioning. This work explicitly conveys the idea that 
government intervention could improve the overall efficiency of social performance. /\1ficd 
Mai-shall in his Principles of Economics had already introduced the concept of external 
economies, but little attention was given to it until his disciple, Pigou, pointed out the 
divergence existing between "private net product" and "social net product". Pigou argued that 
the exchange process could lead to externalities or diseconomies; namely, a situation where the 
costs inherent in any activity (i. e. the costs for private parties) could diverge from their social 
costs (i. e. the costs falling upon such agents and the rest of society). Pigou called "external co.,, C' 
or "external diseconomy" the difference between the social and private cost. Similarly, the 
difference between social benefit and social costs led to "external benefits" or "external 
economies". Pigou observed that each individual adopts his decisions on the basis of the privme 
costs and benefits of his undertaking. In other words, he exclusively considers the costs and 
benefits affectina him. The rational individual does not consider these external "effects", 
regardless of their costs or benefits. Not all the costs and benefits of individual trades ýIrc 
necessarily internalised by the traders. Some benefits and costs may leak and affect the 
behaviour of other individuals who are not a direct party to the exchange. Transactions within 
the market may impose externalities and therefore lessen social efficiency; thus, government 
intervention would be desirable in those instances. This approach initiated the branch of Welfare 
Economics in economic theory and had a deep influence on the perception of markets. Later. 
Ronald Coase demonstrated the fallacy of the unilateral approach followed hý' PIý1101,1 III 
establishing externalities. In essence, Coase argued the two-way nature of externalities. For an 
explanation of how Marshall's perspective was developed by Pigou and later criticised by Coa,, c, 
see R. Ekelund and R. H6bert, A History of Econornic Theory and Method, (New York: Mc 
Graw Hill, 1990), pp. 403-405. For an explanation and critique of the Pigovian contrihLition. ýoc 
S. Cheung, The Myth of Social Cost: A critique of welfare economics and the imp ti( I )I L_ - _21ica 
)IIs 
Pub , (London: 
Institute of Economic -\ffairs, 1978. ) 
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le,, 
-, ýd privilege.,,, control of a large share of totil production. existencc ()I- 
commodities) jn, ýpjred J. RobInson's approach to mperfect markets. 89 
This normative appraisal fuelled the conviction amongst , cholars that thc clo,, cr Z: ) 
i-narket structure was to a state of perfect competition, the more likely it thol 
allocation Would be "optimal". Conversely, in n-iarkets that did not resemble tlic,, c 
extreme structural conditions; that is, all real life markets, competition was clas, ýIfied [,, 
imperfect" or "monopolistic". Armentano explains this reasoninc, in more detail. zn 
"Between 1880 and . 
1933 economists defined and constructed mathematical to 
encompass a theoretical business competition in terms of a particular inarket VI-11('1111-c 
( ... ) 
But why thi, v definition of competition? This particular definition of competition \va", 
popular with economists, and especially with the mathematical economists,, becausc it 
implied a certain conduct-performance from econornic markets that economists canle to 
regard as 'optimal'. In a word, a purely competitive market structure would autoniatically 
generate economic forces that tended to maximise society's wants at the least poss c bIhI 
cost: it was the most effic'ent. Accordingly, pure competition became the ratiollýlle foi- 
laissez-faire; departures from pure competition became the rationale for antitrust". 9() 
The logic of antitrust policy emerges out of this epistemological perception of t: ) L- L- 
reality and the instrumental role of regulation. Market impel. 1cctions required om crninciit Z: ) t) 
89 Ekelund and 1-16bert, pp. 485-486,495-507. The work of Mai-shall's disciples was a ded"Ive, 
factor in turning the concept of externalities into normative yardsticks. Noticeably, in [let 
famous book, Ae Ecoiwinics of Iinj. )erfect Competiti-mi, Robinson explicitly devotes ýi whole 
chapter to relate the notions of "imperfect markets" and "negative externalities" one each other. 
In this chapter she attaches normative properties to her positive findings about some states 
where competition does not replicate perfect corripetition. On this question, see J. Robln'ý()11ý Tile 
Fconoinics-of ln-iWrfect Competition, (London- Mac Millan & Co. Ltd_ 1942), pp. 307-3-16 It 
is also fair to saN, that Robinson herself was well axxýire ()I the risks of misusing equilihi-iLini ýis ýi Cý 
heuristic tool, when she declares: "In order to make a valid theoretical comparison bct\, \ccn 
competitive output and monopoly output in a particular industry it is necessary 1, ) rnakc ýcrv 
-e assumptions These CISS111771)t['017N C11-e 11171i'kely to be titýfilled 1'n anv actual si'tuati'mi". , cvci 
(Robinson, The Econornics. _ pp. 14')- 144. ) (Emphasis is the authors). 
In developing his idcd, 
about monopolistic competition Edward Chamberlin followed an independent line of research to 
R obinson's. but remarkably his studies pointed to similar conclusions. Markets showed sevcral 
instances of monopolistic competition, which prevented an optimal allocation of , ()clal 
resource', ', '. (EkelUnd and Wbert, pp. 486,488-495. ) 
'ti, u,,, t: Econoni'c Theorýancl Legal Ca,,, c,,. (Neý\ Rochelle- 90 1). T. Armentano, The Myths of Anti I 
,, \I-ImL, ton 
Housc, 1972). p. 27. 
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U-Itervention to offset the neboative externalitie,, on competition proce.,,. scý, depictct-i iii thcc 
rnodels. Improving competition required active antitrust enforcement to elin-iinitic 
shortcoi-nln(, s such as collusive behaviour, or excessive concentration or monopolisition L- 
resulting from poor market structure. 
Competition was made 'perfect'; no reputable economist claimed that such a sv,, tem 
ýiccurately described the actual state of free enterprise. However, as Richardson put it 11 11 
undoubtedly stood, for many people, as an I form of organisation -stnctlN, deal or model 1-5 
speaking onloy a logical as opposed to an ethical ideal, although this distinction was 11W 
always sharply made. It does not seem to have been recognised that the fact that 
I imperfections', in sorne forms and degree of strength, are clearly an obstacle to 
ad *II Justi-nent, does not entitle one to conclude that it would be best *f (; -nii-kc1) 
imperfections' were absent altogether. Yct the pedagogic convenience ()I-' pel-fcc, Z: ý Z) 
competition, and its suitability as a base for extensive formal and mathemýltl(-ýI! 
elaboration, gave the system a central place in theoretical discussion". 91 
In this connectim Stigler observed that "definitions do not yield any knowled, -, c I 
about the real world, biti thev do influence impressions (#'Ihe irorhl. Ifonly markets ýý IiIi 
a vast number of traders are perfectly competitive, and if markets with few tradei-, ýii-c 
91 Richardson, Information .... at 
39. Klein emplmsises the importance of the perfect competitioll 
model*for antitrust purposes as follows: -( ... ) of 
Al the various analytical toolkits that constittitc 
contemporary political economy, perhaps the most important model for the cconomlýt 1ý, ille 
model of perfect Competition". B. Klein. "The Use of Economic,, in 
Anti-trust 1, 
itigýition: 
Realistic Models of the Competitive Process" in The Law and Economics of Competition Policy, 
F. Mathewson et al. (eds. ) (Vancouver: The FrLiser Institute, 1990). p. 420. Also, Clark 
"The conception of 'perfect competition' hýis itself for the first time received i-ctll\ sj)cJh-1: 
definition and elaboration. With this has come the realisation that *perfect competition' d()c, not 
and cannot exist and has presumably never c\Isted (... ) What we hai, e leli I's an wireal m ideo/ 
standai-d ii, htch may scrve as a stat-ting point ofanalYsts and a not-In it'ith ii, hich to compoic 
actual competf . t1vc cmiditions. It has also scrved as a standard b, V I-I'lliCh to j11d(Qe thN71'-. 
(Author's italics) (J. M. Clark, "Toward a Concept of Workable Competition", ')0 The Arneriý., tn 
Econornic-Review, [June 19401: 241). Finally, Hayek indicated with regard to the 1)crfecl 
competition model that: "This ideal case ( ... ) cmiic to be regarded as the model and \Vil'ý LlýCd it'- 
it standard hv which the achievernent of competition in the real world Wits _jLIdz171Cd-. 
(I 
Mtvck, LavýLLeoislation and Liberty: The Political Order of a Free Peop-le Vol 3 (ChicaLý()ý The 
Uiil\ci-, -, ItNI of Chicago Press. 1976), p. 66. ) A recent anitlysis on the use of perfect competition ill 
;I norniative viii-clstick is found in J. Burton. "Cornpetition over Competition Anal\si, ý: A guldc I(, 
sonle Colllcrnporm-\ kcolwmicý, Dispute,, ", in Frontier", oll con"IRP-t It loll -Lým 1111,11ROC ot'Eurol)can I m. 1994. ) 
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callc(l oligopolistic (literally, "few sellers"), that suggests that thcse lattcr niarkctý, . -Ii-C I]()[ 
competitive, as well as not perfectly competitive. [Consequently] The suspicion ()f snlý111 
numbers was gradually reinforced by the antitrust cases". (Author', ý ltalics)c)-I. hi thc 
hands of his disciples Marshall's positive concept of externalitics sudclenlý turliccl illto 
normative yardsticks. 
Under these assumptions, all forms of co-operation and economic orý-mii, ýation 
amongst entrepreneurs implicitly entail a departure from the optimal frontier, hccaLrc 
they produce some relaxation of the conditions encapsulated in the Perfect Competition 
Model. They also indicate some kind of externality or market failure which creatcs an 
asymmetry of information to the disadvantage of someone in the market, whether it hc 
the consumers or other producers. 
In the language of the SCP paradigm, economic organisation wa, " assunicd to hC t7l t) b 
based around the monopolistic intentions of firms with "market power". Sin-illarly. 
concentrated markets immediately became questionable, as they appeared to fa\'()Lll- 111 
sorts of trade restrictive dealings. This is especially important in understandiiig thc 
fixation of Latin American antitrust scholars with issues such as market concentration, (i, ý 
we shall see below. 93 As Richard Epstein claims-. "On the [neo-clas,, ical] ccon,, )mic iv'cir 
ihe ii, orhl it is quite a mistake to view competition and monopoly -or at leasi 
, ocial states that cbb monopolization- with a detached neutrality, as two alternative s 
flow as the tides. Monopolization is regarded as an improper social activity, one that vý to L- 
be prevented chiefly by the civil and criminal sanctions of the antitrust laws. " (Author's 
ita I ics)94 
92 See Stigler, Mernoirs., p. 94. Richardson also observes: "there is no reason to expect that the 
hypothetical market conditions which define perfect competition would in fact en'ýUre that 
production would he carried on by the most efficient means. for there is no reason to believe that 
the supposed equilibrium position would ever he reached. The link between market structure ý! iW 
the scale of investments is to be sought more in the particular modes ot adjustment, than in the 
supposed equilibrium situations, with which the structure can be associated. Here. as elsewherc. 
much that is of importance has been denied adequate analysis as a result of the tyrarim \\hlc!, 
II the equi i lum concept has exercised mer modern econornic theory". (Richaidm)n. 
Information.... p. 89) 
'011 12 in this chapter. 
94 R. Fp,, tem. -Privýiic Property and the Puhllc Domain: The of' \ntltl-Ll, ', t*', W 1: 1111CS. 
The severe implications resulting from having this standard eriforcecl at c\(, I-\ 
instance logically forced regulators to realise very quickly that not all "co-operat loll 
socially harmful. This became evident once the initial structural versions of the '-"(-'P 
paradium were challenged by empirical evidence pointing to -dynamic- cxplaiiatiow,, aml L- L- Z: ) - 
people canie to view marly restrictions Lis "efficiericic,, ". 
Antitrust regulations solve these complications in the so-called "per se" and -rulc ol' 
reason" analysis. Certain conduct and corporate forms are "per se" regarded as entaihnL, ýt zn - 
monopolistic intention, since there are no justifications reasons for firms undcl-takillL, I 
them except to restrict business rivalry in order to impose consumers with higdicr I)i-icc,,, 
and other unýlustjfiable i-narket conditions. Therefore. legal rules prohihit theni with no 
exemption. Sometimes, however, these bushicsscs conduct and practiccs nia\ 1)rovc 
necessýiry to enable the , ystcni to develop -, ýoclal efficiencies"-, this conduct should 11()1 1)'' 
forbidden, but subject to a "rule of reason" analysis. The task of such analysis lls 
essentially to make inferences on the intentions of Cirms entering into these practlcc., ý, ill 
order to distinguish monopolistic from efficient i-naFket outcomes. 
The thrust of antItI'LISt rec: 
the elements comprising the L- 
knowledge to improve social zn 
performance is defined, which 
SOLIAt under these reoulations. 1ý z: I 
- "al kI , ulations revolvcs around the idca that proper apI)ILH. 
SCP paradigni can give the policy-i-naker sulficiem tý Z: ) 
performance. That posits the question of ho\, \ ,, ocial 
is ultimately a problem about the public interest 2oal.,,, 11 
Economics and the L,, ýiw Nomos XXIV. J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds. ). (New York: Nc\\ 
York Unlvcr, ýIty Prc,, s. 1982)ý p. 52. Epsteln (1()c,, not c,, capc h-om ImplIcItk 
normative coiisccluenccs of antitrust. Thereloic, he Justifies antitrust action on the asmimpti'oll 
that consunici-, pay more than they shotthl in monopoly markets, due to illegitimate monoj)()h-,, i 
Coercion: "The danp-rs of monopoly have led to powerful legal restraints against freedom (11 
Contract for prl\ýItc parties under both the Shernimi mid Clayton ., \cts". (R. 
Epstein. RýH, 
-, ým)IIILI 
with the State, (Princeton: Princeton Univer,, ity Press. Princeton, 1993), pp. 51,53). ) Similark. 
Rothbard argued that: -many writers have used [Consurner So\, ei-ei, -, iit\, ] as an ideal \ý ith which 
to contrast the alle, -, edly imperfect 
free market , y,, tcrn- and further. the notion has hecii u,, c(I 
an "ethical ideal apinst which the activities of the free market are to be Judged. Con,, umci 
Sovereig, rity becomes almost an Absolute Good, and any action hy producers to th\\art thr" ideal 
Is Considered as little than moral treason". (M. Rothbard, *'%I()iioI)()! \ and Cmillmition". ii; 
I-cononiv md Stme: A Treatise on l"conornic Prin IC', VoI. 11. (PI-Incelow 1) \ . 111 ---- 
Kip I 
Nos I ra n (I Coii 11),, 111 1nc., 196 2 ), pp. 501.501) 
(1 -2 
1 
v 
d) The definition of "public interest" goals under conventional i-c-ulatioll 
Determining the "public interest" goals of any legislation under the conventlomil t: ) 
legal method I.,; not an easy task. The method doe,, not provide Lis with a reliable 
determining the intention of the law-giver beyond a superficial analysis of the wordim-, ol, 
le(lal I-Liles. For this reason, certainty in the law has been construed a,,, -thc prccP, 1oi, ol' ýi Z-7) 
written text emanating from legislators". 95 To avoid the limitations of the convcIltW11,11 ýn 
legal method it is necessary to trascend these narrow boundaries in order to ascertain the zn 
sense and public goals of conventional regulation. It is here that one can find the UltlIM11C 
normative sources of antitrust regulationsjustýfying their enforcement. 
These sources are found, again, in the distinction between "J'act" an(] -va]LIC 
inherited from positivisi-n. Notwithstanding its allegiance to "value neutrality", positivisni 
tended to obscure the distinction between fýicts and values bv virtue of its 
which tended to conflate modelling and aesthetics. Indeed, as we have seen, positivistil 
induced a confusion between the perspective of the observer with the perspective of tho,, c 
players belonging to the observed reality. 96 Hence, it was difficult for positivi,, -, i , ocial 
scientists to escape taking a position on values M their positive appraisals of reajitv. 97 Z- - 
Despite the considerable appeal of this culture which has pervaded cconomic 
gal scholm-, ý. (),, -, Aý, ýi , ýClence I-or two centuries, it has not been widely acknowledged by le,,, 
95 B. Leoni, Freedom and the Law, (Indianapoljsý Liherty Fund, 1961). p. 93. 
() (I See section I. I a) ahove. 
97 Katz explains why- firstly, social science studies a set of problems about which people hiiý 
intense ethical feelin,, 7,, s. 
Secondly, because of the language and rhetoric of moral phil(),, ()phv 
which -ave man\! technical terms a value-laden connotation in ordinarv lan-ua, -, e 
O. c. 
"equilibrium", "market failure", "perfect competition", etc. ). Finally. theoretical rnoclelliný, 
(particularly arnong economists) induced , cholai-, to use rhetoric and example,, to , Implilý md 
i-notivate the model,, -. ho,. vever, rhetoric (which is not appreciated &,, such hN tho"e \\ilhmit 
special technical training) necessarily reflect,, the normative commitments ot the niodcllci. 
(Katz. "Positivism ... " at 
2235-2230). 
98 Howe%er, it fýiir to say that legal science is much dominated hy a positivi,, t oLitl()()k, 
kard,, to the analysis of , ()cial rulc, ý throuLh the analvocal le, -, ýtl method 1c, 
i, cL,, Il in,, truinentah,, m is an important part of pi-ofe,, \, I()iial tradition. Howc\cr, oll Ille 
nol-111,1tive , ide thing-, are percei\ed differenik. A,, Katz contends: "our culture rcLJrd, 
04 
result, economists are frequently committed to values which are not clearly distlngul, ýhccl 
from their positive analyses. For this reason, economists' endorsement of a pollc\, ()I- Ct 
rule as "efficient" entails a complex descriptive statement that can only be solved with the 
help of a well-defined algorithm for checking its presence, which is not always CxI)1Ic1t1', 
, specified. Thus, "efficiency" in economic analysis possesses different meanings, which 
cannot be ascertained unless the analyst states their normative sense in advance. In 
contrast, the comparatively milder influence of positivism on legal scholars makes thcrn 
committed to a variety of values, particularly in the field of public law. 99 These value,,, 
which economists regard as alien to their positive analysis, are essential to legal science-, 
furthermore, their normative essence comes out of discussion. 100 
These considerations are essential for seeing why the formalist approach of le, -, ýd bI 
science in public law did not really entail value-neutrality since "within the formalist 
law as more than commands of an arbitrary sovereign; we expect law to be principled. 
Positivism is controversial because it suggests that we might in some sense be obligated to obey t.. ) t: 1 
unprincipled laws. " (Katz, "Positivism ... 
" at 2239). Indeed, in recent years, there are clear sii-ns tý 
of a growing disenchantment with the construction of legal science as an empirical science. t) 
Evidence of this disenchantment is found, for example, in the new breed of constitutionalisill 
emerging in Europe, which is moving toward a more effective protection of human and 
econornic ri,, hts throu,, h control. Still, European scholars highlight the divcr. "Ity of Z7 ltý - 
national jurisdictions with regard to judicial control; as an ex-judge of the European Court of' 4: ý 
Justice argued: "it is in this area particularly that national interests show their differences". 
(Lord Mackenzie Stuart, The European Communities and the Rule of Law, The Hamlyn 
Lectures, Stevens and Sons, London, 1977, p. 64. ) In Latin America, too, a process towards the 
inclusion of more effective devices for the procedural protection of constitutional rights has 
become dominant in recent years. These means range from preventive judiciaý review 
mechanisms to the specific right of ainliaro. See Brewer, Judicial... More generally in this 
regard, see E. Garcfa de Enterrfa, La Constitucl6n como Norma v el Tribun. al Constitucional, 
(Madrid: Civitas, 1985). In general, see the discussion between H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuiler 
99 See Katz, "Positivism ... 
" at 2247. Loughlin also emphasises how such values are implicitly 
rooted at the heart of the basic institutions of public law. As a consequence of this, two basic 
styles of thought in public law emerge, which he labels "normativism" and "functional 1 
Between adherents of these two styles, he argues "there is virtually no agreeniew over the 
contours and boundaries of the subject", and even if writers may use similar concepts -such as 
sovereignty, liberty, democracy, and law- the meanings which such concepts convey tend to be 
rather different. In his opinion, "this is hardly surprising since these concepts perform different 
roles within competing models of ublic law. " In fact, the differentiation between them is deep. p 
as "the roots of these competing styles are to be found in theorie-, of politics and "ocietý, ". 
(Loughlin, p. 230. ) 
100 Thus, economists reggard these values as "equity" considerations which do not ýerve 1,, 
, guidelines to econornic science's positive analysis. 
An example of this is Rawls' minimax rule, 
which can hardiv be regarded as a positive rule under legal analysis. (Katz. "Posit* vkni -- at 
3 7. 
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approach there existed a specific ideological conception of legality. '"101 Wliat P, t1lat t) 
ideological conception in the sphere of market regulation and antitrust policy? 
In sorne jurisdictions (most notably, the United States of America), MIMFLIý, t P, 
generally sought to protect consumer welfare-, therefore, it , in our view, houlcl Ký 
exclusively guided by efficiency concerns. Consumers will be better off if enforcement 
oblioes enterprises to lower their prices to meet their marginal costs. Hence, conSLIIIICI-S t: ) Z: ) 
must be "sovereign" in the sense that they are the ones who should dictate the tcrill" (11 t- 
market transactions. Purposive legislation should ensure Consumer Sovei-ei, -, iit\,, an(i I- 
vague political concerns should be excluded frorn antitrust policy enforcement. Only hy 
protecting consumer welfare is it possible to develop clear enforcement piidellilcýs 
compatible with the rule of law and avoidance of discretion. Consumer welfare is the only 
legitimate goal of policy enforcement and indeed the only one in mind when the policy 
was introduced. To support this contention, "consumer welfare" scholars resort to 
selected cases decided by the U. S. courts (particularly, the most persuasive ones dccldccl 
by the Supreme Court) which reveal an increasing departure from the former "politic, 11" 
or "structuralist" approach to the policy. 102 
Other jurisdictions often have rationales which are different from economic 
efficiency, probably persuaded by the criticisms made upon the Pareto standard. 103 These 
I () I Lou-hlin, p. 23. 
102 See In particular, R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War wIth Itself, BýI", c Book" 
Puhlisher, New York, 1978. 
103) Initially, the -, ()-cýdled Pareto criterion became the dominant expression of this kind of 
in the economic profession. Later, however, the , tandard was stronl-Ily criticlsed h\ wc1fiii- C 
economists like Sen, who pointed out the harsh implications 
4 
enforcing it with no Cý 
qualification: "Pareto optimality deals exclusl\,, cl\! with efficiency in the space of utilitie,,, jiýivingl 
no attention to the distributional considerations regarding utility. [Thus] the whole tocw. ot L_ tý 
analysis has continued to be utility. It is. of course. possible to Introduce wher 
considerations in judymL, the success of pet-sons and thus of the , ocletv. Pareto optim; ilitv 
CýIPWI_CS the efficiicnc), aspects only of utility-based ýiccountln,,,, -. (Sen, p. 3,3) Indeed, hv leavmL 
I without violatin- 
the condition (fl some people in c\trerne misery and others 'rollino In luxury' II 
efficiency, "Parcto optirnality, like 'Caesar's spit-it'. 'comes hot from hell. " (Scn, p. 32) Further. 
-n interpersonal comparikow, janovski states that this criterion denies the possibility of I aking, Vel IIIII 
of utility. Therefoic. "the welfare of one Individual cannot be offset oi- compared to that ot 
l,, -hich is an essential condition for appraisin, itnother i policý imtiative,,. hcczw,, c "even the 
most trivial pollc\ change P, likely to harm iii least one person Ifitcre,, t, ý .. B\ impedim-, ; III I 
interpel. "M1,11 Comparison of inclMdual \ýelfarc the Parcto critff'1011 Wil', '()L1I1tCI_ to the (d 
66 
alternative ratlonale,, generally defend the existence of a "higlici" economic order wlio,, c t7l - 
workings takc into aCCOUllt consequences in othei- realms of individual freedom. -1-licy 
consider economic concentration to undermine political 1'reedorn, and therefore the 
cxv, tence of democratic and free societies. For example, Ropke Justifies antltl-Ll, ', t FLIIC, ý, Oll 
the basis of sorne "highei" cyood which is distinct from market functloninL,. In hlý, woi-cls- L_ Z: ) - 
"It Is by no means enouah to invoke the laws of the market in appealing to peol)lc", 
enlightened self-interest and their economic reason, for within certain limits, 
lahour unions, pressure groups, and trade associations serve their members" interest,, vcrv 
well indeed when they exercise monopoly power or pressure on the governnlent', ý 
economic policy in an attempt to get more than genuine and fair competition would , i\, c 
thern. There must be higher ethical values which can invoke successfully: Justicc, public 
spirit, kindness, and good will. "104 For these schoktr,.,,, antitrust policy shOL11d PLIP'LIC 
-equitable" political objectives including, for example, the political union of markct,, in 
the process of cconomic integration; protection of the alternatives offered to the 
consumer; protection of less competitive firms, such ýts small and mcdium conil)ciitor, ý, ýi 
challenue to. econornic power, and so on. Determining these objectives becomes a matter 
of discretion and political appraisal. Frequently, this view of antitrust policy-111akin, -, 1ý1 
, ýald to pursue the protection of competitors rather than competition itself. In the Unitcd 
States, "mainstream" antitrust scholars such ýis H. Hovenkarnp, F. M. Scherer and Fý 
Fox, arnonost many others who belong to the so-called "structural" -school of ýintitru, ýt, 
support this view. In Europe, the Ordo-Liberal School of Freiburg defends an 
"integrated" view of the social order, which link both political and economic interaction. 
105 These views are linked to a complexity of valLICS involved in the design of repilanon. Z: ) - 
public policy. To circumvent these problemý,. the slandard wa,, eventually replaced I)-\ the , ()- 
called Kaldor-Hick,,, efficiency standard. alm) called the potential Pareto improvemem. 
hypotlictical compensation test or cost-beriefit analysis. Under this teý; t, it situation is Kaldor- 
Hicks efficient if those that gain can, In principle, compensate those that have been "harmed" 
and still be better off. Therefore, it provides the theoretical underpinnim-, for social cO,, t-hcncfjt 
analy.,, Vs. which Is at the bottorn of antitru,, J normative analvs1s. (C. G. VelJanO\,, ki, "Thc Neýx 
Lýiw and Economics: a Research Revlex". in Readin-s tic Eco os ot g 111 1 11 1111C Law mid Re, -, Lilation. 
A. 1. O(ILIS' and C. G. Veljanovski (eds. ) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxfcrd, 1984), p. 20) For the 
purposc,, of this work. we shall simply call it -cconornic ct-l-iciency". 
104 W. Ropkc. A- Humane Fconon 
- 
iv: The Social Framc\wrk ot Ilic I- ree N'larket. WliilcýiL, (): Hcm-\ 
Rc,, 
7,. iiei')' 
Co.. 1960), P, 1 -14. 
"., L, C, NI, 'T. Collomic Order, Privatc 1-m\ 111d I)Llhliý: Poliý.: \: The l'i-cibLll*L' -School ()I' I-m 
,, uld 1''I"Ollonlic" In 
148 JOLII-Mll 01 111,, litlitioll, 11 M-ld -Fllc()I-Ctk:, Il ý199'1ý 
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In this regard, Baldwin lists five sets of values which make sense of legitimacy claims on 
government rules: the legislative mandate claim, the accountability or control claiiii, the L-1 L- I 
due process claim; the expertise claim and finally, the efficiency claim. 106 
Defining the goals of antitrust regulation has become quite intensc. particLiLirly ill týl t) - 
the United States, where the policy discussion has been rather technical in comparison to 
the Europeah Union where political considerations have prevailed. "One of the ficrc(-st 
and most persistent debates in American jurisprudence concerns the proper goals ýIlld 
objectives of antitrust policy. Such a debate is to a large extent absent from the 
policies of the EEC and the UK". 107 
In the end, the multiplicity of seemingly equal objectives suggests that choosing 
amongst social welfare standards is entirely a matter of discretion and taste, and that the 
whole debate is futile. 108 Indeed, it is necessary to realise that beyond the point of 
choosing between alternative social welfare goals, their ultimate source of legitimacy, r,, 
reliant upon whether they can materialise effectively in policy enforcement, as Baldwin 
contends. This depends, first and foremost, on whether they can be applied cons istentl y -. 
in other words, it depends on whether they can be structured in an effectively enforceabic 
"rule of law". In the end, this is the ultimate normative requisite for legal rules, in both 
the traditions of legal positivism and moral theories of law. As Katz observes: "Both Hart t) 
675-704. On the analysis of antitrust policy from the Ordo point of view, see W. M6schel. 
"Competition from an Ordo Point of View", in German Neo-liberals and the Social Mal-kct 
Economy, A. Peacock and H. Willgerodt (Eds. ), (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 14-1- 
159. For an historical account of the influence of this school on European antitrust policy see F. 
M. Scherer, Competition Pol. icies for an lnteý,, rated World Economy, pp. 28-30. 
106 Baldwin, pp. 41-46. 
107 T. Frazer, Monopoly, Competition and the Law: The Regulation of Business Activity in BrItall). 
Europe and America. (New York: St. Martin's Press. Inc., 1988), pp. 1-8). 
108 Adarns and Brock have questioned the multiplicity of opinions on antitrust policy goal, ý. "The 
debate has centred on the proper role of antitrust in a free enterprise economy. Is the central 
purpose of antitrust to promote a decentrafised decision-making mechanism, or is it , inipl% to 
promote a maximum of 'consumer welfare"' Does concentration of power in the hands of 
sillLfle firm or a fex firms matter, or can we rely on the market to erode monopolY and ollgopolý 
power? How should economic power be measured in the relevant product market and , geographic 
market'. ' If so. how can it be measured, and how should the diveruence be resolved . . 
"' (Adani,, r-- 
and Bfock, P. xi. ) 
w 
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and Fuller recognized that the discipline of la", necessarily incorporated some normam, e 
values: consistency, treatincy cases alike and fair notice. "109 We address the problem ol Z-7 
discretion and whether antitrust theory can result in predictable and consistent legal rulc,, 
more extensively in the next chapter. I 10 
Meanwhile, it rnay be important to conclude thi,, section by highliglitinL, I]()\\ I-I 
MItIti-LISt regulations are viewed under conventional (ippraisal. Regardle, ýs of the pirllciihir L- 
"'OcIal welfare goal sought, they all share a common thread, namely, that thc\ are all 
i-c-arded as mere instrunients devoid of a partiCLI]ar normative content of their o\\'n. 
The instrumental nature of antitrust provisions relies on the fact that the authority in 
question assumed to command full knowled (TC 0f the social system and social \\cll'arc 
standards (social values) that should be implernented with these instruments. In otlici- 
words, this view of recyUlation not only assurnes the omniscience of the authorm in 
connection with the underlying social activity, but also assurnes that all the inforl-nalloll 
z the "right" welfare standard is 
"there". nccessýiry for choosin,, (,, 
Furthermore, no matter what the particular public intcrest goals they are based on, 
antitrust rel-Ullations ýISSLIme that real mai-kcts arc placed at a ý, ub-optimal stale, 
conseqLICIItlN', they XSSUme their purpose is to push reality towards the OptIHILIIII, 
whatevcr that Optimum means. For this reason. "the base line norm (to judoc a bUsHICINý, 
conduct) is not the state of affairs before any contract (which is always irnperfect), but the 
achievable state o 'qft't)-s widel- the competitivc eqn1libl-Min that is the soc *al opt 
(Author's nAics) I11 
Antitrust w(gulations should be irnplernented at any instance in which therc 1ý. 
cIccrnco. I to be the cxIstencc of a failure in the system created by a firm attempting to rcýip b 
"monopolistic" profits accrued from exploiting an information asymmetry in a givcn 
109 Kai/. "Po"Itivi., '111 it 2`39. 
1 10 Chapter ""'sectioll 2, below 
p. 5 4. 11 1 BarL,, tMliiL, .- 
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markci, which is not justified as a "efficiency". This does not mean that antitrW11 
j, egulatiow, are exclusively addressed to attainim-, -efficiency " in the social it 
mniply means that efficiency is always a base-line norm from wnich othcr \vch'L arc 
standards (if any) are introduced in the appraisal of the authority to measure 1. viictlici 
public goals have been achieved. In other word,,, it is practical -criforcement, as expre,, scd 
in the combination of these welfare standards, which ultimately guides the normativC 
appraisal of policy enforcement. 
Briefly, they attempt to achieve a social welfare formula that repre, "'erits 1ý()illc 
measure of aggregate welfare carrying interpersonal comparisons of individual Litilitic, ). bb 
These comparisons are n-iade through a "rule of reason' analysis in which the social co,, t,,, 
and benefits of a giveri undertaking are contrasted to determine whetlier social welt'are 
has been achieved. How this balance should be , )truck is something that is not solvcci 
Linder the rule of reason analysis. In fact, (21ven the assumption of the observer', ý ob, jectivc 
kriowledge, and the coriflation of positive and normative that he is subýject to as a result ()I' 
fornialisi-ri, it is not surprising that the ao-regation ol' individUal preference,,, into a m)cKil 
welfare formula inevitably leads to confuse the preferences of the observed individuals 
with those of whoever is making the calculation. Consequently, under this perspectl\! c 
"Public Interest" does not necessarily represent the interests of the public. 112 In the ncxt 
cliapter we will address these problems more cxteiisively. 
Let us now see how this vision of the i-e(yulatofy process meddled with the culturc 
aiid traditions that pervade policy-making in Latin Anierica. 
1.2). - Emerc, n_cc of the conventional paradigm of regulation in the Latin American 
cxpgnCIICC. 
The instrUrnentafist appraisal of legal formalism has been embedded in Latin 
Anicrica's Ic, ', al culture long before apertitra hegýtn. The intellectual Influencc of I()LIcd 
Rawk c\plicltlv makc,, thi,, point in IIP, cl-Itic',, in of Lit' litarianism. See. J. Raýk Is, A Thcor\ 
Ju,, ticc. (0\ford: O\f'ord Universitv Pre., ý.,,. 1971 )ý pp. -'-'--)7. 
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po, ýItlvisn-j was very germane with the region's Hi Z7 Z-- I ispanic tradition, which in the end ý\&,, 
the driving force of interventionist policy-making in the region. De la Vega highlights the 
significance of this influence: "Positivism has been acknowledued as a strearn of thouLIii 
that most forcefully induced a break with the traditional status quo, and hereh\ it 
to favour a new social ordering, mainly during the period between the last quartel- ()f thc 
nineteenth century and the first quarter in the present century. Thi,, period hiis hccii. 
rrioreover, crucial for the course thereafter adopted by the rn4jority of Latin Americmi 
countries, and the clue to understand the present situation of our countries. [Indeed] thc 
gcneral features of such historical processes would favour or inhibit certain formý, 1)1' 
economic and social development. They would stop or foster certain economic and 
policies-, certain ways of economic and cultural production. They would overvalue cci-IiIIII 
intellectual or aesthetic systems to the disadvantage of others; to invalidate or ratik, 
certain ways of social dynamics. Thus, cultural patterns and ideological models (( ()I) -1 1 IC(I 
in the political setting and materialisation of the different (economic and social) projccts 
favoured the imposition of certain economic and social choices, to the detrinicilt of' 
others, and helped to legitimise them. " II ý) 
A look back at the history of Latin America shows that the roots of the avci-sion 
towards free markets, found in the strong political and econornic centralism practiscd 
the reaJon, extends back to colonial times. For example. a brief look at the colonial perjocl Z-- 
indicates that the strong presence of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns in the economic 
affairs of the colonial settlers discouraged private productive endeavours. Veliz contell(I" 
- 1"' that the colonisation failed to encourage the ernergence of property rights, regardecl 
"in-ii-nunities" gained from the power of the Crown. Instead, Latin America follmvcd the 
dictatcs of the growing colonial bureaucracy that dorninated economic life. 114 t) 1ý 
1 13, De la ve'-'a, pp. '), )-4(). 1 
1 14 Veliz, The centraust Tradition ..., 
The presence of the Crown was most evident in the 11UHIel-OLIS 
conditions imposed on the recognition of private property right's over the land and i-e,, ()Lii-(: c,, 
discovvi-cd by the Spanish and Portugue,, c scitlei-, in the New World, as well a,, on the 
imposition of heavy taxes by the Crown. The literature on the economic liktory of colonial I-mn 
America is vast and cannot be addressed here fully; ho\\ever, for a -, eneral appral,, ýil ee, .1 
Ci-()\\, The E-. I)I'c-()t'l,. itiii-Aiiiei-ica, (New York- DouhledaN Co.. Inc., 1946), pp. 154- 101.17, ',, - 
19 1 -, and G. ('C,, pcdc,, del Castillo, Arn&]-ca -H-kixiiiica 
149-1-1898), (Barcelona. I -JO(, i ial 
1-ýihor, S. A.. 1986), pp. 121-140; 255-2274. 
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The formal sense ýtnd understanding of the law, individual rights and legislation Cý 
which has prevailed in the culture of the recyion since its inception is greatly rcspon,,, ih1c 
for this. The attitude is well summed up in the phrase "Obedez, co pero no cilinplo" (I 
ohey the law, hut do not comply with it), which characterised the attitude ()I the 
Con, quivadores throughout the colonial period before the Crown: that is. an LirnhiLuoulll' zn - 
clisre, _, ard foi- law enforcement, given that the Liw did not reflect the underlying rcýtIltic,, 0 lI 
trade. I 15 
Current legislation reflecting this legal positivism has expressed itself throu., gli the 
prevailing legal culture in the region: whilst the law has been viewed as a tool with which 
to Implernent social justice through government fiat, in reality I'Ormal mechani, "InT111 W, C 
extensively divorced from the rules effectively followed by these societies. This is a 
perception which was inherited from the notion of law held by Spanish legal scholars at 
the time of the colonisation of the New World. As Moreno explains: "From its vcrv 
he. c, inning written Spanish law was far more an expression of ideals to be attained ftin ýi 
reflection of social customs and traditions... As the Etymologies of St. Isidore ... shmv, 
the strencyth of ancient loc(Al habits was undermined by a legal systern that clau-ned nioral 
superiority. Law could only be understood in terms of justice... What the ... Spaniards did 
was to establish the direct priority of justice over law. Specific legislation could he 
superseded on the haýJs of ... abstract moral conceptions... 
" 116 
115 De Madarm., -, ýi surnmarises why this contempt 
for the law Is embedded at the heart of Umin 
American economic institutions: "[In the pr()ccsý,, of colonization] there were certain ýmd 
circurnstances that made a powerful contribution to the economic and commerciil life of F: itifl 
Arnericýt, ( 
... ) 
First, the lack of knowledge ot economic facts which prevailed then everw, ýhcic 
( ... 
) second, the natural vitality of the region, which permitted considerable wealth; third, thc 
imi'versol habi't ofevadiiig the law, which eventually led to a black market that made it e&, icr to 
trade outside the law than within; fourth, the phl'lovoplu'cal cmitempt wt'th which viccvoy, ý 
recei'ved aii(I disi-cgorded Roval Orders theY regarded os inopj)licable. (... ) FimillN/, the fifth 
element shaping the economic life of Latin Arnericýi was the fact that commercial consideration" 
at the level of the Spamsh Crown were sub '. 
ect to political and religious criteriýi. due to i 1', iltli I t- 
-and a philosopliv \xhich invaded all xspecls of life at the tirne" (S. De LI el 
Ll en Arn&ica, [Madrid- Espii,,,,. i-Calpc. 1986], pp. 1-10 141 Ocaso (lei 1111PCI-lo F-S? Lafic 
Moreno, Justice and Lýiw in Latin America: A Cuhan c\ample. 12" lournal Im e r-,, \me] ICýIll 
[19701: 367,374. See also, F. Moreno, LeLiti'macy and Stzihlllt\, ill 
I'jitill "\111-crica: A , ý, Iud\ ot'Chilean Political CLIltLii'c (1000) (-)-1 1. 
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The -status quo" which has prevailed , Mcc the Vcry inception of Latin Amencmi 
Institutions has always diminished economic rjghtý; which have often been 
beforc successive -public interest" goals, as interpreted under ý, Liccc,,,, jvc t: ý - 
These orj, (,,, ins, which provided the seeds for the institutions which prevail in the rcgioii. Z-- 11111- 
ultimately explain oovernment intervention and the attitudes of policy-makei-, to niarkctý, 
acro. ss the repon. 
In the course of time, Latin American institutions have merely re -enactcd 
forms of centralism and legal ss ve "Licce 11 Z7) fornialisni I thus forestalling I privillc 
entrepreneurship at the expense of growing bureaucracies. Rather than providina MI 
institutional setting favourable to the development of market institutions, the political 
independence of Latin American republics perpetuated the centralism of coloniýd tinic,, 
Political independence soon turned into a state of constant political instability in thc 
independent republics durino the nineteenth cciitury; a process which favoured dclacio 
seizures of property arnidst of constant civil wars. 118 
These factors acted against the growth of free markets, and resulted in the , ()cio- 
political ideologies that brought representativc democracies into the region durmL, the ýl Z-7) Z7) 
1 17 This ka common trait ()I' all Latin American constitutions, which all(m "public jntcrc.,, t- to 
limit economic rights. (L. Ortiz and J. Lejarz. i. Constituciones Latinoamericanas, Biblioicc, i (ký 
la Academia de Ciencias Polfticas y Sociales, Carýica,,, 1997. ) There is a noteworthy similaritv 
between the economic policies of dictatorships and dernocracies in the economic hktor\ of the 
reg, ion. This k not often ernphasised by hisi()rlans of the region, who tend to mAc ýi p(flitical 
appraisal of recent history, which has ()\er,, hadowed important ecorionlic subtletic,,. Gciicr, ilk. 
these historians perceive dictatorships as allies of foreign economic interests. In contrast, they 
regard democracies as committed supporters of autonomous development. However. it cl()ý, cr 
appraisal show,, that both types of re, -, Irnes 
have , vmematically practised stron- Lmernment 
interventionism, cclipsin,,! private investment in fýIVOUI- Of "PUblIC 110,11S. " A" VellY I-IL, 110\ 
()hserves- "Durim-, the decades following the Great Depression and the Second Woild ý, Vltr. 
decision centre,, Latin American econornies were not controlled by the private sector, 
but by the public ý, ector. This has nothing to do, or at least very little, with the position that r_- - 
political parties hold within the classic spectrum: the Lovernrnentý, of Cuba and Mexico. ()t Chile 
and Peru, of Brazil ind Aroentina are centralist not beciii-ise the%, are left-wing ()i- 
capitalists or socialists, but because they are Latin American. - (Veliz, p. 233). Stable 
Institutions pl-()\'ided by democratic re-girries were frequently reoarded as inconvenient, sl()%\. 
ri, 
-1,1d 
and paraly,, Ing mechanisms for active and dynamic governments. Dictatorship,, \\cl-C 
frequently praised for their apparent speed in solving econornic problerns and capacity for 
dealino ith problem,,, of po\, ci-t\ in the reiJon. 
I Vcllz, pp. I 18- 10 1. 
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twentieth century. I Io) In thi,, century. political unrest has evolved into 1-nore "'tahle 
democratic institutions, through the consolidation of popular mass movements. TIICsc 
changes, however, have not changed the status quo i-c,, ardin(-, the protection of 1)i-(-)pci-t-\ t) 17, - 
rights, as the movement,,., were taken over by a mix of a indigcnous social-deniocritic and 
,, ocialist ideology (influenced by the Mexlicmi Revolution of 1910 and tile RLI. "ý'Iall 
Revolution of 1917) which generally made the exercise of property rights condition, 11 to ýI 
'SOCIal function'. Consequently, the agenda of the Social Democrat political parties that 
ernerged out of these mass movements called, in most cases, for the implementation ol 
nationalist economic policies structured on economic guilds, demanding nationali,, ation ()r z: I zn 
extensive state ownership of the basic resources of their countries. 120 
Additionally, the influence of the Catholic Church over political and econornic ldcýc,, 
in the region has been significant. The active presence of Christian Democrat parties in Z7) Z: 71 
many countries is evidence of this. Although initially inspired by a conservative reaction 
a(lainst left-wine, Social-Democrat and Socialist movements, Christian Democrat partle, '), Z71 b 
endorsed an anti-capitalist ethos. More recently, the reaction of the Church against the 
inequalities created by reform programmes has extended beyond the realm of its relmcd 
political movements. In some contexts, the manifestations of Catholic thinking liave 
become less subtle (acquiring a clearer anti-capitalist bias) in new forms of expression b 
, such as the influential "Liberation Theoloov", which preaches a new 
"salvation ()I' the 
soul" through the redistribution of social wealth. In the words of Fessard, "M, 'Irmsl L_ 
Christianism and Liberation Theology are [Ilk-e] two relatively independent nver, ý. 
119 See in particular, C. Rangel, The Latin Americans, their love-hate relationship with the Unitcd 
States 2 (New 
York: Hai-court Brace Jovanovich, 1977). In this study, Rangel challen,,,, cs th,: 
mainstrearn vlc\ý that Latin America's poverty is mmicho\\ related to the promotion of Westcrn 
institutions, in the rez, 7non, such as representative 
democracies, political tolerance and the 
protection of individual rights. He evaluates how the -overning elite in these countries Im\c t- 17, L_ 
consistently blamed alien influences in order to JustifN their failL11'Cs in building sL1CCC1,1, fL1l L7 
models ofeconoinic development. 
An i1CCOLInt of the influence of social democrat parties in Latin America is found in C. Ran, -, ci, 
The Latin Animcan pp. 56-61. Also, M. Nieder-ang. The Twenty Latin Americas, (l, ondon: 
Penouin Book,, 19(), )). On Latin America',, contemporary political hlstorý. , ee T. Kill-vi-in 
Don"111, Historw CmitcnTordnea de Am6rica Latina, (Bogota: Alianza F(litorial. I L)oo). 
-t 
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P()l, l, c',, -, mg, however, the same source, the] II III I- 
ir waters frequentlY mixintg either subtictv or i 
fu II sight, mutually rei nforcing each other". 12 1 L- C71 
The combination of these factors has created the perception amongst Latin 
Aniericaw, that economic development and growth has little connection with the 
existence of stable institutional frameworks where individuals may prosper, but witli 
clovernnient intervcntion. 122 Development wi, ý ýI 110al that Aeclw ate governnicni ruic, 
COLIICI achieve; failure to accomplish such a goal would be a result of faulty cnforccnient, L- 
not the result of deficient institutional desian. L- 
Economic rights have become dependent upon such appraisal, to the point of being, I 
sub , jected 
to their express inclusion in a written statute, as a condition for their effective 
exercise before a court of justice. 123 
Not surprisingly, Latin American policy-i-nakers have come to regard govcniniciii 
rules as instruments for reinforcing econornic rights and tools for the consolidation of 
their respective "Economic Constitutions". 124 In this context, antitrust laws are vlcwcci 
121 See, G. Fessard, S. J., Teolo, -fa de_la Liberaci6n: Gýncsis y Trayectoria, (Caracas: Univvi,, iclad 
(I at(')Iicýi Ancli-ýs Bello. 1979), p. 5. 
122 Several historical 1'ýictors combined to develop a centralist culture in the region that reintoiced 
-capitalism. As V611z explains: "Latin American society presents sorne traits, which in other 
re, -, lons, above all in the countries of the cultural area of north-western 
Europe, are inseparihle 
from the consequences of the Industrial Revolution, but here possess an origin ýind charýtcter 
undeniably prell"IdUstrial. It is a bureaucratic tradition of preindustrial rationalization oil which 
centralism relies that shaped the processes of chmige and continuity and an urban preindwtrial 
Culture sui generis within which a vast service sector has evolved, closely relited to the 
hUreaLlCratIC habils and institutions". (Wliz, p. 16. ) To justify these views m)rne intellectuýils 
hold that the reLion's problems are unique mid a,, such, demand special theories and ad-hoc 
Solutions. Other,, insist on blarning external lorccs. Borner et al. ako contend in the same , cil,, C. 
"this intellectual bkis aLamst markets led to the development ofsorne interestinLy. yet at the , mllc 
time dan, -, crous. intellectual perceptions about 
Lýmn American development procc, ", that have 
resulted from this situation". (Borner et al., p. 9. ) A Leneral e\position ot this vieý\ is found in 
Ram-, el, The Latin -Americans... 
IIý 
--I 
Garcia cle Enteri-fa, I ., i Lengua.... pp. 
114-152. 
, 
Tineo regards these laws ýi,, inip-m-cments over the traditional set ()I I-LIICS 124 For cxanlple I t, 
(yoverning, market relations: "The old generation of im-s refers to tho.,,, e enacted prior to the Z7- 1ý1 
laUnching of tile economic reform pi-occ,, \, c,, Linder waý ýince the mid-1980.,,. Thc,, c la\ý\, 
Cjjjpljýj,, I. I, Cd the l)1-()ICCLItIOI1 and punishment of anti-competitke practicc,,. :, somc of the prýicticclll 
he 111 L, cowidercd criminal offences. ln,, tItLjtIonall\ the C()Illl)etl"tl()Il agencic,. lackcd 
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a, ý ý, ctting reasonable restraints on economic right,,, a condition that is indispensahle if' t-- - 
young, and weak Latin markets are to function adequately. Indeed, the recently llberall,, e(l 
1, atin markets will not develop if "fair" rule,, of conduct governing their functioning ýirc 
not establkhed to prevent abuses. 
Ideology and hi,,, tory in Latin America have converged in the consolidation of ýi tn zn 
regulatory appraisal throughout the region that regarck, market phcnornena a,,, reality. LI) b Z- 
which purposive policy-making could bend accordino to "developmental -, oal"". 
Unquestionably, this explains why antitrust policy has been welcomed without niuch 
consideration by legal scholars and policy-makers in the region. Indeed, the closcCl-cild 
view of markets, instilled by the convent] ional paradigm, was highl-v compatible witli the 
way policy-making had been understood and implemented in the region long before the 
outset of institutional economic reform in the 1980s, 
Having examined the intellectual sources of antitrust in Latin America, and their 
particular appraisal of market functioning, let Lis now take a closer look at the wýtv policy- 
inakers reach their particular normative conclusioiis about corporate structurcs ýmd 
business stj, ýItecries. Z: ) 
2. - MAIN FEATURES 01`ANTFHýUST ENFORCEMENTIN LATIN AMERICA. 
". I. - Taxonomy of anti -competitive practiccs Linder antitrust enforcement in Latill 
Anicrica. 
The closed-end view of markets, which makes the existence of competition 
condWonal upon the inultiplicity of market participants, inevitably led antitrust scholars to 
presume the monopolktic intentions of any business initiative would reduce Or Curb 
market cntry to potential participants or compromise their decision-i-naking independcncc. 
independence and since most practices were illegal. the enforcement decision kv&, , uh-1ccl to 
cllallL, C, ý. dcLlvý-, Or ýIlllply not executed hy the Ministry ()f Commerce in the last instance. [. \, ý a 
I-c,,, ult I the,, c countrie,, have recently Introduced amendments to make entorcement of "uch Lms 
ct'lcctj,, c". (Tinco. Competition Policy..., 1). 10. ) 
7 () 
The basic idea that competition was somehow dependent on the degrec of- 111al-kci 
concentration was very powerful, partICUlarly in the examination of competitioli III leý'ý' 
developed countries. In these underdeveloped rnarket, ý, the conditions of conccim-atioi-I 
seerned to be even more evident. 
Following the rationale of the SCP paradioni, ý, c%, eral legal doctrlllc., ý, %\'cl, c týl 4: ý 4n 
clevcloped a', extenswns of the basic idea that market structure and cconoinic 
performance are somehow related. These doctrines are: Firstly, the -doctrinc of 
dominance", according to which the lar er the concentration of markets, the more likely b9 
dominant firms are to impose exploitative prices or conditions upon consuniers. 
Secondly, the "doctrine of collusion" or oligopolistic behaviour, which states that the 
fewer cornp6titors there are in the market, the more likely they are to collude to elinlinýlle 
competition and behave zis dominant firms are presurned to do. Thirdly, the "doctrine of 
exclusion of competitors", according to which firms possessing market po\\, cl- Illay 
enoacre in certain conducts and arrangements to impose exclusive arranaernents and 
preferential conditions in order to exclude competitors from the market. This docti-111c, 
also called the -potential competition theory" has been extensively enforced in Latin 
Arnerica. 125 Finally, the "doctrine of predation"', whereby dominant firms may displitcc 
competitive firms from the market by artificially undermining prices or distorting, 
markets. 1 -Io 
Antitrust schenies are not uniform in their legal treatment towards corporatc 
Structure,,. They lack a uniform criteria for the types of conducts that con, "titutc 
monopolistic behaviour. Indeed, Latin American antitrust ýtatutes frequent1v coiit; iiii 
125 As Simham oh, ýcrvcýý. Brazil's CADE has been particularly active in enfoi-cin, -, thi,,, doctrine ill 
the analysis of i-nerLcr,, and Iong-term exclusive dealings. (S. Sin-ham, Shaping Conilictition I -- - Z- C7 PolicN, in the Scope for Trmiý, mkmtic Co-operition? 24 Rnwkkn 
Inicriiatiomil La\\ 1998) pp. 380-38-1. ) 
126 Alternatively. Bork classifies these doctrine,, as follows: a) The doctrine ot the 
elimination of rivalry". b) The doctrine of "autornatic exclusion of competition- and c) Thc 
doctrine of predati(m". (Bork. pp. 135-160. ) Posner, on the other hand, distin, -, uishe.,, hemccri 
practices that facilitate collusive pricing, cxclu,, iOnir\ practices and practlcc,, that are ltý - 
nionopolistic since thc\ increase the gains from 1110"OPoli,, tic pricing. but are not collusivC nor 
c\clumonary. (R. llomicr, Antitrust Law, (Chica, -. o: The Univermtv ot Chicago Pre.. ss, 1976). pl). 
) 3, -35) 
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cxtenslve lists of restrictive types of conduct or cconomic organisation which tcrid to he 
anti-cornpetitive, but the lists change according to the jurisdiction. In a \\ýtv. thi,, iý, i 
consequence of the international debate about which corporate forms should he 
considered likely to proniote anti-competitIvc behaviour. Although most Latin Anierican 
ýintitl-LlSt statutes provide for an omnibus prohihition or aeneral clause against ýill husiiicsý, L- Z7! 
practice,, that curtall, linilt, restrict or distort competition, they differ in the structurc thcy 
attach to legal prohibitions. 
Some statutes make a distinction between absolute and relative prohibitioiis. ii(-) 
doubt inspired by the differentiation made under U. S. antitrust law between conduct /)(, /- 
sc and conduct subject to a rule-of-reason analysis. Absolutc prohit)itions ir-: 
undertakings regarded as void, whereas relatli, c prohibitions require the relevant firniý' t() 
wield substantial power in the relevant market. This distinction is made in the Mexicall, ill 
Costýi Rican and Parianianlan legislation. 127 Other schenies such as Venezuela',. ", do not 
acknowledge such a distinction, but simply combine an general provision with a ll"t of 
forbidden conduct. 128 In creneral, as Tineo argues, le-al structure "is affected by the type 47) 17, Z- 
of ci-iforcernent power which the law and ca,, c law developed in each country c()IIfCl- oil 
the coi-npetition agency". 12(-) However, it is possible to draw certain cornmonaltics. L- 
These common features follow the inferences drawn from these legal clocti-irics on 
(I the eff-cts of market concentration on the anti-cornpetitive behaviour of firms. On the 
basis of these it is possible to develop a "taxonorny- of anti -competit i ve practiccý, in Lýitin 
America's antitrust schemes. These practices are based on ýt t'Ormal distinction hctwecii 
unilateral and Multilateral anti-competitive undertakings. In turn, multilateral rc. ý, tnctioný, 
on competition are classified according to whether the conduct occur" hCm, cen 
conipctitors (horizontal rcstraints) or non-conipetitor, -, (vcrtical restraints). 
127 'Sl1whalli, P. 
'$91. 
1211-11 Id. 
129 Tineo, C'millmilioll... P. I I. 
7,, '-, 
a) Ex Pdoitative pyactices: output restriction and other conclucts. 
Antitrust policy seeks to eradicate output re, ýtrictions, whether agreed collC(, II\, Cl\, 
m- unilaterally imposcd. The prohibition of a-reements amongst firm,, rcstrict, 
competition aims to preserve the "Independence" ()f market participants action,,. Milch 
c1rives prices ýts close as possible to marginal costs. Therefore, an\, ýittcmpt to 
output by means of combination, agreement or similar arrangement should be 
discouraged by heavy penalties. 
The definition of "exploitative" conducts under antitrust domestic ruic', Is VcI, \` 
broad. Generally, the list of these practices coi-riprises the following conducts: zn 
a) abLISIve pricing by a monopolistic firm*, 
b) resale price maintenance; 
c) co-ordination arnongst competitors to impose monopolistic prices. 
In turn, horizontal co-ordination may also adopt,,, cvcral forms: 
a) naked output restriction; 
b) price fixIIIII, 
c) co-ordination of the conditions ofsale, 
d) bid rigging, Z7) Z: ) L- 
e) CLIstomer allocation, and 
I') price di scrim i nation through market , comcntation; t: ) -- 
Naked outpLit i-cstriction is regarded i, ý anti -compel it I vc hec. -ILlse llco-cj; ), ý, 4,11 
cconornic theory assurnes that it is done with the intention to impose monopolistic (i. c. 
cxploitati\, c) priccs. It often results from , o-called collusion and other 1101-17,0111A 
restraints ainied at fixing prices at supra-cornpetitivc levels. For this i, ca,, -, ()n thcý, c 
. irrangcnicnts are perhaps "thc core area of conccrn in cxi-, ýting, competition iii 
the 
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s are presumed to be opinion of Khemani and Dutz. 130 Their negative effect, 
there due to the inexi,, tence of any collateral cfficiencie,, that would other%Nj, _, _jLiio'v 
thern. The general consensus about the anti -competitive nature of these agreement.,,. lls 
that they eliminate rivalry amongst competing suppliers; hence, these corporate , tructure,, 
have "the cyreatest need for penalties". 131 
By contrast, other horizontal restraints may be more ambiguous in thch- effcuts. 
', 'Ince they normally combine forms of co-operati tn on regarded as beneficial. Exai-nplc,, 0 
these are joint ventures, research and development agreements, and exchan-c 
information. 
All Latin American antitrust statutes reviewed have provisions for dealln, -, willi I 
horizontal agreements that restrict competition. such as price fixing, bid ri-ging. nio-kei 
seurnentation, custorner allocation and other forms of output restramt. Geiicraflv. thi,, 
kind of conduct is regarded as per se prohibited. I ') -1 
Output restrictions in the form of price fixing have been a focus of concern for 
nascent Latin American antitrust agencies. The reason generally advanced to chalIcnLc 
them has to do with the reluctance of businesses to compete, allegedly resýulting froill thc t) Z: ) 
persistence of prior intcrventionist policies In the business culture of Latin . \iiiciican 
entrepreneurs. This type of conduct, which governments in the i-egion activek, proniotcd 
in the pýist though regulations and official price,,,. has fi-cquenti. y endLII-CCI IICý(): W 
130 Khei-nani and Dutz, p. 21. Similarly, Boner ar-Lics. -rcl'orl"i, h) economic,, are often to ý7 L- 
give high priority to the prosecution of price fixIng" (R. Boner, "Competition I)olicý and 
iiraii\c Institutions in Reforming Economics" In Re,,, -, ulatory Policies and Reform: a Coiiipl _ 
Perspect ve, Private Sector Development Departnient, (\Vashington, DC: The World Býinký L- 
1995), P. 4-1) 
I') i Kheniam and DLItZ. 1'. 21- 
13 2 For example, in Brazil any limitation or restriction of competition aniong compew0i,,. Cý 
as \\i-on-. Aniong these conduct.,, are: h\in, re,, ardless of the intention involved, Ps re-arded I 
condition,, of ýAc. hoycotts against new entrants. obstructing acceo, h\ competitors to ic"ourcc" 
or technolo, -, v, &, well as exclusion 
from the media. (See "Ne\\ antitrust lei-, islation 1" "j,, ne(I I-, \ 
President of BraAl", Antitrust and Trade Regulatioi Rcýoort. 30 June 1994. ) 
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apertura-, hence, the significance of this sort of restriction in the enforcement endeýtwur,,, 
of Latin American antitrust agencies. 133 
The prosecution of tacit collusion may prove difficult, due to constraiiitý, oii 
gathering evidence. For this reason, much attention has been devoted to anýlly"Ing the 
behaviour of industry and trade associations in their collection of information. lvcll-)I'()CýIý 
checking of price quotations, reduction of secrecy and facilitation of colluslon. 134 In 
other cases, significant nominal price changes, due to government controls and hiall In L- 
inflation rates, make enforcement difficult; 135 this probably counts a, " an additional rc. l, "km 
for the conspicuous emphasis of Latin American antitrust enforcement on merger control, 
as we shall see below. 
As elsewhere, sorne Latin Americaii jurisdictions exempt certain cartels froni 
antitrust enforcement, albeit inspired on political rather than economic consideration', - for 
example, export cartels. Other combinations. such as "depression" cartels focused on the 
rationalisation, specialisation, development and standardisation of goods and services a1v 
justified on the basis of obtaining advantages that would otherwise be unattainable, such 
I 13 For example, in Peill cases have been brought against petrol pump ; uppliers and ýtýitiows. puhh t7 L- I Ic 
transportation and bread. See, C. Guman-Barron. Experiencia Peruana en el Slstcýmýi dc I-IN-c 
Competencia, paper presented at the first meeting of Latin American competition IL'cllclC,, 
Cartagena, Dec. 1995, pp. 2-3. 
13-1 Venezuelan antitru,, t enforcement has been partjcularlý active in i-evjeýkjng the link" (fl him" 
investigated for price fixing and relating them to their membership of a given trade or lndwoi-iýd Z-1 -- C- 
as'sociation, as for example in the cases C. A. AGA Venezolana y Gases Industriale" de 
Venezuela C. A. (1992) (liquid oxygen)-, Prernezclados Avila (ready-mixed concrete) (1993): 
AVAVIT (Association of tourist agencies) (1994); Camara Venezolana de la Industria del One 
y del Video (1994). (See Informe Anual, Superintendencla Pro-Cornpetencia, Caracas). 
Similarly, in the Brazilian services sector, Salgado highiights the influence of labour Linjon" mid 
associatiow., in fosterin- cartel behaviour throuah similar contacts amona their memhers: "No 
I -, itica mais comum &a cai -nento jd evidenciado corn ýi foric setor de servicos, a pi -telizacao, elei II 
preserica de ass()cKicoes e sindicatos con-io agente,, representados em procc. ssw,. FP, ýif L1111,1 
infori-nacao importante para orientar o acompanhamento deses segmentos que. inuitas ve--cs iiao 
colicentrados, sao organizados por a-ýsoctacoe. s que dýfimdem injormacoes e padroi i /M 
colliportalnentos". (Author's itafics) (L. H. SaILado Politica de Concorrýncia- Tendenciall 
Recentes e0 Estado da Arte no Brasil, IPEA/DTPES, Texto para Discussao No. 385. 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econ6mica Aplicada, 1995), p. 29) In aeneral, see Jatar, Competition 
Pol icy in Lati n America, pp. II- 14. and Tineo, Competition-, p. 25. 
13'5 Khemanj and Dutz, pp. 21-22. 
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a., -. economic,, of ,, cale, , harino, risk and inforimition. 13(-) These arran, -, cmentý, arc 
Lis lonLI w, thcy do not involve output restriction. 
h) Exclusionary practices: monopolisation and vertically restrictive arrangellielit". 
Antitrust also seeks to increase (or preserve) the number of participant,, in flic 
niarket. The rnore participants in the market, the wider the array of choice,, avmlable ý'()r 
the benefit of consumers. The SCP paradigm leads the analyst to assume that compctition 
will he more intense in rnarkets comprised by more intei-acting firms, Jnce in , Lich c. iý, c, 
the fori-rier will be closer to perfect competition, which repre,, ents the ideal normative 
standard. In this reoard, antitrust policy focuses on ensuring that market strUCtU1-C z:: ) b 
promotes the existence of more independent outlets. This is the rationale for conden-illino 
individual or collective cndeavours that inhibit or preclude the abilitý, of other oi, 
a product, for example c-kclusionar. v potential suppliers to compete in the market 1'()i- C 
practices. 
Automatic exclusions may be individually or collectively exercised. In either cic,, c 
one or more suppliers take actions that hinder the entry of potential cornpetitorý,. 
Examples of individual exclusionary conducts are the following: 
m refusal to supply. 
b) discriminatory pricing. 
c) abuse of patent rights. tý 
Refusal to supply involves the case where suppliers refuse to deal with ,, I)ccific 
cllentý, foi- no other apparent reason than to impose higher prices or onerous condltl()",, 
on them, or to cx(-ILidc thcni fi-om a downstrearn niarket , k, hci-e they compete k-,., Itli thc 
Id., p. ". For c\ýuiiplc, Article 49 of Colombian I)cci-ce 2153.1992 cxenipt certain re, 'trictkc 
ýIL'ICCIIICIII", ha"., cd on , tandardl,, atlon of rLdc,,,. rý2,,, carch and dcvelopment and u,, e ()I common 
1'ýicihtieý,. Siniilarlý', Article 18 of Venezuela'.,, Ley Pro-Conipetencia. and Article 10 ()1 
Re-Ulation No. I. allow-, agreements aimed at increasing output, improving the distribution and 
trýjdc in goods and development of common rules, agreements for export of and 1ý1 
fralichl"', I lit-, 11LIreenientS. I- 
,, crv1ccs/products delivered by the suppliers' integrated firm. Further. throupli 
discriminatory pricin, -, suppliers will charge 
different prices to diffet-ent custonicr.,, for 
()i-dci-,, placed under sin-ii1m cii -cumstances for no apparent rea,,, on. Thi.,, conduct li&, hccii 
rc(-, arded as anti-cornpetitive since suppliers can discriminate if they are able to restrict 
their Output according, to the customer. In other word,,,, discrimination has been con,, inic(I 
a clear sign that the supplier is restricting his output to a Particular customer. Flnilly. a t-> Z7 - 
firi-n i-nay usc its patent rights to exclude a competitor. 
On the other hand, collective action to exclude competitors may he he imp(), ýcd h\ 
cornpetitors -(boycott, -, ) or through vertical restraints between non -compet i toi*,,.,. Wrtical 
restraints comprise agreements between suppliers and purchasers in separate up,,, tivý1ill L_ 
and downstream markets. Khemani and Dutz provide a complete list of these conll-ýIcltiýll 
forms, insofar as they are relevant for antitrust purposes: 
a) restrictions on pricing (for example, resale price maintenance, setting ýI filial 
downstream price): 
b) restrictions on market partner choicc (CXCJUSIvc dealings), when tll(, hLlycr 1ý' 
induced to deal only with one seller's prodt-tctsl 
0 refusal to deal or supply, when buyers encounter difficulties in ohulinin'2 
products fi'0111 Suppliers, usually aimed at coercinc, them into adoptinL' an anti- 
competitivc practice)-, 
restrictions on choice of location wxclusive territory arranlgcinents), when the 
geographical territory in which the buyer may resell i,,., limited-, 11 Z7) 
e) restrictions on purchase choice (tying), when the availability of one product rS 
continaent upon the purchase of other goods or services, and full-line l'orcHILI. Z: ) -I 
which is a forni of tying where the manufacturer requires the distributor to can-y 
all its products-. and finally, 
f) restrictions on othcr busincss pi-acticcs (such Lis tradc-nanic,,,. bi-and 
store sct up, and form and content of advertising, as in fi-anchi,, im-, 
ýw, wcnicnl,, ). 1,1 '7 
137 Khemani and Dutz. p. 22- 
0 
Exclusive dealings prevents other potential distributors/suppliers from competim-, in L- - 
the nim-ket for the product concerned. Theý, e arrangement, ý hýtve been coný, Idercd a, 
i-rionopolistic if in force for long periods. 138 They rnay also be Coupled with addltlonýd 
efficiencies or a provision for some other social ()ood. In this context, franchise,, are not 
seen as openly anti -co rnpetitive devices, perhaps because they are seen as tools of' C01-C11-111 
investi-nent. Indeed, this fact has led many jurisdictions in the region to allow th(-,, c 
business arrangement-,,. Finally, territorial restraints are sornetirne" ýiLrccd to P1-C\, C11t ()Ilc L-1) - 
of the partics fron-i sclling in one particular niarket. Antitrust theory create,, the , Lispicion Zý 
that these restraints are attempts to disguisc other nionopolistic practice,,, SLIC11 Llý, 
I discrin-iinatory pricing. I-)() 
Compared with collusion, Latin American policy tends to regard vertical integration 
and restraints imposed upon suppliers or would-be clients with more benevolciicc. 14() 
Under a conventional perspective, these agreements are permissible, pi-ovIdcd tllc\' 
"promote economic efficiency by overcoming market failures". 141 On the one hand, the 
ýigreements prompt ýintitrust concerns becausc they may enhance or collsolicimc thc 
niarket power of major participants by facilitating collusion ai-nongst established firms in 
upstream or downstream markets or by encouraging market foreclosure, that is, the ý: ' Z7ý 
elimination of incumbent or new competitors from the market. 142 This is particularlý, 
iniportant in Latin American countries, as Curlel argues, since in such cornparatkck 
small econorriles, they could easily result In entrY barriei-, ý to more corripetitoi-, who are 
ali-cady scarce. 143) 
138 T. BLH-kc. A. Gicnii-Bash and B. Haine,,, Competition in Theory mid Practice, (Loncloll: 
Routledge, 11)88), pp. 102-166. 
139 Boner and KI-Llel! Cl'. p. 56. 
140 sc\, crýjl ýIntitrust , tatutv regard vertical remaints m "relative" prohibitions subject to it rule-ot'- 
reason analvsk Ftw ewniple, Me\ico (Article 10 L, cN Federal dc Compctenciýi 
Costa Ricit (Article 12 I, cy cle Promoci6n de !a (1mipetenda v Defensa Ffectiva (lei ConquirOAr. 
1994): Panama (Article 14 Ley No. 29, lqq())ý VenezLieLi (Article 4, Rqgulation No. I ). 
141 Khemam and Dut/. pp. 
14 2 W., p. 23. 
1-43) c. Curiel, 1)iscfio de Lin Modelo de la Competencia en ei -dc 
ki 
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On the other hand. however, they fl-CqUently re, ýLilt in efficiencic,, which 
deserve consideration. Their restraint., -, "(wercome a market fLUIL11-C ývhencvcr flicy 
mtcrnaIi.,, c externalities that arise when downstrearn enterpriscs igmore the effcci of' ilicir 
actions on up,,, trearn profits". 144 Economist.,,, genemily emphasisc cfficlencIc,, 
improving the Supply Of retail service and quality to consumers; hence, the com, cmional Z: ) 
view considers these problerns as resulting frorn misplaced incentives that could endan, -, cr I 
"efficient" resource allocation, since they discourage parties from undertaking cerlmn 
investments. For these reasons, mainstrearn scholars adopt a rule-of-reýtson again,, t lhi"' I 
type of conduct, and warn developing countries against adopting stringent rules in thrIN 
field. 145 
In Latin Amer1ca, the enforcement experience on these arrangements has heen 
uneven, despite the Structural sirlUlarities of domestic econornies in the region. Pcrhýtj).,, 
the reason for this phenomenon is found in the slow, convergent learning process of 
national antitrust acencies dealing with thesc restrictions. Latin American mititrwt b 
agencies are still very inclined to follow their own policy agenda, which is shaped h\, 
theoretical as well as practical considerations: the difficulties of preparing a ca"c a 
firm often counts as much as any other cons] deration. 146 
liiii)lýtritýici(3ii (Je las Polfticas de Competencia en Latinoainerica. paper presented ýit Ilic 
Re, ýtrictive Practices Unit at the UNCTAD Secretariat. Procompetencia, 1996, p. 15. 
144 Id. 
145 Id., p. 24. In this sciise, Jatar also oh,, ei-\, c,,: "the prohibited conducts should estýihll,,, h clem 
difference,,, between agreements among cornpetitor,, who are trying to restrict competition and 
vci-t1cal restraint,,,, which are usually made for efficient reasons [this policy] permw, 
competition policy-makers to concentrate their efforts on clear cases of cartelized behaviour WId 
avold decisions over cases where the anti -cornpeti ti ve effects are difficult to evaluatc. " Oatar. 
ConqpetitionPol icy inLatin America, p. 2 1. ) 
146 HO\\'c\'cr, unc\'cii enforcement does not mean that it is non-existent. Chile, for c\miiple, hw" an 
intense tradition of controlling vertical restraints, rather than the prosecution of cartels. Bem, ccii 
1974 mid 1992, the number of vertical pr(),, ecuted hy the Chilean Resolutive Commi, "mon 
antitrust body) was 117 (61 c&, 'c', on vertical agreements; 156 caseý, on vertical 
1-cstraints). compared to 61 horizontal prosccutioný,. (Paredes, Polfticaý, de Competencia en un 
pýjrs ,, In tradici6n de Mercado (Chile), 1). 17). Other Latin American countrie,,. , uch I,, 
\I-L, entina i1nd VCIICZLICla. haVe had a morc modcrate c\perience in thk field. 
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More frequently, vertical agreements are seen as monopolising behaviour, M the t) 
coiitext of "market dominance". Sometimes this -, taridard takes ori a separýitc 
from other vertical restraint prohibitions. 147 In other cases, however, it has beeri 
as an additional form of vertical restraint; as in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rlcýl, 111d 
Brazil. 148 Faced with severe difficulties in obtaining evidence of the restrictive natui c ()I 
vertical agreements, Boner argues that incorporatingy an abuse of dominant P(),, -, MOii 
doctrine is highly desirable, because "treating vertical restraints as an abuse of doillIM111cc r_1 Z7 
requires a complainant to establish that the firm imposing the restraints is domillant. This 
standard has some notable advantages for the reforming economy: vertical restraillis ý11'c 
prohibited for large, dominant suppliers but are legal for other suppliers. Thus, the b 
restraints are legal where they are most likely to be technically or allocatlvck 
efficient". 149 
c) Mergers and acquisitions. 
This area of antitrust policy is the most controversial and perhaps the mo,, i 
frequently used by Latiii American antitrust ageiicies in their enforcen-lent work. 
Antitrust agencies regulate economic coiicentration because this is interprctcd a,, i 
sign companies I intentions to acquire a dominant position aimed at seeking monopoly 
rents, as it establishes the platform for abuse of a dominant position. Following ;i 
structural view of markets, mergers and acquisitions can only be seen as reducing the 
number of "Independent" traders in the market concerned. Boner argues: "merLict- conti-()l L- I 
and other structural IVI"LlIations are designed to preserve the independence ol' , Lipphci, ý, 1-7) 
and to prevent corporate transactions that would substantially elin-linate competitioll .. . 150 
147 111 Venezuela. the law prohibits "the abuse on the part of one or several persons subýject to thlý 
law who hold a dominant position in all or part of the national market.. ". (Article I ') Lev Pro- 
Cornpetencia). At regional level, the Andean Group (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and L- 
Bolivia) prohibits ahuse of a dominant position. (Artlcle,, 3 and 5. Decision 285 ofthe Andcmi 
Corn lilt] III tv). 
148 Scc, Paredc.,,. Politicas..., P. 17, in general. ýec OAS, Inventory, 
149 Boner, Competit on-Policy and Institutions III Rctoj-jjjij, ý, F, 
Id. In Lcneral. , cc Boner and Krueger. Op. C pp. 68-84. 
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These struct. ural regulations complement the "gaps - in "conduct- prohibition,,. \\, Iio,, c 
absence, in Boner's opinion, would induce ri-ionopollsts to devise i-nergers a,, corporatc 
, trategies to elude cartel prohibition: -[In the absence ofl Sti-LiCtural regulation. L7 -- 
would allow competing suppliers to co-ordinate pricing policies, this conduct \\OLIld 
()therwise be illegal". 151 Zý 
Khernant and Dutz also refer to the potential negative effects of i-ner-cr". III flICII, 
opinion, horizontal mergers amon st two or niore firms ii-i the , arne line of 9 
reduce the number of competing firms and increase market concentration-, %ertical 
mergers arriongst firms engaged in different sta,, es of production rnay close sourcc.,, ()I 
inputs or distribution channels to competitors, and conglornerate mergers an-iong firills III L- L- I 
diversified or unrelated businesses may lead to cross-subsidisation and rcciprocýd 
-fernents that I imit competition. 152 , irranc t, 
Perhaps these reason,, explain why policy enforcement in this field hir" hCcII 
PM-tICUlarly active in sorne Latin American countries. The investigation of file I-,, ' 
effects on competition is sutýject to similar guidelinc,, to those used in the Unitcd Stýitc, ý. Z7) 
These culdelines Include: 1-1 
a) The value of the transaction and of the ýtsscts involved, 
h) the identification of both the product and geographic relevant market-, 
c) the dynamics of competition, in terms of number of competitors, procluclWil 
capacity and product demand, regulatory constraints, and the like-, 
d) entry barriers*, 
e) concentration levels, as measured under the Herfindhal-Hirschrnan standard-, 
f) efficlencics, ýiccruing from the coriccntration. and cventualiv, 
whether the merging firms Would go bankrupt if the rnerger clocsn'l tAc 
placc. 
IýI Boncr. 1). 
I 
-ý 
-) Klieniam and Dutz. 1). 225- 
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interesting to note that wherever mercler control has been incorporatcd into L- L- 
national legislation, it has become the preferred too] of enforcement by antitru,, t ýiocncic, -, - 
For example, Mexico's Comisl6n has devoted the bulk of its resources to cvaluatiii(-, I 
mergers Lind acquisitions. Rowat argues. -The bulk of the [Mexican antitru"t] 
Coi-nrn i ss ion's activity has been devoted to meruci- ca, ýcs based partly on the fact that the 
pi-e-notification requirenient provides an effective way of generating 17) 
Venezuela has taken a more balanced approacli to its enforcement policy-, nc\ci-tlicIc.,,.,,. 
niergers are an important part of its work, even though per-merger notification in tllrlýl 
country is not i-nandatory. 154 Brazil and Colombia also possess significant merger 
enforcernent systerns. 155 The reasons invoked for active enforcement in this field viit-v 
Merger enforcement has been negligible only in countries where antitrust is very recent, 
, ýuch as Costa. Rica and Panama. 
Other countries, however, have preferred other alternatives to merger regulatioti,,,. L- C) 
The laws of Argentina, Chile and Peru do not contain express provisions in this area. In 
these countries, concentrations are only pro. sccuted, if they create a dominant position in 
the market. In this case, the undertaking is treated as abuse of a dominant position. Other 
COUntrics, such its Costa Rica and Panama, possess provision,,, are too vague to allow any 
153 Rowat, p. 16. In 1993-1994, the Mexican Comisi(in received 52 notifications and decided 4ý. B\ 
contrast, it opened 22 investigations for monopolistic conduct. In 1994-1995 there were 109 
notifications, an increase of 27% fi-om the preceding year, compared to 17 cases of restrictive 
practices. (Comisl6n Federal de ]a Competencia, Informe Anual 1993-1994, Mexico, D. F- 
1994. -, als'(). Inforine Anual 1994-1995, Mexico, D. F., 1995. ) 
154 During 1991. Venezuela,, Superintendencia Pro-Competencia authorised 5 merger proposal,, Z7' -11 Z7, 
OLIt of 6, while it examined 13 cases involvmL, rcstricti've conducts; in 1994 it decided 7 mer. Lcr 
cýi.,, cs and 7 oil restrictive undertakmLs. in 1995, it decided 10 merger casesý compared to ) 
prosec Lit lolls oil ], C"tl-lctl\, c conducts. (Superintendencia Pro-Competencia. Intorme Allual ]_(-)(-)2- 
191)"), 191). ". Intorme Anual 1994. Cm-aca,,. 191)4ý Int't)rme Anual 199ý. 191-)ý. ) 
155 Accordim, to Niattos, "CADE has I'ocuscd W, work, since 1994, more on mer-ers than oil miti- 
competitive conducts. which is not consistent with the international trend. This cýin be , ccn 
I)v the lo\\ Ic\ cl of anti-competitive conduct,, . 
ged relative to the , tock of ýuch case" at ('. \DE ludýý 
in 1996,23)% compared to the same statistics for nier-uers w, hich reached 59c/c". (C. Mlitto,, Thc 
Recent EVOIL111011 O[QO icýn Brazil: ., \n Incomplet Transitton paper piccnted at 
tile contcrence oil Competition Policy and Economic Reform, Rio de Janeiro, Brazi 1,10-1 ') ILIIN 
11) 1) 7, P. 6. ) 
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enforcement. 156 The reasons for not actively enforcing merger control in these COLIMI-ICý, 
vary, but Lin important factor seems to be the lack of technical , kill.,, for &%, clopin. - 
elaborate regulatory standards and techniques which differentiate between -,,, ()()cI- and 
"had" undertakings. This is particularly true in the determination of market power and the 
evaluation of efficiencies. 157 
The relation between market concentration and economic efficiencv in the 
(lcslL, n of lcoal prol-ilhitions Linder Latin American antitrust enforcement. I Z7 
The fear of large firms is an ever-present issue amongst antitrust scholars whcri 
analysincy competition in Latin America, and more broadly, in developing countne,: ý. Iýilx- 
aroues that the high market concentrations common in the repon have "important C) L_ 
implications for antitrust enforcement". 158 These irriplications refer to the lncreýiscd 
likelihood of cartel formation, and to their gaining market power after the liberallsation ol 
prices. For Khemani and Dutz, "many of the analytical problems posed by a small nurnber 
of market participants and ofigopolistic interdependence are more likely to occur in , niall 
econornies than in larger ones". 159 L_ 
These concern,,, are mirrored in the ýtntitrust lealslation of most Latin Aniericýjjj 
Jurisdictions. These statutes lend paramount 11-nPortance to market concentration in 
ascertaining the existence of anti-competitivc acts. Some statutes set -, pc cihc Z71 
concentratiop levels, beyond which any undertaking deemed to be restrictive hy 
participants is regarded as a legal breach. For example, Article 20 of Brazil's Lei No. 
16 TineO, at 20.111 Our opinion, Tineo's conclusions m-e not entirely warranted. Articlc 16 ofCo,, i; I 
Rica's Lev ýle Promoct'(5n de la Competencia v Defenso Electivo del Constimi'dor ( 1994) 1 c, -,, ii (1, 
concentration activities as relative prohibitions. and sub jects thern to ex-post I'LlIe-01-1-Cý1, M) 
analvsIs. On the other hand, Article 20 of Panama's Lev No. 26,1996 alkms mana-ci-, to 
request authorization to undertake a mer, -, er operation, at their 
discretion: but no effects occur it' 
ýi meroer Is rewscd. However, rnei-Lcrs without AlthOrlZatiOn CoUld he IcLAly challcilLed 
the fir,, I thrcc vcýirs. (Article 22). 
157 Khemani and Dutz, pp. 25-20- 
I 
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9984,1994 condemns any restrictive undertaking by firms 2W7(- of the nitrket 
w, anti-competitive -irrespective of their guilt" 
Most statutes, however, subject the illegality of condLlCtý, CC()11()Ill]C 
conccntration to the condition that they entail the undue exercise of either markct 1)()\\-ci- 
or dominance in the market. In this regard, national antitrust schemes have been inicn.,, cly 
influenced either by European or United States competition rules. 160 For cxarnpic, 
Argentina, Peru and Colombia have incorporated the European notions, of "doniinýincc- 
and "abUse of a dominant position" into domestic legislation. 161 Other jurisdictions rely 
on the concept. of "market power" imported from U. S. antitrust legislation. The model of 
this second group is found in the Mexican Lcý, ['cderal de Compewncia Econoinic(i, 
which was the first statute to adopt it. w-, Some countries combine the concept" of 
"dominance" and "market power" in a rather confusing wLiy. For example, Venczucki's 
LeY Pro-Col)ipeteiwia has a section devoted to "abuses of a dominant position"163, 
coi-nbined with a range of prohibitions condemning unilateral conduct which apply when a t-) Z: ) 
firn-i enjoys "market power". 164 Market power is also applied to othcr ca,,, c,. ý, in thc 
VeneZUelan 
'jurisdiction 
where there is multilateral conduct leading to the eliniination ol 
-cffective Competition". 165 
In this analysis, ,, cveral aspects may be con, ý, Idered hesides the ýI/o of niirkct ýhii; v 
for instance, cross-elasticity of demand, distribution or transportation co, ýts*, 1C. 2al I'LIIC, '-,. 
160 Pi-ýictio: A con.,, I derati oils have also played an impoi, tant role in shaping national 111titi'Ll. "'I 
, chemes. For cxample, Latin American counti, ic,, ýýill 'Ittempt to 1'ýIcilitatc the N 
f0reWn principle,,, ind doctrine.,., into domestic ICLLIl ý\,,,, tcms. Mexico chose a le,, ýil an1mwt 
'ýIIAICI[Llre ýiimlar to that of the United Stale,,. ho, -ýmse ()i its menihei-d-iip to NAFTA. 11ý, conlrýi,, i. 
other countries have adopted the European tInion model, in order to facilitate the incoi-poi-ýmon 
of new antitrust docti-Inc (because of their common civil legal systems). 
161 , \, -Ilcle 2 Ai-Lentlila , Ley No. 22.202,1980. Article 5 Pei-u',, I)cci-ct() Xo. 701. 1- A vt ii cIc 45.5 ('() Iomhiý i's Dec reto Le v No. -115 
3.199 
102 10,1 1,1-' and 1 33, Mexican Lev Federal Lie la Competenciýt. 
163 Artlclc I CIICZL]ell I, C\ Pro-competelicid. 
164 Articlc.,, 6-1). VCIICZLICLCS LCY Pl-()-CoIIIPetellCKl. 
I W, , \I-ticle 14, VenezueLt',,, LcN 
Pro-Compctcnciýi. 
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and -so forth. In any event, enforcement acencies hold considerable discrction in Zý 
determining which elernents should be used in the analy,, i,,. For iwitancc, Artick, Ij ()I- 
Venezuela's Ley Pro-Competencia assumes that market dominance in economic actlVitV 
is exclusive to one person or group of related and whenevei- Lhei-e rý, iik) ci'ic, iiýc 
competition between them. However, Articles 2 ýind 3 of Regulation No. 1 ica\c (11(, 
definition of both "relevant market", where competition is restrained, and 
cornpetitjon'ý to the Superintendency. Articles 12 and 13 of Mexico's LeY F'cdcral 
Competcim-la Economica provide a similar ', 011-ltion. Article 15 of Co, ýta Rlcý, ', l-, - 
Promoci(in de la Competencia Y Delensa Lýtecth, a del Consit, midor instruct. ', thc 
Comisi(in to measure market power by following certain indicators such as the nim-kci 
share of the firm-, the possibility of imposing prices unilaterally, the existence of entrN 
harriers; the existence and power of competitors; access to resources and other "1111IL11- 
considerations. Other Latin American antitrust statutes provide similar solutions. 166 
Antitrust laws throughout Latin America arant antitrust agencies the discretion to 
calculate economic performance from mai-kct coriccntration rcsultim-, frorn cxploitittivc m 
exclusionary conducts, or from economic concentration. In particular, Latin American 
ýintitl'LlSt rules attach central importance to market concentration in the identification ()I' 
dominance or market power-, in fact, except for the relatively older antitrust statutes, this 
is a central consideration in all Latin American jurisdictions for judging the existence of 
-competitive behaviour. 167 The discretion involved in the analysis of market pmver 'inti 
and dominance is quite significant, and extends not only to the measure of the relevant b 
market, but also to market power or dominance's constitutive elements: clegrce ol 
concentration, existence of entry barriers and the dynamics of competition. 
166 For example, Article 16 of Panama's Ley No. 21). 1996 (Identification of the "pertinent market") 
and Article 17 ("market power"). Also, Article 4 of Peru',,, Decreto I, eLIslatl\! o No. 7M and 
finaliv, Article 45 of Colombia's Decreto No. 2 153,1992. 
167 The only cxccptloiis m-c the absolitte /)/-0/71'/)ItI'0/IS Of IsOMC 1, ýmn Americmi jurvdiction, ý (i, c 
Nlc\ico. Costa Ricýi, Panama). However. aniong these type of conduct, the economic 
ofanti-competiti\ c cl'lcct,, expressed through the SCP paradwin is -Llven a 
iegal per w citect itild 
therct"orc no further analysis i's required once its em.,,, tence is determined. The existencc ot tllc,, c 
I\pc of conduct (1()c,,, not contradict the Conclusion that the C()Ilcelltl-ýitloii-pei-foi-iiiýilicc 1\1,, 
(Ictermines the anti-competitive nature of market restrictions in Latin American Ic,,, P, I at loll. 011 
the L-0,11tral-N , 
it i,, reaffirmed. 
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Thi.,, i,, perhaps most obvious in the economic analy, ýis of cconomic cOnccntra: iO;,,,, 
For example, in case No 27/94 on the proposed acquPition of Kolynos do Brasd S. A. 6Y 
Colgate Palmolivc Company, Brazil's Con, wlho -Adm1171St1-(111VO dc [Vf("S(1 
(CADE) held that the merger could not proceed due to high levels of concentration in the t7l 
toothpaste market. The merger was only allowed in the toothbrush scctor. In ýcjic/ýLicia. 
SUI)crintendencia Pro-Cornpetencia challenged a proposed nicrger in the paint lnclustr\ 
between Pinco Pittsburgh, S. A. and Corim6n S. A. C. A. (Resolution No. SPPI-C/()()')6-()-4) L- 
for similar reasons. In Mexico, the Comisl(ji7 decided that the rnm-, er between Klmhc! -1, 
Clark de Mexico, S. A. and Compafifa Industrial de San Crist6bal, S. A. ( 1995) lncreýl, ýcd 
the likelihood of restrictive behaviour because of its potential effects on concentration in 
the relevant market. Many other cases have been decided accordino to similar 
In short, the concept of concentration has been pervasive in shapin2 antitrust enforcclimit 
in Latin American agencieý. 
Ultimately, the essence of the legislation relics upon economic the li,,, i ()I 
prohibitions is only effective insofar as it determines to what cxtent ccononiic analy,,, iý, 
should be applied to certain types of behaviour deemed to be more dangCI-OUS Or 
suspicious than others. This form of economic analvslýý focusc, ý on market concentrýmon 
to determine whether a type of conduct or undertaking should be allowed. 
In addition to market concentration, econornic efficiency also plays a central roic iii 
the determination of antitrust liabilities in Latin America', s schemes. This aiiaksis Is 
sometimes left aside as the particular conduct or --conornic organisation iýý ýcr 
sc presurned to entertain necative social effects. This is generally the case of pricc fixino Z7) Z: ) Z- I 
market division and bid rig-incy 1ý I"-- t) * 
However, in most instances econornic analysis under a rule of reason is reclu, rcd to 
evidence the underlying effects of the analysed undertakings. This analysV, Is appllcýthle to 
vertical arrangemcntý ; uch as territorial restraints, exclusive distribution Z- - 
CXCIusIvC arrallocnients and the like. Some omntriý:,, prohibit cxcIu,,, i\c dki, ihuiikwý It" 
() ) 
to the extent that they entail anticompetitive effects. This is the case of Mexico. Paiiaiiiýt. 
Brazil, Chile and Co,, ta Rica. 
I 
Sometimes, different national statutes take differing approaches towards cermin 
conducts not clearly within any of the previous groups. For example, tying ýirrýtngcrncllt'ý 
are prohibited under a rule of reason. Refusals to deal are not included in the leL'isk1tJ()1, ' 
of Chile and Mexico, other jurisdictions regard it as a rule of rcLtson conduct. Aý L-1 
predatory pricing, resale price maintenance and price discri rni nation, there ýire differen! Z1- 
approaches. In Colombia and Venezuela, a dominant party can only affect predatorý' 
pricing; by contrast, in Panama it is necessary to evidence an anticompetitive purpose. 
3. - INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST PO-1-ICY IN 
LATIN AMERICA. 
3.1. - Features of antitrust enforcement in Latin America. 
a) Diversity of antitrust enforcement agency structure. 
Antitrust agencies in Latin b America can adopt the 
forrn of administrativc 
cornmissionsI68 or single-person Z: ) super] ntendencics, in Colonibl. i ui(l 
Venezuela. 169 
, 
fe 168 Foi- example, Argentina's Colnisi& Nacional de De wsa dc la Competclicia (National 
Commission of Competition's Protection), has five members (Articles 6-16 Ar., zentina's Lev No. 
I rotecti -162,1980); the Brazilian CADE (Administrative Board of Economic *on). ýýC\cn 
members (Article,, 3-6 Brazil's Lei No. 8884,1994)-, Chile's Coniisi& Resolu,, ii'a (Re,, olLitli%L, 
Commission) under Decretos-Leyes Nos. -11 1,197'1 and 
1-760,1979. Pelll', s appelziw ho(IN, hw 
INDECOPI's decisions is the Tribunal de Dqensa de 161 Conipetencia, Miich in 
administrative tribunal (Article 13 Decreto Ley No. 25868. )-, the Costa Rican Coniisioii paro 
Proillover la Coll 1petel I ciý 1 (Comission for Promotion of Competition), has five menihei-, 
a Rica's Ley de Prornocl6n de la CompetencKi y Defensa Efectlvi del (Articles 18-27 CostC 
Consurniclor, 1994)ý Mexico's Comisi6n Federal de Conipctciwia (Federal Coniniis,, ion 0 
Competition), five members (Articles 23-29 of the Mexican Ley Federal de Competencla 
Econ6rnica, 1992)-, Panama's Coniisi6n de Libre Competencia v Asuntos del Cotisulmdor (Fi-ce 
Competition and Consumer's Affairs Commission). three members (Articles 101-114 Pananw',, 
Ley No. 29.1996) and finally, Peru's Instititto Nacional de Dcfi-lisa de la Coinpeteiwia - 
INDECOPI (National Institute for the Protection of Competition) with three membci-, (. \rticles A 
and 5 of Decreto-L, cv No. 25868,1992) 
109 Colombia's Superiweiidencia de Industrio v Colnercio (Superintendency of liidiiý, Irý and 
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Nevertheless, the similarities are more important than the difference,,,. \11 liw-k' 
bodies normally eRjoy a large degree of technical skill and functional al-ItO1101M. Ll--ý iiWh 
decisions on investigations and procedures are isolated from political interl'ercncc. 
Sometimes autonomy is ensured through budgetary independence; in other ca"c" throLigil 
specific provisions wl-ilch separate them from the rest of the Public Administratioii. I-() For 
cxai-nple, it is common to find that their decisions cannot be brouGht to appeal t)cl'()I, c 
higher administrative bodies, but only before jurisdictional bodies. 171 
The appointment and removal of their members is generally subject to , I)ccIA 
conditions. 172 Sometimes, their tenure exceeds that of covernments in office. 17') A] I thc,,, c Z: ) 
condition,, ý are intended to reinforce their independericc and political status. 174 
Commerce) under Decreto No. 2153,1992 and Venezuela's Superintendencict poro /(I 
Prornoci(jli v Proteccimi de la Libre Competem-io (SuperintendencM Pro-Compewncim 
the Ley para Promover y Proteger el Ejercido de la Libre Competencia. 
170 This is the casc of Panama's Article 101 of Ley No. 29, which provides the Colllisi('11 dc Libre 
Coliipeteiicla Y Asuiffos del Consumidor with independent legal identity. inici-nal autononiv ý111(1 
functional independence. Also, Mexico's Article 23) of the Ley Federal de Conipciencid 
Econ6mica, provides the Comisi& Federol de Coinpetencia with technical and operatIVC 
autonorny, and autonomy to issue resolutions. Similarly, Brazil's CADE enjoys ailt(ýIwlii. v in 
budgetary, personnel, and decision-makincy matters, according to Lei No. 9021,1995. Finýdlv. 
according to Article 19 of Venezuela', s Ley Pro-Cornpetencia, the Supel-111tendellcia Pl()- 
Competencla has functional autonomy (but not hudgetýtry). 
171 Article 53 of Venezuela's Ley Pro-Competencia indicates that the decisions of the 
Supet-bitendenct'a Pro-Competenci .a can only be appealed before administrative court, '. 
Decisions of the Chilean Comisi6n Resolutiva can only be appealed before the Supreme Court 
(Article 19, Decretos-Leyes 211,1973 and 2760,1979). 
172 A qualified semority is required from candidates to head the antitrust agencies in Venezuela 030 
years), Mexico (35 years), Argentina (30 years) and Brazil (30 years). Professional exl)ei-tl,, c and 
ethical standards are required by most statutes. The members of these agencies are often 
required to be either attorneys or economists (for example, Article 19 Costa Rican Lev dc 
Prornoc16n de la Competencia; Article 8 Argentina's Ley No. 22.262.1980; Article 4 Brazil'.,, 
Lei No. 8884.1994) 
173 Me\lco', s commissioners are appointed for renc%vahIc per, ods of ten years. and ma\ only hc 
removed in c\ceptional circumstances (Article 27, I. cv Federal de Competencia Economica. 
1992). Venezueki', ý SLIperintendent and Deput\ S uperl lite nden t are appointed for low \c,,,,,. ik) 
avoid coinciding with the presidential term of fi\c ycar,, (Article 222. 
Lcý Pro-Conipcicncia. 
1992). 
174 In some cascs. independence is ensured by the appointment Ot representatives from dittercm 
sectors of "ocictN. as a counterwei-ht to gmcniment appointments (generalk, the 
Miril, 'Ir\ of 
Industi-v or the Ministry of Economy). For c\ýimple. in Chile, the Comisi(in Resolutiva i,, formed 
94 
Finally, in some cases, antitrust enforcement activities are divided between t\\-() 
aoencie, -., hy additional prosecuting bodies. This is the cýtse in Chile where the Coiiii, ýi(ýli 
Resolutiva imposes administrative sanctions, and the Fiscalia Nacional Ecoiioini( o 
(National Economic Public Prosecutor) acts as a representative of the collective inteiv,, i 
before the Coini, yi(jn Resolutiva or the courts] 75. It is also the case in Brazil whcre the 
Sccrctarfa de Diretto Ecoi76mico is in charge of enforcing, Brazil's antitrust laws. Finally. 
in Peru the Tribunol (le D(t(visa de la CoinpOcncia is in charge of enfoi-cernent Licttvitic, - 
there. 
b) Jurisdiction of antitrust enforcement ac., , encies. 
Antitrust rules apply in all Latin American statutes to all economic activities. 
However, there are significant exceptions worth mentioning. 
Latin American antitrust enforcement seldorn challenges legal rules ciiýictccl hy 
Governments to create monopolies or restrict competition. Antitrust statutes coninionly 
exclude enforcement and do not challenge legal rules which create obstacles to zD 
cornpetition. 176 This is another consequence of the structural bias of the policy, whicli 
wrongly emphasises the analysis of barriers alleged to be created by the dynamics ()I' 
to examine the sources of leaal discrimination found i markets, and nealects : 7) 11 
concessions, privileges and so on. 
by representatives of the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Finance, ýi 
Dean of a Law School and a Dean of a Faculty of Economics (Article 16 Chile's Decretos-Lcvc,,, 
21 1,1973 and 2760.1979) 
175 Article 24 Dccrcl().,, -I, cNles 211,1973 and 2760,1979. In thcoi-y. at least. all Lat'n Anici-icall 
COUnti-ICS with antltl-USt schemes have fiscolkis t,, ciier(ile. s whose activities are independent of' 
other branchc,, of Government. These flycedkis are inlended to protect individual rigflitý,, lroin 
government or other interference. Howevcr, thesc bodies have traditionally been confined to 
political aspect,, of the protection of huniall Ccollonlic riolits are not seen aý, parl of theill, 
ILHASCIlChOll 
176 scc, OAS, Invelltoll P. 11. 
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Clearly, neo-classical econoFMc analysis has influenced the way in which antitrust 
a, ocncicý, throughout the region interpret statutory Icgal provisiow, and deternmic, the 
le-ality 01' bLISiness behaviour. As antitrust rcgulation i,, ý intended to correct a , pcclal kfflo-I 
of "market failurc", it cannot be combined with other regulatory measures aimcd iii 
wplacing unfettered market functioning by gownimerit fiat. 
If markets do not meet optimal condition,, they are in-Lmediately claoccl ýr, 
"failure,, ", because of externalities, monopolistic output restriction, or any other 
contingency calling for intervention. O'Driscoll and Rizzo describe the devices Lisccl to 
deal with market failure: taxation, regulation and antitrust. The logic behind thc usc of 
these regulatory mechanisms, means that whatever form is chosen to "correct" or 
"control" market failures will most likely preclude the other two. 177 This explains \\, Ii\, 
certain regulated sectors are excluded fi-orn antitrust enforcement; which, of cour"c, 
applies particularly to the Latin American schemes. 
In this regard, some antitrust reaulations cslablvsh exceptions to enforcement in bb 
certain econornic sectors-, but such exemptions are not uniform. According to Tinco, Z- 
these special regimes are established "cither hccý-iusc the general (competition) , ystem 
does not help to achieve the objectives of competition in cases of public utilities (natural 
monopolies) or becausc the social repercussions on other sectors are considercd 
sensitive". 178 
Finally, certain monopolies are allowed where activities are regarded as strateoic or tl -- 
where national security is allegedly involved. For example, in Mexico, Article 4 of the Z7) 
Ley Fcderal de Cornpetencia Econ6mica exen-ipts nationalised "strategic industries- , uch 1 Z7) 
the oil industry and natural gas sectors and Articles 5 and 6 exempt trade unions and 
cxpoi-t co-operatives respectively. Sim-ilarly, Article 5 of Chilean Decree-Laws Nos. 
197', and 2760,1979 limits the enforcement of antitrust provisions in virtuallv cvcl-ý' 
177 G. 0' Dris-coll and N1. Rizzo. The Economic,,, of-Ti-nne and Ba, "il Bllck\\(, Il. 
1985), pp. 137-138. 
178 L. Tinco. Conipcill loll 1'()Ilc\; 
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sector regulated by other legal provisions. These sectors include mining, oil prodUCtIO11. 
public services, liquor production, health, banking, insurance, the stock market alld 
transport. In Costa Rica, according to Article 9 of the Ley de Promoc16ii de la 
Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consunildor the following sectors are excludecl 
competition: insurance. alcohol distillery, fuel, public concessions, telecorrimunlcati()11ý1. 
the telephone service, electric power and water services. 
In general, most countries allow separate legal systems for certain public LitflltlcN 
and monopolies involving concessions or copyright. Hence, strikino a balance hcm, ccii Ln 
sectors subject to monopolies and those subject to privileges is not easv since politic. l! 
criteria tend to be involved. The general conviction here is that political reason.,, Justlk- 4: ) 
exemption from general competition rules. Z: ) 
Aside from these exceptions, it 
antitrust statutes apply to all national 
private ownership. Iii addition, they 
agreement, act or transaction lending 
goods and services. 
should be borne in And that Latin Aniericaii 
and foreign firms, regardless of their public or 
apply to every undertaking, type of coiiduct. 
to the production marketing or distributioii ol' 
Finally, following standards sifrUlar to those applied elsewhere, Latin American 
lealslation incorporates an "effects doctrine" whereby, irrespective of national origin, anv t) C, 
Undertaking is prosecuted if it adversely affects domestic markets. Countries that are 1: ) 
members of regional economic grouping-, such as the Andean Cornmunitv ()I- 
MERCOSUR, establish special provisions for the enforcement of common competitioii 
i-uIcs when the practice produces restrictive effects on competition in the integl-ýIlcd 
niýtrket. 179 
179 The Andean COIIIIIILIIIIINI (Venezuela, Colombia. Lcuaclor. Bolivia and Peru) and IMEW'()., 'ý"I 
C, 11' . 1\') -e treaties 
to establ-sh' 11 ec011()IIIIC (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and UI -'LIL ai I 111(y COMMO 
markets ainona these Latin American countries. Inspired by the Treat), of Rome in the ELIFOI)C, 111 
Union, both intevration experiments provide for reolonal antitrust provision, ". The Amican 
antitrust rule,,, are embodied in Dccision 2S5 of the Andean Community, 199 1 ("Ruic, to pi cvcnt 
or C()I-I-Cct (11"101-tion" Oil competition L'Cneratecl h\ rc,, tricti\ cbusiiic. ss J) I, Iý. IIý: L", '). 
MERCOSUR's antitrust rule,,, are embocliecl in the Protocolo de D(testi da Com mi clict,; do 
IIERCOSUL. 1996 ("MERCOSUR's Protocol of Protection of Competition") Both Articic 2N 
I)ccision -)N-5 and 
Article 3 of Protocolo de I)ctcw da Concorrýncia do AIERCOSIT, /990 
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c) Adr-ninistrative p ocedures. 
Most Latin American jurisdictions follow administrative procedures for thc 
investigation and prosecution of anti-competitive practicc, ", in this respect, Lx, 111 
American administrative legal rules follow Contincntal Eui-ol)e',, two-ticr 
procedures Lire initially conducted before an administrative agency and then beforc tllc 
courts. The existence of these specialised administrative agencies is seen to c(mipen,, ite 
for the claimants' lack ofdirect access to the courts whenever claims are brouLdit beforc 
the administrative jurisdiction. 180 
Two kinds of administrative procedure are followed under Latin American aritltlll, ýt 
statutes: the first deals with prosecution of restrictive conducts; the second "'Ith 
authorisation of undertakings with possible exemption from enforcement. Generally, thcsc 4n 
entail special administrative procedures and normally depart from the general RIICS 011 
Aministrative procedures in other areas of intervention. 
In the case of i-nercrers, Latin American procedural schemes show coll, "Idcrallic 
Ii ions use authori 11 divergence. Some isation procedures, in which mer-in- firms iii-c 
required to file it pre-rnerger notification. 181 Other countries merely establish ;i 1--ý 
limit the scope of i-c, -, Ional enforcement to conducts affecting the Andean Suhiv, -, Wn and 
Mercosur, respectively. 
Gcnerally, the decision of the administrative a, -, ency on the anti-competitive nature ()I a 
rcstrictive underlakinc, or practice is needed before a civil action can be brought. in the 
ca.,, c of "unfair competition", the statutes allow the victims inore leeway to present their ckiim, ý, 
before the courts. Sometimes, filing a case beforc the court preclude,,, filim-, the ýýinie claim 
before the administrative a-ency. The lo(, Ic of this is hased on the need to avoid contradictory 
decisions. For exýiniplc, Article 55 of Venezuela's Le\ Pro-Competencia allows at'lecied partic" 
to make clainis before ordinary courts only after the Superititendem-W Pro-Compeiencia ha" 
rssucd it final administrative decision. 
181 Scc ArticIcs 16-22 of Mexico's, I-ey Federal de Conipciencia Econ61nica oil -Conccntranons-ý 
and BrazlF.,, Lei No. 8158.1991 (todav'. ý Ley No. No. 8884,1994) which that ", in\ 
agreements thýit limit or reduce competition, includin2 mergers, whose consequence i,,, a market 
,, harc higher than in the relevant rnarket- must be appro\cd by CADE. Finally. 
VcnezticLi's Superintendencia Pro-Conipetencia hýi,, dcveloped a rneri, cr control N 
dubious Oil the basis of a general CLILIý, C in the Lev Pro-Cornpetencia (Article II). and 
coniplementarv Repilation No. 2 oil Mer,, 7, cr,, and 
Acq u , ýj t liolp, 
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requirement of notification for registration purpose,,, with varyin, -, consequencc,, is-, 
ýI Soi Z: ) x -ne COLIntries 
do not even possess specific merger procedure,. in their stat Lite,,,. i, 
Finally, antitrust procedures may either he initiated ex-oficlo or hy any illtcre, ýtcd 
party. 184 Sometimes, however, ex-oficio prosecution begins only after Li 17,1-CvIOW, 
investigation has determined the likelihood of anti -competitive practices. 85 Ao 1 11.1 I gain, 
d1i 
circumstance reveals the power granted to the State in deciding the existencc of' ami- 
competitive restrictions and classify them as matters of "public interest". 1-10\ýcvci-. 
antitrust laws in the realon do acknowledge that individual rights are impaired hv these b In 
restrictions, as they still provide for civil compensation to those affected. The affected 
party before must seek compensation through a civil court once the antitrust a-clicy Ims t) 
determined the existence of an anti -competj ti ve practice. 
To carry out these activities, Latin American antitrust auencies aenerally enjoy b 4n -- 
broad powers allowing them to investigate economic sectors or particular firms, obtaiii 1-1 
evidence, to require co-operation from other ýiovernmental agencies, take preventativc It, Z: ) 
measures, and require cvldence from private and public bodies. 1, ýo 
182 For example, in Costa Rica, a rule-of-reason analysis is used for concentrations that limit 
competition (Article 16 Ley de Promocl6n de la Cornpetencia y Defensa Efectl\a (lei 
Consumidor). In Panama, there is an ex-post meraer notification system, with relatively , evcrc 
consequences for mergers above prohibited levels. (Articles 19-26 Ley No. 26,1996). Z- 
183 Thl. s is the cwse in Argentina, Chile and Peru, In these jurisdict ions, concentration,; are only 
prosecuted if they create a dominant position in the market. In the case of Argentina, however, 
Articles 9-16 in the new Competition Bill (expected to be passed by the end of 1997) dc\clop i 
. section on "Concentrations and Mergers", which provides foi- a pre-merger notification l 47- 
procedure. (See. Cornpilaci6n de Legislaci6n de la Competencia, Am6rica Latina v Carihe 
Volurnen 1, Cornisi6n de las Comunidades Europe&, Direcci6n General de la Conipetencia, 
Bruselas, April 1997, pp. 36-37. ) 
184 For example, Article 17 Argentina's Lev 22.262; Article 32 of Venezuela's I-Cv Pro- 
Conipetencl. t; Articic 30 of Mexico's Ley Federal de Cornpetencia Econkilca-, and Article 15 oI 
Peru',, Decreto LegPdativo No. 701. 
18ý For evimplc. 30 and 31 of Brazil',, pr()\icle for a ')O-daý period of prelimmm\ 
invc,, tigatiow, after %\,, hich proceeding,, -, ma\ be initiated. Venezuela',, administrative practicc 11,, so I Z- - 
ormit, ý ýi period for preliminary investit-, ation, hefore a ci,, c k brought ex-olicio. 
186 The provisions rci-nilatim-, these powers are t,, foll()%\ sý Article I LeN No. '1.16' 
19801 , \i-tlclc 7 Brazil's 1-ci No. 8884,1994. Articles 17 and 24 Chile',,, DccrctO,, -l, c\c,, 21 1, 
1973) and 21760.1979, 
Colombia',, CO&L, () Peru's 1),,,, ctO- 
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Antitrust agencic,, are sometimes granted powers to regulate their own cleci,,, ion- t) 
making activity with rules and official guidelines. 187 Agencies have often re, ýortcd to Z7, L- 
issuing "opinions", which clarify the legality ot' an actual or potential undertakin,, -, III 
connection with a partiCLIlar firm. 188 
d) Legal sanctions. 
Legal sanctions come in the form of administrative fines imposed for bi-eachim-, I 
"public order" (hence, their administrative natui-e). In some cases, a breach may also lead 
to civil damages, which only affected firms may claim. 189 
The fines for breaching antitrust statutes, which can be very high, arc ultimately 
determined by the seriousness of the distortion caused in the market and by taking into 
accOLIllt the income of the company which caused the inffingenient, as in Venezucki, fiiic,, 
are also Indexed to a minimuin wage or fi,,, cal unit &, in Mexico and Brazil. ig(-) 
Lepslativo No. 807; Venezuela's Article 34 Ley Pro-Competencia; Mexico's Article 31 I-Cv t: - - Federal de Competencia Econ6mica; Article 24 Cost Rica's Ley de Promoc16n de la 
Competencla y Defensa Efectiva del Consurrildor, 1994: Article 103 Panarna's Lcy No. 29. 
1996. 
187 According to the general principles of administrative law prevailing in all the Latin Americýin L- Z-- I--, 
jurisdictions, these administrative authorities may interpret their own rulings and creaie 
, guidelines 
from them. They may also change their former rulings in future cases. The chanLc in 
the interpretation given to administrative activity makes the formulation of guidelines useful. Cý Z71 
these authorities become bound by them. For example, Venezuela's Superiiireiidevcio Pro- 
Competencia has issued instructions on the interpretation of the Exemptions Regime Z- 
Onstructivo No. 1,1993), and the notification of mergers and acquisitions (Instructivo No, 
1994). 
Mexico's Article 24.7 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica; Venezuela's Article 'I oI 
Regulation No. 1; Costa Rica's Article 24 0 Ley de Prornocl6n de la Corripetencia v I)clciisa 
Fýfecti va del Corisumidor; Panama's Article 103.1 () Ley No. 29,1996. 
189 For cxampie, Article 55 of Venezuela's LeV PI-0-Competencia, also, Article 27 of Panama's l, c. \ 
No. 20,19961 ArtIcIc -Is of 
Pei-u's Decreto Lc,, J,, IatIN o No. 701,1991. 
190 Article 41) of 1, ev Pro-Competencia, allow,, the Superintendencla to impo,, c a fine up to '()'(' ot 
the value of s-, tlc,, in the year preceding the c1cclsion. Similarly, under Article 23 of Brazil',,,, Lci 
No. 8884.1994 fine,. may consist of up to ')()(( of the year', s turnover. or Lip to si\ million in 
Fkcal Reference Unit,,;. In Mexico, under Article 35 of Ley Federal de Competencia Lcon6mica. 
finc, ý may reilCh LIP to 375,000 minimurn 
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Some conduct which is regarded as exti-ci-nely reckless or socially harmful cm 
entail crii-ninal proseCLItIon and short prison terms under some Latin American antllfll'ýI 
statutes-, this is the case in Argentina, Chile and PeRl. 191 
3.2. - Administrative and Judicial control in antitrust enforcement. 
The are formal differences between national 'urisdictions with i-coard to the jIII L- 
procedures followed for administrative and Judicial rcvicw. In some countries such ý1" 
Costa Rica, Colon-ibia and Mexico, legal rule,, provide for a review of cýrsc" hý the 
antitrust agency or a higher administrative body. 192 In other cases, such as In C1111C. 
Brazil and Venezuela, decisions are only reviewed by the courts. In Peru, (1Cci"ion'-1 
adopted by INDECOPI are reviewed by the Tribimal de Dý10isa de la Cotnpetciwia. i, ). ', 
Notwithstanding these differences, it is agreed that the design of competiti0ii L- t) 
policies should follow certain basic and general principles of policy ellformilclit. 
11'1'CSPCCtIN. /C Of the COUntry-specific environmem. Khcmanl ýind Dutz oh,, crve that thc, ýc 
principles are essential for deciding whether the implementation of cornpetition polIcV In Z71 
developino countries IS useful. They argue that many opponents of this le-islatim 
emphasise the lack of speciallsed staff, poor institutional knowledge and the absence of' a t: l 
tradition of analytical rigor needed to ensure beneficial interventions. I 9-t 
Consequently, ccrtýim principles MUst be (-, u araii teed tO C11SUre that cnforccmem \\ III 
he correctly exercised. Firstly, the agency should be independent and isolated from 
191 Specifically, Article 42 of Argentina's Ley No. -22-162,1980, 
Article I of Chile',,., Decree 21 1. 
1973 and -1760,19-79, and 
Article 19 of Pel'L]*,, Decreto Lepslativo No. 701,1991. 
Scc Article Ol of ('(),, ta Rica's, Ley de Promoci6ii de la Competencia y Defeiisýt FACC ti\o (1121 
Con, ýLjiliidor. 199-4. Article 39 of the Memcan Ley Federal de Competcncli Econ6ii-ilca all(m,, ýi 
-'0 dav,, ot'notification ()I the cleckion. iccon.,, lderation within ) 
vto I. cv No. 25868. The Trihunal Is an administritive court: It,, (]ý, jmjj ; 11*,, \rtlcle 13 of Dc-cf - 
onk suh_ject to appeal hefore the Peruvian ', miprcme Court (Article 17). 
194 KlICIM111V MId DLII/, pp. 27-28- 
political interference and budgetary constraints. Secondly, it must be accountabic: ()ii%- 
way to ensure this is to require the publication ()I' an annual report for , Libn-ii,,,,, ion to Hic 
legislature or a special committee. Thirdly. competition la", should , cparatc (lic 
investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions. This prevents the antitrust 
from becoming investigator, judge, prosecutor and jury at the same time. Fourthly, (lic 
process should incorporate a system of checks and balances that guarantee the right to, t) Cý 
appear before the authority, allow a review of decisions taken, and given aCCe"ý' to 
information on the legal and economic interpretation of the law. Adimnistrtiivc Z-- 
procedures and regulations must be transparent. The proceedings and resolution of cýi,, c.,, Z: ) 
should be expeditious to avoid unnecessarý, business-related costs and coll-illicl-cially 
sensitive business information should be safeguarded. 195 Finally, to deter anti-conipctit tn 
practices, tho law should establish penalties, including meaningful fines and other remedial 
measures. 196 
The reason for the insistence on incorporating these "safeguard" principles 1" based 
on the unwarranted assumption that the legal systei-n can provid-e effective judicial control 
over antitrust enforcement. In other words, these scholars concentrate on the procedurai 
niechanisms of due process to ensure that the rule of law will be preserved. This is .1 
central concern among antitrust scholars, as was ernphasised at an important international 
antitrust rneetin recently held in Europe. -Antitrust schemes should. 
be designed to hc 9 t) 
user-friendly", meaning that the enforcement of rules must maintain certain cý'ýCWMI t) 
elements, such as transparency, efficiency, consistency and substantiveness. 197 The 
195 Some statutes provide for the confidentiality of the information submitted. For example. Art, cle 
I of Mexico's Ley Federal de Competencia Economica subjects government official', 1() 
administrative penalties if they make this information public. Similarly, Article ')I of 
Venezuela',, Ley Pro-Competencia establishes the confidentiality of the information on these 
proceedings. Confidentiality applies to the prohibition on disclosure of pertinent information io 
the public; obviously it does not apply to the parties involved in the proceedinos. as concealim-, 
such information from them would impair their rights to dite pi-ocess. C7 
196 Khemany and Dutz, F). 28. 
197 Scc D. P. Wood, "User-Friendly Competition Law in the United States", in Procedurc and 
Enforcement in F'V. and U. S. Competition La\\. Pler Jan Slot and Alison %IcDoilell 
(London: S\\"Cct , ý: MI\\\, Cll, 1993), pp. 6-18. F[mvever. it is unlikelv that focusinL, on procedural 
ýispects will Correct any of the stibstantive cleflcienclc, ý and potential e\ce,,,, e.,, a,,, soc'lated \\ Ith 
antltru, ýt policy cnforcement. 
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positivistic view of the law has confined legal , cholars to seeking means to redrc, ý,, ihuscý, 
by Authority on mere procedural rather thaii ý, uh,, taritivc gr()Linck. EJ-f*ccti\c iiiiitutioilýl Z7 
for the protection of economic rights, such x, the ombudsman, are almost non-existcrit. 
At best, the protection of these rights is confined to political or procedural 1-1 g, 11 t ýý 
(freedom of speech; habeas corpus, etc. ). The real substantivc obstructioii,, to cconomic 
activitics, implemented through devices such ýts licences, price controls. output 
restrictions, tariffs, authorisations to trade, and so forth, are easily Justified as pj-()tcctI0II 
of some Vague form of "public interest". 
4. - CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF Cl, (), SFI)-END ANALYSIS IN THEDFSTGN ()I 
ANTITRUST REGULATION fN LATIN AMERICA. 
The ideas that emerged in the nineteenth century changed the method of wialy,, r, iii 
social sciences, and consequently legal scholars' and economists' perception,,, of 
phenomena. This change led to a wholesale reappraisal of the agenda of scicntific 
research and formulation of public policies. Scientific research shifted its emphasis froill 
analysis of entrepreneurial interaction to the essentially neo-classical rnatlieniaticLil 
formalistic science in an attempt to measure social phenomena through abstract t-1 
economic equilibrium models. In the crucial period of 1870-1920, economists hc('. '1i11(, 
more interested in developing mathematical models to explain anonymous static rnarkel 
forces, rather thart their previous emphasis on examining the dynaillic interaction of 
cntrepi-clICUrs in the i-narket. Perceiving reality in closed-end terms inevitably introducod 
an assuniption of omniscience among social scientists. They becarne Z: ) -II 
optinilstic about the chances of moulding rcýtlity to predetcri-iiined goals hy nicaw, oý 
iý; suincy collective orders. 
In the domain of public policy, this theoretical apprav, <d had far-reachmL, 
iniplications- Until that point, the economics profession had agreed on the positive effect.,, 
of the division of labOLIi- and economic exchange on economic development. Cla,, sicd 
cconoi-nists viewed economic exchange as a proccs, ý pursuant to equilibi-junn: iiot wi . thill 
cquilihriuni. Their focu,, \vis therefore reliant upon the HISMI-ItIOnS nioulding ccowillic 
CXchan(TC, rather than Cconomic exchange alonc. Under theii- apprýiisal, Ilici-c could hc no Cý C) 
I 0-1ý -1 
flaw,, inherent to market functioning, but ,, imply foregone opportunities ovcrlookcd I-)\ 
less alert entrepreneurs. Only contrived artificial restraint, ) such as privilcgcý or legal 
monopolies could introduce exogenous distortions in the process of exchange. By 
contrast, urider neo-classical equilibrium appraisal, any departure from the perfcci-k 
competitive equilibrium appeared as a failure that CoUld be prevented or con-ccic(I hý 
proper intervention. A completely different normative appraisal of capitalism ensued. 
In the case of developing economies these considerations are all the more 
important, as the alleged existence of negative externalities and market failures promple(i 
the suspicion that capitalism and unfettered market functioning Could not be an adequitc 
tool for development. Machovec links the intellectual genesis of these policies to the neo- 
classical notion of market failures, whose presence in developing COUntries is preSLIIMI[)I%' Z: ) - 
due to the concentrated structure of their dornestic economies. 199 
Accordinf, -T to theý, c views, it is only nccc,,,, ai-y to identify tho,, c special fcaturc.,, that 
represent son-ie particular class of market fW11.1re,, in &\cloping COLIMIACS, III ()I-CICI- 10 
adopt the necessary correctives through purposive legislation. In this regard, Todaro L- L- L- 
argued: "the existence in developing countries of numerous deviations from perfectlý, 
competitive norms ('market failures') justifics ý, ubstantial public Intervention to ol]'., ý, ci 
their utility-reducing impact". 200 
This context cxplains the introduction of antitrust policy in Latin Anicrica. 'I'lic 
II IC [Orniulation of policy-making in the region has been dominated by success ve "publi 
intcrest" goals considered to be socially relevant. Formerly, these goals were assoclatcd I Z: ) 
198 Machovec provides an explanation of the causc, ý and consequences of this evolution of economic 
theory: "The adoption of perfect information modelling as the heart of neo-classical economic.,, 
transformed the ý\Ilav economists were trained to think about the institution known &. the niarkc! 
Under the classicd f-c-irne (and into the eýirlv 1920,0. econonnisV, ýa\v the market alý a pro(: (-'s 
thow-di which entrepreneurs earned profit and drcovered v, 'hat to produce and how to producc. 
Under the perfect-Information regime, whzit and how hecome the kno\\n end,, and mean,,. and 
the mai-kci hcc. inie a computer for providHiL, the eClUilihi-IL1111 rnagnitude,,. Thi', new nicnlid 
franic\\ ork led to a pro-,,,, overnment disposition in several key arezi,, " (Macho\ cc, 1). 300. ) 
99 Nlachm cc. p. 59. 
-100 Mýichovcc, p. 61. 
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with the promotion of development through the creation of donieý, tjc 
industries capable of making, Latin American consumers independent of forei, _, ii capitalirsl 
interests. The failure of such policies turned the attention of pohcv-maker, ý to the 
possilhility of iimplernenting market-oriented policies. However. markets were C\. Z7) 1111111C 
under the pervasive neo-classical theories that presented thern as weak structures protic 
to "fall" unless (yovernnients intervened. L_ 
The theoretical framework summarised above considers the manifold expres, ýion, ý ()I 
iiiarket malfunctioning to be responsible for the lack of entrepreneurial spint c\, Idciit 
among so rnany Latin American firms. Following this logic, antitrust policy in Latill tý tn 
Arnerica is regarded as a preventive or corrective tool to eliminate what many perceivc to 
he obstructions to market functioning, produced (according to this perception) hy h1(-, h tn -I 
levels of economic concentration. Its goal is to ensure that i-narket transparclicy, fi-ce r1-()I11 
distortioi-is, ensures optirnum outcomes. Aside fron-i antitrust policy, the inarket. 1tillurc 
logic invites policy-inakers (in Latin America and elsewhere) to rcIgulate othci-\N'isc 
VOIUntary transactions by means of a variety of government initiatives Involving differcill 
I'C(TUlatory devic-cs. li-i fact, within the raiigc of policies based ori the market-failUre 
1)reniise, antitru,,, 1 policy appears more cornpatible with market functioning, at leýist wheii Z-- 
corripared with other types of regulation. In coritrast to other initiatives aimed at wealth 
redistribution, antitrust policy expresslv states its Intention to irnprovc niarket 
I'Lirictioning, sometimes even at the expense of redistribution. Z-71 
However, the market failure explanation seems at odds with Latin American reality. 
Economic history clearly shows that market concentration in the region emerged froill 
de\, clopi-nent policies that relied heavily on government intervention, rather than niarkct 
dynaimc, -, Government intervention ruled virtually evei-y aspect of busliic,, s and economw 
life.. As explained above, Latin American policy-makers sought to protect domestic 
industries frorn foreign competition in an effort to develop domestic industries Lind 
tlici-chy I'ostcr dc\, elopi-nent. Private property ri., zhts and contractual freedom wci-e subicct 
to IIUIIICI'OLIS legal and de facto condition.,, that eroded their sei-viceability. VOlLIIIUII'V 
Interaction was Constantly curtailed in the nanic of public intercst, which proclaimed the 
intention of promoting domestic growth Lind development. Under this rc, -'1111c oI' 
105 
Institutional privileges and official monopolies. protected industries gradually tunied ii-it() 
inefficient industries incapable of prornotiiig economic ýii-owd-.,. ii-inovatioii aiid 
critreprenCt-irship. In fact, if anything has prompted economic reform in the reuioii. it is mi I 
honest desire to eliminate these obstructions in order to allow markets to operatc freck. 
N the ]I, -)-ht of Latin America's institutional reforms, the question is whether antiti'Li, -, t 2: ) 
policy is capable of eliminating such restrictions and fostering competition, or whether in 
policy-makers should attempt alternative initiatives. 
hi this regard, aii important conclusion can be made 1'rom this chapter ahout the 
type of intervention Under the conventional paradiam of reclUlation, and the SLIbSt,. IIICC Of 
legal rules comprising the conventional paradigm. 
Legal fules are merely instruments of authority designed to achieve social outcome.,, 
regarded as "just" or desirable according to an "external" normative criterion. In thc Z-) Z7 
1xii-ticular case of antitrust legal rules, this criterion ii-iay be represented by the Pai-cw 
standard of economic efficiency (albeit this P, not the only representation of social wc1l'arc 
that this policy might pursue) as the enforcernent experience of many jurisdictiolls 
suacTest. t: )b 
These social welfare standards define an "optirnum" world against which market Cý 
transactions appear as "Imperfections" which reqLIII-C some correction through aiintrw'i 
policy. Thc application of-'the policy contains several irriplicit assumptions: 
Firstly, policy-makers possess all the uýjormati . on necessary to make a proper co,, t- 
hcriefit appraisal to maximisc benefits and mininuse costs to society as a whole. In othcr 
\vords, the ruler posscsscs objective omniscient knowledge, even of information missinc, Z7) tý 
from the systern, thus ci-cating asymmetries of information among economic agent, -, which 
inipcdcs efficient social resource allocation. 201 This information relates to the niost 
cfficicrit means of allocation of social resourccs according to the tastcs. prefei-cncc,,. and 
I)ersonal (ýoals of the individuals affected, but is also assurned to be unchanging. In othei- 
201 G. F. Thirlby, The RLIlel-. in T. S. E. E,, sav,, oil . 1. Buchanan and G. Thirlbv wd,,, ). \cw 
Yo rkLInN, c i-ý it\II rc 19 8 1. pp. 165 - 198. 
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words, policy measures are designed and enforced on the basis of the Informath)" 
gathered from the social system at the particular moment of its adoption, the\ camiol 
incorporate unforeseen information resulting from subsequent changcs in the ,, ocial 
s' ettin (--, I 
Secondly, in closed-end view of markets, market outcomes resultin, ý_, 1'roin 
econornic interaction can be predetermined. The question then is how to allocýlte 
resources to achieve those outcomes regarded as rnost efficient. A given measure will be L_ 
judged ", pood" if by following the objective standard, it improves the allocation of social 
resources. In other words, allocation of resources takes priority over any other pos"IbIc 
by-product of the interaction itself. 
Thirdly, it is assumed that legal rules can be worded in such a way thatthe policv- 
maker is able to gather all the relevant information needed for ascertaininc, the "oCial b L- 
welfare goal (or the instances where the social welfare goal is unfulfilled in reality). Aký(). ýn 
it is xssurned that the information which could identify the means to correct any failure or 
irnpcrJ'CctIon of the system will be readily available. 
These considerations are important with regard to the particular features of the 
this regulation has been implemented in Latin Arnerica. The closed-end bias of the theor\, Z7) - 
Underlying antitrust policy is currently guldino enforcement of this policy in Latin 
Arnerica. The institutions designed to enforcc antitrust are following the prMcIj)lc,, kild 
down by antitrust theory. These principles have been adapted to the legal structule ol 
Latin American countrics, which is based on the Civil Law system. There are sollic 
cxccl)tions arising froi-n the need to harmonise the legislation with economic inic(gration 
acyreenients. L_ 
All the schemes base their efforts at enforcement on an administrativc authority. 
This authority is givcn considerable powei-,, to conduct investigations, and makc ý7 z: I I 
-1-ninatiolls about the cxistciice of monopolistic prýicticcs. Fol- thiI., suhstantivc detel 
mi important conceni ha,, been to ensure the accountability of antitrust a(yencies, which, it 
is ocim, ally aoreed, has been achieved through the cxistence of procedural requiremcm,, I- 
Z7, Z7, 
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as titte process. The question remains, however, as to whether it rs pw,,, ible to s 
subject antitrust enforcement to more transparcrit parameters or objective criteria in the 
substantive detern-iination of the existence of illegal practiccs. tntil now, 'udges havc ()iil%- Z7 I Z- - 
SUcceeded in developing certain vague proxies in relation to conducts that "hould he 
rcgarded as monopolistic. 
It seerns as if the conjunction between law and econornics under the neo-cla, ""Ical 
structural appraisal has severe limitations that prevent the emergence of a stable rulc ()I' 
law. In this regard. Richard Epstein defined the central role of economic 
theoi-v in its support of antitrust premises. In his opinion, "the economic edifice might not 
he perfect, but econon-iics is the only public policy game in town, and it,,, basic 
conclusions must be beaten back within its own teriTis and its own premises 1. . -)()2 Foi, thi,, -, 
reason, criticism of antitrust policy in the last instance has to rely on a broader critiquc ol' 
the neo-classical StRiCtUral paradigm on which it wa,, Counded. Th*l,,, Is exactly , vhýa vvv 
shall attempt in the next chapter. 
Epstein, Privatc Property-, at 55. 
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CHAPTER III. - THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SUBJE TIVE APPRAISAL (4 
MARKET RELATIONS ON THE VALIDITY OF ANTITRUST LEGAL 
DOCTRINES UNDER THE RULE OF LAW. 
"If wcm% to me that m(my of the current dispittes with re,,,, ard to both ecmiomic them-Y 
ond e(-oiioi)il*( pollcY have their commoti on . gi . 11 1. /I a Ini . scollcepti . oti about the nature )/ 
the cumiomic problem of socierv. This iniscmiceptioii III nint i. ý due to aii errolieoits' 
trmi. %1cr to social phenoniena of the habits of thought we have developed III dcaliiig 
with the pheliomeiia ofiiature. 
(F. A. Hayek, The U, & ot'Knowledge in Society 1). 78) 
0 
I. - THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF A MISGUIDED PERCEPTION OF! MARKI, I 
PHENOMENA UNDER CON VENTIONAL REGULATORYAPPRAISAL. 
I. I. - Epistemological misuse of equilibrium models in the analy-sis of mm-kcl 
phenomena. 
The essential flaws of conventional market analysis arc related to the influericc ()I 
fI orinalism on economic theory. Formalism introduced a trend whereby equilihi-11-1111 
models started to be put to a ii-iisleading use. In this way the perceptions construed froill 
the nususe of these models were responsible for i-nisrepresenting, the evolutionary cssci-icc 
of social phenomena. This limitation has hccii particularly noticeable in the reitIni ()I 
iiiarket aiialysis, where thcse models seem to h; ivc lost touch with the reality they purport 
to explain. I 
The problem with the way in which scholars visuallsed reality under convemlonal 
rc, -, 11latory appraisal stems 
from the heuristic use of equilibrium for apprehendim, the 
I-- 
cs,,, ciicc of real markets. Initially, regarding equilibrium as an "ideal type" positcd no t: ) 
problems because under this appraisal the qUe,, tion concerned how departures frorn the 
cquilihl-11.1111 may constitute forms of incompletC 14ICCCSIý: "An idcal type I,, neither inten(Icd 
to (icscrlbc i-calitv nor to indict it. It is instead a theoretical construct intcndcd to 
illtiniin, itc ccrtain things that might OCCLII- In reAity, empiricýil investigation deternwlclý 
\vhc1licr these pherionicna are actually prescrit and how they came to be there. " )()" As a 
with Economic,, '. ) at -23 2 Rocttkcý What Wroll-L 
109 
i-nethodological device this epistemology merely purported to explain the world froni the 
perspective of what could be at equilibrium ()I- away from It, hut It did not attempt to 
make any comparison between these two essentially different entities. 
However, the formalist revolution in economic thinking in the 1930s abandoned thiý, 
use and adopted a perspective which attempted to conipare reality with modek. In this 
way, reality was idealised "to the point of utoplanism". Either reality was thow-dil 
approximate equilibrium or was regarded as dystopia. 204 
The problem ultimately lies within the formalism of conventional economic 
appraisal, which denies the very phenomenon it is supposed to examine; namely, that the 
world is in permanent disequilibrium. Indeed, the very idea of perfect information 
(accruing at equilibrium) contradicts any sense of motion in this system; individuals' 
motivations to act are in fact by-products of the imperfect foresight of officr 
participants. 205 
204 As Boettke argues, "the departures of reality from the model of perfect competition were now 
thought to highlight interventions in the market economy that would be necessýlry to 
approximate equilibrium. Competitive equilibrium and the maximising behaviour that would 
ideally produce it represented the hard core of the research program of economists from 1950 
on. As this happened, economics as a discipline was, transformed. " He concludes, -toi inalism IM 
to utoplanism". Od. at 19. ) 
205 Moroerstern showed that, when one individual',,, plan is dependent on that of another, perfect C- knowledge will produce "an endless chain of reciprocally conjectural reactions and COLIIIICI 
to a standstill. (0. Morgerstern, "Perfect Foresiol-it and 1-. c()noiim reactions leadint-, I-- 
Equilibrium", Zejýschrift fQr National 6konom ie6 (part 3)). Trans. F. H. Knight in A. Schottcr 
(ed. ), Selected Writings of Oskar Morgerstern, (New York: New York University Press. 1976), 
1). 250. He illustrated this point with the Holi-nes-Moriarty story, which is worth quotlný- In full: 
"Sherlock Holmes, pursued by his opponent, Moriarty, leaves London for Dover. The train ýtop, ý 
at a station on the wa , and 
he alights there rather than travelling on to Dover. He ha" seen y Z-- 
Moriarty in the railway station, recognizes that he is very clever and expects that Moriarty will 
take a faster special train in order to catch hirn in Dover. Holmes' anticipation turris out to be 
correct. But what if Moriarty had been still more clever. had estimated Holmes' mental abilities 
arid had foreseen his actions accordingly? Then. obviously, he would have tra\e1led to the 
intermediate , tation. Holmes, again, would have had to calculate that and 
he hiiii,, elf \\()Lll(l hdVC C, 
decided to 2o on to Dover. Whereupon. Morlartv would a. -ain ha\e "reacted- differelitk. 
Because of so much thinking they might not have been able to act at all or the intellectualIN 
weaker of the t"(1) would have surrendered in the Victoria Station, since the whole fliLdit \\Mlld 
have becorne unnecessary". (Morgerstern, pp. 17')- 174, quoted by ODriscoll and Rizzo, p. '84). 
The moral of the story is that perfect knowled, -, c of each other's plans makes attainment of "tich 
equilibrium impossible-, Inotion (such as competition) is, hý definition, e\cludcd fi-()m the 
system. 
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FquIlIhrium rno(lek eliminate all conmderatioii of the idea of rnotiori which por\, idc, 
rivairv and competition. Addleson has pointcd out that the neo-cla,,,, ýIcal i-nodel IeLivc, ý mil 
niariy questions esseritial for comprehending the sense ordinarily given to the teri-i-i 
11 coi-i-ipetition": -[The I questions that need to be answered, but which a "ýystcill \iC\, , 
obscure,,, include: What are competitive activitle,, " Who competes with whom? Oti what 
hii,, is, or what by MeM'),, d() businesses compete ,. )II -)()(, 
Neo-clas, sical scholars attempted to overcome thi,, firnitation, and to depict rcalit\ 
more accurately in their analyses by defining intermediate models betweeri Pure 
Monopoly and Perfect Competition such as "i-nonopolistic competition" or "Inipci-feci 
competition". These models were taken to he a faithfUl expression of iriarket traiisactiori,, -, 
as they operate in the real world. Robinson hcrsc1f'wa.,, lured into the falLICV (4 ýIY, 1.11111111-' 
that ideal models could somehow replicate reality. as is clearly shown in her endcitvours 
to ci-eate a link with the real world simply h%, relaxing the extreme ýISý, UIIIPOOW, 0' 111C 
i-i-iodels of Porfect Conipetition and Pure Moriopoly. Iii her words: "A , inipic aiialy"is caii 
only he rnade upon simple assumptions and the more complicated the analysis, the 111orc 
complicated the assumptions upon which it will work, and the nearer the WýSt-lrnptiowý cýiii 
he to the complicated conditions of the real world. The practical man must hc asked to 
hýive patience, and rricanwhile the econornist i-nLi,, t perfect his , ools in the hope of hciw-, 
able sooner or later to rneet the practical man's requirements. If those ýtssLuflptioiiý 
are ricar enough to the actual conditions to make the answer serviceable the practical nian 
caii ýicccpt it, but it' the Lissumptions are ý, cr\, - ahstract the econoniist \vill orth briwg di,, 
practical man into confusion and himself into disrepute by allowing him to supposc that 
the quc, ýtion which is being answered is the same as the question which is beillul 
askc(F. 207 To rnakc her assumptions more rcalistic, and therefore to make econoniic 
tl`ICOI-ý' useful to the 1wactical Inaii, Robinson moved from the Perfect Competition model 
into models depicting less-than-optimal situation,,. However, she did not realisc that the"c 
models wcrc as idealistic as the former ones. did not therefore (-, ct any closer to the "i-cal 
Addle,,, on, P. 100. 
'07 Rohnison, The Fconomic,,.... P. 
world". Edward Chamberlin also attempted to restore realism by constructing , niodek 
monopolistic competition that consider the role of reputation and product djfl'crcni, ý, tion 
in market behaviour. 208 
However, findinc, a n-nddle ground did not narrow the gap between thesc modcl" tD t7l 
and conditions in the real world. The models of unpeýfýct or monopolistic competition 
were no less "obýjective-, and in this sensc. incapable of appraising the .,, Lib C, -jectivi., -'m 
A 
competition processes. Kirzner deals with this question in the following tcrnl: 'ý 
"Chamberlin'.,, attempt to restore realism h\ constructino model,,, of 
competition rrýssed the mark. He did not recognisc that the source of tile 
unrealism lay in the assumption of already-attained equilibrium in the perfect competition 
model. What he proposed instead was a more complicated equilibrium model. The model 
of attained monopolistically competitive equilibrium is in a number of respects le'o' 
insulting to our sense of realism than the model it sought to replace; nonetheless, tile ne\: ý 
model suffers from the same cardinal fault. By postulating already-attained equilihi-mm ii 
cannot explain how equilibrium might come to be approached. The theory misses 111c 
opportunity to provide a satisfactory explanation by considering the disequillbi-ILIIII 
features of the market. "'-109 
It is a fallacy to assume that reality is somehow closer to "Intermediate" model.,, ol 
monopolistic competition, and that they could therefore he useful "(! Uideposts'" fnr 
IN Ekel Lind and Hchcrt, pp. 484-5 10. 
209 1. Kirzner, How Markets Work: Disequilibrium, Entrepreneurship and Discovery, IEA Hobart 
Paper, No. 133 (London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 1997), p. 30. Richardson observe" in thl. 
regard: "the theory of monopolistic competition is hardly more useful than that of perfect 
competition in enabling us to understand the working of an actual competitive economy. It, 
ýissurnptions represent, in comparison with those of perfect competition, a step I"IeLil-Cl- I-eAlt), In 
particular It l*icc,, a desirable emphasP, on product variation and on ýclling co, ýtv hill, 11-011) 
other points of view. it represents a less radical theoretical departure than i, ý ; ()inetinic, 
supposed. (Indeed), the theory, like that of pericci competition, c1'1CctIvel\, lgnorcý, the 
informational properties of economic systems. The question whether. under the ýirrant_, cmem, 
l)()SIU1a1Cd, el1tI_el)1"CIICUI"S would be able to lorm rchable c\peclatlOn'ý'. Is "1111PI\ 1101 11h; 
decisions ýire assunied to be taken merely on the hasi,, of current demand and co, "i conditikmý 
Both theories are dominated by the concept of equilibrium, althouah neither really , Licceed iii 
showing how in fact it could be attained. they fail to focus attention on the process of chan, _, c oi- 
adaptation it-, itself. although it is this which is most urgently in need of exlikination" 
(Rlchý . irdson, Information.... pp-111-112) 
IL 
I-CLILIIýItion of markets. Thv, i,, clearly not the ca,, c because the model,, do n0i ttke ml(ý 
consideration the way in which information change,, con,, týintly, in i way that canno( 
foretold. Indeed, there is always the assumption in Lill these models that the exte]-11ý11 
observer knows the information necessary to predict future outcomes. Even under nlodel'ý 
which depict how information is spread unevenly ýtmon(-, st economic agents, the out,, idc 
observer knovi,, s how much information is nussincy for each participant, and ho\. \' much 
information is needed to enable the system to achieve equilibrium. In the end this i" \cl 
anothcr form of orriniscience. 
Many ýocial scientists attached properties to the neo-classical equilibrium model for 
which it was clearly unfit, because they distorted its original purpose. The Perfect 
Competition model was never intended to become a standard against which reality could b 
be cornpared. In fact, neo-classical scholars have constantly emphasised that the lack ()I 
reallsi-n in the assumptions under which they frarne their models does not dirrill-il. "11 the 
value of the models as reliable predictors. Under the positivist method, dernandiw-, 
realism from the assumptions on which positive models rely is irrelevant, both in ternns of 
prediction, as Friedman said., and in terms of explanation, as Popper clearly argued. 210 
The models were therel'ore not supposed to "represent" reality, only to interpret it. In 
order to explain how resource allocation varies Linder abstract states of equilibria, neo- 
classical models had to idealise the operation of market force,,,. Howevcr. (11c 
i 11tel-I)rCtat loll ýTj ven by many scholars went well beyond a niere representation ol'i-cality. 
10 Friedman argues that it is irrelevant %vhether tile iissumptions of positive models are real or 
fictitious; what is relevant is that they can provide us with proper predictions of what would 
happen in reality if other conditions remained con..,, tant. The purpose of positive models is not to 
depict reality as it I.,., but to create a tool to understand how individuals behave "as it-' certain 
l'orces are oulding their action. In other words, the%, are nothin(i but models, which %%crc iic%ci Z__ I-- 
intended to become normative references for measuring reality. (See M. Friedman. "Dic 
Mictliodolot--, of Positive Economics", Essays M Positive Economics, M. Friedman (k: (1. ), 
Whiicat, o: The Univcrsity of Chicago Press. 1953. ) In a similar fashion, Popper contended that il 
is impos.,, ibic to Nciik the model of Perfect Conipciltion, gl\cn that the cL,,,, cncc of "niodcl, "'' I.,, 
that they are met. qfliýsical statement,,. If this I,,., the case. then we will have to ýicccpt ilic 
implications oftlic model I,,, a matter of logical deduction. and admit that the %vorld maý reach I 
of perfcct competition. In this cx,, c. hoý\c\cr. it 'is crucial tor the model to icph"'Itle 111c 
world. But this k not so simple, as 111odcls In Cconoillic'. are 111CICIN, tools for C, \pressIn, _, Ccrtain 
relationships in mathematical terms. Reality. ýis Popper ha,, Indicated, is a non-verifiahlc is"'Lic. 
and therefore heyond the realm of scleiicc. (Sce D. Papineau, "Philo,, ophý of Science", in Tlw 
Bkockwell Companion to Philosoph\. N. Bunnin and E, P. TsLII-. lM_11es, (Ed. ). ((W'Ord: 
Black\\ell Rcfcrcn(-c. 1990). pp. 
I 13 
The source of this confusion probably sterns h-orn the positivistic inclimitioi-i io 
(I. 
i 
grant ernpirical evidence an unjustified weight in the dernonsti-ation of hvIý()thetjc,,, I 
pi-edictions of social phenot-nena. This made neo-classical scholars tend to assurne that the 
essence of reality could be grasped by incorporating traits or featui, es into these niodck 
which they regarded as "realistic" expressions of the real world, as perceived through 
SCIISOFIal experience. They were thus inclined to assui-ne that model,., incol-poratino 1ýý 
conditions such as "reputation", "advertising", and so forth, were closer to rcýth[N 
hecause these ai-e elenients found in reality. Theii- positi%,, istic al)proach niadc thcii-i I)r(mC 
to SUb , 
lect their theoretical appraisal to the enipli-Ical evidence of their observation,,, (4 the 
real world. 
In other words, scholars arbitrarily chose hypotheses that depicted causalitlcý' of, 
regularities they perceived to be the expre,, sJon of a" more realistic world" mid 
incorporated them into the models, resultin, -, In truly arbitrary interpi-nition', ol' ý(-)ciýil 
phenomena and opening a "Pandora's Box". Schumpeter clearly saw a lack of' wlentific 
ri(Tor in this: "Both economists and popular writers have once more run awaý, with sonic In 
h-agments of reality they happened to grasp. These fragments themselves were mostlN,, 
correctly. Their formal properties were mostly developed correctly. But n() 
conclusions about capitalist reality as a whole follow from such fragmentary analyscs. 11' Z7ý 
\\, c draw them nevertheIcss, we can be right only by accident. That has been done. AII(I 
the lucky accident did not happen. "211 
ConseqUently, social scientists fell into the trap of assurrung that empirical cLita L- 
ýilone is a source of knowledue about reality. They ýissumed that their models, te, ýted \vIth ID 
such empiric. al evidence, could provide an olýjectlve explanation of social phenomena mid 
that the interpretation of those "facts" could be separated from the values of the 
. 1. Schunipeter, (-'ýipitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy. (New York: Harper &, Rmý Puhh"hei". 
1194-11 1950), p. K. 
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Clearly, this was not COUld not be the case since SLIch methodological positivism was Unfit 
to examine reciprocal interpretations of social phenomena. 2 I) 
Mises pointed out these epistemological inconsistencies a long, time aco. -'l 1) t-11) L- -- Hc 
showed how conventional economic thinking sterns from the misconceptioii that 
economic behaviour can be assimilated with natural phenomena. Conventional econonlic 
science is dorninated by a false belief, namely that of assuming that human behýt%'IOLIF C. 'M I-) 
, -nehow be assimilated into perceived regularities easily observed in the enip rc soi tI al 
evidence gathered from physical and natural events. These regularities take the Forni of' 
"laws", which can be framed by observing past patterns of behaviour. Yet, this kind of' 
analysis is misleading in the case of economics. Human beings, which frorn the substratL1111 
of economic analysis, behave purposefully, pursuing individual goals which calillot 
possibly be predicted. 214 
2 12 Perhaps Lachmann made the most eloquent criticism against the use of positivism for examinim-, 
human conduct. Specifically, he contended: "Fiow can a system of pure logic, like thal oF the 
logic of choice (characterising market phenomena), provide factual knowledge? The ans", ci 
follows frorn the essence of my thesis: the distinction between logic and factual knowledge r", 
justified in the realm of nature, where no meaning is directly accessible to Lis, and in which care 
must thus constantly be taken to distinguish between our concepts and reality. In the re. ilni N 
human action it is different. Here such a distinction seems unjustified. On the one hand we are 
unable to verify or falsify our schemes of thought as hypotheses by predicting concrete event,,. Z- - Z-7 Scientific tests are not available to us since their require a complete description of that concrew 
no position' in which the test is to take place. Every human action, however, depend" oil I starti Z- 
the state of knowledge of the actors. A verification test therefore would require an exhaustive 
description of the state of knowledge of all actors, also according to the mode of distribution -an 
obvious impossibility. Otherwise, however, the starting position is not exactly defined, and no 
real test is possible. In economics this means that e\cry concrete transaction dcl)ciii,, aimoizý 
other things, on the expectations of the participants. To test an economic theory in concreto, \\c 
must, then, be able, at the point of time of theory formulation, to predict the expectations ()i 
economic agents at the (future) point of time of the verification test. " (L. Lachminn. "The 
Significance of the Austrian School of Economics in the History of Ideas" in Capital. 
Expectations and the Market Process: Essays on the Theory of the Market Economy. Institute for 
Humane Studies, (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel. Inc.. 1977). pp. 57-58. ) 
213 L. Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method. Vail No. "'trand 
Company, Inc., PrInceton-New Jersey, 1961. 
214 Mises. observes in this connection: -Econornic, ý is not about things and tangible material ohiccij 
it i,.,, ahout men, their rneanings and actions. Good,,. comrrioditic., ý,, and \\calth and ill 111C ollici Cý 
notions of conduct are not elements of nature; they are elements of human meaning and conduct. 
He who wants to deal with them must not look at the external world; he must search for theill In 
the meaninL,, of acting men. " (Mises, p. 92. ) 1 Cý 
II 1ý 
Clearly, the positive inethod has been extremely useful in detecting 
amongst its own elements, particularly in the idealistic Perfect Competition i-nodc], %\ ll(),,, c 
logic, as we have scen, is based on imperso"(11 I'lathe'llatical i, clationship. s. HO\\c\ý: i, iol 
these very reasons, it is a poor method of ýoclal foi- ýippraiý, in, _, the conipic\w, 
i-eality and the factors motivating human action. 215 This limitation was commented on h\ 
Isaiah Berlin, who stressed that the attempt to press political studies into t natui-ý)l 
scientific frarnework had obscured many of the issties that were indispensLil-fle to t!,, c 
understandiric, of political life. 216 Loughlin makes similar remarks with regard to the 
effects of positivism on legal method: "Just as the attempt to pi-ess political studle. " into ý1 
natural scientific framework has distorted and ob,, cured i-nany of the fliit : irc 
indispensable to an understanding of political life, so also this claim may be made foi- 1ýivv. 
The conception of law which we obtain from the formalist approach and the adoption of 
the analytical method obscures more than it reveals. "217 
For these reasons, it is impossible to make predictions about the future behaviour Of 
firms based solely on statistical economic data. It is simplistic to assume that prediction,,,, 
made in the workina of these abstract markct forces somehow indicates ho\, \, Hc,, h-and- tn 
blood entrepreneurs would react similarly under similar conditions. As Rizzo contencls, 
the predictability of the causality between two factors in a model cannot be translatahlc 
into real world predictability, because "the contrary assumption merely demonstrates the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness". 218 For this reason, an essential premise of antitrust 
theory is the assumption that past market dominance will dictate or "control" the terms of 
I'Liture n-iarket transactions. 219 
215 M. Rothbard, "Praxeology as the Method of Econornics", in Phenomenology and the Social 
Sciences Vol. 2., M. Natanson, (ed. ), (Evaston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. ) 
216 1. Berlin, 'Does political theory still existT in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds. ), Philosophy. 
Politics and Society (Second Series), (Oxford. 1962), 1). 1, cluoted by Loughlin, p. -19. ýiko 
contended emphatically that attempts to apply natural science methods to social science werc 
misguided hCCýW. IC they ne-lected the purposive nature ol' human action, which P, -, ulded h\ L- - Z- I 
, 
_, 
oals, not in-ipersonal regularities. (See Mrses. The Ultimatc Foundation... ) 
' 17 Loughlin, p. 41ý 
-118 M. Rizzo, "Disequilibrium and All That: An lntrodLICtOr% Essay- in Time, Unccrtainl\ In(ý 
Dise, c 1 dibrium, M. Rizzo (Ed. ), Lexington Books, Toronto, 1979, p. 3. z-ju 
II () In the word,, of Sowell: "Antitrust laws, like all forms of third party monitoring, depend tor their 
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It is also necessary to understand the role that equilibrium play,, in cconomic 
analysis. Its significance will ultimately depend on the use we attach to it foi- heui-Ptliý 
purposes: "Whether we view equilibrium in [dynarr& terms] or take a more conser%, atl \C 
[static] position is purely a matter of heuristic and analytic convenience. Indeed, (lic 
notion of equilibrium, (... ) is only a mental tool without any direct operational 
significance. Depending on the purpose at hand we may use either concclit". 2-10 
Ultimately, everything con-ies down to one simple question: What is the 'level of' reLlIM' 
weare interestedin? '-1: 11 Under this perspective, the goil of scientific Inquirywill nothe 1() 
discover how equilibrium (or any position in relation to it, for that matter) operaics in 
reality, beca6se such equilibrium exists only in our minds. 
Instead, the question is whether the changing causalities of market interaction can b 
be exarnined through the tenses of equilibrium, by way of counterfactual analvsl.. 'ý. 
O'Driscoll and Rizzo deny this possibility in categorical terms- "The received theory ()I b- 
competition is coniparatively. static, focusing on beginning and end points. Econoniic b Z: ) 
ac, ents are interested in neither the beginning nor the end points, but in coping with never- tn In b 
ending adjustments. The theory of perfect cornpetition analyzes the state of affairs or 
equilibrium conditions that would exist if all competitive activity ceased. 11 1"S /1()/ (1/1 
approximation but the negation of that activih, ". (Original italics)222 For this reason, a 
-ticulation of characteristics objectively observable in social effectiveness on the ai 
which may or may not capture the decision-i-naking process as it appeared prospectivek, i(, the 
aggents involved" (Sowell, p. 205). For this reason, 
&s 
author araues "antitrust proponents have 
scoreci a verbal coup by constantly terming such percentages the "share" of the market 11 C7 
11 controlled" by certain firms, as if they were discussing prospective behaviour rather than 
retrospective numbers. " (Id., p. 205). 
Rizzo, p. 6. 
III O'Drkcoll and Rizzo, 1). 17. 
O'Driscoll and Rizzo, pp. 97- 98. In a similar fashion, Kirzner has stated: "The lconvcntlonýil ý 
story, even allowing for the deliberate simplifications sought for the sake of (11(lactic 
effectiveness, is disturbint,. To assume that evervone is. it each instant. ýiskim-, ind receivin- ili, 
Same PHCe IS to ýISSLH-ne away the possibility ()I price C(m1petition or, alternatively, to assuilic 111111 
competition achieves its results instantaneousIv. If we wish to understand the competili\c 
process ofsupply and demand more adequately. we must amplify the textbook story to rccoLniisc, 
that different sellci-s and different buyers nim, be charging different price,,, ". (Kirzncr. r-- 
P. 
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mcaningful analy,,, ],, should explain relationships that can occur in the disequilibrium of thc 
marketplace since they are the essence of the pi-()cc,,,,, under examination. A,, Kir/ner 
ý"tates', "no matter how Illuminating such a picture may he in providing Mdirect clues a.,, (k) 
how such a conflouration of decisions might come to be attained, it cannot of 
portray any such [equilibrating] process [as found in reality]. Any adjustments needcd to 
achieve this equilibrium configuration must have Occurred prior to the moment pICtLII'Cd 
in the CCII-Illibrium model. Thus a view, which sees the world as at cill timcs in the i-elcv; int 
attained states of equilibrium, clearly rule. y out (ill the aýýI'iistments ýchich mi, (,, hi h(we 
iiuide sitch (itt(iinincia possible. " (Original italics)22) 
It is not possible for this methodology to explain how market participants intcrýic( in 
such a way that they eventually reach equilibrium. Indeed, a closer look reveals that the 
nicthodology does not solve this problem at all, hecausc it simply stipulates bI the conditions 
(i. e., perfect. knowledoe) within which such equilibrium would occur. III other \vords, it L- 
does not provide explanation but it descrihc.,, the explananda. Explaining the oi-I-mw-, 
chaiige which leads to equilibrium is inherently Impo,, sibic to this methodology. --i 
Kirzner contends: "A model in which perfect ki-iowledge is assumed is neccs,, arily it 4: ý 
model of already attained equilibrium: it cannot grapple with the process III which 
Imperfect mutual knowledge may tend (or I'ail to tend) to generate Improved mutual bb 
kiiowledge. Consequently, quite apart from the unrealistic character of the perfccl II 
knowled-c assumption in mainstream theory, that ýissumption renders such theorv, whcii 
used to explain the equilibrative properties of markets, internally contradictorv ami 
incoherent. " 225 In his pioneering work In. toi-niation and Investment Richardson had zn 
K -ziiei-, How Markets Work, p. 23. Interestingly. by 1940, Clark had already pointed out: "[The ii 
-able results, in that it cloc" standard of perfect competition] has seemed at tirne,,, to lead to undesii 
not afford reliable -, uldance to the 
factors which are favourable to the closest available \v()rkmL, 
apprommation t, ) that ideal, under actual condition,, ". (J. M. Clark, '70\ýarcl a Concept ()I 
Workable Competition". 30 The American Econoninc Rc\, ic\\,, [ 19401 at 24 1) 
'24 11-0111CAIN', Thom,, cil 'Lit'l-ILICS the flaw-, of convcntional analys'lis: "this approach haý, "onic 
unavoidable contradiction. s, because to make ýuch dec],, Jons correctly mu, ýt be the cývw in 
equilibrium- ýigents must know beforehand what the\, are H-morant of and the co, ýts an(i benefits 
of the kno\\ IcLi, -, c the\, could acquire, that is, they must 
knkm what it Is theý, do not kno\ý. - (I. 
Thomsen. Pricc,,, ind Kno\vIed, -, e. (London: Routled! -, c. 
19921). 1). 23. ) 
2 25 Kjrzner, Hm\ NIm-kcl,, 
-Work, 
p. 23. 
I Is 
already emphaslsed how the premises which prevail under perfect competition are indeed 
incon,, istent with the conditions that shoUld prevall in order to reach , uch a . tatc. -)-, (, 
In conclusion, antitrust principles rest on a misguided appraisal of reality, which iý, a Z7 
consequenco of applying a methodology unsuitable for evaluating hurnan relations wil-im t: ) ZD 
the market. 
1.2. - Divergence between the objectivism of conventional regulatory ap - ral"al and a P- -- -- -- 
the subi i - joctive essencc of real markets. 
Contrary to neo-classical assumptions, individuals seldorn possess sufficient 
information about the conditions that could influence their econornic behaviour. This i, -, ti 
fact that runs Counter to the omniscience that neo-classical analysis assume,, of rnarket 
participants. In the realn-i of antitrust policy, this Inforniation IS &SAMIC(A W l-)C tfaWSIMUCCI 
to a central "antitrust aoency, which will then establish whether a undertakinL, fall" 
short of achieving some standard of social allocative efficiency. 
It Is clýar, however, that this is not the case. Individuals live in a "fog of ignorance- 4: ) 
that leads them to speculate about how future circumstances would affect thcIr 
businesses. At most, they seek to grasp certain trends in the hope that these wIII lead to 
ccrtain future outcomes, but nobody ever knows for sure because their knowledg-c is 
h-agnicrited. Hayek observed: "The pecullar character of the problem of a rational 
cconon-i1c order Vs detern-nned precisely hý the 1', ici that the knowledg-C ()I tliý. 
circurnstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or intecyrated forni 
but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowled, c 
which all the separate individuals possess". 227 
Scc -mierally 
G. B. Richardson, Information and lnveý, tment (()\t*oi-d- ()\torci L; mvei", itv 
'27 1-. A. Hawk. "The of Knowledge in Soclety", in Individualism and Economic Order. 
(ChicaL, o. The University of Chicago Prc,,,, 1948), p. 77. 
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Individuals face difficulties in assessing, \vhat information ()the]- Pal-tICII)d[It', IWIC1. 
becaLISC Of Its subýjective nature. In this regard, knowledge i.,, ,, ubýjectkc nawi-c ilic 
sensc that it relates to the expectations of' IndiVI'CILWIS 1-ather ftin (-)b, )'ectl\c 
Loasby has indicated, "choices depend upon beliefs". individuak overcollic thC11- 
I'misbellet'S" by mteracting with each other and by ad usting their initial expectýLtl()W, 
through a process of "ti-ial-and-error". 228 Markets arise from subýjectivc valuation" hy 
individuals who either choose to buy or sell, or alternatively refrain from doing , (). Foi- 
example, consumers act upon their perceptions of which corni-noditics are avaikil-flc and 
the prices they must bid to secure them. To make the optimal choice of cornmodit\ pricc. 
they Must discover the whole range of prices and commodities available to begin v,, 'Ith. 'A", 
discoveries are made concerning hitherto overlooked commodities and unsuspected pricc 
opportunities, the array of buyers' bids is progressively modified. Zý 
As an individual, no entrepreneur can know the actions of the others, therel'ol-c, hill 
actions are nothincy more than a tentative inquiry into an uncertain future. Enti-cpreiieur, b 
ýtre forced to seek and obtain enough information to encourage them to make investlllclll,, ý, 
todaY, which are related tojuture production outputs. Information may not be conipictc. 
hLlt nevertheless it accomplishes the aim of enablii-ig investments to be made. 
It would be presumptuous to assume that all the information relevant to ()11C 
jective nature, uncertainty is endo-cnous investment can be acquired. Because of its SLIN 
\'is-a-\'is economic interaction in the sense that it cannot be erradicated from I-Cill 111'e. 
Thei-c is no way that individuals can foresee the future from their knowledge of pi-c"Cilt Z- 
C11'CUrnstances. Additional information may eliminate "initial" uncertainty, but still ci-catc. " 
more in the future. As 0' Driscoll and Rizzo contend, "further information has not 
eliminated uncertainty, but has merely transformed it to a higher lc\cl kfl, 
counterauessinor". "N 
S B. L(msh\, The Workim, of a Competlti\c 1"Iconomv: G. B. postAkirshalli, til 
Amilv,, is in "The Mind and Method of the Fconomki- (. Aldershor Edwird FILm-. 11NO). 1) 1ý7- 
,, cc also. O'Driscoll and Rizzo, pp 37-38. 
'))9 (YDriscoll and Rizzo. at 73. 
I ý() 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, because individuals attempt to outdo 
everyone else in the market, they will be inclined to seek information that either 
theni an advantage or prevents others fron-i gaining onc. Individuak \\ill icnd 
appropriate information, and will not therefore be inclined to transmit it into the syslcill. 
Secondly, (and this is crucial) because individuals do not make predictions about 
objective data (such as the availability of resources) thus in their co-ordination ()I 
activities, but rather try to conjecture vvhat other indn, iditals are predicthi,,,,. Tlicir 
knowledge of the world, hence their behaviour, will be influenced by the beliefs of other 
individuals. Social knowledge is thus construed on the basis Of Mutual expectatiow.,. 
which as Keynes demonstrated in his "Beauty Contest case", is a precondition of 
uncertainty. 230 
I 
For this reason, these expectations exclude decisions resulting from routines or tD 
conventions, because the need to obtain infori-nation does not arise. Thus, expectatloll'N 
are not formed unilaterally; they require speculation by all concerned. It is an cxcl-cl"c ol' 
guessing what everyone else is guessing. A mere insight into the habits of other producci-s 
is insufficient to ensure an appropriate level of commitment from everyone else. As 
230 This case exemplifies the "genuine" uncertainty surrounding decisions taken on the basis of 
mere expectations. The speculative nature of the decisions market participants adopt in thch, 
transactions is similar to a beauty contest whose winner is chosen according to the recll)rocal 
expectations of the deciding judges. In Kcync,, ',, c\ýirriplc. etch jLIC121C casi, hi,, vote ýiccor(liný, I() 
Jurv will decide, but since none of the JLICIL'C', what lie considers other members of the 
certainty as to the decisions of the rest, as he does not possess ail objective fact on which to hilsc 
his decision. All their decisions will inevitably he based on sheer oi- genuine uncertainl\ 
Keynes, J. M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, (New York: HarcOL11-1. 
Brace & World, ( 1964) [1936]), p. 156. To understand how sheer uncertainty prevents markets 
frorn functionin-, unless certain devices are broucht into action, consider the case of a firm 
aware that the total demand for a product will rise by a certain amount at a future time. Other 
competitors are equally ready to seize the profit opportunity. Therefore, it is impossible for our 
particular entrepreneur to form a reliable expectation of what the volume of competitive ýtippl\ 
is, and what the future price of the good wIll be. In the event of sheer uncertaintv. III\ dec L_ 1 1011 
to stop guessing is either arbitrarily chosen hy ýi ', Uperior authority. or decided h\ aý_, rcciiicnt 17 4--- 
aniom, market participants. As O'DrIscoll and Rizzo aroue: "There is in principle no limit ýo thc Z, 
hei, -, ht of the levels of , uessin- and counter "Lies'sIng. 
There is no logicallN, stillicielti ieaon to 
stop at any point, all such stopping is, to a large extent, arbitrary or derived from a convention**. I 
(See, O'Driscoll and Rizzo, p. 73). In the case of market transactions, these conventions 
'on through manifold arrangements. or h\ t-Ici sometimes occur in the form of explicit co-operati tý I It 
understanding where one firm appraises those elements that shape its expectations about othcr L_ 
firms: reputation, 1)revious business behaviour, and so on. We shall return to this question more 
extensively belo\, \,. 
I? I 
O'Drl,, coll and Rizzo argue, acqul,. ition of knowledge i,, primarily respon,, ihIc h)r it,, 4--) -- 
continued existence. 231 
Another crucial factor in the con,, ideration of the emergence of' t7l 
expectations is that they are in constant flux, as individuals' perspectives of the s-%-, tcnI I 
continuously change. As time passes, individuals' predictions about future outcoincý, 
change too, affecting the information obtained by others. 
In forecasting the future, individuals must constantly redefine theii- initial plans i.,, 
they discover in retrospect that they are unsuited to their present goals. Time i-cfel-clicc 
under this dynamic horizon is therefore evolving in the sense attached to It by Henn 
Bergson, la dur, ýe reel or "real time", or "the continuing flow of experiences". '-'-' The 
notion of "real time", like that of subjective knowledge, is essential in the diffewntiation 
of institutional analysis from neo-classical. Neo-classical analysis relics on Ncwtonian 
time, which is "spatiallsed .... .. its passage is represented or symbolized by 'movemcni"' 
alono, a line'. 233 By contrast, "real time" ernphasises the sub* f the tD Jectire experience o 
passage of time which conditions "human action". It 1,,, a "dynamically continumis 1'1()\\ ()I 
novel experiences". Sulýjective time is "continuously dynarn-Ic" (the present is linked to 
past memory and to future expectation), "heterogeneous" (each moment is different and b 
novel), and has "causal efficacy" (time as a source of novelty). In real markets, individuals 
interact under conditions of subjective time. action does not take place in a ýsingflc 
moment, but in a continuum of flowing moments. 234 
23 1 O'Driscoll and Rizzo, p. 74. 
-) 
-1 
-) H. Berason, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. (London: 
Geoi-,,,, e Allen Unwin, 19 10. ) 
t-- II 
dates irc 233 O'Driscoll and Rizzo, p. 53. According to these authors, in this form of time different 
portrayed as a succc, ýslon of line segments or points within which decision making is donc. L- -I 
Therel'Ore, it Is "homo-enoeus" (each point Is identical to all others), it 11, "CO11011LIOU"k 
-esultant Point" LII-C h) Citch divIsMe" (no matter how finely we divide time and how close the i 
other, there is ilways sorne space between them) and it is cau, ýally inert (if there al-e chan.,: c,. 
these must be COMPLIted from the beginnin-. The initial staoc contains all that is to ? -- 
produce "change": passing time adds nothino). 
'14 In general, sce L Lachmann, "Profes.,, or Shackle on the Economic Significance of Time" in I- (ýapLital, Expectatiows and the Market Procew Ess. ivs on the Theorv of the Market F, cm-ioniv. 
Institute for Humane Studies (Kansas City- Sheed Andrews and Mc. 'vicel, Inc., 1977), pl). i -9ý',. 
also, 0' Driscoll and Rizzo, pp. 5--70. Akw, Ni. Rizzo. Real Time and Relative Incletei 
Thus, business expectations constitute the core of decisions adopted under 
uncertain conditions. They provide entrepreneurs wi IIII I-e. ith a tentative 'ns*lc--, ht into the fUtU 
Taylor explains how real time affects economic calculations: '"There is no prcci,, ion in 
economic calculation because of the uncertain future that pervades all activities in the 
market economy. Predicted future costs and revenues are an expectation (if thc 
entrepi-eneuf producer, who possesses no superhuman ability to know the futurc. Thil-I 
uncertainty similarly affects the retrospective calculation of profit and IOSS J-VC', ILIIC HIC 
most recent calculation of capital is tenuously based on a money eqUI\, alence that the 
future may not uphold. An individual decision-maker is unable to know preciscly thc 
future preferences of consumers, changes in technology, plans and actions of other 
producers, and the infinite number of other external events that will Occur in the futurc. 
The gathering of empirical data as is done for actuarial tables is not sufficient I'Or tile 
purposes of entrepreneurial activity in the market economy". 235 
It is this changing and evolving exercisc of forecastim, which -ives the anak", i', w, "I Z7 
distinctive subjective flavour. As Mises indicates, uncertainty about the fUtUl-C 1-, 
inseparable from human action. If individuals knew their future, they would not need to 
choose and therefore would not need to act. They would simply become machincs 
I 
reacting to external stimuli without any sense of purpose. 236 Moreover, as Buchanan and 
Vanberg say: "At the core of (the) attack on the 'neo-classical citadel', and central to the 
radical subjectivist view in general, is the Issue of what we can claim to know ýIbOLIt the 
future in our efforts to understand the world of human affairs. The basic objection to neo- 
classical general equilibrium theory is that it embodies assumptions about the possIhIlII\ 1: ý I 
in Economic Theory, New York University, paper presented at the Austrian Ecolloilllcý' 
ColloqUiLlm, Department of Economics, New York University, November 1996. 
C. Taylor, The FUndamental of Austrian Economic,,. (London: ALIM-n Smith 1IT', tilLite. 19', -"Oý. 1). 
19. Sheel- Uncertainty, which characterises entrepreneurial forecasting activities , hoidd IV 
differentiated from niere risk-, whereas the foriner cannot be assessed, the latter iliaN he mcýt'\tired 
with actuarial CýIICLllaiion. Frank Kni,, ht the first to distinpish bet\ýccn tile t\\ý) notlolls. 
See F. Knight. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Reprint,, -, of Economics Classic. (Ne\\- York: -Sentr\ 
Press, ( 192 11 1964. 
236 L. Mises. Human Action: A Treatise on Economlcs. (London: William Hodge and Ci) I id 
1949)' pp. 105-106. 
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of knowing the future that are entirely unfounded, not only in their most exti-cme \ ari, mt, 
the assumption of'perfect knowledge. "237 Sheer Uricertainty i,, a crucial challengc to iic()- 
classical models. 
Individuals must assess the constant flow of new information arising from tlieir L- 
exchanges, leading them to change their initial plans in ordei- to adapt their nccck to the 
new oýjectlves which arise. In this way, the open-ended nature of information iircvcnl, ý 
the social system from achieving neo-classical "equillbl-IL1111". 
Mainstream models do not enable a proper appraisal of i-narket i-elation,,. hccau, ýk, 
they treat information as a "given" objective asset. Even SCP "dynamic" models depictilig 
business strategic behaviour fall into this false assumption. Thus, it makes no difference 
that these models emphasise the problem of co-ordinating individuals who are actirlo 
strategically (in order to recreate a dynamic business setting), they fail to do so hccaLISC 
they do not address the same problems of co-ordination that individuals face in realitV. 
Indeed, mainstream econorrucs suppresses this problem entirely by assurnina: a) that there 
is ari isornorphism between the real world aiid the niarket player%ý image of it-, h) 01,11 
market players only differ with respect to decision-mak-ing capabilities in terms of ho\\ t) 
fine or coarse their information partitions are, and c) that information partitions are alvcn, L_ 
like full information is given in the general equilibrium model, and that sheer just I t) tlý 
uncertainty resulting from mistakes and surprises, producing genuine knowledge -al)s, L_ t) ýý L_ Z7 
caii be ruled out. '_1')8 Foss concludes that, -iii much of game theory there is precisely the 
conflation between the objectively existing and sulýjectively perceived (reality)", but that, 
"the co-ordination problem of course isn't solved ýtt all, nici-cly , id, _-,,, tcppc(! --2'() Thc 
comparison to be made is not between static and dynamic equilibrium, but betwecii 
as heuristic models of interpretiiig realitV. equilibrium and diseqUi II 
7 J. Buchanan and vý J. Vanberg. "The Market a, ý a Crc; itive Procc, ý,, -, F'conomic'; am, C Philosophy, \/()I. 7 (199 1), pp. 167-186. 
-138 N. Fos,, Firn-is and the Coordination of Knowledge: some Au-, ýtrlan Insights. DRUID 
Paper No. 98-19, Department of Inclu"tri'll 1-collonlic, and Slimen, ColleilliaLell 1111,111c" 
School, Copenha,,,, en. 199S, p. 17. 
Foss, I d., P. I S. 
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Contrary to the neo-classical paradigm, which Implicitly assurne, ý the omni, ýcfcncc ()F 
the decision-maker by considering this knowledge to be an asset which is objectivel. % 
appraised, the nature of' this information is not only to be scattered out dls() suoll, ý,,: ti\ck 
appraised. As Thomsen contends: "[In the neo-classical equilibrium fi-ame\v()1-kj 
knowledge is treated as a costly commodity that, like all other commodities, 111U. "t hc 
economized. Therefore, the resulting equilibria entail not perfect but only optI111.11 
knowledcre: auents will have deliberately uneradicated ignorance. Such ignorancc ivniain: ý, b 4--) b C) 
tineradicated because the benefits of additionil inf()i-rnation do not compensate 1()I- 1he 
costs of acquiring it". 240 Knowledge is fragmented and appraised by each IndividLial 
within his own framework of means-ends, and consequently, evolve, " on a conLin()Ll, ý, 
basis. 
In fact, as a commodity this "knowledge- may well be information tliat no 
individual in the economy has yet, since in an evolving world (i. e. disequi libri U 111), 
individuals are forced to deal with new problems for which they must devise ile'VN 
solutions. These new ways of solving unexpected problems require new undcrstiindin, L,,,, 
and perceptions of social phenomena. This enables a "discovery of facts", in HaycklMl 
terms, which is the goal of any economic system: "[The economic problem] is not merely 
a task of utilizing information about particular concrete facts which the individuals 
already possess, but one of using their abilities to discover such facts Lis will be relcvant to 
their purposes in the particular situation. "241 
1.3. - Consequences of antitrust policics objectivism on legal analysis. 
Perhaps the hi-nitations of the conventional approach are best illustrated by the 
inability of antitrust decisions to produce a stable rule of law that distinguishes between 
is rcason. pro-competitive" and -anti-competitive" restrictive trade arrangements. For thi 
decisions taken in the cxecution of this policy cannot be subjcct to justiciabllit. \ hy C()Ul-t,,, 
`40 1'. Thomsen, Prices and Knowledge, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 23. 
241 F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty The Political Order of a FreePeopLe, p. 190. 
I -) Z, 
n 
a,, thk section will show. 
To examine the nature and scope of thk problem, it v, useful to refcr to thc 
enhanced enforcement discretion which results from a positiv st, c understandillo IIII IC , j! Of L, 
theory and economics in this field. This economic theories can be incorporated Into the 
body of law, defined as a set of "blind orders" dIctated by an authority. Finally, wc will 
examine more closely the rule-of-reason analysis currently used in antitrust enforccl-nem. 
to highlight the impossibility of distinguishing between "good- and "bad"' markcl L- --I L- 
ýtrrangements- 
There is an implicit assumption in antitrust legal analysis that economic data can be tý, 
appraised obýjectively, as "facts" are capable of being, appraised in legal cases. Froill thP-I t: ) Z: ) 
ob 
- 
jective data, antitrust theory discerns the intention of agents that enter into rnarkct 
arrangements, which is an essential condition for establishing whether they are acti 11 LT I 
rnonopol 1 stic ally. Antitrust legal analysis simply endorses Nvhatever ready-niadc nonnati\ c týl 
conclusions are deduced about the inner intentions of entrepreneurs, in order to irnposc 
penalties. The crucial question, then, is whether neo-classical economic theory can 
provide such a distinction. 
The answer is negative: facts, as we have seen, cannot be objectively appraised 
because they are devoid of the subjective values shared by the observerjust as much . 1s I)v 
market participants. There can be no single conclusion about the intentions of pal-ties 
undertaking restrictive arrangements, which must be explained in relation to what eacil 
p, trty perceives to be desirable, not to what aii extermil observer ýISSLlmes societ\, 
The conventional paradigm is incapable of pointing to unique or single explanatiows 
ýihout the causality of economic data. Its flaws are clearly seen in the predictivc natuiv of 
its models (a feature no doubt inherited fi-om it, ý, po,, itivklic býlck-l_0LMd), Miich 
ericoui-agcs as' many cxplanations Lis there are tcritativc hypotheses to explaiii Lich 
causality. In'other words, there are not one but many competing theories explailling the 
Causality attached to these "facts". As Breririer point,, out, "there i,, not one model, [lot 
one araurnent in economic theory. which -when taking into account entrepreneUr. 1,111p, t) Z__ 
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innovations and chance- would relate structure to performance and anti competi t1 Vc 
conduct, and which, in particular, would suggcst viewincr with suspicion even a perslý, tcnl 
positive correlation between 'profits' and concentration". 2142 
Further, since leaal rules are instrumental in this approach, it i tý i is easy to foresee that 
several diverging, even conflicting, legal rules wi 1111-1 a ill emerge, each one repre. "cliti Z7 
particular decision of the authority in question issued in accordance with each hypothesPI. 
Loughlin criticises analysts who have attempted to make ob Jective legal deterniination, ý,. 
In his opinion, philosophers of science have undertaken the futile task of defining a single 
set of criteria as a basis for differentiating objective from subjective knowledge. Ho\\! c\'C]-. 
as Bernstein states, "the lesson to be learned, rather, is how difficult and complex it is to 
articulate standards of objectivity relevant to different domains of inquiry, and the ways 
these standards are open to criticism. "243 
As indicated above, all neo-classical efforts to appraise market relations ol-)jecti\, cI\ 
are futile, at least in the uncertain and changing context which the entrepreneur faccs iii 
his activities. Rather than building up reliable legal principles on which to enforcc ýi rule 
of law that would promote competition, economic analysis in its neo-classical versions 
provides an array of competing theories, none of which is stable enough to render policN, 
enforcement predictable. 
The contradictions in antitrust legal doctrine,,, which have evolved over time in 
sLiccessive legal rules, have mirrored this proliferation of conflicting models. The"C b Z7. 
doctrines are found in the text of statutes, reoulations, legal decisions, adminktr. iikc r-I 
rLilings, and general legal rules enacted in this field. 
Many market arrangements now presumed "fair" were formerly considered to 11c 
nionopolistic manipulations of trade. Resale pricc Maintenancc, for instaricc, Li,, cd to N, 
24') R. Brenner, 'Niai-kct Power Innovation-, mid Antitru,, Cý in The I-m mid I,.,: ()n0mjc,, oi 
Compciltion Polic\. F. Nkithewwii et al. (cd,. ). 0', mcomci: T1w Fra"'Cl In'tituic, 1). Igo. 
'43) Bernsicin, Op. cit. 
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considered prohibited per se, as it was seen a,, dJ. S(ILI*Se d horizontal price-fixinL, aniont-, 
retailers; however, today it is viewed under the rnore flexible "rule-of-reason". Sinillariv. 
there are still echoes of the most famous "successful" antitrust prosecution ever. The 
conclusions of the Alcoa case decided in the late 1940s appear unsatisfactory to&\,. -, -i-i 
In fact, the ambiguities associated with the functioning of the rule-of-reason ýirc 
inherent in the historical evolution of antitrust policy. This can be seen, for mstancc, in 
the difficulty of defining terms like "lessening competition", "unfair restrictions" aiid the Z-ý ti- 
like under successive U. S. antitrust statutes245 and in the difficulty of developim-1 I 
244 In this reLgard, Bork makes an extensive critique of landmark antitrust cases, which L'Uided 
policy enforcement for decades. See R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox. Some of these Cases arc 
compiled in W. Breit and K. Elzinga, The Antitrust Casebook: Milestones in Economic 
Regulation, (New York: The Dryden Press, 1982). 
245 M. Handler, Antitrust in Perspective, Columbia University Press, New York, 1957. Handler 
gives us a good example of this in the long history of failed attempts (still present) of the U. S. 
Congress to determine the scope of the rule-of-reason initially formulated under the Stindmd 
Oil and the Addyston Pipe cases. Once a rule-of-reason was introduced, discretion to dccide 
good trusts from bad ones emerged. Almost immediately, the rule-of-reason was open to 
criticism because "a rule of discretion without objective limits invited the court to 'set sail on a 
sea. of doubt', and to exercýise 'the power to say ( ... ) how much restraint of competition is in the 
public interest, and how much is not" (Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. , 
85 Fed. 271,283-284.16th. 
Cir. 1898] aff'd, 175 U. S. 211 [1899]. ) Henceforth, all legislative efforts to clarify the 
distinction between monopolistic and non-monopolistic restrictions inevitably failed because 
they could only provide clarity at the expense of prohibiting many useful business undertakings. 
Nevertheless, this is the approach that President Wilson advocated to challenge protests against 
the ambiguities of antitrust policy. In his 1914 message to Congress, he requested "a further and t- zn 
more explicit legislative definition of the policy and meaning of existing antitrust law"". III 
particular, an "item by itern" statutory prohibition '*in terms as will practically eliininýiic 
uncertainty" (President Wilson's speech, quoted by Handler, p. 30. ) The outcome the 
Federal Trade Commission Act and the CLivton Act of 1914. These StiltUtes, howevci. did not 
set absolute prohibitions; their provisions required a tendency to monopollse or a substantial 
lessening of competition. Neither dealt with the problems created by the rule-of-reason. A,, ýý 
consetluence, the 1914 legislation left antitrust in this state: the creative role of the , 
lLId1Ch1I-\ 
under the little-understood and much maligned rule-of-reason, far from being curtailed, %ýa 
supplernented by a blank-check grant of power to a new administrative body whose outlawing of 
unfair methods of competition' was made subject to judicial review. Therefore, the legality of 
business techniques which were conditionally forbidden was to be governed by a new statutory 
yardstick ('substantive lessening of competition'). The problem of engrafting and clarit yI II, _, I 
judge-made rule-of-reason was obviated by the fact that the statute contained a built-in 
qualification. This qualification, however, did not essentially differ frorn the rule-of-reason. 
Handler puts it: "... precisely how this new test differed, if at all, from the criticked but 
unrejected judicial criteria, neither its word,, nor history disclose". (p. 3 1. ) In fact, the inclusion 
of the term "substantially" did not add anything new to the test. Handier statesý 
appeared to be re-enacting the same 'direct-indirect' standards and Investing the courts with the 
, same discretion that the new 
leLislation wa, ý ýupposed to forestall". (footnote 16. p. 115, ) A, 
result, an administrative or judicial tribunal would have to determine in each case \\ hether thc 
challenged practice was likely to substantially lessen competition. "In essence. Ithc [ýSl 
Congress with a minimum of guidance returned the problem of antitru, ýt to the courts who,, c 
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predictable legal standards to provide a proper measure againsi \\hich to 
individual cqses in the European Union. 246 
In Latin America. the problems of making Such distinctions have aiso heen 1-twed. 
the lack of criteria to distinguish between per sc and rule-of-reason beha\ IOLII' ( ... ) 
makes law enforcement very hard and only leads to increase confusion unnecessarily ill it 
country with no antitrust tradition". 247 
Accordingly, pleading before antitrust agencies is an art of persuasion based ()11 
giving the "best" or most convincing hypothetical causal explanation (i. e. theoi-\, ) to 
connect otherwise isolated events. This is cleai-ly illusti-ated ill the kind of' ovidelicc 
, (, athered in antitrust proceedings. The information collected to determine the liahlllt\, ifl' ýi :1b- 
firm in undertaking a particular arrano-ement comprises, for cxai-nple, statisýtio:,, ), t) Z: ) 
information about the industry concerned, information about the performance of similar 
industries H! other Countries, as well as the opinion of witnesses on trend'., in the 
industry. 248 In other words, evidence on all sorts of econornic factors relating to thc Z--1 
husiness environment, but no evidence about the undertaking itseýf Thus. C\,, Idcilc, c 
comprising statistics about the economic behaviour of similar firms in the past, oi, in ()thei- 
markets, or the testin-iony of witnesses about their opinion of the likely behavior of the 
industry is used to demonstrate the likelihood of the hypothetical conclusions of the 
economic theory used by the authority in question. Stevens and Yamey once complained 
that the old UK Restrictive Practices Court -has not often had the benefit of ýiccounts ()I' 
solLitions had aroused so nILlch dj,,, sim,, kwIion-. (p. 
-140 Korah has raised this point emphatically by criticising the failure of the European Union 
Competition Agency, the DG IV, to determine cx-aittefiacto what practices impede conipetmoný 
which Would provide sorne criteria on which enterprises could determine their le-al ýtaiw, v 
vi, s competition ISSLICS in advance. (Korah, pp. 207-284. ) 
'47 A. Jatar, Poh'ticas de Competencia en Economfa.,, Recientemente Liherýtli/, ýodas. EIC, t,, o de 
Venc/, ticla, internal paper, Superlntendenciýi Pro-Competencia. Caracii, ý. p. 1-4. . 1.1tal 
not realise that such a distinction is impossib1c, no matter how detailed the regulation iflaý hc, 
becMV, C the instahility of economic theory prevents it from identifying either behaviour: and nol. 
ýi,, she alle.,,, cs. IICCýILISC of the lack of lc,,,, al clkninctions. 
248 R. B. Stevens and B. S. Yarney, The Rest, -Ictl%, e pract, ces Court. - a Stud% of the JLi(i, c,, tl hocc- 
and Economic Policv, Weidenfeld and Nicokon, London, 1965, pp. 91 et , ccl. 
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events in actual SItUations closely similar to the hypothetical ', ItUations with which it hi, 
heen concerned when predicting, the effects of the terimmition ol'restrictions". -, -4ý) 
Indeed, antitru,, t theory k linked to hypotheticýij conclu, ýion,, ahout niirkci 
behaviour. For example, a crucial element iri consideriii-, -, the existence of monopolistic 
intentions in a given undertaking is to determine whether the firm enjoys market po%\Ci-. t: ' 
However, we cannot perceive market power through our seiises, instead our hYpotlic"c, 
tell Lis ýihout its existence ýtnd we construct a hypothesis to predict its iniplicýttioii, ý, 
Consider the current lines of reasonin, -, in any antitrust proceeding. All partic-, mv 
ternpted to interpret the observed facts in their fiwour, showing that thcir rc, ýI)ccnvc 
theory is the correct one. Plaintiffs (either private parties or administrative agencies) will 
endeavour to show that concentration is high enough to as. yitinc that markct powcr 
not cxIst, ctc exists, whereas defendants will aim to show that market power does 11 1 
becausc concentration is low, or becausc a correct econoinic interprctati . on Oljacb 
shows that regardless of concentration, firrns cannot exercise market power. Ho\\cvci-, il 
I'acts are perceived and understood in term,, ()f the endorsed theory. it is ohvious that 
theiv is no -way to gcl around this deadlock, and that any attempt to con"truct an 
11 obýjective- interpretation is doomed to failure. 
In practice, this impossibility leads to ýcvcral complications in the ()I 
niarket restrictions Under antitrust pi-oceedin,,,,,. For example, why should we re, ard -,, ()mc 
types of data as valid for the purposes of formulating our assumptions about the I t__ 
I'C'-, tI*ICtIVC hehaVIOLIrOf firnis, and exclude other data? Neo-Aissical cconornist,., a'ý,, SLIFC LP, 
that this is achieved hy examining the cross-clasticaN of demand, which will tClI LIS 11OW 
\vIllingly consumers iti-c to substitute one product for another. This has led rcl)uIcd 
scholars like Robert Bork to make dubious statenicnts such as. "While no clear cut 1111C,, 
can be -ivcn [as to ý, vhich firms en j oy market powci] onc useful cut-off is that ninciv 
I)ercent of' thc market diare is usually high enouLft while ýi 60 percent ýhare k oftcn too 
241) and Yalllc. %, P. I I-'. 
lo%v-. 2ý() Yet when it comes to determinim-, the , Izc of a ,*I i\, ci, market, wh-N, hotii(i \\c 
exclude some products from it and leave othei-,, '. ' 
it P, fair to sýiy, however, that Bork's opinion is iiot sharcd hý- ýM antitrwl 
advocates, who acknowledge the difficulty of ascertaining a 'magic nurnher'. For Z7 L- 
cxarnple, Khemani and Dutz contend: "To determine the existence of dorninýince, 
different countries specify different market-share thresholds. There is no critical niarket 
share of concentration level that clearly signals the deL-, L- -, ree of competition ýind nionopoIN, 
in a market. Moreover, there is disagreement ahout how to delineate the relevant , Ilc ol'a 
rnarket". 251 
Neo-classical premises of objectivity conflict with the subjective niiturc ol' 
inl'ormation conveyed by the market. From this alternative perspective economic data 
would render a different appraisal of the phenomena observed. For exanip1c, thcrc WOUI(I 
be an alternative explanation of market concentration to the one provided by nco-c Ica I 
appraisal. In this respcct, Sowell states: "Thc alternative cxplanation about market 
concentration is that some industries are concentrated becauýe some firms' products arc 
simply preferred by consumers, either because of their qualitv, price, convenience or 
other appeal. If this is true, then the slightly greater profitability of industries with I'c\\, 
scilers is not because the whole industry is more profitable (as it would hC L111dCr 
COHLISIon), ýut because son-ie particular firms have a higher profit rate wh'Icli 
arithmetically brings up the average, while economically [this] does not make the rest (4 
the industry any more profitable than under cornpetitivc conditions. The data in tact show 
no profit advantaoc to a firm of a given size in being in a concentrated versu, -, a non- 
concentrated industry. "2152 
Consider a variahic such as price, which is generally used in antitrust procecdlll, 2s a" 
the vm-dstick for apprav,, ing whether a monopoh,, Hc intention cxl,, t,, behind a I)C 
2SO Bork, 1). 166. 
). ý I Khemani ýind Dutz. p. 24. 
-)s ) S()\\ ell, 1). 200- 
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arrangement. What does price reallY tell Lis'! Does it tell Lis some ýort of ohiectivc 
information, which can be contrasted with co,, t,, " In a sub. lective appraisal it certaink doý-, 
not. Ebeling explains why: "A seller finds himself with the unsold inventory of ýi prodlic, 4: ) 1- 
in excess of desired levels at a particular price. But what exactly is the market tellin, -, hiri-, 
at that price? That he needs to relocate his store? That he has failed to advern"c 111c 
existence or availability of the product sufficiently? That the price is 'right' but the qual11% 
or characteristics of the product is 'wrong'? Or that the quality and characteri"tic'. 1 ML, 
cright' but the price is 'wrong'? What the price has conveyed is information tllýlt 
sornething is wrong, that the seller's plans and expectations are inconsistent with those ol 
others. It has not unambiguously told fiirn in which direction the error lies. Tile 
information, in other words, needs interpretation as to its meaning concerninL, the 
preferences And plans of others. "253 Again, values and goals are necessary to give prices 
some meaning in the context of the transaction. 
There is no such thing as objective empirical evidence which is able to support ýt 
positive determination between monopolistic and non -monopolistic market behaviour. 
For instance, costs cannot be. appraised independently of the concerns of investors w1w 
have had to forego an alternative course of action (opportunity costs). The attempt to 
find an objective marginal cost against which to measure the efficiency of a given 
undertaking, in order to determine "monopolistic" social costs, is a mere delusion. Cost, ý 
cannot be appraised from market prices; prices result from competing valuations which 
are expressed in the costs that market participants have to tolerate in their economic 
activity. 254 Lavoie contends: "The MC =P rule will optirnize allocation within a givcn Z-7 
253 R. Ebeling, "Towards a Hermeneutical Economics: Expectations, Prices and the Role oI' 
Interpretations in a Theory of the Market Process", in Individuals, Institutions, Interpretations. 
Hernieneutics Applied to Economics, D. Prychitko (ed. ), Avenbury, Aldershot, 1995, p. 143. 
254 There is important economic literature about the subjectivity of costs. See In particular . 
1. 
Wiseman, "Uncertainty, Costs and Collectivist Economic Planning", in L. S. E. Essays on Cost, J. 
Buchanan and G. Thirlby (eds. ), (New York: New York Unversity Press, 1981). In the sailic 
volume, Thirlby argues that every rule establishing the existence of an ascertainable ohýiectivc 
relationship between income and costs (that marginal revenue equals marginal cost or price 
equals marginal cost or total revenues equal total costs) "has not the objectivity th. it P, h\ 
implication attributed to it; consequently, the application of the rule is impracticable". (Thir1hy. 
"The Ruler-, p. 166. ) Also Huerta de Soto: "The marginal cost rule cannot be used heclaic 
do not determine prices, but quite the opposite, it is prices that determine costs; therefore, tile 
rule possesses all the ambiguity of a circular reasoning". (See Huerta de Soto, p. 325. ) t-- Z!, 
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framework of' means mid ends as Iong a,, future co,, t,,, are expected to be the , amc Cc, Cý 
current cost,,. This is a world of static expectations, which aj-c reasonable in a , tatic 
world. In a world of continuous change, however, an entrepreneur must try to anticipatc 
cleniand, to form expectations, and to act on them. He should view his costs on the ha,, is, 
of the specific alternatives that appear available to him at the time ot'his choice. Both hi, 
estimate of revenue and his estimate of costs depend on his expectations at the time of' 
decision". 2S5 
For instance, there is no objective measure to establish that, one corporate l'orin or 
rnarket arrangement 1.,, socially "better" or *'more efficient" than another. Such a 
determination ultimately rests with thosc subjective costs (i. e. opportUIIIt\' Costs) 
perceived by market participants. 256 Nor is there a magical number telling us objectivcly 
that a firm belongs to one particular market or another. Antitrust agencies cannot set a 
degree of concentration beyond which it is inferred that firms are hchaving, 
nionopolistic. ally. In this regard, Areeda writc,,. *'There is no concentration number al)()\c 
which anti-competitive pricing is clearly threatened and below which competition is 
c1carly assured". 257 In the end, regardless of the technical complexity surrounding the 
discussion, the matter is left to arbitrary choices which are devoid of any analytical 
consistency. Antitrust legal doctrines are prc, ýcnted and supported hy mere allegations, 
not by objective facts. Thus, no positive conclusion about monopolisation can he madc 
h-orn the fact that a firm possesses, say, over ninety per cent of the relevant nlarkct, 
unless the observer as'surnes that such concentration encouragcs firms to undcrtakc, 
monopolistic endeavours. For this reason. Sowell concludes: "what is, involved here is not 
ii tcchnicality of antitrust law, but a far broader qUestion about the use of knowledge mid 
'155 D. Lavole, Rivalry-an(l Central Pianniijg:. The sociallst calculatl0j, dehate reconsiderccl, (Nc\\ 
York: Cambri(h-, c Un'ývcrsity Press, 1985). p. 14 1 1 
Rothbard. "Monopok 
...... 
Nevertheless. convcntional economic theory leads antitrusl authoritic, 
. 1" fL[CtOl-V and markel , hare, to fOCLIS their attention on "objective" evidence SUCII L the , ize of the 
the intensity ofcompetition resultinL, from marketim-, and ackcrtkmc, , ti-ate,, ie,,. and the , cOpc of 
channel,, of distribution. Obviowsly, in a closcd-end appraisal of markeus no othei conclwion 
could foll()\\ from the,, c elernent,, e\ccl)i that they enable enti-clirciieui-, to c\ploit 
le% cls of I- 
257 P. Arecda, "Monopolization, Mergcrý and Mai-kct,, - A Centur\ Pa, ýt MICI FLAII-e", 75 C1111'01-111,1 
La\\ RcvIC\\. [ 1987 1. p. 977. 
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the role of articulation. The basic problem in thCSC JCfII1itI()I1-0f-pI-()duct th, 11 
ý)Ubstitutability is ultimately subjective and prospectl%'(2, whIle attempt.,, to del'Inc It IIILI,, ý 
he obliective and retrospective. "258 
Hence, antitrust economic theory transforms circumstantial evidence into I'Lill 
evidence by -linking these otherwise isolated facts into an elaborate chain of , upposition.,., 
ýtnd predictions. Ultiniately. determining antitrust lcuall liability r, -, not a rnattcr od' pLitti;,, ý, 
I'Orward objective factual evidence in support of one's contention, it is , peculativc mquir\ 
(theory) to create a preSUITIPtI011 of guilt which, if not challenged, results In 1c,! al liahllltlcýl 
for firms participating in the arrangement,,,. Howcvci-, x.,, Sowell p-aphicalk I)LIt, " It'. 
"There is usually nothing in antitrust cases corriparable to finding someone standing ovcr 
the corpse with a smoking pistol in his hand. Objective statistical data abound, but its 
Interpretation depends crucially on the definitions and theories used to infer the IMtLII_C ()I 
the prospective process which left behind that particular residue of I-cti, (), ý, pcct1\(, 
nun-thers. "259 Therefoi-c, the identification of truly inonopolistic undertakii-Igs in oi-dcr to 
inipose lc-ýtl liability r, dependent upon an inipossIhIc condition, name], \,, that of mAim-1 
objective appraisals about collected data. 
In short, antitrust agencies reach conclusions about the existence of violations Of 
the public interest based on evidence that does not relate to the conduct ot' the firm 
invcstiuated, but is based on data explaining the conduct of anonyi-now, market lorcc. ", 
The relevance of these forces to the leoal ýiction can only he determined through the z: _-, I 
cýwsal link offered by the particular theory endorscd by the antitrust authority. Thc 
definition of legal liability in this case is therefore subject to the evidence Of ',! Llllt thýlt t7l 
these theoretical hypotheses, predictions and suppositions provide. 
Antitrust agencics overlook the fact that economic theorjc,, ý ill-c mere prcdlcti(ln, -ý L-1 
ahout the future-, purc , pcculation abOL1t uncertain fitct,,. which may or may not occm-. 
They cannot therefore scrvc ýis a basis for the imposition of legal liability. It i" not 
'ýmveU, p. 204. 
-15 () S(mcl I, P. 203 
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ýurprvýinL(!,, t en, that there is an irresistible temptation for the i-, -, cnc'Ic,, to make arfvrlý-,, 
interpretations of these "objective" facts about the arrangement under mvcstl L-, It loll. Z-- - 
which confirm their own theories. 
In conclusion, because of its subjective nature, economic data cannot , ei-vc i,, 
evidence of regular and predictable ob'e(, -t* II tn .1 ive patterns of 
behaviour in the rnarket. The 
Littempt to make objective appraisals about the intentions implicit in the actiori,, of' 
actors is impossible Outside the realm of closed-end systenis. where all lnforrnýitjon 
known (i. e. assumed). As we demonstrated in the previous section, this is ,, upported hý 
the failure to forl-nUlate theories that offer satisfiactory explanations about rnarkct 
behaviour. 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE CONVENTIONAL REGULATORY APPRAISAL 
IMPLEMEN-rING PREDICTABLE SOCIAL WELFARE GOALS. 
Althouah tempting, the idea of achieving social welfare goals through purposcl'ul Z: ) Z-. ) L- b 
i-cgulation has two scvcre flaws: the first is the practical impossibility of ý[Chle% In" Pull! 1C 
,, oals with the aid of instruments which call into question their rai . son eVetre. The sccond 
one refers to the underrnining effect on individual,, ' rights within the niarket. Both Z7) 1ý 
considerations affect the ultimate plausibility of those institutions governing inýirkct 
trýinsýictions, which are en-ibodied in the rule of law. 
Our basic contention is that conventional regulatory appraisal entails cost-benefit 
calculations that can only be made with reference to social welfare stalld; lrds wllo, ýe 
appraisal through practical enforcement is too expensive in terms of the informational 
requirerrients it posits on the enforcement authority. A point is reached where the 
standard itself becornes "non-optimal" and therefore, impossible to achic%, c. Thi,, iý, s ever 
clearer if the passing of time is considered in the analysis. In light of these diffICL]It]C'ý, tile 
authority will havc no more choices but to -A-hoc" wclt'ýirc standard, " iii it,,,, 
cifforccnient acti\, ity. Iii this way, any policy enforcement decision become,, ciitirclý 
LIMICCOLMLIhIC hV C011VC11110nal legal inStrLIIIICIIt,, mid the rule of law crodc,,. , L- 
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The futility of comparing _rcality with idealised standards 
for policý 
ciih)rcement p-pi rpqs e s. 
The idea of achieving optimal social welfare in an "imperfect" world I,, a "clf- 
defeating one for Policy purposes. Public policy is neither conceived nor Iniplernellic(l In 
the abstract: it is intended to produce effects on real markets and people. Howcvcr, 
finding a "social optimurn" in the real world I,,,, hy necessity, denied since no policv-mAcr 
has the perfect Information to know with ccrtainty when ()I- wherc social \\, c1l'aj-c ý\ ill 
ýIC(Llally be maximised following intervention. It i,., to &terminc whethcr 
equilibrium has been achieved. 
Any attempt to deduce an "optimal" point from the mere observation of the nunihci- 
of firrils existing in a market is simply a delusion, since the authority cannot possc. ".. ", 
sufficient information to establish the "right" number of firms that should prevail ill tllc t) 
inarket. In other words, conventional welfare analysis disregards the costs of adw\, in- 
Such an optimal state. The costs stem from the subýjective nature of the information that 
1-las to be passed oil to the planning authority in order to achieve social welfai-c. 
As we have indicated, market information is "subjective, practical, disperse aild 
liardly articulable". 2(-)() In other words, it is inforniation which will always be inacce. ", "INC 
to the external observer due to its subjective nature. ft is subjective, in the scnw that it 
cýiii only he appraised under the influence of those accordin- to the individual i-nean". 
goals, needs and objectives held by whoever possesses it for enhancin, 2 his or lier own 
well hcing. Thus, it caii only be properly appraised by market participants and cannot he 
I)assed on even to a neighbour, much less to a distant planning or antitrust authority. -)oi 
juc Neocki IN) . 
1. Huerta de Soto, La Methodenstreit, o el Enfo(jUe Austi-faco Frente al Enfoc 'Ic C11 1ý1 
Ciencla Econ6mica. actas del 5o. Con-reso de Economia Regional de Castilla Leon, A\iI, i. 
November 1996. p. 53. 
For an cuensive aimlysis of the problem of kno\ý led, -, c ()I subjcCtl\ c Information, scc III '-ýelierai 
O'DrP, coll and Riz/. (), pp. 35-51,71-91. AIs(). Huerta de Soto, Sok: Ialismo... pp. 4 1-86. Ako, . 
1. 
Huerta de Soto. "Entrepreneurship and the Economic Analysis of Sociallmn". In NL, \\ 
Pci-spectives ()n_ Austrian Economics, G. Mci]'cr (ed. ) (London: Routlc(l,,,, c. London, 1995). pp. 
I 
- -1 (,, )) - -, 
ý, ') II possible t(, apprai, ýe economic information ol)'c,: I'\-el\: Even as,, uming that 't would be IIIIII 
Sen has noted that Individuals would not lijvc tile mcclitive,, to reveal to the authorit\ the 
information nccc,,,, m-y to make such decisions. hecau,, c choosing aniong, equall\ efficient 
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These trouhles are clearly expressed in the ýo-(, ýtlled "Second Best Problem", 
efficiency requires not one, but all markets to be in a state of equilibrium. Yet there 11(' 
aiarantees that achleving efficiency in one market will improve the efficiency of the t7 - 
system as a whole. As Velýjanovski argues, *'In an imperfect world where some Cctors ()I 
the econorny persistently deviate from efficiency, it will no longer be true that fosterlil. (2 
efficiency in other sectors will maximize econornic efficiency. The constraint Ii-nj)()"ed 1.1. % 
deviant sectors of the economy must be taken into consideration and this will requll'c 
immensely corn. plex, if not impossible, calculations to determine the optimal pofic\. "-)o-, 
--ow 
Moreover, finding social welfare gets more complicated if one con,, iders the Z7) Z-, ) II 
passage of time, which is inherent within the functioning of real markets. In a chanc, 1112 L- t. 7 L- - 
setting, individuals constantly reconsider their goals on the basis of new expericiicc,,, this t) Z: ) 
infori-nation, which could enable the identification of a social optimum, is in continuous 
flux and cannot be assessýed obýjectively. It is, nc, -, Iccted under static analysis, \, %hich doc, " 
not consider the effect of time in evaluatin(y aovernrnent intervention. As Boettke an-, Lics, 1 Z7) Lý - 
"In cases ) where discretionary intervention might be desired to correct for perceived 
inarket failures, the problern remains as to how to acquire the requisite knowlccl, -, c to I 
intervene properly. Ignorant or haphazard intervention will simply lead to fUrther b 
destabilization and exacerbate the problem it sought originally to correct". -)(-)3 Thc tý ;n 
solutions InevItablv turns the matter into one of deciding, on the basis oI distribution conccrn. s. 
(Sen, pp. ')0--')7. ) Even if individuals were successfully compelled to disclose their information 
, in(] the necessary ]ump-surn transfers were identifiable and economically feasible, -is,, uc'ý ()I 
political feasibility can be, obviously. extremek important when dealim-T with such fundamental 
imatcr, s a,, the radic. tl changes in ownership". (Sen, p. 3)7). On the question of the polItIcA 
interaction induced by antitrust enforcement, , cc in general F, McChesney and W. Shu,, ý, hm-t 
(eds. ), The Causc, ý and Consequences of-Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective, Tile 
University of Chica, -ýo Press, 
Chicago, 1995. 
VI el, janovski, The New Law-and-Economics, at 2 1. ThP, is what the economic literature CUrrently 
refers to as the "second-best problem". 
2 P. Boettke, Why Perestrolka Failed: The Politics ali-d Eco-noiIncs of Socialist Transformation. 
(London: Routled-e, 1993), p. 92. Antitru,, t iL,, encies have serious limitations in adoptmL, 
efficient measures which correct perceived breakdowns in the system due to the passage of time. I This is a problem %\ hich is not related to antitrust policv exclusively but to conventional pohc\ - 
making in general. As Boettke argues: "The dvimmic,, of change associated with the pas,, iwc ()I 17 
time also present a tinlino Problem for public policy, as Milton Friedman pointed out aI Z11- 
III oIILT t] [lie 
aý-, o. A lonL, and variable la, -, exists between: (I) the need for action and the recognition of this C, - C, 
need. (2) the reco(mition of a problem and the de,, ign and implementation of a polic\ 
1, 
uncertainty which emen,,,, cs is ever-present in the process of ac[ioll and 1-cact'011. ýý ilcich\ 
individuals adopt business decisions, subject to the mistramr., of legal crivir(mmmit,. dmi L- 
Igive c0iisiderable powers of intervention 
to government agencle"'. The re, L111 ()I 1111ý, 
process is that governments cannot adopt efficient regulations because of their 
informational limitations, and individuals cannot predict the conduct of governrneiit,. ý,, mr/ C) 
time. As Cordato observes: "the extent to which the real world resembles a "tLitic (i. e. 
timeless) Pareto OptIMUITI cannot be a meanirigful measure of performance 1k)r acwC 
market processes. " 264 
The implication is that "even if Perfect Competition General EquilibrIL1111 dild 
therefore Pareto optimal market outcomes could be identified for a point in tin-ie (... ) they 
would immediately become obsolete as soon as time is allowed to pass". 265 For thIS 
reason, "the problem of constructing an optimal governmental policy that lntcrvenc, ý L- 
properly without distorting the flow of inforimition is compounded by the pas,,, a, -! e ()f' 
time. For one, relevant economic data is contextual and not abstract. Iiijbi-mat"i0ii 
gathered yesterday may he irrelevant for decisions today because of changing coiichtlow, t, ýn 
The price system overcornes this problem by alerting individuals to these chan'-Ic,, through Z-- I C, 
the adjustment of relative prices. Activity outside the context of the market, howe\, cl-, 
does not have access to such a realster of accommodatina chanaes in intertcmj)()i-, iI Z: ) C, L- 
decisions". 266 
and (3) the implementation of the policy and the effect of the policy. Because of these 
Friedman argued that discretionary public policy will often be destabilizing. For this reason lie 
aroued the case for rules rather than discretionary public policy". More specifically, "the 
of time introduces strategic problems for policy-makers. Policies that seemed appropriate at tl 
may not be deerned appropriate at t2. In fact. a basic presupposition of the arzýlunicjit 1'()I- 
discretion 1,,, exactly that policies accepted t'Or one period jvove to he inappropi-law I'(11 
another, and therefore, policy-makers must possess the ability to shift policy as circurn, ýtan,, C,, 
change. Such ýhifts In public policy (coupled with the impact that thc, ý,, ýhiftý hiivc on t1v 
expectations of economic actors), however. may 1)rovc de,, tabilizim-, to the overall cconomic 
environment". (Bocttke, pp. 92-93. ) 
264 Corciato, weifal-C.., at ý. 
265 cordato, Id. 
266 Boettke, Why Perestrolka Failed 
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V, 
For public policy purposes it is futile to judge reality hv unattainable -Nilr%ana- 
, ýtandards, as Demsetz observes. 267 It is, in fact. a , elf-defeatim, ar(-, unient, ýt,, Calahrcý, i 
points out. To clairn that it is possible to achieve an "opth-nal" state only if w, c liýid acct,,, 
to information thal we cannot possibly have amounts to wishful thinkincy. In hi, ý 
"... the set of Pareto superior changes which would make no one worse off and ýIt lcllý, l 
one person better off must ex ante be a void set. For if strict or fanatical Pareto 1. " tile 
criterion, why Wouldn't any change that belonged in the set have already been i-nade" 
Since, by definition, no one would in any way be hurt by the change, why would amolic 
object? " For this reason he concludes: "... the Pareto criterion is of no general u,, c ýt, a 
normative guide". 268 Calabresi contends that it is arbitrary (and futile) to LUSSUrne that 
reality is located at some point inside the production frontier, as an ', imperfect" statc of 
affairs in relation to that which could be if we possessed unattainable information. 
In conclusion, ascertaining and achieving a social welfare optimum requircý, SLICII a 
high level of information, that it becomes "non-optimal". As Kirzner argued, a situation 
that appears ideal may be far from ideal if it can only be attained at a high cost. -, (-)() For 
267 In his own words. - "The view that now pervades much public policy economics, InIplIcItlv 
presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing 'imperfect' institutional 
arrangement. This Nirvana approach differs considerably from a cornparati\, e hi, ýtitution 
approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangement,, ". 
(H. Demsetz, "Information and Efficiency: Another viewpoint", 12 Journal of Law and 
Economics, [1969], p. 1) Also, see Sowell, pp. 203-205. Twenty years before Dernsetz, filiýck 
had clearly identified the misleading use of neo-clas'sical models of perfect, irriperfcct and 
III onopolistic Competition to draw normative implications. In his words: "The economic prohici-D 
is a problem of making the best use of what resources we have, and not one of what ývc should 
do if the situation were different from what ýiciuallv is. There is no sense in talkln, ý., (4 zi Lisc of 
resources 'as if' a perfect market existed, if this means that the resources would have to he 
different from what they are, or in discussing what somebody with perfect knowledge would do 
if out- task must be to make the best use of the knowled, --, 
e the existing people have. 
[Therefore] the araument in favor of competition does not rest on the conditions that would e\Ji. st 
if it were perfect". (Hayek, "The Meaning of Competition". p. 104. ) Almost thirty vear" 11ticr, lie 
i-cstated this point- "The test [for adequate policy-making] should not be the dcoi-ee of approdch L- Z7 
towards an unachievable result, but should be whether the results of a given policy exceed or 1ýill 
short of the results of other available procedures". (F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and I-1hcri\ 
The Political Order ofa Free PeopLe. p. 67. ) 
los pýjj e G. Calabresi. "The Pointlessile,,., )t -eto: Further-, 100 Th 
0 Ll 1- 11 ýl 1, P. 12 1 
'09 1. Kirzilcr. Competition-, pp. 2')1-2-')4. Tcn cill-licr, Kii-7-ner had ýIIFCLKIý pOIIIICd MW "(.. ý 
it is the mai-kct pioccss that is being"Lidged rather then the tatc of equilibrium the pr()ý: c,,, 
IC. Ikl, r-- I t- 
10\\ al-d After all, In a changing world, ýi ýtate ()I market equilibrium. a.,,, %\c havc , ccii, i" 
hard1v an attainabIc goal. The precise dci-, rcc in which the , tate of market equllibi-ILIIII dC\ldlC,, 
I 'I() 
thp, reason, attempts to find such optimal interpersonal states are irrelevant because therc 
is no point in comparing, reality to some unattainable state, or trying to reach a state 
which can only he attained at such a high cost that the social welfare goal becomc,, non- L- 
optii-nUrn. 
2.2. - The impossibility of defining predictable enforcenient goak undcr 
conwntional regulatoryajýjjraisal. 
In addition to the lack of information held by enforcernent authorities, clim),, in, 2 I 
amongst welfare standards creates a lack of indeterminacy in the rule of It\\- to hc Z-n 
tI ollowed in policy enforcement. 
The conventional regulatory appraisal Of MItItIll, ý4 POIICN, ' ClItMIS a utilitarian mialv, ýi, ý 
aimed at enhancing social welfare by distiniguishing between non-i-nonopollstic and 
monopolistic restrictions on competition. This analysis aims to identify the effects 01 
certain market arrancrements on competition. It is here that the essential problem hegm, ý. 
hecausc this is a determination that cannot be directly appraised. By definition, almo,, t all 
an-angocnients that firms undertake restrict short-term competition, bccau,, c tlicý 
compromisc the independence of action that flrm, ý would othef-\vi, ýc enjoy. 
Antitrust analysis purports to determine whether these arrangernents creatc ýtnv 
"social efficiencies" that could justify them, irrespective of the restrictions they 1110-OCILICC. 
It is necessary, therefore to make a positive deterinination of the "social efficicncy- ()i 
prosecuted arrangements before they can be accepted, otherwise they will be regarded x, 
rnonopolistic" or "unfair". At first sight, this exercise seems easy, for anyone could put 
J'orward his or her own impression of wlietlier a particular arrangernem is "'clTiclent". 
1-10\ý, c%, cr, the real problem lies in reaching a Unanimous conclusion about what -sochi/- 
from the conditions of optiniality is therefore (... ) a dktinctly academic question". (I. Kirzner. 
Mm-kcl Thmj and the Price System, (Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., Inc, 1963)), p. 299. ) Sec 
ýdso R. Law-dors, Economics as a Procc,,,, ý Essýtys_ in the New Intitutional 1,. ý: onoillicll. I -- --- (Cambrid-e- Camhri(ILc University Pre. ss. 1986). p. 41. Cordato arguc,, - "the partiCLIkll' Clld-,, tilte 
pattern of resourcc allocation (is) hypolhcticýd and Irrelevant for real world appral", il" (d 
cfficlencN, '". (Cordato, Welfare.., p. 45. ) 
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efficiency is, in order to provide uniform principles on which to base a rule of LI\\'. 
Unfortunately, it this is not as simple as it appears on the surface. As Bork emphatlcý111\ 
states: "efficiency cannot be studied directly and qUantified". 2170 
"Rule-of-reason'" analysis basically construes market arrangcrnents in thc li, _, ht ol 
those efficiency criteria chosen as "socially optlimil". Antitrust a(Tencies the 
advantages of allowing market co-operation aniong rivals, acy gainst the disadvanta, _, c,, ()I 
i, estrainincy competition. The fundamental question, however, is whether such analy, "il-I can t: ) - 
be stable and predictable, so as to favour the emergence of a predictable "rule of la\v". 
The answer to this question is negative because, once again, due to the subj'Cct1\, C 
preferences of individuals within the market, it is not possible to make an obýjccilve rulc- 
of-reason anaiys1s. Choosing a "social" efficiency criterion as the malrlsta\/ for , uch 
analysis inevitably entails a utilitarian analysis, whereby interpersonal comparisons ol 
utility are arbitrarily made. Clearly, in this appraisal only the decision-maker can actuaik' 
decide what is "efficient" or "Inefficient". In other word.,,, the decislori-maker po".. "C'ýscý, 
Unaccountable discretion in classifying a given arrangement as favouring, "111al-kci Z!, I, 
fill 11.11-CS". Obviously, no rule of law can emerge from this. z: _ 
To scc this question more clearly, it is necessary to find the inner es,.,, -cnce of the 
cýilculation performed by social welfare analysis. In the field of welfare economics, it Is 
wideiv accepted that measuring the efficiency of a policy entails some form of Cost- 
I-)enefit cýilculation which requires interpersonal utility comparisons in order to dcvclop 
ýt, _-_, rearate welfarc standards. 271 On paper, efficiency analysis, (oi- 
foi- that matter. any lI ltý - 
'70 Bork, p 192. However, this author states that: An antitrust the required common denominator 
(Of LltllltV) is provided by the goal or value of consumer welfare. (Because) in a sys1cm \\hich 
I)CHIllt', COrlSLlnlerS to define their own welfare hy their purcha-ses. it follmv,. s. that, a firill", 
efficicncy is shown bý its success. " (Bork, p. 105) Although , ve sympathise with Bork',, \, ic\\ 
Under the imposed by the conventional paradi-ni, his normative analysis does not pooc', " 
SUI)el-101- value compared Nvith that shared anion., those who consider that antitrust should pursuc 
other _ioals. 
In fact. measurim-, efficlenc\1 ()I market arranLcrnent,,, Irom the pobit (ý/ vtcýi ol the 
Iii-in (as Bork contends) docs not neccýsaril\ fit into tIjC IoLliC of the comcritional paradiorný to 17 znl 
\\111cli coll"'Ideratioll" of static equilibrium and ; -illocation of rc, ý()Lircc,, are central, \\, 
hcrct,, the 
I Z, II -IN , cc(, l ( slandim, of the 
firm in attaining it,, objective,, in the most efficient \ýa\ 1,, cleai ., 
I Lll\ ý 
271 Vel'ano\,, ki, 'Fhc New 1-aw-and-Economic,,, p. 
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wher a, -regate welfare standard) provides a Li,, cful measure against which to compm-c ýý Lý Z7 Z-7 
thC LI, C of a policy or a rLde. 
However, this calculation is misleading if we do not acknolwcdoc it,, limitatiow, 
when applied as a measure of market functionino, which is comprised of the interaction ()I 
niany Individuals. As Knight argued: *'There is a con-inion n1P., 11: 0riception that it is possihlc 
to discuss efficiency in purely physical terms. The first principles of physics or 
science teach that this is not true, that the term efficiency involves the idea of valuc, and 
,. ()me measure of value as well. ( ... ) The correct definition of efficiency is the i-atio, not 
between "output" and "Input" but between iisctltl output and total output or input. Hcncc 
efficiency is meaningless without a measure of usefulness or value. In ally attempt to 
understand economic efficiency, the notion of value is more obviously crucial silicc MoSt 
economic problems are concerned with a number of kinds both Of Outlay and of I-etul-n. 
and there is no conceivable way of making comparisons without first reducing all the Z7 Z7 
fýictors to terms of a common measure". 272 It is first necessary to determine 11'170, S'(' 
efficiency before arguing ii, hat efficiency. 41-1) 
It IS Untrue that economic actors value the utility of their goods simultancoudy. 
ionorino the fact that every action is creative and performed in sequen(--c. Their maraliml Lý Z: ) L- 
utilities may not only differ at each stage, but may al.,, o be incomparable. fi-I 1hr,, i-cgm-(1. 
Haiis Mayer observes that whenever "all wants differing in kind or quality al-C 11ot 
reciprocally present to one another, then the postulate of the law of equal marginal Litility Z7) - 
becomes impossible in the real world of the psyque". A forced synchronisation of utilltv 
estimates that "it I,, ýts if one were to express the experience of aesthetic value of hearii-IL, 
a niclody -aii cxl)ci-iciicc determined by succcssl\c k2xperiences ot' indkiidual iiOtc-,, - iii 
tcrms of the aesthetic value of the simultaneous harmonization of all notes of makirl(, 2 LIP 
the i-nelody". 27) GUrIning also shows that it is impossible to derive welfare 'udacniciiis I- 
J Z- 
27 2 F". Knwht, Economic Or(imilzation, (ChicaLo: The Univcrýil\ ot'Chicap) Prcss. 19, ',, ')). p. o. 
273, H. Maver, "The CoLmItIve Value of Functional Theories ()I Price. Critic and Po"itivc 
lmc,, hkgatiowý concerning the Price Problem". in C1, iics in Austrian Economic, "'. A SýimphW, 
in tile Hi,, torv of aTradition. 1. Kirzner(ed. ) (I ondon: William Pickering. 1994). pp. 
142 
based on individual preferences from a model which assumes technical and distributivc 
efficiency. 
Consider the Pareto efficiency standard, later evolved into the Kaldor-Hick,, 
criterion. This test is an ordinal concept of efficiency; it does not reveal any iiltell, "il\ ol 
preference or interpersonal comparability of utilities, In other words, iL does not tell th, 
comparability of different inputs or outputs. 274 It therefore has little value whell 
measuring individual preferences with in the context of society. In this sense, White 
ýirgues that such a view would misleadingly take utility to represent interpersoilaliv 
comparable magnitudes, while the choice-theoretic concept of dinunishing marginal utilltv 
implies no such thing. It would require only that the individual ranks the u. scswn ý1 
personal scale) to which successive units of a good might be put. Marginal utility is the 
agent's preference- ran kin a of the marginal unit, not the magnitude of pleasure affordcd 
by that unit*275 Singham also holds similar concerns, which he relates to the case of 
274 Ironically, not even Pareto himself would have agreed to use his test for normative PUI-POSCS to 
make interpersonal comparisons of value. Pareto was a convinced ordinallst, who believed that 
individuals perceive value differently, as their hierarch), of personal preference,, ohvioUSIý 
differs; and who regarded the utilitarian concept of introspective utility as unscientific. Sec. V. 
Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, Macmillan, (London, [1910] 1971). p. 113. Deterillinim-, 
an ideal state of affairs -following social welfare measures represents an imposmble t; i4. 
Furthermore, while it provides a ranking of allocations of economic goods between indiVICILIal". 
the Pareto test does not permit a ranking of all such allocations. There are many different 
allocations that are Pareto-optimal and which differ with respect to the distribution ol 1-Cal 
incorne (i. e. utility) among the individuals in society. Therefore, it becomes impossible for the 
would-be interventionist (antitrust) agency to determine the most adequate allocation 
considering the distribution of income. (Lockwood, p. 811. ) For an extended critique of the use 
of efficiency as normative yardstick, see M. Rizzo, "The Mirage of Efficiency", 8 Hoftra L, m 
Review [ 19801, pp. 041-658; and A Rizzo, "Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Ne-l I Lellcc 'Ind 
Strict Liability in Tort", 9 Journal of Legal Studies, [ 1980], pp, 291-3 18. In these articleý,. Rizzo 
clearly shows the theoretical contradictions of those who attempt to use economic efficiencv is zi 
normative yardstick against which to measure the operation of the law. 
275 L. White, "Is There an Economics of Interpersonal Compari sons? ", Advances of A- Ll 
Economics, vol. 2, part A, [1995]: 138-140,144,146. Lionel Robbins was the fir, ýi choLii to 
criticise such a comparison on normative -rounds: "The theory of exchange does not aounic 
that, at any point, it is necessary to compare the satisfaction which I get from the spending 6d. 
on bread with the satisfaction which the baker gets by receiving it. That comparison i,,, a 
comparison of an entirely different nature ... 
It involves an element of conventional \ýihwnn 
Hence it is essentially normative". See L. Robbins, An Essay oil the Nature and Signiihcaný: C ol 
Economic Science. (New York: New York University Presý,. 1935). pp. 138-139. In a contrýlrv 
opinion, Sen observes that "for reasons not altogether clear, interpersonal utility coniparkow, 
were then regarded &ý being themselve-, ý 'normative' or 'ethical' The POPUlal-ltý' Of that ViCkv i 
perhaps traceable to the powerful endorsement ()I that position hý Lionel Robbin,, ". (Sen. 1). 
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developing countries. In his view, there are shortcomings in assu i-i -in he :D nung net welfare c. 
measured in constant dollars: "Clearly, there are maýjor social implications of this. and onc 
can easily envisage a series of facts where the loss of one dollar by a consunier 1, 
considered of greater effect than the gain of one dollar by a monopollst. "270 \/el1ano\'sk1 
contends tHat the evolved Kaldor-Hick,,, criterion allw, ý', for , LCll 
comparisons of utility. 277 However, this is a mere delusion. since it confuses the position 
of individuals whose utilities are compared, with those of whoever undertake the 
Indeed, it is not only that social welfare, as generally understood under the b 
economic efficiency standard of Pareto optimality (or Kaldor-Hicks), expresses a 111CLIsUl-C 
of value that does not necessarily correspond with the sense of social welfare shm-ed in 
society. 278 It is, more importantly, that any social vreU('ire standard, as undei-stood h-, 
conventional regulatory appraisal, has to be interpreted in Such a way that disi-egal-cls Hic 
individuality of those to whom the standard ultimately applies. As Rawls contends. the 
utilitarian social cost-benefit calculation depends upon the decisions of an impartial 
spectator who is conceived to carry out the organisation of the desires of all persons into 
one coherent system of desire; it is a construction that fuses many persons into onc. 271) 
Foi- this reason Kirzner concludes: "The notorious (and inevitable) failure of modern 
welfare economics to overcome the problems raised in interpersonal comparisons of' 
utility has, quite simply, invalidated all atternpts to evaluate the market in tci-i-n,, ()I' 
resource-al location norms". 280 One could qualify this staternent by stating that cvvii 
though the conventional normative analysis, which differentiates between "facts" and 
'76 Sinahani, at '170. C- 
`77 Vel. lanovski, The New Law-and-Economics, p. 20. 
278 As Singham observes: "It is ustified to say that allocative efficiency concepts 1111.1'ýt MCIMIC 
everything to which people assign a value. Thi,, could include those items that traditionalk ha\e 
been perceived to be non-economic goals, mch as increasing opportunitlcs tor small 
or a public policy objective of the diffusion of power gcnerally " (Singharn at 37 1. ) 
279 For this reason, RavvIs concludes that utilital, ial, "doe,, not take Sel-iOLVýIV OIC kh"tillcli 011 
between persons. - Sec. Rawls. p. 27. 
'180 Kirmer, Competition 
.... p. 
2 15. 
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66values", is widely accepted in economic science, it is bound to clash %\ ith 
culture. 28 I 
Even though it appears irreconcilable with the requirements of a legal sý sicni 
on the respect of individual rights, the fact that the aggregate ut'l I ty has no LIS CIII 
i-neasurinc, the well being of individuals would in itself pose no problems in ri-tea"L11-111L, tý bI 
social performance if we assume that each individual',,, preference soryiellow account" lor 
society. However, aggregate welfare standards possess further problems which niAc 
them incompatible with the predictability required by the rule of law. Thus, these social 
welfare criteýia lack the objectivity required for consistent application, a condition that iý" 
implicit in the notion of the rule of law. 
For this reason, determining an ideal state of affairs based on social welfitiv 
measures represents an impossible task. While A provides (on paper) a rankill- of the 
allocations of econornic goods between individuals, no standard of social efficlenc\ 
conceived in interpersonal terms, whether Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks or any other permits ý1 
predictable ranking of these allocations. In other words, there are many different 
allocations which differ from the distribution of real income (i. e. Litility) ammIL-1 
individuals in society. It therefore becomes impossible for the would-be interventionisi 
(antitrust) acency to determine the most adequate allocation based on a given distrihLition 
of incorne. 282 Even under economic efficiency standards, the selection would rccluirc, in 
additional criterion which is not offered by the standard itself, but by considerations of 
equity. It thus becomes obvious from a practical standpoint that it is impossible to derive 
welfare judgements in a complex market economy based on individual preferences. Some 
arbitrary criterion has to be introduced. The implications of this analysis arc t1lat it IS 
impossible to preserve the integrity of individual rights, as they will no longer dictate 
social preferences. 283 Yet, as Calabresi observes, -many persist in using the Parcto 
criterion as it crutch, as if its fundamental emptiness did not matter". 284 
281 See Katz, "Positivism ... 
" 
B. Lockwood, The New Palgrave in Econonucs. A D, ctionarý ol EconoIllics ol. 282 
M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds. ), (London: Wcmillan Prcs,, Ltd., 1987), p. X'I 1. 
tý .11 
2 83 P. Gunning, INTERNET www. uchu1c. edu t%\ /-! _, unn, n,, 
/pat/,, ub*cct'/%\ orkpape/an, %vclf -lit nim. 
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0 
In conclusion, the interpersonal essence of economic efficiency make,, oh. jccti\c 
appraisal impossible. Economic theory alone cannot provide an objective view of what il-I 
in fact a value concept, dependent on the normative preferences (i. e. cost-benefli) of thc 
observer. 285 The authority has no guidance for selecting a single Solution: 111'ý[C'Id, 11C Cý Z7 
must necessarily add his own preferences into the calculation. Obviously, this \vIII prevcIll 
the emergence of a rule of law, because policy decisions will ultimately follow the criteria 
laid down by whoever is in charge of the enforcement authority. 
For these reasons, the attempts by antitrust authorities to use standards of efficiei-icy 
t. or making interpersonal comparlsons of welfare amongst 1nd'vIduals are improper. Tile 
standards were not intended to lead to such utilitarian calculations in the first placc. The 
lit-nitations of making interpersonal comparisons of utility are clearly visible III the 
difficulties discovered in the cost-benefit legal analysis that antitrust policy-makcs to 
develop stable legal rLiles. 
2.3. - Consequences of the impossibility for antiqqs, ýAicy to implement predictah1c 
welfare goals vis4-vis the rule of law. 
Epstein shows how difficult it is to construct ýi normative systern that ha,, c,, 
criteria for judgment exclusively on an aggregýitc me; rsure of social satisfactiori, wlici 1wr tý b Z-- 1ý1 
stated in the form of utility, welfare or wealth. He specifically points to the difficult\' ol' 
reconciling antitrust postulates with the notions of property rights and corrective 
justice. 286 
p. 7. 
2X4 Calabres], 12N. 
285 Sen ai, (-Yues that the calculation based on interpersonal comparisons of utility is not normative or 
ethical. Instead, he clairns, it was part of Lionel Robbins's reasonjnL, that estahli., died the 
negative proposition that interpersonal conipari, ý()ns cannot be made 'scientificall) '. (ýcn. 1). 10 
footnote). Even accepting Sen's contention, the conclusion is altogether the same: the I'LlIC-01- 
reason calculation cannot be made in an obJective \\ci\,. and it theretorc oblk-, e,, the cifforcciiien! 
a-encv to make an arbitrarv decision. 
2so See in general, Epstein, Private PropDit-y... C- 
I -t6 
The ultimate reason for this inconsistency stems from the ImpossibliltY 01 
reconciling the utilitarian essence of conventional regulatory appraisal, (and In parti 
of antitrust policy) with the standards of predictability required under a system based on 
the rule of law. The raison d' etre of such reclUlation --to achieve a preconcei - ')rIII L_ INM 1, ( 
"well-being", "social happiness" or the like-- is merely an incidental by-product (A 
consequentialism. Its success is judged by its capacity to achieve the chosen forni ol' 
"social good". 287 Under this perspective the Inte'Ji-ItV Of PI-Opelly 1-1011ts and Jusilcc lClkl" Zýý ý Z7) 
to superior goals defined by the law-giver under a social welfare forrnula, which III thc 
case of antitrust policy are most often (albeit not exclusively) embodied in the , -Liperlol, 
Pareto formula of "economic efficiency". 
There is a fundamental incompatibility between the rule of law and com, cimoiial 
regulatory appraisal, arising from the impossibility of developing stable and predictthle 
legal rules from policy enforcement. Regardless as to whether it follows a prior ruling 
each policy decision is adopted on the basis of its presumed results. Because of this, the 
authority has to determine whether the results of a given policy initiative meet the chosen 
standard. However, the information held by the authority when making choices between 
alternative paths of enforcement is insufficient to allow him a picture of the ecollomic 
causalities involved. Again, the subjective nature of such information will prevent (lic 
authority frorn gaining full knowledge of the underlying causalitie,; which integrate the b L- L- - 
functioning of the markets he wants to regulate. In short, the authority will be unable to tý b 
l'orecast what the results from intervention will be. 288 
Judging the Success of a policy on the hasP, of its capacity to achieve its 
creates problems because. as Rizzo reminds us. "a utilitarian or balancing franiework II It, 
I 
287 Rizzo argues that the more goal-oriented legislation is, the more likely it is to be based on co,, t- 
benefit considerationsl whereas the more abstract a legal order is. the more heavily it depend,, on L_ 
oeneral rules. (Rizzo, "Rules", pp. 866-867,871-874. ) 
C- -, 
xeci EcO110111N. ard a theory cmionim, 288 See in general, S. Ikeda, Dynamics of the M) 
(New York: Routledae, 1997). 
It, 
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would require u,, to ti-ace the full effect,,, ol' each (tentative) 
, judicial 
decl,,, Ioii, and then 
CýALWtC it against the particular utilitarian stancLird ; i(l(-)ptccl'*. which pLicc', an Linho; ii-J-flc 
hurden of information on the shoulders of whocvcr i-nu,, t decide the ', LICCCY, Of 
policy. 2X') 
01' course, the belief that cost-bellefit Utilitarian calculation., ) are po,, sible r, ý ýt! i 
indiii-cct result of the pretence of perfect kno\\ IcLI-, -, c that co ve ti I-CI-ILILItOI-V 
vcsts upon the observer of the social system. The observcr is assumed to have becn -, i\cn 
the necessary information from individuals and their transactions to kno\v hoýý fal- ()I- IICý11 
they are fi-om the "optimum" (i. e. equilibrium) and therefore, what steps are ncccs.,, ýiry to 
achieve such an "efficient" social state. Social cost-benefit welfare calculations trc 
possible as soon as it is reallsed. that Inclividuak are considered to hold equal prefercnccý, 
and tastes. 
Obviously, this logic clashes with the subýjectivc nature of market expccuit Z: ) 
How can the successful intervention by antitrust authorities make prices equal to imir, -, inal 
costs (i. e. the ultimate -oal of antitrust policy), while we havc to ackno"'led-C that thc Z71 -- 
costs which individuals face in their transactions are entireiv dependent on the valuc ol 
the parties taking part in the transaction rather than third parties. 
The inherent limitation of the welfare endeavours ot' antitrust aLýcncie,, tiici-cl'()i-c, i,, 
that they assume an impossible condition for fi-aming public policy-. namely, that the t-I 
information necessary for the authority to intervene efficiently will ý, omehow be readik, 
aNiailable. This is precisely the problem that has to be solved; it is thUs not po.,,, ýIblc to 
&, SLI111C that a central agency has the information necessary to co-ordinate from ahove the f 
ýictivitles of everyone in society from above. In complex social orders, such inforniation iiý, 
not oivcn to anyone in it,, entirety. I- 
'189 NI. Ri/zo, "RLilc,, \cl-su,, Cost-Benefit Analv,, i,, in the Common La\C. 4 The Cato Jmirnal 
119851, p. 873. 
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No uniform legal standard embodying "acceptable" conducts can develop out of I 
social cost-benefit calculations, because by their very nature, the objective,, in SLich 
utilitarian calculation are to consider the effect of the measure in the particular context 
where parties interact. In other words, each case will follow an "ad-hoc" standard of 
welfare created by the enforcement authority. Hence the trade-off is inevitably linked to 
particular conditions and features of the prosecuted case, which can hardly be reproduced 
in future cases, as demanded by the rule of precedent. 
There is no way in which a rule can develop which constrains decisional actl\"t\' to 
objective parameters: it will always depend on the particular "measure" used by tile 
decision maker to weigh the utilities of individuals. The diminished position ()I' 
individuals whose utility is decided by another is irrelevant in this matter. Any Utilital-KIII 
assessment rendered in a particular case will inevitably constitute the noi-matIVc 
imposition of whoever enforces the criterion. Whether "social welfare" has been achic\, cd 
will depend on the personal opinion of whoever interprets the rule. 
For example, under a rule-of-reason analysis, a corporate form may be either 
condemned or authorised depending on the facts surroundingy its functioning in the t: l r-- 
inarket. From this point of view, no two cascs are similar and one can hardly cxl)cct the 
presence of any pattern that could lead to the development of legal standards. Z) 
THE INADEQUACY OF CONVENTIONAL LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR PREVENTING THF 
EROSION OF tHE RULE OF LAW UNDER ANTITRUST PROCEEDINGS. 
The combined effects of the misleading conventional appraisal of market intcractioll b 
and the impossibility of defining social welfare obýjectively provide antitrust authoritie'N 
with unlimited scope for discretion in the cases brought before them. Obviously, Under 
such circumstances, it is impossible to define a stable and predictable administrative 
decision-making process, and this leads to the erosion of the rule of law. Antitrwýt 
scholars and policy-makers are aware of the erosive effects on the rule of law caused hy 
unaccountable discretion which results from deciding social welfare matters from a Z71 
conventional paradiorn of regulation. For this reason. they ha%-c atteniptcd Vc-11-10W, 
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initiatives aimed at circumscribing the ran, -, c of optlow, that antitrust authorlitle" Call 
choosc from in their decision-making. 
I 
In this section we explore how formal legal positivism is unsuitable for prm idinc 
the tools of le, -, al interpretation that could other"lisc conti-ol the di, ý, cretlon ol- the 
regulatory authorities, and thwart the ei-(),, Ive effect of principle,, sustalncd h\ dic 
conventional paradigm on the rule of law. t) 
The lack of referential normative values against which instrumental replation couiýi Cý L- 
be contrasted made scholars prone to rely on the wording of these rules in order to 
control any possible unwarranted discretion on the side of the enfoicciiient. authoiia\. 
Great care was therefore exercised in drafting these rules, so that the condUCt Of the 
enforcement authority was subjected to "predictable boundaries". Le0al po,, itivi,, ni I-- 
induced scholars to believe that the certainty of legal rules meant they could he L- 
appropriately worded in order to incorporate social orders dictated by the ruler. Legal 
sub jects only had to check the text of the codes, StatUtcs, decrees and other "official" 
statements to ascertain the extent of their obligations. t7l 
In this sense, the instrumental view of legal rules is responsible for obSCL11-1111-1 thc 
sense of certainty in the law, by confusing it with detail. Epstein claims that such a vicw 
is a misleading appraisal of the nature and function of a legal "'y. "tem. In his word,,: 
"[LJiidei- the instrumental appraisal] the legal systen-i must specify in , -, i-eat detall the 
I)j-(,, cise courscs of action that individuals are then bound to follow. In effect, the , y.,, tcni 
iiiakes most of the rna'or decisions about the allocation of resourcc,, through its ccntral. 
public agencies and allows individuals the right to make adjustments in their own cxscs 
only at the margins. Such is. for example. the \N: ay a system of rigid ýý'age aiid price t7) In L- 
controls must in pi-incipic work. The systern . cts the terms on which exchanuc can takc 
1)1, t(: c-. individual,, can at most opt out of thc RuIc,, with such , pcc'! -"*t, V . 11"' 
COLli,,, c difficult to formulatc and enfol-cc. Yct cvcn if thcc difficLiltic,., arc '-, Lll*lll()LIl`ltCd. It 
J-ejjjý, - - thýjt w-tilin this regime the ruics ýts PrOlIlLilgrated havc a vcry ýIlort Lvýctlll ill, s c1c, 11 IIIt, 
1-7)() 
life, because the legal systems must take quickiv IWO L )LIJIt CX )II 
'IC CIk 
SLIpply and demand in setting out their schedulc, ý for production ýind ewhanL'e- b- 
It would be impossible for the legitimate authority to gather all the int'ormatioll Z: ) 
required for drafting legal rules in such a way as to adapt them to unfoi-c"ccll bb 
circumstances, which would be a condition for achieving, social efficiency in a wol-ld ol' 
changing individual preferences. 
Similarly, detailed legal rules would not necessarily enable individuals to ()htain (,. I 
precise sense of their social duties. Howard noted the failed endeavours of rezg)-ulator, ý 1() 
develop detailed rules which could make the law "clear": "To most experts, the highest 
art of American lawmaking is precision. Only with precision can law achieve a scientific 
certainty. By the crafting of words, lawmakers Nvill anticipate every situation, evcry 
exception. With obligations set forth preciscly, cvcryonc will knoý\ xhcrc ; kaiic!. 
Truth emerges in the crucible of the democratic process, and legal experts usc tlicir IoLic ZID - 
to transform it into a detailed guide for action. The greater the specificity, the nl()I-c 
certain we are that we are providing a government of laws, not men. ( ... ) Making law 
detailed, the. theory goes permits it to act as a clear guide. People will know exactly what 
is required". He continues: "But modern law is unknowable. It is too detailed. ( ... ) The 
drive for certainty has destroyed, not enhanced, law's ability to act as a guide. All you 
have to do is pick up any volume of the Code of Federal Regulations to confirin [lie truth 
( ... ) that regulation has become so elaborate and technicai that it is hevoild tile 
understanding of all but a handful of Mandarins". 291 
The kind of certainty required in market transactions is not related to the fact that 
legal rules occurs in written form through codes and statutes. Market certainty depend.,, 
oii the extent to which individuals perceive their ýirr: ingernent', to be binding. iii thc 
that they effeCtiVely Uphold their legitimate expcoation,, -, vis-cl-vis other indlViCILIý11', ill IIIC 
290 R. Epstein. "The Static Conception of the Common Law. - 9 J01-11-11al of Legal Studies I 
254. ' 
291 P. Howard, The Death of Common Sense. (New York: Warner Book, ý. 1994). p. 30. 
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market. 292 These are expectations built upon social consent*, therefore, thev entall 
abstract principles which are-sometimes impossible to express in a written formula. III 
other words, they are expectations which comprise will of the many, and which 1-nay or 
may not coincide with that of the formal authority. 
Consequently, stability in time and the adaptation of the rule of law to wiforese%. - ii 
circumstances both arise from the involvement of more individuals in the law-makiný! 
process. This is a question that Leoni observes: "The certainty of the law, in the scil"c of' 
a written for. mula, refers to a state of affairs inevitably conditioned by the possibility ftll 
the present law may be replaced at any moment by a subsequent law. The more Intensc 
and accelerated the process of law-making, the more uncertain the duration of present 
legislation. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent a law, certain in the above-mcntionc(l 
292 The particular meaning attached to the certaintY of the Itm, explains, to a great extent, the 
diverging perception of public law in Civil Law systerns in Continental Europe, compared with 
Common Law countries (particularly, the United States and Great Britain) with regard to the 
powers of government intervention. Cohen TanucTi contrasis the emergence of' rqull t, ý -itoi-y 
a-encies in Common Law countries, which are the outcome of negotiations to LIvc i speci,, d 
status to specýfic interests in society, such as consumers (the case of antitrust), ethnic minorities. 
environmentalists, and so on; with the development that occurred in France (and other Civil 
Law countries) where intervention has been rnade through the ambiguous and generallsed 
concepts of iiitere-, ^t X, ý-njral or the seni . ce public. He writes: "Aux Etats-Unis ... les diver,, 
int&ýts affect6s par telle ou telle politique d'une agence administratif ont acquis le droit dc 
participer A ia formulation de cette politique par des proc6dures contradictoires formallsees. et de 
s'assu'rer un contr6le judiciaire sur 1'6qullhi-e r6alis6 entre les lnt&ýts concurrent, ý pýir 
I'Administration". By constrast, in France: "Le concept central et foridateur du droil 
administratif francals, comme de la rh6torique politique, est celui de I' int6r6t g6n6ral. Cest lui 
que sous-tend et l6gitime les notions de puissance publique et de service public, critýres ayant 
historiquement servi A d6terminer, A leur tour, la comp6tence du Juge administrant' et 
I'applicabilit6 du droit administratif. C'est parce que ]a puissance publique et le service I)Llhl]C 
repr6sentent et d6fendent l'int6r&t d6n6ral qu'lls soivent b6n6ficier du statut exorbitant qLIC ICUI_ 
conf6re le r6gime administratif. On retrouve ici, ý un autre niveaLi et au profit de 1'executifccac 
fois, la th6orie que fonde la souverainet6 de la loi, comme expression de la ', "olont6 u6n6rale". (L. 
Cohen-Tanugi, Le droit sans I'Etat: Sur la d6mocratie en France et en Am6riqu (Pari,, - PLJF'. 
1985). pp. I 10- 1 11 ). The fact that writteit certainh- pervades Civil Law systems, such a,., lhoc of 
Latin America, whereas certaint ,v 
as exI)ectancy dorninates in Common Law countries may ý\ c1l 
explain, frorn a legal perspective, why judicial activity in the former appears to be based on the 
abstract principle,, of a legislated constitution, Mierea,, in England judicial decrsion-, ý aic at ihe 
fi undat'on ()I' the English constitution. Th',, entails t\,., () diffel - le\ck of ccrtall"ItV ven, oI L_ III -in., 
whereas all the guarantees that Continental Constitutions afford to citizew, relate to 1he 
suspension or withdra\val of their rights by some power that is above the ordinary km ot thc L_ - land, in England such a possibility is excluded on principle. See F. A. Hayek. The Consti-tutiml 
of Libert (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960). Chapter XVIII. Z__ It:, 
15 
,, en,, e. from being, unpredictably changed hy another law no lcs,, ý -CCI-taill, thall 1110 
previOLIS one 11 . 293 
These considerations allow us to understand why mechanisms comcntjoimllý 
devised for preserving the rule of law in antitrust policy have not ,I HIL, L- , Licceeded in I'Lilfill' 
their purposes. These tools endeavour to restrict the conduct of antitrust ýWtIIOI-ItIC. ý', 
hV 
placing careful limits on their procedural activitic,,,. yet the\, are unable to control 11-ic I- 
interprctations given to economic causalitics \vhich, as \vc havc -, ccm mv foLmdcd mi ihc 
false premise of objectivisým- 
For example, in the United State,,,. the Federal Trade Cornimssion and the 
Department of Justice fi-equently issue "e-c_yeneral ýpiidellnc,,, - on specific aspects of thc 
policy. 294 Allegedly, these guidelines provide business with "guidance" concerning 
antitrust enforcement and procedures, 295 and give some guidance on how authorities 
could decide in the presence of "certain commonly occurring issues affecting [their] mxn 
enforcement decisions". 296 Similarly, the EU CoiTUTUssion DG IV has issued scvcl-ýIj 
"Comfort Letters" and "Short-form Exemptions" for particular individuals. 297 A similar 
practice has sprung up in several Latin American antitrust agencies, most notably Mexico 
and Venezuela, which Issue "opinions" on the legal position of particular firms in 1-Clation 
to antitrust provisions. 298 Other initiatives are more formal and involve law-makim-, I 
193 Leon], p. 80. 
294 All example of this is the "Antitrust Enforcement Guldelliics for Intermitional Oj)cl-atl()Ils,, ()f 
Api-11,1995 ýmd the "Horizontal Meroer Guldelmc, ý- of April 1992 an(] revised in April 1997. 
issued by the Antitrust Division of the U. S. Department ()[Justice and the U. S. Fecleil-d Twdc 
295 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines International Operations, Ant, trust Division, 
Department ot'Justice, Washington, D('. 1997.1. 
No Id. 
297 Korah, p. 277. 
U. Curiel, Elenlento, para la aplicaci6n cle polfticil, dc competencia en econoinfas cii 
La F\periencia cii Venezuela. Paper Iii-c.,, ciited at the meetim-, "Polftica,,, cle Competencia cii 
Amcrica Latina ý el Caribe", Superintendenclid Pro-Competencla-UNCTAD, Caraca". 23,11 
Oclober 199ý. 
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processes. An example can be found in the Europcan Comnjlsý, Ioll 1-c,, LIIýItIk)IIs oll 'A'OLIJ) 
Exemptions, which many Latin American COLIIIUIC., ý, 11-c introducino in Lheii* k)ýý I 
schemes. Due to the structure of antitrust legislation into Civil La%v jurisdicti I11jiiio ns. m o,, t 
agreements entered into by entrepreneurs are subject to a formal prohibition, which 
requires express lifting before the arrangement can be eXeCUted. Group Excnil)now- 
prevent unnecessary delays in the process of cvaluation, since they ý1110ý% rin"I" I 
i-nechanism for determinino with some certainty whethcr theh- undertakim-,, " ýý()Lild 
Linder the rule. Presumably, that should give thern legal certainty regarding their 
under antitrust legislation. 
However, these initiatives have lirrated effects because they either restrict flicir 
effects to the particular circumstances of the requests before them, or they beconic tot) 
vague if applied to largcr groups of individual.,,, or they simply do not cntail a rcal bindinL, t7ý I 
commiti-nent for the deciding authority, which reniains fi-ce to chmigc the -p-cuMcni" 
created. 
For example, Comfort Letters or legal opinions" are not legally binding on the Z7) Z: ) 
enforcement agency, and therefore provide little shelter for the parties if a prosecution Is 
initiated. As Korah argues, "Comfort letters stating that competition is not rcstrictc(l b Z: ) 
owing, to the parties' small market may be of little use a few years later when their Z: ) 
liusiness has been succeSSfUl". 299 In some countries. clear limitations are inilio,, ccl oll 
authority of administrative bodies to give advance ruling,, or opinions on pro., -. j)ccti\c Z: ) 
cases. Although the purpose of this limitation is to avoid leaviner out any potenmil pi-t\ t7l L- 
to the procedure without the possibility of defending their rights, this constraint 
represents a serious limitation on the assurances that antitrust auencies can aivc h) 
bL1, S111eS, SCS that they ývill not be prosecuted. 
Furthermorc, systems such as the European Group Exemptions, which I-)ccii 
adopted in some Latin American jurisdictions. contain serious flaws, which in lact -, ct I 
reprodUced. The Group Exemptions are intended to function &, guidelines 1'()i 
299 Scc Korah, p. 277. 
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arrangernents entered into by firms, classifying them into "black", "white" and -Lrcv- lil-It" 
to indicate their degree of "restriction". Generally, distincti ising each Ii t7) I ions catecrori i 1, ý, t are ýn - 
hased oii the temporal span of the arrangernent com, cried: the longer the re,, trictioii L- Z7 
ii-nposed, the more difficult it is to qualify as "whitc". 
However, in practice it is very diffiCUlt to reconcile the workings of the "Group 
Exemptions regime" with the certainty required by businesses in their ccononlic 
ti-, insactions. How can ýi business find out whi III ich "I'st" their particular undertakinl(-, i 
How long should a restriction last to qualify as exempt'. ' What share of the market "11OUld 
i-ei-nain within the threshold of legality? How many outlets should the restriction 111ýikc 
inadmissible? What efficiencies should the agreement provide'. ' How can these be I)i-()\ cd'. ' 
As Korah firm-ly contends, "these formalistic categorics have nothing to do with t-- L- 
competition policy. "300. These are only few of the questions arising fi-om the omissions of L- 
the Group Exemptions. 
Finally, issuing guidelines provides no significant assurance ahout the commitment 11 
Z7) 17, 
of the authority in deciding cases in a manncr consistent \vith prioi- deci,,, ion, ý,. Cowidici- 
the carefully balanced words used by the tT. S. Antjtru, ýt Enforcernent Guldelinc,, for 
International Operations- "Several caveats apply to use of the guidelincs. First. the, ýc 
Guidelines arc not intended to be a restatcnient ol- the la%\ it ha.,, ii, 
courts. "301 Later. in a footnote, it is made even clearer that, "The (U. S. Departnicrit of 
JLIStice) rnay undertake a more extensive market power analysis under the ruic ()f' i-c; r,, (m 
I'Or enforcement purposes than some courts would require in litigation. ")(c In plain terni". 
these guidelines do not ensure that decisions taken will follow anv settled criteria. 
300 Korah. 278. In addition, these initiatives generalk, clash with the ordinary intervelit lot, 
Civil Law systems through the principle,, of Administrative Law. Under these prMcIpI(-,. 
authorismLT a pm-ticular business conduct P, reLýarded ; t,, an act with , pecial effect,. In the IC! 1ý0 
sphere, for the heneficKiry of the authorisation. In other words. IhCN are. hy defillition, indivld[1ý11 
aulhorlsadonsý tile ICL'ýI] systems do not contempkile , Lich ýt,, "Glohal" c\cmptiOii,. \ý Iiich 
L,, () wmnst the need for ccriainty demanded h\ the Simllrc( ht. 
, t' )i ccment Gu II cle Ij nes p. I 
I d. 
-1 
]'ý5 
The basic rcason for the lack of effective control over administrative disci-ction i, 
found in the formal legal CLIlture pervading the draftinL, and interpretation of the,, (, 1c, -,. ii 
rules. The interpretation placed on them makes any endeavour to define le, -, ýil ruicý, 
difficult due to their formalistic, rigid and contrived appraisal of markets, which are ahovc 
all an evolving social phenomena. Korah has noticed this in the work of the Eur()pean 
Commission: Ansteacl of drawing its reaukitions in broad economic term,,. Ihe 
Commission has drafted them in legalistic detail. "303 There is no question ftit thc 
ultimate cause for such excessive formalism and the lack of effective judicial i-c\ icw can 
he found in the legal culture of conventional regulation, whose intellectual roots are 
cyrounded in the ideolo-y of positivism. The problem with these initiatives is that the\, 
place their e4ectiveness in the written nature of their instruments, a condition that doe,., 
not by any means ensure their flexible interpretation by the authorities as circumstances 
chanoe. L- 
These problems could be avoided if the authority were subject to some sort ol' 
political accountability which compensated for the lack of Judicial control. The rule of km 
would still be preserved if market participants knew in advance what policy goals are. or 
ii-iore precisely, who the beneficiaries of the policy would be Linder each particular set of 
circumstances. However, this is impossible in antitrust proceedings, because the iiature of 
L- I1 1011 clecisions made in these instances relate to changing "policy" goals, whose 
definiti 
ciepends on the personal normative preferences of the decision-maker in the last rc, ýort. 
As we have seen, these preferences are already built into the i-rUnd of the deciswii-makci 
ýis ýi coi-iscqucricc of the n-iisleading closed-cnd picture that i-ico-clas-.,, ictI ccoriomic 
com, cy, s, of rnarkets. Only by challenging this contrived pictui-c will it be po,,,, Ible io 
cluestiori positive theory, normative appraisal and the implications of antitrust 
enforcement for bLISIFICSS conduct. 
In the end, all the conditions will be in place to erode the basic formulation of tllc 
rule of law because the antitrust authority \vIII have incentlVes to impose Its own standard 
. )03 Korah, 1). 277. 
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of , ()clal welfare iriterpretation, thus framing legal FUICS accordinL, to its will, jj()j tlic \\ill L- - 
of the Law. 
By contrast, in a ,,, vstem where the iII L- -ule of 
la%N,, effectively prevails. legal pro, --edurcý 
would focus on "finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the 1ýlw of the laild 
to the facts ,o found. including where required a ruling UpOi-i any disputed cjLic,,, tioii )I- 
law". Rulings are imposed following the rationale of the Law, not men: non sub holnine 
scdsub Icgc. In its absencc, cases turn into "a qUaSI-judicial Situation where SUCII j)F()CCY, 
is replaced by 'adnilrilstrative action', which niight irivok,,, - 'consideration,,, ol' public 
policy' ()i- 'discretion". 304 
In practice, such discretion may easily deg-ci-icrate into arbitrary decisions, a,, Pouii(i I 
iioted insightfully: "[there is a] tendency IS to SCI Lip and give effect to policies hcvotid the t-- -- I- 
overninc, the action of the adminktrative ýtocncy [becauscl it is vcry to , tatutes (, -, b 
diat the public interest dernands or justifies activity beyond or in contravcnt loll of the 
stýitutc and to cover this up by a general pronouncement upon the cxsC.. 'Mý III&M. 
under these proceedings, there is always the temptation -to identify in advanco: one sldc 
of a controversy with the public interest and to find the facts accordingly. This tendency 
is the more likely when the administrative agency combines undifferentiated invc,, -, ti(-, atin(-,, 
proseCUtIng and ad judicative functions. Under such a combination of functions it I,., II L 
cýisy to realize that the policy is to be applied in determining the legal effect of the [ýicts 
under the statute, not to determining the facts-. 3)()6 
In this case, there is no way a firm or firms investigated could escape with flicir 4: ) 
1)roperty rights intact, as it would not be possible for them to demonstrate their 
Innocence 11 on the basis of a social efficiency analysis, becaLISe Of tile way the 
)04 kep®rt of the Committee on Ministers, CIII(I. 4()(-)() ( 193)2). pp. 73.74.8 1) (quoted h\ 
Stevew, and Yzinicv. pp. '14-25, footnote 6. ) 
R. Pound, "Administrative Procedure Legislation (For the Mi"01-itY Report)". -'(-) Amei 1ý- Im- 
1,, ii 
Vv, oclation Journal, f 194 1 ], p. 667. 
1 )06 
I ':, 
operates. 307 This means that antitrust agencies are, in the words of Stevens and Yaniev. 
"required to act without certainty and on the balance of probabi II ties". 308 
4. - THE LIULY EFFECTS OF THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY OF LATfN AMERICA'. S 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. 
In this section we will explore the economic effects of the erosion of the rule of Liw 
on the behaviour of market agents in the light of the Latin American experience. Wc \\. -]I 
also analyse the problems faced by the poll III HILI in the region when creat, - 
the appropriate conditions fo r the promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship. Oui- 
analysis centres on the informational disadvantages of enforcing antitrust policy in weak 
institutional settings, such as Latin American countries. 
There are clear informational disadvantages in enforcing antitrust policy. ýis 
unaccountable government intervention enhances the uncertaInty of indIvIduals abOLII 
their entitlements, and about their capacity to trade within the market. 
Political institutions in Latin America suffer from a chronic lack of accountability. 
This creates the right conditions for the creation of legal monopolies and privileges to t-) 
protect the "lecalised" rent-seeking behaviour of those groups or individuals NA, hopo, ý,, 4: ) t) 
stronger lobbying capacity. 309 
Ir 
307 As Pound noted in his The Minot-ity Repoa, there are clear losses which \ý()uld not occot 11' a 
rule of law prevailed, when implementin- this sort of administrative "justice". These arcý ýi) 
there is a failure to hear both sides; b) undesirable secrecy of proceedings through private 
Consultations and undisclosed reports, c) a determination with no basis in substantial e\ idencc. 
d) a risk that the policies implemented will he given effect outside statutory provisions. c) that 
policy will determine the relevant facts, and not the contrary; and finally, f) that there \\III he an 
undifferentiated finding of facts and law. (R. Pound, "Administrative Procedure Leuislation (For 
the Minority Report)", 26 American Bar Association Journal, [ 1941], 664-678) 
309 Steven-, and Yarney, p. 91. 
309 A. Krueger, "Government Failures in Development", 4 Journal of Economic -Pcr, 
ýpectj\, c,,. 
[19901: 9-23. 
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Political means of control during the process of enacting lecj, ýIatjon which affect" r7l 
i-narkets are particularly fragile. The capacity of the region"s governments to carrv out 
their functions was never high, even before the economic crisis of the 1980s. Thc"C 
governments are easily influenced by private interests; thus they lack the autollonlý to 
formulate and execute policies that benefit the general population, rather than serving tile L_ 
narrow interests of the controlling elite. As Nafm states, "Latin American governnients 
have traditionally exhibited a dismal capacity for preventing the interests of small groups ZD Zý 
and even faýnilies or individuals from taking precedence over the public interest. [Not 
surprisingly] the poor performance of the Latin American state reflects a distributioll of 
economic and political power that biases public action in favour of the rich, squeezes the 
middle class, and excludes the poor". 310 The pre-eminence of local and private interest", 
reinforced by the weakness of formal institutions, is a clear feature of the law-makin- 
process. 31 I 
In this context, antitrust policy entails a clear risk of underrnýining the already weak 
Latin American institutional setting even further by creating a new source ol 
unaccountable discretion in enforcement agencies in the region. Thus, due to the 
unaccountable nature of antitrust policy, individual rights do not provide an effectivc 
safeguard against political actors competing, for the use of social resources. The 
appropriatiop of these resources will be exploited by whoever is in a position to do so 
effectively. Political processes possess a dynamic of their own which may distort market 
functioning as they erode the expectations of individuals participating in the market, 
because political markets tend to function on the basis of intangible factors that are 
difficult to grasp. 
Nafm, Latin America's... at 13. 
See K. Karst and K. Rossenn, Law and Development in Latin America: A case book (Berkelc\ 
University of California Press, 1975), p. 61. Also, C. Gunnarson, "What is New and What ill 
Institutional in the New Institutional Economics" An Essay on Old and New InstitUtIonalkin 
and the Role of the State in Developing Countries-, 39 Scandinavian Economic Histor, Re\, ie\\, 
1991143-67. 
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The presence of unaccountable players in the system may obstruct institutional 
transparency. According to Koppl's "Big Players" theory, the orderliness of market 
processes, which are dependent upon the social environment in which individuals 1IItcF, IC!. 
may become severely disrupted by the presence of "Big Players" in the system-1 12 This 
could obviously be extended to unaccountable antitrust enforcement agencies. Bl! -' 
Players emerge whenever the atomistic structure of the systern is lost due to institutional 
failures, and some individuals gain greater of comprehensibility power. Their ýIctivil% 
therefore adversely affects the economic performance of a given social system becaL].,, C 
they become immune from the profit and loss consequences of their decisions. TIIC%' 
effectively become unaccountable for the consequences of their actions, which pI-odLICCs 
erratic and confusing signals that destroy the expectations of other market participant,, ý,. 
The discretion exercised in the use of such power disrupts the process of natural selectioil 
in the market. 313 
The economic problems raised by government discretion are essentially related to 
their disruptive effects on individuals' expectations of the market. The deficiencle" of 
Latin American institutions aggravate the uncertainty of market actors and citizens, who 
are less able to predict the outcomes of social processes; obviously, these shortconlings 
also influence their perceptions of their respective spheres of appropriation of socMI 
resources (viz., customary property rights). 
In Latin America, the lack of predictability of the institutional framework in the 
region is clearly linked to the pre-eminence of government intervention in econornic and 
312 R. Koppl and L. Yeager. "Big Players and Herding in Asset Markets: The Case of the Russian tl I 
Ruble" 33 Exploration in Economic History [1996-1: 367-383. Also, William Butos and ROýoýei 
Koppl. "Hayekian Expectations: Theory and Empirical Applications" 4 Constitutional Politlcýd 
Economy [19931: 303-329. 
13 Butos and Koppl, pp. 322-323. Big Players need not be government officials, although the"c 
play an important part. In. general, the deterioration of the private allocation of propert% right,,, 
favours the emergence of unpredictable Bic, Players outside the realm of government. Exaniplcý' 
abound. law firms possessing privileged ascendancy over ý-, o\crnment officials in claiming a 
-biaaer share" of social resources on their client's behalf, economic experts with persuaske ,ý C- 
reputation over Ic,,.,,, trained officials, whose advice becomes crucial in establishmL, to Miom 
resources should be allocated; less efficient competitors pos,, L-, sing stronger politic. il clout in 
order to obtain ,, octal resources from political interaction; and so on. 
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,, ()cial aff'airs. The presence of the traditional Latin American figure ot- C(IlItI1,11(). \ý-Ijj 11 
has dominated the political scene since the start oI' independence, is , till felt. HO\\c\ci-. 
today this preseiice Is revealed in variou's t'01'1111.1 W lll[cl*\CllhOlllsll] "llich al-C CXck-i"'L6 
most frequently by the executive branch. This is often not subject to effective politicil 
accountability by other branches. 314 
The, ýe institutional conditions hinder the achievement of improved stmidarck of 
V 
institutional efficiency and economic growth, &, their activity prevents the Ilow of' Li,, cl'ul 
information about trade in social resources through the system. L- 
Businesses have great difficulty in ascertaining the laws governing particular t7l 
transactions. As Karst and Rossenn observe, "it is not uncommon to find scvcral 
decisions by the same court on different ,, ide,, of an issue. Instead of amending ha,, ic code 
provisions, Latin. Arnerican [legal] practice is generally to adopt supplemental legi.,, Iati ýý 1 1011, 
which, in turn, is amended and amended again. Frequently, one is forced to read a ho, ýt of 
separate statutes and decrees regulating a oiven SUb ect (and many others as well) and 
then undertake the jiosaw Job of piercing together the provisions still in force to find the 
governing law. Hence, it is quite common to discover that the authorities charoed with t) t) L- 
administering a particular body of law are unaware of significant changes in the ,, tatutoi-y 
or case law. Inertia, ignorance, and inability to keep abreast of rapid-fire leo-islative 
change frequently combine to produce substantial differences between the formal nol-111 
and the law actually being applied". 315 L- 
In the field of corripetition the lack of rehahlc institutions is even more prohIcniatic, 
court systerns in Latin America suffer from long delays, cumbersome administrative 
314 Cimceniing the lack of accountabdity, Bonier cl al. conand: -The main cause of inshlutional 
uncertainty in Lathi Arne6ca. is that checks and balances are not presen Inswati w thrcc 
halancing pmvcr,,,, the typical Latin American country has a veg, po%Ncrtul e\ecuti\c that can 
clmnge lams and enkwcement at will. No judiciaiý will niorntor and : io le,., Jslature. neithci 
parliament mr voms, can efficiently pivem against this discretionaiý po\ýci. The c\ccutivc , ii, 
do virtuali\ Miatc\cr it likes, and the (mV reaction of the peoMe is to V\ to mapc hý 
submeruing thernscl\cs in the infornial sector or lea\ing the coumrý". (Borner ci al., 1). 
I Karst and Rosscnii. p. 66. 
I () I 
procedurc,,, judges with insufficient training particular in 1 17 C7 1 fielck 11kc competinor pok,, 
and unpredictable and non-transparent result,,, in the absence of decidii - ik i- Ii e ct, -, c,, in a 
likc manner". 316 
The legal system in Latin America is fi-ill of contradictions and paradoxc"- I'()]- 
exýinnple, there tends to be excessive emphasis on the formalities of legal rules. I 1()\\-c\, ci-, 
the attitude ofcontrived legalism toward,,, t'ornial institution,,, which 1)icvails in thc iv, Lion 
liýis little cffect on the effective enforcement of rule,,. In this scn,, c. Karst and RO,,,, cnn 
contend: "where there is some gap between the law on the books and the law in 1)rýicticc 
in all countries, the gap is notoriously large in Latin America. Despite an ii-npress1\C 
arnount ofconcern for the appearance of legality, a strikingly large number of Icaal nornis 
ýtrc honored only in the breach". 317 
Legalism is frequently synonymous with excessive governmental interfel-clicc in the L- 
individual sphere. As a i-esult of this excessive intervention, there is a sti-ong fecling that 
new I'ormal institutions or practices ought not to he aclopted without prior lc, -, PIatiOii. I 
This attitude is well expressed in the maxim that in the realm of public law. individuak 
niay only do what is authorised by the legal rules, whereas in the realm of private law, 
individuals may act freely unless otherwise prevented by the applicable legal ruIc. Llý 
Iii the realni of production these pi-Mcipics i-csult iii coi-istant rcstraints oii pnvatc 
production and entrepreneurial initiative because of the cxtensivenes, ý of iiiattei-, 
woulatcd by public law, and particularly of those concernim'! the regulation of market, ý. L- - L- 
The underlying institutional framework oovci-nino the effectiveness of social aild 
economic relationships among individuals in the region has diverged from the f i-nial , ci 11 0 
)16 Rwxat, p. 15. Based on the experience of Ar, -eiitiniýtn and Venezuelan commercial court,,. Ulen 
and Buscaglia havc attempted to develop an cconomic analy, ýIs of the court ýystcm in ti-ic"c t\\, () 
countries. Thcv rciched the conclusion that the performance of the I; v,, tem k poor becausc com tý 
Mc 111ternalk orL"1111"CLI, Ir,, \\C11 thc 111CIllod ol 'ippoliffli)CIII ot jud, -, L" IIId 
T. Ulcii and E. BwcaLflla, A Quantitative Assessment of-the Efficiency of' tile - 
Judicial Sector In 
Latin 'AmericLi, paper presented at the American Law and Economic,, AS1,0CIatiOn Annual 
Meeting, Univer,, ity of California, Berkele\, MaN, 13- 1 -1.1995). 
)17 Kii-, i and Ro,,, senn. p. 58- 
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of rules; this phenomenon has influenced the attitude of Latin Americans towards dicir 
governments reinforcing their disregard for formal legal rules. and has encouj-ýIged an zn Z--ý 
arrogant official attitude towards individual rights arid wealth creation. 
Latin American formal institutions are highly fragile. Only the elite, and the 
relatively small but growing middle class use the formal legal system. 318 Fornial 
institutions do not penetrate into the mass of the population, due to the high costs of t__ 
compliance, ý 19 the lack of a proper court system in the provinces, and the failures of thc 
systern to provide justice. 320 The institutional arrangement of social groupings relill - orcc"' tl t) 
the search for solutions to potential or actual disputes outside of institutions officially 
established such as courts. Thus, most disputes are decided by informal, yet effective, 
mechanisms of consensus which are administered by local leaders, or possibly tile 
state. 321 Nor is there any assurance that institutions will follow formally stated goals. In Z71 
short, the rules enacted by formal authorities do not correspond with rules implementecl 
by society. As a consequence, decision-making authorities lack legitimacy, and individual" 
tend to make transactions outside of the legal rules. 
The presence of Big Players in the economies of the region could create niqjor 
problems' for these economies once the initial economic stabilisation attempted by 
institutional reforms is achieved. 322 
318 Karst and Rossenn, p. 65. 
319 A very popular study about the costs of legality in Peru is found in Hernando De Soto, The Otlici 
Path, (New York: Hai-per & Row, 1989. ) On the informal sector in Latin America, see A. Porte.. " 
and R. Schauffler, The Informal Economy in Latin America: Definition, Measurement and 
Policies, Working Paper No. 5, Program in Comparative International Development, L_ 
Department of Sociology, John Hopkings University, December 1991 
www. jhu. edu/-soc/. Iadark/. working-papers/. 5 
320 See, E. Buscaglia and T. Ulen, A Quantitative Assessment of the Efficiency of the Judicial 4: ý' 
Sector in Latin America, paper presented at the American Law and Econornics Association 
Annual Meeting, University of California, Berkeley, May 13-14.1995. 
1 )21 See, 1. De Le6n and J. R. Padilla, "La Soluc16n de Controverslas en Venezuela: Quý hacer. " 
Venezuela Analftica, Caracas, June 1996. 
1 322 See Borner et al., pp. 16,19-20,27-28. G6rnez also highlights the effects of the unpredictabilltv 
of official policies in discouraging firms from investing. In the case of Latin America. thl, ", 1ý1 
evident in specific fields such as monetary policy. or more generally in the reversal of apertitra 
when political cost,, are deemed too high. In his words: "For multi nationak. the probIcni, 
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These considerations play a major part in the consequences of enforcing antitrust 
policy in weak institutional settings. The absence of clear criteria on which to base the 
restrictive nature of a market undertaking obscures the legal consequences and potential 
risks that could be impose. The lack of effective judicial control and predictable staII&M. " 
encourages the emergence of "Big Players" and therefore undern-unes the "LibJective 
expectations of market participants, who could otherwise co-ordinate their plans 
efficiently. As Borner et al. point out: "Uncertainties about the nature and enforccilICIII 
of the 'rules of the aame' can have devastatinc, effects on private investment and 
specialization. Such institutional uncertainties arise when the executive has highly 
discretionary powers to change and enforce the law arbitrarily. Any reforms designed to 
enhance specialization and growth must first increase institutional certainty. Executive 
power must be more answerable in order to stabilise the institutional rules of the game 
and thus allow growth-enhancing interpersonal and intertemporal. exchange". 323 
Consequently, antitrust policy causes innovative businesses to refrain from certam 
activities that could be regarded as "illegitimate" exercises of market power left to the 
discretion of these "Big Players". By enhancing market uncertainty, antitrust inhibits 
economic exchanges and the competition process, which would otherwise allow firms to 
"unfold" new -information and create new goods and services. 
These firm, are thell 
limited in their discovery of new opportunities and ability to exercise entrepreneurship 
thi-ouCFh competition. 324 t) 
encountered [in Latin America] center on currency volatility, such as that triggered by the 1994 
Mexican peso crisis, and throwbacks in economic policy, such as occurred in Venezuela. 
Exchange rate fluctuations can render a plant uncompetitive from one day to the next, or spell 
losses when earnings are translated into the multinational's home currency. Changes in tariffs 
can cause havoc for multinationals that are in the process of choosing between tarl-, clifiLl d 
particular country as an export market or as a manufacturing base, particularly in the cýrc of' 
complex products with some parts locally made and some imported. For new entrants that hýlvc 
descended on the region with little experience, such as Wal-Mart, the Mexican peso 
proved so costly that it halted plans for expansion; more experienced firms avoided lo""C', hý 
holding local citsh to a minimum. One lesson from recent experience is the crucKil role of 
financial management. For both multinational companies and Latin American firms In generýil. 
the chief financial executive is often a key decision-maker, holding a degree of power that I,, 
uncommon among firms that operate only in developed countries". (G6mez, pp. 242-24'). ) 
323 Borner et al., p. 5. 
324 The benefits of cliscoverinu, new information that \\'()LIICI othci-\\',,,, c remain AllIfOICIC(F Is JICI-11ý111ý, 
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As a result of' its lack of accountability and wide discretional-\ pox\, cr,,. 11-ititill"! 
does not protect, but diminishes individual rights. A defective determination of' its 
capacity to appropriate social resources stimulates their misallocation because the\- are I 
not a,. ý, signed on the basis of efficient decisions made by legitimate holders. Oil the 
contrary, allocation proceeds according to the erratic guidelines made on the hjj, ]ý, ()I 
(uncontrolled) administrative decisions of antitrust authorities. which are more concCrnCd 
with only allowing firms of a "desirable" size in the market rather than with their efficici-it 
functioning. 
Going beyond the formal goals of antitrust Icgislation, it is perhLips rnorc iniportant 
to ascertain the political mechanisms that affect individual rights x,, they arc l1kcly to 
occur In the field of antitru,,, t regulation. Such an mialysi" will provide fflsiýohts into ho\\ 
antitrust policy could discoui-aae entrepreneurship and firms' will 111(mess to coilipcic. 
Consequently, the main problem faced hy a policy aimed at promoting competitioll 
iii the region is how to neutralisc the behaviour of Bic, Players in the field of ýintitrust I-) zn 
policy, and more broadly, the sources and effects of anti-competitive acts, , 
jUdICW1 
inefficiencies, lack of political accountability, and the introduction of constlaitloiiii) 
control. These are the elements that need to be considered in the proniotloii of 
competition in the re. gion. 
hi this context, competition advocacy could play an important role a,, a catalyst foi- 
ilwswit inarket institutions in Latin America hy addi-cssing governmental discretioii wid ýý Z: ) 
SLIPPOI-till. " Individual expectations in the market. C, II 
the lll()St IIIIPOIJýIllt fCýItLlre of market functionim-,. \\hich k inevitabl\ frustrated h\ antitar't 
enforcement. (Scc 1. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial D1, SCOVVIN Mid the Competitive Nim-ket Proccv, ý 
An Austrian Approach, 3,5 Journal of Economic Literature [19971. pp. 60-, 'ý-4ý 
I () 1: 1 
CON-CLUS IONS: Do WE NEED A CHANGF IN 
-THE 
CONVFNTIONAI, APPRO WH TO 
U 1, ATION? 
Market order entails a myriad of restrictive agreements on rivalry and the entry ()I 
market participants, but not all of them are "i-nonopolistic". It i. ý the rol, ol* ý, ou;,, c! 
cient from antitrust policy to distinguish those that are effi I thosie that are nionopoll,, tic. To 
clo so. we have seen earlier that antitrust 'ud(ye, -. and policy-makers attempt to ftcilitýik' j Z' 
analysis by developin- legal proxies aimed at distinouishing the effects ()I' dicc Z7 t) Z-- L- 
arrangements and economic organisation on the i-narket. 325 b t. ) 
But conventional legal analysis is not very helpful in providing insights into the 
monopolistic intentions of those who restrict trade. By definition, legal proxies can onk, 
make an eX (117te appraisal of the assumed el't'Ccts of economic organisation on mai-kci,, 
However, inascertaining whether the transactino parties intend to irnposc a monopolistic 
Cost Upon society inevitably dernands e-v post analysis ol'the economic environment ýN, ith'In 
which the transaction produces its effects. The most that such proxies can do 1'-' to 
develop tentative hypotheses on the likely econornic effects of certain transaction,,, on thc 
hasis of the prernises of conventional economic thcory. Consequently, "LICII PI-OXICý'-' 
cannot avoid reproducing prior legal decisions, and thereby the conventional cconornic 
theory upon which the former is based. 
Howevcr, ccononilc theory failed to provide stýibility to these legal proxic". 11clice. 
It Could not set forth reliable grounds foi- the emergence of a rule of law. Oi-i, _, iiial 
sti-Lictural" explanations about market causalities that linked the conduct of firliv-, to 
Iiiarket structure were later replaced by "dynan-11c" versions, as the enipirical cvIdciicC 
encoLiragged riew approaches to the conduct of firms and entreprelICUrs In the niarkct. 
However, none of the,,, c succeeded in convcving the fundamental evolution of niarket 
inlcractloii, xvhere the , Lib*ecti\,, c expectatiow, of economic acent,, Inte(_, rate in a coniple\ 
WCI) OfflUid and chanoring information. L_ L_ 
325 Sce Chapter 11. 
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Thiý,, is obviously a fundamental question that cleak with the diffiCLI]tie,, of the 
conventional paradiam of regulation in offering sen, ýIble episternologicA explanations ol C) - Z-71 
imirket functioning. which are capable of gulding, policy decision-makim-T pi-oce,,,.,, c,,. The 
qUestion hes in whether market relations can be appraised objectively, which is curi-cwk 
the underlying assumption of the conventional paradigm. 
This is a crucial issue, since by assuming, that oNective market apprýti,,, d is noi 
possible, it is necessary to conclude that (my model of industri tD II 'al organ'sation under Ilic 
SCP paradigm will possess clear epistemolo-Ical flýtw,, that prevent any mearilm-, ful IILlit 
being shed on the way actors behave in the market. In the absence of a settled core of 
ýintitrust economic theory from which to develop stable legal doctrines and rUICS, it I'll. Z-- 
impossible to conclude that this policy can distinguish ob , 
jectively monopolistic rc,, trictivc 
ýtrrangements frorn non-n-ionopolistic ones. 
These limitations have not been seriously addressed in the empirical reappraisal of 
the SCP paradigm, frorn to "dynanilc" explanations, which has characwriscd 
the research of antitrust scholars since Bain's theories. Quite the reverse, the reappral,,, ý11 
has seldom criticised the intermediate "dynatTuc- models developed to deal with the 
IIISLiffiCiencies of the initial SCP paradiarn. For these antitrust scholars, the rnodel,,, 
provide an adequate explanation of market phenomena, from which they derivc thc1l, 
conclusions on the need for antitrust enforcement. 
Sowell observes how antitrust policy is firmly rooted in the xssumptioii ol 
oNectivisni: "Antitrust laws. like all forms of third party nionitorin-, depend tlIcII* jII -- 
, social effectiveness on the articulation of characteristics objectively obs-ci-vable 
(... ). "3-'o 
Guided by the asSLInIptIOII of obýjectivisrn, scholars take it for granted that it is pos, ýihlc to 
cýilculate the social cost,, of monopolistic negativc externalities imposed upon the , ocial 
, ývstcin that it is also possible to identify social wc1fare unequivocally. t ýnder convontjonýil 
IVI'LlIation dic authol-ItN, attcnipts to make ob' Ifare dctei-rn*nat', )ns -frorn ihovc-, Lý - 
jCch"'c we 1 11 c 
c 11.1). 2 03. 
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hy a.,;,, umInL, that it can eventually acquire ornniscient knowledce ahOUt the comfitiow, 
determininc, social welfare. t-- 
The idea of eqUilibrium in economic,, hw, therefore played a per\&, ivc rolc iii 
scholars' analysc-ý of market interaction, by conflating positive and normative amily"i" Z- II 
However. this particular understanding is fraught with methodological inconsi. ý, tcncicll L- L- 
which are not readdy realised. As a result, scholars become lurcd bý the propcrno, ý, ol' ilic 
models drawn under the influence of this appral,, <d. 
Klein warns against the excesses of conventional methodol(),, v in the followim-, I 
terms: "When conducting antitrust analysis it is crucial that economists do not conduct 
what I call 'blackboard economics. ' The economist must not use abstract models. largely 
divorced frorn real world conditions, to reýich economic explanations and policy 
iniplications. While the admonition that economists should 'get their hands dirty, and 
ki-iow the facts of the situation they are analysing i-nay seem obvious and ti-Itc, IIILIch 
cconomic analysis, both the now dominant 'Chicago School' and the 'new' Hidustrial 
on, anization varieties are often not connected closely enou(, h to the events LIIICICI- 
ii-ivesticration". 327 tl 
The assumption of obýjectivism tacitly criticised by Klein leads those i-naking, the 
conventional appraisal to assume that it is possible to identIfN a "social optirnurn" ýigain, ýI 
which reality can be matched. Thus, conventional analysis compares market relat, ()II,, to 
idcA normative standards, such as the Pareto standard. achieved in the Perfect 
Conipetition model, and condemns any departure as "failures". This appraisýil falk to 
iippreciate the limitations of comparing the world with a model which ,, perfect only ()n 
paper. Takin g the conclusion that the former is "iniperfect" provides no LiscfLil Iround for 
I)ractical policy-making. Comparing reality w'ith theoretical i-nodels that depict LI(OPKIII 
327 KIcin, "The Use of Economics ...... p. 
419. Klein borrow,, the term from Coase, ýýhO Ll, CS it to 
criticlse those svsterns "which live in the minds of economists but not on earth. " ScC R. H. 
Co; tsc, "The Institutional Structure of ProdLIC11011", III on Economic,, and F, -onomist,. 
(ChIca, -, o: The Uni\ crsitv of 
Chicago Prcý, -,. 1994), p. 5. 
1-- 
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worlds is a futile and a misleading exerci, -, e, which will inevitably conclude that rcalit\ ii, 
imperfect, and require,, some exogenous correctivc intervention. 
Firstly; it is a futile intellectual endeavour because it entails the fallacy of reach"I., -' a 
Nirvana that is impossible to attain in practice because of the costs involved. Ccrtaink. 
Perfect Competition would not be an optimal standard for society to achieve if tile 
involved were higher than the benefits resulting from the allocation operating in that 
situation. 
These costs relate to the information required to make the standard operativc aiid 
enforceable. Here, the antitrust authority in charge of maxin'nsing social welfare. ficcs an r: ) 
unsurmontable problem, for there is no way of passinto, tacit knowledge which can 0111v hC 
sidýjectively appraised by market participants to the antitrust authority. In fact, the 
problem of gathering information faced by antitrust enforcers makes it ii-npossihle evcn to b 
know whether a given social situation is close to ýi -, ýtatic equilibriurn" point. Z: ) 
For th is reason, the activity of antitrust authoritics is devoted to makim, ad-hoc 
calculations of interpersonal costs and benefits, in the false expectation that such all 
exercise will somehow reveal social preferences. It is impossible to subject such social 
calculations to any accountability; therefore, they cannot be compatible with the rule of' 
law, regardless of compliance with the forms of legal procedure required for its adoptioll. 
Indeed, such use of economic analysis is unwarranted, even under the methodolo(-,, Ical 
standards of conventional analysis, because it is not the purpose of a pwltivc 
Linderstanding of reality to deduce normative irnplications. 328 
)28 In his seminal essay The Methodology of Poslove Econornics. Friedman cla, ni. that the 
usefulness of positive models has little to do with the realism behind their prenii,, c,, ý "it rN 
bey()nd doubt that individuals in the reality behave and act in a way which cloe, ý not have to 
L'Orreý,, pond to the econornic model so created. ITliu,., 1, a model Vý useful whenever it allm\-, ti,, 1() 
isolate factor, ý and rcýrsmis that would othcrwkc be di,, guised: to under, ýtand how redit\ ýwrks. it 
is neces'sary to construct an idealistic world and then proceed to test eýich of its tzictor,,. to 
ii,, certhln the*Ir individual effect on the total outcome". (Friednian, "The \IethodoloL, ý ....... pl). 
166- 177. ) Clearly. under this appraisal, arguin,,., realism of the model',,,, premrse,, is unnece,, "ary. 
since it doe,, not purport to deliver an\, normative conclusion,, about , Lich realit\ Miich i,, 
understood a,, i whole. It simply attempt.,, to c\amine the element,, of it, construmon in pwitivc 
lerms in order to approximate an idea of how such a realitv would behave if ccrtLiln \ýii-Mh1c,, 
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Secondly, it is simply that equilibriUm depict, ý a world of perfection. which i,, 
impossible to attain in practice. As we have Indicated, the hi-nitatiow, of convcnnomil 
analysis run deeper, stemming from the fact that , uch models convc, %,, no connection with 
the real world. 
Antitrust scholars have attempted to circumvent this problem by drawing, dYnanilc 
models of market interaction which overcome the most significant limitations introduccd 
by the static approach to market relations. This has eventually led them to ýt.,, sumc that 
even if perfection could not be reached, at least exogenous intervention could prove to he 
a second best solution, because it could improve social welfare by favourino the 
correction of instances where "reality" departed from the optimal equilibrium. However, 
even such dynamic conventional models fail to capture the nature of reality. Let us 
elaborate on this problem. 
Certainly, antItI-LISt scholars were aware of the idealism of optimal equilibrium 
analysis, which characterised Perfect Competition. 329 However, they were lured into the 
belief that drawing rnore "realistic" models about market behaviour could be done siniply 
by describing ad-hoc situations outside the extreme "ideal" conditions of the Perfect 
Competition model. They relaxed its extreme constitutive assumptions: "perfect" 
information was made "assymetric" arnonast economic participants-, product 
"differentiation" replaced product "homogeneity", infinite market participants were 
replaced by a few interacting firms. They assumed that in this way the dynarnlic market 
interaction of an imperfect world depicted in their models of imperfect competition would 
convey a better "direct" sense of reality, than any comparison made with the extreme 
static equilibrium of the Perfect Competition model. 
closer to ot For exan-iple, Scherer and Ross notice: "... Prices often hovei cS thým one wmild 
predict from an analysis that takes Into JCCOUnt only the fewness of sellei-, ignoring C()- 
ordination oh. sticIcs mid I oil IT - run constraints. Thc, ýe Inot-e subt/c structural and behaviour, 
vm-lahles help explain why pricing performance in modern industrial markets hýis on the Miole 
hecii fýilrlv , ýttlsfactorv despite significmit delmi-tures from the struclural ideal of pure economic 
theory". (F. M. Scherer and D. Ross, IndLIStI-1,11 Market Structure and F-conomic Performlince. 
Third. edition, Houghton Miffin Company, B0,, ton. 1990,1). 410. ) 
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However, the revised model still contains a fundamental cpistcmoloý-, Icýjl 1111111ý111()Ij 
from which conventional appraisal cannot escape. The nature of market behaviour i,. 
i-epresented in the idea of evolution and change. In the words of Sc1iLiijjpctcj-- 
-Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of econoi-n1c change and not oiil\ nevc1- 
[Rit never can be stationary. And this evolutionary character of the capitalist PI'OCC,,,, 1, " 
not merely due to the fact that economic lifc goes on in a social and natural env "'Oil 'lie" I 
which chmiges and by its change alters the data of ecoi-iomic act* t-I loll. ( ... ) The fUll(kIHICIltal 
impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine In motion comes fi-om the new con,, umcr 
,, ()()ds, the new methods of production or tramsportatlon, the new, markets, the I- 
of industrial organization that capitalist enterprises create. ' , 3ý)() This is an unescaixihic 
reality, for market information is not an objective asset capable of being equally seized 
and appraised by Lill agents. On the contrary, its nature is -subjective, it is scattcred b 
throughout the systern, and therefore inter-preted differently by each market participant. 
Any decision in the market is adopted on the basis of conjecture and projectioll. " ahmit 
what the future will bring. Expectations, by definition are untested plans whose refiahilitv tn - 
depends upon execution. Failure or success in these prediction,,. -. will encourage cconomic Z: ý 
agents to chanae or maintain their ongoing course of action, in order to deal With fLItLII-C 
similar situations. 
In the next chapter we will explain how evolution and change follows or 1'rom this 
1)i-occss, and how entrepreneurs seek to mininilse the losses that could result fi-0111 IIIIILIFCý" 
iii planning their activities. At this point, it is sufficient to note that any policy whicli 
attcinpts to niaxin-iise social welfare should take note of this simple caveat: adl-ici-ents ()I 
MIMI'LlSt fail to understand the crucial role that business expectations play in fi-an-iing 
c\'(flution and change Under real market processes. As tentative appraisals of the I'Lituiv. 
Ilic cxpectations which ernbody the essential elements necessary for undcrstandin,! 
conipetition in the real worid and which ai-e abscnt froi-n the neo-classical model.,, Iii-c i-cal 
tinie and sheer ignorance. Antitrust theoi-y hases itself on the expected nionopolistic Z- - 
belia\, iour Of fil-1111, Undcl- the assumption that policy-makei-s, as omniscient outsIdci',,. can 
ýI SCIILIIIIPCtel-, C'Zlj)ltlll', Ill, Socialism and Democrac\. pp. 82-83) 
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properly appraise the complexity of the relevant inforijlýjtjojl \, %ilich ]JIL11-k-et P( ' 111 Ic I i" 
produce and possess. 
This chapter has demonstrated how, by sticking to an unfit appraisal. policy-makcr,. 
cnct Lip making unwarranted normative concILL, ions. Antitrust theon,, t,, cannot help hiii 
i-eaard these practices as simple devices used by firms to prevent rivalry amon, -, ý, t thcm, 
and thk is assimilated to rest rictions on competition. Indeed, competition is defincd 'in 
terms of the number of effective market participants. 
However. competition in the real world Is much more than that. Corripetition. M tfic 
subjective sense, relates to the possibility that entrepreneurs can be alert to nC\V 
opportunities or valuable information which they had previously overlooked. By 
definition, the activity has to be related to a new sector, product, technique, , cogrýlphical 
ai-ca, usc, skill, attribute or particularity that entrepreneurs consider VaILMMC III d 
subjective sense, because it will presumably bring, sonne benefits, which are measurcd hy 
their personal goals. 
Under this alternative concept, the 11LIMber of participant,, i,, irrelevant-, indeed, 
under this alternative paradigm it is impossible to define i-narket structure with refcwnce 
to products or geographical areas. In a sense, every firrn has a unique advantag-c that 
eiiýihlcs it to exist in the market, every firrn Is a "nionopoly" becausc it has di.,, cm/cwd ,i 
hitherto unexploited opportunity. Under this appraisal, the main question is how to 
I)I-CVC11t Current reoulation, social custorns, legal rules and other instItUtIOM11 
hkm to ýtn-ýtn(lcnicnts froni unduly restricting entrepreneurs' alertness. The probleni 
C11SUre a imnimun-t predictability of social rules. and gowmi-nent action. It i,, necc,., -,, m'\ to t: ) - 
control administrative discretion, which in the casc of antitrust policy is ii-npo,, sible, siricc 
cdorccri-icrit inevitably strikes a balance betwccii intei-personal comparisons iccordim-, to 
the unaccountable of the deci,, ion imikcr. Considering the 111,401-V Of ý11)WC,, ()I 
, on the growth of' 1)()\\, ci- in the Latin American public policy, and its stalling effen, 
enti-cprellcul-ship and 11111m, ation, it 1,.. c1car that thcsc quc,, tion's 11CCLI to hc addl-c""'Col. 
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These considerations are essential for understanding the wcýtk epkicmo1(), -JcA Z-- - 
foundations of' antitru,, t theory. Under such tlic()i-\, it I.,, foi- the anal% "i to i; 
meaningful positive conclusions about the conduct of entrepreneurs. who \\()LIld 
otherwise support policy-making. Indeed, what these models depict is not the conduct ot 
any particular person, or even their likely conduct, but the expected outconle" ()I 
anonymous forces whose interaction depends on the conditions postulated M the 
respective model. These models cannot therefore "predict" any future market outcollic. ". 
since the ideal conditions they impose are unavailable at any instaticc in realltý,. Thu,,. iio 
empirical evidence can really prove whether markets "fail": at best, a positi\ C 
conventional analysis provides tentative explanations of past market behavioui-. Any legal 
doctrine developed within these premises will also be tentative and weak; it will be ýl poor 
foundation on which to base stable legal standards suitable for udging the conduct ()I' 
entrepreneUrs. 331 
Equilibrium is a poor mechanism for understanding how such realitý' \\'()i-k,,, 
because it requires the analyst to take away the basis of reality, which is evolutive and 
331 The problem is indeed a fundamental one, and deals with our beliefs about the výilue 0 
empirical evidence and the positive method of providing "support" for our explanations about 
"human behaviotir". This is a question that can only be challenged on epistemological grounds. 
where the critique of the positivistic rnethod in social science,, is rooted. Individual,, drc neitlici 
things not- animals, therefore they behave purposely; they do not necessarily act reactively to Z7 
external stimuli alono certain patterns of conduct. As a consequence of this basic and obvioll" 
premise, social -scientists are forced to regard human behaviour with different methods of Z7 
enquiry from those currently used by positive scientists to measure and predict patterns (law, ()I 
behaviour) found in natural events. As Frank Kniaht claimed: -(... ) man's relations with his 
fellowman are on a totally different footing from his relations with the objects of physical mitUl-C. 
[For this reason, economics should] give up, except within recognized and rather narrow hinits. 
the nai've project of carrying, over a technique which has been succe, ýsful in the one "Cl ot 
problem and usin, it to solve another set of a categorically different kind". See F. Knil-Tht, "Thc 
Limitations of Scientific Method in Econornics, ", in Ethics. of Competition, (New York-. Books 
tor Lil-_)raries Press, 1935), p. 147. It is at least necessary to acknowledge these weaken". "es in the 
positive method of' enquiry of explaining, hUrnan behav)our, in order to know whil to c\pecl 
from empirical data. Milton Friedman ýva,, particularly cautiow, about this. Lis he ickno\\ Icch-, cs 
in his Methotlology ol Positive Economics. He ar, _, ues- "Econornics as a positive science ka 
hoo-IN, of tentatively accepted gueneralizations, about econornic phenornena that can 
he ived to 
pi-ediqt the consequences, of changes in circuriv, 1ýince,,. Progress ill expallding this body 
g -allzat, -engthtening out- confidence in theii- validitv, and inipt-oving the acciti-acv ol tons, sit 
the pi-eilictions theY Yield is hindet-etl not mily by the linutations ol hiiiiian ability that impc(le 
all scat-ch lot- knowledge but also b, v obsiticles that ore especially impot-tant Jor the mcial 
sciences in genei-al and economics ill pai-ticidar, thot(gh bv no nicaii. s pecidtai- to thetil". 
(Author's italics) (M. Friedman, "The Methodolop' . 
", p. 177) 
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changing, for the sake of enabling the models to fulfil their "predictive- rolc ()ii pjjjvj-. 
Conventional economic analysis appears to be more concerned with demonstrating ho\\ 
economic models work, rather than explaining how reality behaves. b 
This is not to say that equilibrium is not useful or interesting as 4,. t niewal 
construction. Unquestionably, its theoretical expressions can only be understood al'ici- 
exercising great care and advanced mathematical skills. Indeed, they may be useful fol- 
dealing with'very exceptional cases where the analyst holds all the relevant information 
involved in the appraisal. However, in open-ended realities, such as those fcatui-im-, 
markets, where information changes and evolves constantly, this perception is clearly 
irrelevant. Such models are useless for defining solutions aimed at improving the well'al-c 
of society in the real world, simply because such a perfection cannot be found oil papel-. 
Nevertheless, despite all these drawbacks, scholars continue to overestimate the role of 
the mental constructions used to understand economic reality. 332 
In conclusion, the dual assumption of perfCct-ob 
. jective 
knowledge and cquiiikaim 
entail two essential shortcormngs in the analysis of market phenomena and competition 
processes. First, it attempts to explain the process of competition under conditions k\ lievc 
the process has ceased to exist, which presents the observer with a contradictory or at 
least futile dilernma: that of examining phenomena denied by definition. If information 
were "perfect" and readily available, why would firms bother to compete for it" If it wcre 
not, why would antitrust agencies attempt to make "perfect", by doing so they 
discourage firms from competing? Second, even if we attempted to explain sucil 
phenornena indirectlY, in comparison with an idealised image of a world w1lerc 
competition is "perfect", the objective nature of the information required for the model to 
be meaningful would be inconsistent with its subjective nature, in reality. Therefore, 
scholars constantly misinterpret the role of empirical evidence, and thus ffldlrecflý- 
misinterpret the entire process of market interaction. 
332 As Rizzo claims: "Whether we view equilibrium in [dynamic terms] or take a more con'ýCrv; QJN C 
[static] position is purely a matter of heul-,,, tic and analytic convenience. Indeed, the notion ol 
equilibrium, ( ... ) Is only a mental tool without any 
direct operational significance. Depending on 
the purpose at hand we may use either ( ... ) conception 
11 . (Rizzo, 
Disequilibriurn.... p. 6. ) 
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These caveats open an epistemological di,, cus,, lon ý\ hich it is to 
here. Indeed, policy-makers should at least retain an element of connection %\ Ith Hic, 
reality which Is lost in conventional analysis. Even acceptln,, t; that equIllbi-lurn ` ach1c\', l-)jc 
(or something that approximates to it is possible), this way qf thinking doc, " not 
satisfactorily explain how the economic system reaches such a point. The model,,, "Imply 
assume that equilibrium is "there", already achieved within the model hy perl'cctly 
informed entrepreneurs. It does not tell how imperfectly informed entrepreneurs conduct 
themselves in order to gather such information. thLl, ', PUS111111-1 the economic s\ý, sicni in(() cl 
position of equilibrium. As Richardson argues, "by neglecting the whole problem of 
information,. the perfect competition model condemns itself not only to unrealism but to 
inadequacy even as a hypothetical system. It is no defence to appeal, moreover, to tile 
analo y of mechanical statics which, though neglecting friction, can still identil'y the 9 t) ZD C) 
equilibrium position of a system of forces, for we cannot demonstrate that economic 
systems have such positions of rest without reference to expectations and information 
which could not be presumed to be available in the absence of restraints-. ')33 
The only way of overcoming these difficulties is to turn the appraisal upside cl()\\ n. 
ýiiid switch the paradigms of approximation to reality. fristead of assurning that i-eýilitý, iý, 
failing compared to a model of perfect competition. where no restrictions on coinpetitloll 
exist, we should appralse reality through an approach based on models that 111c()I-pol-ýItc 
pi-edictability, the element which entrepreneui-s need in ordei- to achieve ýi i)(),, itioii ()I 
equilibrium. This approach draws economic i-nodels which are based on the infon-natioii 
they make aýailable to market participants. Under this appraisal, the perfect competition 
inodel has no special norrriative status*, it is ,, imply a i-nodel depicting an institutioiial Zý 
environment where no restrictions on trade exist. but where busincss predictab it- P-1 
/ci-o- Models that depict trade in environments where predictability is positi\, c \vOLIld 
ivpresciit a more meaningful standpoint froni which to appraise real niarkcts. aii(i iii zn 
Pailicular, the conduct of entrepreneurs. 3)34 
III 333 Richardson, Information ..., p. 
69. 
ý)34 G. B. Richardson, -The 
Theory of Restrict, %c Tradc Pract, cc,,, ", 17 OxIO'-(l Lconomic Palm, 
(1965), pp. 4,34-435. 
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In other words, wc shall attempt to outline an institutional approach that deak \\ Ith 
the more meaningful dilemma of confronting feasible insti ional frameworks. Ohviousl\'. b tut I 
this leads us into another sphere, namely, that of cornparintg) real institutional frarne\\ ()i-k,, 
and assessing how capable they are of delivering real effects. The objective, thcn. 1'. t(, 
conceptualise an abstract order that could promote competition and predictahilitv 
amongst econormc acFents in conditions of unavoidable impeýfe'ct 111-1-11 1 on human 
knowledge. 
v 
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CHAPTER IV. - TOWARDS A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF NIARKET's. 
ECONOMIC ORGANISATION AND RFGULATION. 
" nie limitations ofthe concept [ofpei. je'ct competition Im dealbig with conditions of 
persistent caid impeiJectlY predicted change vvil/ iiot be removcd until ecoizomicý 
possesses a (h, veloped dicor. V of'change. " 
(G. Stigler, "Competition" in The New Palgrave in Economic,;: A Dictionary--ot 
Economics, Vol. 1, p. 535. ) 
"This process qf'Creail'vc Destructioti is the esseimalftict abotit capitalism. It is whal 
COPitalism collsists 1/1 alld what every capitalist com ern has got to live in. " 
(Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1). 83. ) 
"The coordinatioti of ccoiiomic activities, o/ course, 
is WhOt i. N 
ovent'lle/mi/igh, about. " 
(B. Loasby, Equilibrium and Evolution, p. 9. ) 
In order to ground an institutional proposal for promoting competition, it is Z-. ) zn 
necessary to lay down an alternative understanding of market interaction. ThP, clial)(cr 
Pl-eSC111s such theoretical 
framework by incorporating, the ýLibjective basis which pci-vOcs 
social phenomena. Compared with a conventional appraisal, which represent,,, the 
hehaviour of firms as, a rriere endeavour of sclection arnono'st maxii-iusino options t-) t-- 
performed with full knowledge, this alternative approach portrays business activitv in 
ClUite different terms. It is presented as an ongoing exercise of speculation about the 
future, in which entrepreneurs make conjectures and pro - 
jections about the use of s()c1al 
reSOUrces-, in other words, it is as an exercise pervaded by sheer ignorance, which is a fill- 
cry from the neo-classical assumption of omniscience. It is the subýjective nature ()I' tlicsc 
conjectures and projections that provides markets with their distinctive dynamism, MIA\ 
ilbsent frorn conventional neo-classical models. The perception of markets through the 
Icris of sub'ectivism could enlighten us about the intentions of entrepreneurs and their 
ýlctl\-ltlcs as rivals and partners in the market pr()ccss, thus providing a more rchýihlc 
N'ýirdstick for the development of normative le(gml standards in'JUdging their action, ý 
The , Llh, JeCtl\'C ýIMIIVSIS Of Market relations and its implicatiow, in the 
formulation of 
PLINIC Policy for the promotion of competition are addressed in this chapter &., f()110",, ý: 
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The first section provides an overall view of the natul, e Of the 111', titUtl(-T, ý11 paradk-,, ni Lij-)()P 
which we base our analysis of markets and competition. Thi.,, section exploi-cs how , ()cial 
institution,, are inextricably linked to an evokin, I-CaIIL\, 11 Z- and how wiLhin the UI),: CI-L, iiHL\, 
created by such an ongoing process institutions provide some predi II Ic ictability for econonii 
ýtgents, thus fulfilling a crucial social role. We will explore how changing the 
order" also opens the way to an adaptable but nevertheless predictable rule of la\\. Under 
this appraisal, individuals confine their uncertainty to behavioural rules Which are 
inutually agreed and which evolve into general principles and comprise the sub,, tratuni ()I b 
a stable -yet-orderly changing- legal order. 
In terms of policy-making, this appraisal reveals that individuals are better equippecl 
to discover socially valuable knowledge compared with governments. Hence, it qUesti0ii,, z! ) 
the traditional role of governments by challenging the traditional notion of -social Z: ) 
welfare" guiding policy action. In an open-ended world, governments cannot , cllc all thc 
relevant information necessary to achieve "public intercst". Therefore, cailliot hc a 
qLiestjoii of choosing the notion of social welfare that better fits "public interest" into the 
ca-e of government -oals. Rather, social welfare occurs throuah individual iritcractiori. Z71 Z: _ Z: ý t) 
albeit understood in radically different terms, iii contrast with the conventional iiotioii ol' 
Welfill-C. 
These preliminary ideas are necessary to set the stage for understanding how , oclal 
Riles and practiccs which emerge from market interaction are embedded in it. in the , cii,, c 
that Ilicy are indispensable for the materialisation of exchanges and trade. 
The question that follows from this is a closer exanunation of how competition ilý, 
i-elatccl to co-operation, and how improvements of competition niay enhance , ()clal 
wc1fare. Is competition contradictory to co-operation achieved throu., --h businc,, ý, practic(-, 
ýtii(l arrangernents which are considered "anticompetitive" under conventional antitru"t" Z: ) 
In order to highlight why this is not the ca,, c, this chapter present,, competition a,, thc Z7, ?n 
constant crideavour to , cck valuable infori-nation, achtcvcd through the dcvclopnient of 
I'OLI(HIC, s and social com, ci-itions which CVCIItLMIIN' i-riaterialkc Into CLIStOrnar\ 
1 7S 
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Competition, enables market actors to reappraise these routines and conventions in ordei- 
to adapt them to unforeseen circumstances. 
The second section explains these generýtl concepts in more detail with reference to 
market functioning. It shows why firms seek to co-ordinate their activitics, ýjjjcl \\11\ L, ij 
co-ordination is not necessarily harmful but may well be regarded as the 
expression of institutional efficiency which allows the systern or rules to unf'old ci,, Ll 
convey valuable information which entrepreneurs require to make their production plan,,. 
This view provides a blueprint for making a different normative judc), ement froiii 
that embodied in antitrust policy, since many forms of co-ordination of information, 
which are inevitably branded as "anti-competitive'" under the latter, appear as efficient 
nieans of discovering and conveying useful information hitherto unknoký11. Thesc 
iderations provide a conceptual basis for examining the likely negative implications of' consi Z_ t:, 
enforcing antitrust policy on many of the corporate structures and stratq_, ICI. I &\, clopccl 
and practised in Latin America. 
Finally, the last section puts forward a policy proposal for promoting competition in r-I 
Latin America. This proposal focuses on enabling entrepreneurs clear spaces to exploit Z-- 
their alertness to profit opportunities. A competition advocacy agenda to be implemented 
in the context of Latin American socio-cultural institutions is devised. 
I. - THE DEFINITION OF PUf3l. IC INTEREST UNDI--ý-R -OPEN- 
ENDED ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. 
I. - Dis ilibrium as ýl IICL11-IStIC tOOl fOl* %'iSLiall,,. LIII,, C, inmarikets. NLO 
III CtIlWallS177, Socialism and DemocracY. Schumpeter observed: "The cý, sciitLtl 
point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionai'v L- - 
process. 1 '335 In essence. this is a -Creative Destruction process, which entails a procc,,,, 
of "industrial mutation" that revolutionizes the economic strLICture . 
1rom within. 
Schullipetel, P. 8-. 
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destroying the old one. In this process, "old concerns and established industries, whether 
or not directly attacked, still live in the perennial gale. Situations emerae in the process of Z- t-1 
creative destruction in which many firms may have to perish that nevertheless \\; ()Lll(l he 
able to live on vigorously and usefully if they could weather a particular storm. Short ()f 
'such general crises or depressions, sectorial situations arise in which the rapid charige ol 
data that is characteristic of that process so disorganizes an industry for the time bellity 11ý1 
to inflict functionless losses and to create avoidable unemployment. " 3 36 
Notwithstanding, while Schumpeter accurately described the dynanuc nature ol 
market functioning, he did not advance an elaborated theory of markets explaining how CID 
the creative destruction process comes about. Rather, he developed an intuitive appraisal 
of what he regarded to be an obvious condition of markets. In this perspective, his views 
were indeed an important departure from the mainstream on markets and firms. AS wc 
have indicated above, no serious scientific effort emerged to explain this "dynamic" 
portrayal of markets at the time, due to the formalism which had pervaded economic 
science since the 1930's as a result of the use of "heuristic equilibrium", in which w(is 
arounded the understanding of social phenornena, and in particular, market 
interaction. 337 
In order to develop an alternative explanation of the nature of markets it is 
necessary to overcome the limitations of equilibrium as a heuristic model in order to 
appraise social interaction and market functioning. In this sense, O'Driscoll and Rizzo 
visualise an "evolving" market order through the idea of "pattern co-ordination' 
336 Schumpeter, p. 90. Perhaps the use of the aqjective "destruction" impinges upon the 
1W 
VISUalisation of markets, portraying thern as something chaotic; yet this is far from the ti-Lith. 
Indeed, markets follow a certain logic under the guidance of abstract rules, thus creatI110 MI 
economic order". In this context, open-ended systenis define an -order" which is inconylctc. 
but nevertheless bound. This is the case in markets where interaction is guided by the interaction 
of the many, but does not follow anyone's particular ends. Notwithstanding the ahsencc of 
external intervention, markets achieve an order which is built from within. This proccs,, is hesi 
described by the Greek word "catalaxia", which conveys the idea of an arrangement which 
oi -ganises its elements in such a way so as not to constrain anyone. See, Hayek, Law, Legislation 
and Liberty: Rules and Order, Chapter 2. 
337 See Cbapter 3. section 1, above. 
-88. Pattern co-ordinati -, es from the perceived %\cAnc,,, c, -1 ) tý O'Diiscoll and Rizzo, pp. 85 1 ion emer, , 
of Hayek's notion of equilibrium as "plan co-ordi nation". as presented in his seminal \mrk 
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Reality is comprised of a complexity of facts that belong either to a "class" evcntý, ()I- 
44unique" events. The first group corresponds to events which can be perceived to folloW 
a repetition or "pattern" over time, whereas the second is comprised of events which are 
perceived as not being dependent on time and which are therefore not repeatable. 339 
Thus, pattern co-ordination exists whenever individuals' plans are co-ordinaiccl 
with their class features, even if their unique aspectsftiil to iiiesh. The fact that Luiicluc 
aspects do not co-ordinate with equilibrium is, according to this notion, not a weakiles" ill 
the analysis. but as strength because it allows time and uncertainty to be dealt with 
satisfactorily within the model. 340 The notion of pattern co-ordination provides us with 
an explanation of the "spontaneous" way by which institutions, such as legal rules, 
emerge. Conventions emerge to co-ordinate individual plans with respect to class features 
which are perceived to occur repeatedly. Similarly, the singularity of "unique" event,, 
explains why endogenous changes occur in the system that are necessary to adapt 1() 
unknown future contingencies 
Econornics and Knowledge. 4 Economica, [new. ser., 1937], reprinted in Individualism and 
Economic Order, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 33-56. Under Hayek's 
notion, the remuneration that could potentially arise frorn trade exchanges creates expectations 
for those who feel they could gain something from trading. To Hayek, trading is possihie Z-- Z-- 
whenever individuals possess mutually compatible expectations about each other and about the 
external data. (Hayek, "Economics ...... pp. 
41-43. ) However, some of these expectations will he 
disappointed as the circumstances frequently prove to be different from individual beliefs. 
Therefore, certainty about market conditions is essential for lowering the number of 
disappointed expectations. It is the task of competition to show which of these expectations are 
unfounded, and of the legal system to minimise the number of "underserved" failed 
expectations. Also, M. Rizzo, "Hayek's Foui- Tendencies Toward Equilibrium", Cultural 
Dynamic [19901: 12-31 and M. Rizzo, Equilibrium Visions, Economic Research Reports. R. R. 
#91-58, C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of Economics, New York 
University, New York, 1991. These critiques rely on the incapacity of Hayekian co-ot-dination 
equilibrium analysis to adapt to real time. 
339 "Class" events are ascertainable through certainty or through the calculation of probabilities. - I, 
the first case, the predictor asserts that a given event will occur, in the second case, the pi-edictoi- 
associates a compound set of mutual class events with a series of weightiny's. O'DI-1, ýC(fli and C71 - 
Rizzo put forward an example that differentiated the two ways of anticipating class events: the 
use of the certainty method allows the prediction that there will be a police patrol in a given 
place and time-, the probabilistic method, by contrast, allows the calculation that the pi-obabilit\ 
of such a patrol may be 0.4, a gang brawl 0.2, or a delivery of illegal narcotics 0.4. In both L- 
the class condition of the events predicted does not change, what change,, ho\vc\, ci-. i,, the 
in which they are predicted. (O'Driscoll and Rizzo, pp. 76-77) 
140 O'Driscoll and Rizzo, pp. 85,87. 
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The fact that social interaction is a complex evolutionary process trIggcred hy thc 
sheer ignorance of its participants does not mean that social systerns lie in chaos. Ordcr 
results from the recocynition that changes in the sysleni and the ascertainin, -, ()I' future t, -IIý 
events to some extent are bound by the level of information available todav. If therc xvci-c 
no certainty about the future whatsoever, it would make no sense to make plans to 111atch 
and co-ordinate activities in the marketplace. 
To explain how individuals and firms behave in the disequilibriurn oi- "pattel-11 C()- 
oi-dination" that characterises the open-ended rnark-et order, Kirzner de\, cloped hr', 
concept of "entrepreneLll-" in his seminal work Conij)etltion and 
This concept attempts to overcome the rigidity of the neo-classical hoiiio ecollollm-10, in 
ccononilc analysis. The notion of "entreprencur" provides a useful connecting thrcii(l 
between all these elements. The entrepreneur act., -, as Lin arbi'irageur led by profit-rnakinLT 
opportunities constantly arising from gaps in the knowledge of the market as a wholc. 11c 
111LISt be "alert" to discover new opportunities that allow him to move ahead and )Litt-Io 
his competitors. Firms exploit these profit opportunities, thus creating new know1cck-, c, 
favourina exchange possibilities and enhancing the co-ordination of individual plans an(l 
social efficiency. In the words of Kirzner: Each entrepreneurial discovery represent,, 
Aertness to a hitherto unperceived interpersonal opportunity -an opportunity that 
depends on the co-ordinated plans of two . -, cparate individual,,,. ý\s this ", ciicral' 
equilibrating process proceeds bv competitive entrepreneurial alertness, it identifies nioi, c 
)41 1. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship , (ChjcaLo: 
The University of Ch, c, i-, () Pi-c,,,,. 
1973) It should be noted, however, that K1rzner has never fully acknowledged disequilibl-11-1111 A" 
a hel. 11-ISOC tool. His notion of the economic , ystern is one which is always moving to\ýard" 
equilibrium, as entrepreneurial action narrow. s the -ap of disequilibrium created hy the 
awýirencss of business opportunities. In this *issue, his view,, appear more moderate in contraý, t 
with those inaugurated by George Shackle. who advocated a radical departure from any heurr"i it-, 
appraisal of reality based on the idea of equilibrium. Nevertheless, Kirzner's vle'ý\'ý brouLht ; in 
important in. -., i, -, ht on the 
limitations of the neo-classical appraisal to e\plam market pr()Ce""c". 
On Shackle'.,, radical disequillbrium, see L. M. Lachniann "Professor Shackle on the Economit', 
SiL, nificance of Time" in Capital, Ex ectatlon, ý and the Market Process. Es,, ay, ý on the Theor\ ()I IP 
the Market Econoniv, Institute for Humane Studie,,. Sheed Andi-c\\s and McNlecl. Inc. K, in"a, 
Cliý. 1977, pp. 8 1-93). 
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Lmd more uncoordinated situations, while spreadirig the mformatim i)_\ 
enti-epreneUrIal alertness among wider and wider cl market". 342 i rc I e,. the 
These opportunities do not refer exclusively to price gaps, but also, to the \a,, t 
an-ay of value exchanoc niechanisms that enable to pin , uch iii Z71 Z71 1 
the market. Therefore, in contrast to the conventional appraisal, Kirzner, ý not]()" 01 
competition refers to any factor which gives a business advantage to a market participant 
O*s-ýi-i, is their actual or potential competitors. It comprises new products ftit ýire w(will, 
producing; new methods of producing known products, new uses for old prodLlCtS. ' Ile\\ 
sources of supply for given input services-, new attitude,, of known suppliers to cxP-, 1111L, Z7) 1 
input service,, -, new distribution, marketing and sellin- techniques, and so on. In ý! cnci-Lil, 
these refer to either uncoordinated or unforeseen gap,, ()f inforn-iation. IntUltIVCIV, 111C. "C -! 7' 
, qs "tell" perceptive entrepreneurs that cermin IcchniqUCS Will PIVV, 111 ()r that will 
i-eplace them. 
In order to seize market opportunities, however, entrepreneurs must necessank, 
avoid the waste resulting, from mistakes thcy could make with false or incon1pictc 
inforniation. To do so, they have to build reliable conjectures about what to expcci Ironi 
other fellow entrepreneurs. Co-ordination appears necessary to gain knowled(-, c \vhIch L- I 
Would make them better off. Social wealth is also created sincc this newly acquircd 
kiiowled-c serves the needs of society more effectively. L- 
9 
However, it would be impossible to achieve these goals if the system is not i-cliahic 
ciiough to preserve enti-preneurs' expectations concerning their productive activitie'ý. To 
ifflow markets to function adequately, it is csscritlal for the mechanism created to fuffil the 
c\pectittions of tho,, c sufficiently aStUtC to dkcOvcr hidden OPPOIILIII]tleý dIld thcrchy 
civýitc new knowled(_, c. Thus, for Cordato, the efficiency of the social hody "call hc 
by the extcnt to which [it] encourages individuals It 
existing in a It7 social context 
to 
pm, sLic their own ooals as consistently as possiblc-. 343 To achieve this the prcrcquisitc iý 
"4' Kiiviicr, Competition ; -ind 
Entrepreneur,, hip. 1). )-)-). 
jIO1,11-ý, ClellLItC Oil thC Of cordato, at 01. , ýusti-iaii-iiistitutioiizili,, t 
illStIR111101MI ctficienc%. Kirzner, for evinipIc. contcn(k that efficlcnc\ ],, achic\ed thiou. -h co- 
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that markets must provide a minimum stability against the uncertainty that could 
Linderi-nine such expectations. This is the function of legal rules: to en,, ure that thc 
possihic amount of undisclosed information ci-nerges from the dark and that tho,, c who I 
VýIlLle It rnost can gain access to it. We will nm\ focus our attention oii this cpc,, tion. zn 
T, he role of government regUlation in the open-ended market order. 
a) Understanding public interest in opei -ended economic svsterns. 
The heuristic model of pattern co-ordination allows Lis to define an alternatke 
appraisal to the understanding of public interest which is embedded in lecyal ruIc,, in the L- 
context of open-ended systems. 
In this context, public interest is not an abstract formula of social welfarc dcviscd in 
the mind of a superjor "central planning- entity. Instead, it embodies the mutual 
pei-ceptions and collective wants of many individuals, thus providing the concept "vith a t 
tRily social sense. In the context of market tl-an', ýICWIIS. "InStItUtI01M]" public intci-cst i, 1N 
not ideafised under an abstract welfare calculation of efficiencv (as for example, the 
Ni-eto Crite'rion, or the Kaldor-Hicks) but is realised through an aggi-egate "opinion" t) ýý 0 ý- 
expressing the partICUlar way that individuals find most acceptable for co-ordinating their Z7 
ýictivities. 
Under the institutional paradigm, the social efficiency standard which enahle. " the Z7) 
observer to the performance of "pattern co-ordination" does not depend on how 
I-eSOUrces are allocated but on how much the social system co-ordinates scattered data 
ordinating the actions of market participants, while Cordato contends that co-ordination i,, ýt Z- 
,, ccondarv poal to facilitating the attempts of market participants to attain their particular C- L- 
although that may conflict with the overall co-ordi nation of markets. (Corclato. Welfare , p. lt, - 62). It ,, ccrns thai this discussion does not re\ cal a contradiction of postulate,,, since In hoth c, ', t:,, 
iciency O. e. Pareto 01)W111.1111) social interpersonal goals which serve a,, a reterence for social eff 
11rc rejected, and ýittcntjon k Placed oil the ind, v, dLial condition ()I market pm-ticip , 11-its to 
del'int, 
.1 an institutional lormula of ýocial efficicncy. In,,, tead. it appears that the question poscd I" L 
matter of Crilphasr". one Can regard efficiency from the \ icýý point ()I the ob , 
jecme", ol the 
hodv (i. c. Munerian co-ordination of rnarket,, ) or reLmid cHICMIL'N from the pcr.,, pcý. tive oI ilic 
participants indiN iduals. as Cordato propo,, c,, 
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and information which i,, subjectively perceived by different entrepreneui-, accordinL, to 
their own learning experiences. The distinction was initially ernphasised hy Havek in li",, 
1937 paper Econ. omics and Knowledge, 344 later followed by Richardson',, 
Social efficiency is only t'Casible if entrepi-enCLII-S can co-ordinate their acti\jtjc,,, to the 
rnaxiniurn and exchanoe available information which enables them to meet their A,, 
Hayek indicated, in what has perhaps beconic hi.,, most frequently quoted scniciicc in 
ccnnonilc science: "The economic problem ()f s(wiety Ps thus not merely a pi-0-flem ()I' 
how to allocate '(-, iven' resources, if 'given' is taken to mean oiven to a single mind which L- t7l 
delihcrately solves the problern set by these -data'. It is rather a prohlem of ho\. \, to , ccurc 
the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relat'\V 
importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the 
utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in lt, ý, totýjjlty-. 340 
To understand the nature of the problems that individuals face in the marka 
consider the situation where producers are all hit by an increase in demand. HO\v Iliucli 
should they increase production by? The information found in other firms' investment 
decisions which would be necessary for calculatin1g, optinial investments js not rcadllý 
availahle to anyone. Entrepreneurs may gues,,, ofcour,, c, but these gueý, scs are dependcni 
UPOII the guesses of other firms, which would , cci-n to lead into an infinite mid 
slicer Uncertainty. 347 
Markets possess an inner condition of pattern co-ordination or institutional 
clTicicno, which brings about a correspondcnce between the expectations of cach t- 
)44 A. Havek, "Economics and KnowledLC, IV 1-', conomica [ne\ý , ei., 11)') 1 71: 5 4. 
v 
i, essentially a prohlem in\ Aving thc decision of each IndivIdLiil in )45 The allocation Of rcs(M"CeS P, 
the social systern, Micreas coordination is the kcy te understanding hoý\ different plaw, and 
pieces of knowle(l, -, c are separately held in the mesh of a social settina. Economic theorv lm,, not 
as vet clearIv acknowledged the full irnpllcýitlons of this different appraisal, being concerned 
'. 111110st CXCILII, ]'\Ci\ with the individual le\cl. Scc N. Foss. "Austrian and Post-N I, ir"lml liin 
Economics: The Brid-int, Work of George Richardson", in Economic Organization. Capabilitieý, 
and Co-ordination, Routledge, London, 1998. In this \wrk, Fo,,,,, explains the clo.,, c intellectuA t_ 
strands of Richaid.,, ()iC,, ývork and Havek's. 
14o F. A. Hýt\ck, The Usc ()I'Knowledge in Socicl\, pp. 77-7S 
47 ThP, 1,, ewinplificd in Kcvne, ý', ý famou, ý Beitut. \ Conle,, l 'ýcc Chapter ". , cctlon 1 2, ohwv 
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participant through a learning process. This \N, ýty of co-ordinating, indivIdLml actioWl b L- - 
secures an effective utilisation of the knowledge and skills of the members. Later. kN, c will 
explore how market arrangements provide the neces,, m-y web of information to rcich i 
solution to this problem Of uncertainty. 
In this perspective, the existence of exterrialitics lc,.,,., cnm, (,, "public mtei-cý, C' iii Ilic Z'7 
conventional sense is, by definition, denied. In the context of market relation", 1111111,. 1,1 
Huerta de Soto explain,,, the fact that entrepreneur,. fall to , cc or ignore the cxistcncc ()I 
profit opportunities leads them to err. But with this approach, such ci-roi-s do ]lot 
necessarily entail a negative bias, as the notion of market fiadu 1-cs \vould, becausc thcir 
existence provides an opportunity to profit 1'or more alert entrepreneurs: "It Is precisciv 
the existence of [sheer entrepreneurial errors] that generates pure entrepreneurial 
profit". 348 Therefore, the presence of errors does not diminish the efficiency of the opcn- 
ended system, if individuals are free to correct them. 
Hence, public interest is not related to the protection of a value which fies "outside" 
the will of those actually involved in the transaction concerned. It is i-nore related to the 
aeneration of valuable information, achieved throuo-h a learning process which deniands b Z7) C) 
both co-ordination between entrepreneurs and competition so that they 1-nay 
ii-il'orniation gaps and reveal "uncoordinated" business opportunities. Its existcnce doe,, 
not depend on the specific outcomes achieved at one given stage. Instead, public intere'A :n 
depends on the fact that present and prospective co-ordination is improved as niuch ýi,, 
I)ossiblc, because it is then that the hidden value of , ocial inforniation will i-naterialisc and 
satisfy the needs of those who "become aware of it". 
-ror process inevitablv ch. "appoint" 48' . 1. Huerta de 
Soto, La Methodenstreit... p. 58. This trial-and-ei 
some expectations. Responses to the dIfference,, hetwecii the expected and the actual W11111', \\ III 
lead to fewer frustrated expectations in the 11C\t I'01-ind. Hence, there will be some expectatiow, 
that the market order will inevitably fail to fulfil. (F. A. Hayek, Law. Legislation and - 
Llhertvý 
The Mirm'., e of Social Ju,, tice, (ChIcazo: The University of Chiczwo Prc, ý,. 197-))ý chapter M. ) 
Nevertheless the pi-occ,,, ) hi,, created iiew kno\vIcdLc. although 
in a necrati\c ýcii"C' h\ indicmilL, 
What C0LII', 1, C Of ýItAIOII should be avoided. III thi,, \va\, markets fulfil a , ()cial role III (11"clo"11IL" 
hidden Information, even it' by doing w some 111(11\ IdUal e\pectation,,, have I() he (11appollitc(I 
Market order Luldes individuals' actions and brings about a correspondence hci\\'cCn th, - 
c\pectatIons of the people that actually sLICCCCd. while IIIdLICIIILT 1-111SUCCC10stUl mics I() ; hm-pcn 
UICII' IOFCCýIIsIS III fLI1UI-C transactions. 
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h) The role of legal rules in the transm] I ion in open-ended economic ,, -s 
o-no-f-informat 
, svstenis. 
A redefinitic. m Of PLINIC interest inevitably leads to a reappraisal of' the \, ci-\ j)Ul-j)(), C 
of social and ooverriniental rules in the social systcrn. Thus, the legitli-nacy of fi-(m-, 
iin institutional perspective, is inevitably tied to the capacity of thesc rulcs to collvcý 
valuable information to economic agents, which enable them an easier or more cfIcctIVc 
plan co-ordination. Hence, what makes public iritcre,, t --public" from the standpoint ()I 
lecyal science is not dependent on whether the legal rule is enacted by the authoritv, or b 
whether it is agreed ýiccording to certain procedLII'(_'. -, rc-ýii-dcd as le-itiniatc, r, lc(_, al L_ 17,1 
positivists would contcnd. 349 It is whethcr the rule favour" or inipedes "ocial co- 
ordination. 350 
Therefore, undcr this definition, "ICgal" IIIIC possesses a broader mcaning. Thc I- 
definition enýornpasses those rules enacted under formal mechanisms as well ýis customs, 
conventions and routines developed out of social interaction, regardless of wlicther mi 
official law-i-riaking body formally approves thcrn. 
The chief feature of legal rules their embodiment of the social consent, which v,, 
dieIr ultimate Source of coercion. That consent is not found on principle but M the 
practical role they play In conveying information valuable for productive activitie,,. Thrs 
341) Hart, -Poýltivlsni..., - pp. 593-629. 
1 )50 In his work Thc New Social Contract Macnell underline,,, the failure of positivistic le- d tl ii ki Z7- ýII 
to distinguish between "official law", and "real world" contractual needs. It seems that Z7 
percelvin- the law in -IeLalistic- terms. that is, as merely consisting of "official" souvce. ý,. hýv,, L- -- -- 
serious limitations in relation to the need to adapt human exchanges to unforeseen events. (I. R. Z-- 
Macnýil, The New Social Contract- An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations, Yalc 
University Press, London, 1980, p. 5. ) True. -Nlacnell contends- "official lwk- is an importaill 
component of' all contractual relations, vei the significance ()t contract,, c\ten(k hcý()nd it,, 
houndarles. "Contracts are about getting thiw--, done in the real world" (P. 5) Hence, "official" 
law should not be confused with the underIving social relatlons that it airns to regulate. 13ý 
contr'Ist. 1ým-oricrited definitions narnm OL11- per,, I)cclive because the\, force Lis to think aboul 
law, thus neLdccting the underlying relatjon,, ý "It' ývc \\, ],, h to 1-111&1-'ýtand C011traCt 1ý1\\. \\C 11111"I II ltý 
think about c\chan, -, c and such th1n(-, s first, and law "ccond- (P. 
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explains why rules must adapt to changing circumstances; they may otherwise beco"Ie 
obsolete and loose their informational role. 
According to North, "institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or moiv 
formally, are the hUmanly devised constraints that shape human interactimn () 
Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life". They provicic a 
reference framework which makes the future less uncertain, thus enabling i-narket 
exchanges. 351 Thus, overcoming uncertainty in order to encourage entrepreneurs to 
inake investments is related to a capacity to establish effective institutions which providc 
the stability needed to predict possible outcomes and the flexibility to adapt to chanic-l". e. 
Such effectiveness is inextricably linked to the extent to which individuals perccivc thc. "C 
institutions as binding and capable of meeting their changing needs. 
The informational role of institutions has a lot to do with a legal notion formerly 
neglected in the conventional appraisal of legal rules namely, "legal certainty its 
expectancy" or "certainty as expectations". 35 2 The rule of law emerges as a result of ýi b 
process where entrepreneurs match their mutual expectations in their interactions over 
tii-ne. An entrepreneur may succeed in communicating his intentions to others by slniplý, Z: ) - 
behaving similarly under similar circumstances. Conversely, others may build up firill 
expectations by relying on their own past trading experience, or by basing their b t-1) j 
351 D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, (Cambridge: L- 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 2. 
352 This notion was eclipsed for a long time due to the rise of legal positivism's emphaslýl oil ý1 
formal approximation to the source of legal rules' enforceability; yet, this is by no means alien to 
legal science. On the contrary, its significance has been long acknowledged, as Leoni staics- 
"Many Western countries, in ancient as well as in modern times, have considered the ideal ot, 
individual freedom (the absence of constraint exercised by other people, includin,,,, the 
authoritle, s) essential to their political and legal systems. A conspicuous characterknic ot thls 
ideal has always been the certainty of the laws". (Leoni, p. 93. ) It , rounds le-al certaintv oil 11-ic C' 
basis of a series of rules spontaneously accrued in the decisions of individual cases, and later 
ascertained by judges over the centuries and generations. "Certainty" is related to the need for 
individuals to know the likely outcome of their activities in advance. For this rea"on. thVS 
concept embodies the "aggregate knowledge" of cumulative decisions solving problems alon. - a 
similar pattern, thus giving economic actors relying upon the alignment of their conduct., and 
Iong-term plans a rule embodying a tested solution. As Leoni states. "general reoulatiow, laid L- L- - z: 1 
down 
, 
in due time and made known to all citizens make it possible for them to foresee w1lat %%ill 
happen on the le-al stage as a consequence of their behaviour". (Leom, p. 72. ) -Z, 
L- 
188 
on the reputation of a given entrepreneur, reflectino the trad'n( experience of ()tllci- I L-) r 
entrepreneurs. Alternatively, they may resort to contractual means Cea to nsur W1111111-flic"', 
to comply with the expectations created. If contracts are unavailable for some i-eil"oll, 
then parties may simply align their conduct with that of other entrepretieul-s. oil the 
of what they expect frorn them. 
In this perspective, the particular wording or written form of the rule rnav Indecd 
have some influence, but this is not the ultimate reason for the willingness of tho, "e 
sub' I -e I ject to it, to comply with its mandatory eff n, History Lives Lis many 111stalicc, " ()I 
how institutions are related to the ýffective constraints imposed upon entrepre lie u I's, 
which emerge not from the conviction that they are dictated or enforced by the lc, -, Ilinlýllc 
authority, but from the conviction that they i-nust possess some practical usc. TIIC"C 
constraints may result from the enforcement of an official rule, but may also evolve frorn 
the traditions and customs to which the legal system may or may not attach official 
recognition. 353 
353 History gives us examples where these customary rules were more effectively enforced by ýý! R)Lll)s 
sharin- common interests than the numerous rules contained in codes and le-Islation throu, _, hout 
the world. In Rome, for instance, Cato the Censor, cited by Cicero, highlighted the superioriltý N 
Roman customary rules as compared with other systems. In his words, "th: 2 political s\,,, tcm, ()I 
other countries had been created by introducim-, laws and institutions according to the pcismml 
advice of particular individuals like Minos in Crete and Lycurgus in Sparta, while at Athclis, 
where the political system had been changed several times, there were many such persons, l1kc 
Theseus, Draco, Solon, Cleisthenes ... 
Our state, on the contrary, is not due to the personal 
ci-cation of one man, but of many; it has not been founded durim, the lifetime of all\ particular 
Individual, but through a series of centuries and generations. For he said that there nc\er \\&"' in 
the world a man so clever as to foresee everything and that even if we could concentrate lill 
brams into the head of one man, it would be impossible for him to provide for everythinL, at onc 
time without having the experience that comes from practice through a long period of history". L_ - 
(Occro. De Republica 11,1,2. Quoted by Leoni. p. 88). Most of the Roman rules on privatc lm\ 
were not dictated by a superior authority, but emerged slowly from social interaction: these RIIC', 
were embodied later in the code provided by Justinian Coi-pits Jith. y Civilis. Private Rornail Lm. 
which the Roman, -,, calledJus civile. was kept beyond the reach of legislators. The varlous 
plesbicita and Senatus Consulta were reserved for public law matters relating to the fLIIlCtIOIl1nL' 
of political assemblies. The fact that written law was reserved to matters quod ad t-em Romatiam 
spectact, and that Romans relied on customary law for their economic relations did not dirrilril"h 
the predictability that Romans enjoyed in business and private matters, as evidenced 11ý the 
enormous development of the Roman econornN. Similarly, in the Common Lm ,, \sicin the 
judges had all Inclination to remain as spectators rather than actors in the law-makirlL, piocc"". 
(Leon], pp. 81-86) Finally, it is illustrative that the later Napoleonic Civil Code ýv. ls 11 
compilation Of I-Liles dictated under the Aiwiew Regime. which was. in principle. inicn(IM to 
make the former accessible to the layman. not to overrule him. (J. Nlerr\ man. The Civil I '11w 
Tradition. Ali introdLICtion to the Legal Systems ol'\Vestern Europe and Latin America. Stantord 
University Press, Standford, 1969, p. 100. ) 
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In this. sense, the rule of law comprises institutions which are already endogenOLISk 
embedded in the expectations of social actors. To this extent, it encompasses, conditlorlýl 
and shapes the economic interaction that takes place within a complex web of express 111(1 
tacit rules of behaviour accepted by all. Unlike the conventional approach, which re-garck 
legal rules as "orders" imposed upon social interaction from the outside, our appraisal 
regards them as the outcome of cumulative market interaction, following patterris whcrc 
utility maximisation is difficult or costly. 354 Thus, like the uncertainty they alm to 
eradicate, institutions are endogenously created. 355 
Hayek describes the informational role of legal rules as follows: "AlthOU"11 b ý7 
legislation can certainly increase the certainty of the law on particular points, I aill flow 
persuaded that this advantage is more than offset if its recocynition leads to the In 
requirement that only what has thus been expressed in statutes should have the force ot, 
law. It seemý to me that judicial decisions may in fact be more predictable if the judge is 
also bound by generally held views of what is just, even when they are not supported by 
the letter of the law, than when he is restricted to deriving his decisions only from those 
among accepted beliefs which have found expression in the written law". 356 This is more 
likely to happen in those legal systems where no single individual has control over thc 
law-making process, but where decisions about the law are left to a multiplicity (fl 
decisions that reproduce evolving patterns of social behaviour regarded as "fair" over 
time. 
354 K. Vaughn. Institutions as the Source of Catallactic Order, George Mason UniveN . "y paper 
presented at the Austdan Economics Colloquiunj Department of F-collonlic". N, -\\ YoO 
University. October 1996. 
355 According to Choi, individuals idealise the reactions they expect from mutual interaction ,, ýIjj 
approval -seek ing and disapproval -avoidance pattern. They formulate idealised categories of the ý7 Z_ 
conduct that each one expects from the others, and the conduct that he thinks others should 
expect from him. (Y. B. Choi, On Neglected Opportunities and Entrepreneurial Discov - 
erlclý' 
Paper presented at the Austrian Economics Colloquiurn, Department of Econornic,,. New York 
University, April 1997, p. 6. ) 
"56 Hayek, Law, egislation and Liberty: Rules and Order, p. 116. 
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Hence, these principles are not devised by any particular authority at a given point 
in time, but embody the aggregate wisdom of past experience. 357 Legal framexvork,, L_ 
evolving from marginal additions are less prone to change in the long-term: thereforc. thc 
certainty resulting from these systems is superior to that in systems where the certainl\ ()I 
the law relies only upon the wording of the legil instrument concerned. A'ý RLIck!, Im! 
states, the law is not represented by codes, statutes or other legal means, but hy *,, i ,, ct ol 
principles gradually evolved and refined by a jurisprudence extending over nlaiiý 
centuries, with little interference from a Legislative body". 358 It is on thesc 
principles that entrepreneurs base their expectations, and ultimately their decisions ýIboul 
whether to invest or not. 
Legal rules are necessary tools which enable market actors to overcome their 
ignorance and, in particular, their ignorance about the future. Legal environments which 
are characterised by regular decision-making are prone to improve the predictive 
expectations of individuals of the conduct of other market participants. 
These considerations enable us to see thit it is not by seeking pai-tiCLII, 11- 111110,11-ItIll 
goals but something else that allows us to grasp the essence of a rule of law in an tD t-) Z' 
evolving social setting. That something else Is related to the informational function that it 
plays in conveying disperse, changing knowledge to market participants. bb 
Let us delve more deeply into the essence of this evolving process that eventually 
leads to the creation of customary legal rules with a clear informational role. It is froill 
this process that legal rules evolve and consolidate into a "corpus" of settled routines 
acknowledged by society as binding and legitimate. Their legitimacy lies in the anticipated 6 
357 See M. Rizzo, "Rules versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law", 4 The Cato Journal 
[1985]: 865-884. 
358 W. W. Buckland, Roman Law and Common Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer"itv Prc, '. 
1952) p. 4. Merryman explains that the process of case law gradually defined certain le. -al 
principles; in turn these legal principles constituted the substratum for the codification pi-occ-,. 
which took place at a later stage. (See in general, J. Merryman, The CI\ 11 Law Tradition: an 
introduction to the Legal Systems of Western ELIrope and Latin America, (Stanford: Stýint"Ord 
University Press. 1969). 
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solution they provide to unforeseen problems. In this way, conventions become s(flutiollý, 
to the recurrent problems that individuals face; eventually, these solutions can generate L- 
customary rights. It is important to realise why ordens imposed "from the tol)" h\ ý1 
central authority somehow erodes these consolidated Customary ri-Ats and co"I'lict', \\ Ith 
better coordination within the social system. 
The informational role of social rules is best achieved if they are flexible enough to Z7) 
conform to markets' open-endedness, thereby adjusting to unforeseen contingencic, ". 
while providing a framework of stable principles whose steady evolution they call foil(m. 
Hence, these conventions should be simultaneously stable and flexible to adapt to ncw 
circumstances. In this sense, "stability" provides individuals with the predictability they 
need to pursue their goals, while "flexibility" becomes decisive in perrnittinL', 111al-kci 
participants to adjust their conduct to unforeseen problems and envisage new solutiolls. 
In sum, the rule of law under this perspective fulfils a dual informational role: it reduces 
entrepreneurs' sheer uncertainty to tolerable levels, while it gives them the nleýllls, to 
discover new solutions through a flexible framework. 359 
Let us look at these two questions more iii detail. 
i) The provision of predictable boundaries against sheer uncertainty. 
Social interaction generates a spontaneous trial-and-error process which individuals 
undertake in order to select the patterns of behaviour that provide a more efficient 
solution for a recurrent class problem. Whenever individuals face a class probicni the\, 
359 In this regard, North observes: "Different institutional rules will produce different lol 
knowledge acquisition, for 'learning-by-doing' and for the selection of those required 4: ) L- 
verifications. Rules will determine not only the types of viable and profitable economic activitN 
(i. e. productive activities vs. redistributive activities), they will also provide for the efficiew 
adaptation of business internal structure and organizations through laws regulating entr\ into 
the structure of (, overnment and the flexibility of those organizations. In particular. rules 
encouraging development of tacit knowled-e, and therefore, of creative entrepreneurial falent 
will be important. " (J. Stiglitz et al.. El Papel Econ6mico del Estado. Instituto de Lstudio,, 
Fiscales, (Madrid: Ministerio de Econornfa Y Hacienda, 1993), p. 121. ) North emphasi,, cs the 
two conditions that these institutional WICS ShOUld meet, naniely, providing sufficicni "tahilit\ 
for businesses in their dealings with the governi-nent, and enabling a ýLifficient de, -rcc ol L- Z-7 
flexibilltv to adapt to unforeseen changes. 
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devise a hypothetical solution and test their hypothesis. The results may prove tile 
hypothesis to be false or the hypothesis may continue to be operative until it 1,, cvc,, ILIý111\ 
proven to be false. 360 
As a result, individuals learn to cope with problems arisimi Crom their mtcrýiciion. Iii 
a time-evolvincy framework, decisions are speculative and experimental, b tn I ut expennient 
results in accrued learning in which individual,,, in the process of carryino out thcIr plaw', 
develop new strategies or routines that enable thern to cope with the practical prohlcm,, 
they face-361 Institutions emerge whenever the problem-solver finds a solution to a 
recurrent "class" problem; in this case, the solution becomes the routine solvMg of a Z71 
problern repeatedly arlsincy over time. If the problem is not recurrent, the new learning 1ý, ZD 1 I 
stored away in case a similar situation occurs in the future. In an evolvin, -, and chan, _, mL, 
world whcre the future is unknown, people can confine their expectations to ccrtaill 
parameters which allow them to make plans in line with their goals. The fact that the 
6 4class" problem is identified allows individuals to devise stable conventions to solvc it. 
which reinforces their expectations. 
However, these solutions are ephemeral. As new unique event,,., arise, ci-cating ii(, \\ 
problems, individuals must reconsider their temative solutions to prevcnt thciii* 
cxpectations from being undermined; if problems are repeated, they develop llc\\, 
I-OLItIlleS, which reformulate the effective institutional settino in which they pkicc their 
expectations. In thk process, however, successive solutions steadily push unccrtaintv 
itway, and even though new ignorance emerges (due to the emergence of Linfore,, ccii 
unique evenrs), progress is nevertheless made. r-I 
)60 Vau " 11 n, 111 "t i tu tI ()I I pp. 10- 12. 
301 01)VIOUSIV, the I)i-()cc,,, s of developing, routinc,, Is not similar to the bchav, oLl, ",, 
concept put forward by the neo-classical school. As Vaughn argues, the difference,,, itIV CRICMI. 
111ax I fills] ng model" imply that the decision is instantaneous (no time to deliberate). thal it iý, 
Linproblematic (perfect knowledge)-I and that the choice is always correct (the objective is ak\av,, 
IIIII ake,, time to 'ichieved: Whv then, experiment? ). By contrast, the -in, ýtitutional- problem t 
SOI-t Out Option, through a mental proce, ý,, of trial and error. he iiiýi\ find th-, ýit 
hi" initial "(flutioll 
PS unsawfactor) and therefore requireý, more e\pcrimentation. FLIIIIICI. the ý, OUI-CC Of 
does not need he c\ternal to hi,, own mental , tatc. The in,, titutional problem ý, okcr ma\ 
l'ind ilcý\ 
problem,, by de\clopln(-ý mental conjecturc,, about ým old pattern of idea". or thc nek\ 
C()IlflL, Ill-, Itl()Il of- event', oi- materials. (VAIghn. Institution P. 10) 
I 
The closer expectations are to the routines that solve class problems. the morc 
efficient" these are. Under these circumstances. routines convey meaningful inform. ilion 
to the actors, thus considerably reducing the uncertainty of their future MLIWý11 hC111\10111'. 
The likelihood of making forecasting errors will climinish. t:, 
In terms of costs, routines eliminate present day costs arising from uncertainty I-- - 
about the future. Once firms know their costs (for which they must havc clcýtr 
objectives), it is only it niatter of deciding whether the coursc of ýtction cho,,, cn r, cot rccl- 
As Wiseman argued: "Once we admit that the future is unknown, analy, ýi,.,, of dic 
behaviour of producers in terms of adaptation to knowii future condition.,, bcconlc, ý, 
irrelevant". 362 The picture is open-ended; therefore, one cannot devise a precise fult, 11-c 
state. 
This is why parties develop legitimate expectations in such a changing process (and 
will respect the rule thus created), focused on the fact that ever\/one will stick (() thcsc 
routines, as long as the circuinstances tindcrpinimig thein reinain unchangcd. III thiýl 
exercise individuals may, of course, differ in their interpretation of which CII-CLIIITý; IýHICCS 
change, and which remain the same. The role of Judges in common law systems, who 
ascertain the material facts that make up the ratio decidendi of a case, is essentially to 
attempt to identify the substance of such mutual expectations in order to determine which 
interpretation shouid prevail. 363 As Choi contends: "The very developi-nent ol 
conventions has the effect of stabilising the individuals' expectations about each ollicr. A, " 
they are the results of individual's search for order and regularities, the majority of peopic 
in society can be sccn as coqfoi-ining to conventions. Those who conl'orrn to convcntiow,, 
30-1 Wisernan, Uncertainty.... p. 2 33 3. 
363 It is in this context that the notions of "good faith". "bonus pater famillae". and "negligence-, to tý ltý ý 
mention only a few, are interpreted under particular cases. All the, ýe concepts 1)(),, ý, cv, an "hiner.. 
content, which cannot be differentiated from the particular circumstances in which theý 
But, in a chan(tina world, such limits would ýtcadil\ change in a proces,, where rule,, c, q), iMe ()I 
providing more information to market participant,, would replace leýs capable one,. ind endure 
(wer time. See G. Williarris, Learning the Law. (London: Sicvens ind Son, ý. 1982. pp. 07-90. 
Also, M. A. F-Isciihei-, The Nature of the Common l, a\\. (Carribridoe: Harvard Unlwrsit\ lIrc,,,. 
1988. ) 
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in turn, have the expectation that others will also conform, in that others' conformit\ iý, 
the necessary (and often sufficient) part of the \'Iahlllt\, of the conformi, 
the expectations of others' conformity assumes the character ()j'cL,, stOjjý,, -\! rIlght,, ". , o4 
This explains why people enter into traiisactiow, kiiowing that to achievc thelf, I 
future goýtls they may have to co-operate and hind thernselve,,, throu, -, 
h contrýicwtl : md 
legal rules. They ensure the inescapable corrin-iltment ()I' the other trading entrcpi-encLir,,. 
thLis enhancin- expemitions of their conduct. As Macneil contends, contract,, mv 
pro'ection of exchange into the future". 365 These instruments provide entreprelICLIP, WIth 
ýi legal certainty, on which they can ground their expectations about the use of rcsourcc, 
ii-i the future. Therefore, the instruments allow theiýn to reduce uncertainty under a ccrtain 
iiLirnber of otherwise unknown future conditions. In tLirn, it Js the entrcl)rcncullý" 
, ness to avoid the uncertainty of the 
future that provides their corrirnitnicnl, ý with willin(7, 
coercive power. The problem then is to determine how precisely indkiduals frarne their 
le, yal relationships in a dynamic evolving frarnework. 
Let us now turn to this second question. 
h) The* discovery ol'unforeseen- new-know ledge, 
Conventions arising from positive expectations do not only limit "sheer" unccrtawi\ 
liy eiiabling stability to exist within the system, they also incre&, c the p()ssihiliI\' ditil 
entrepreneurs will discover new knowledge. Conventions may be useful for stabilisin(i 
cxI)ectations over a wide range of possible future courses of action, but not over all ()I' t: ) 
tliern because new circurnstances could render current routines obsolete. Choi iiotices thc 
im-, terms: "It' convcntiow, ar,,, tcnslon I-)ct%vccn stahility and flexibility in the foilmvi - 
cimhfing by their they are also defimitmL, their infI(, xibdiI\, -.. -)'OO ý7' 
304 Choi. On Ne, ýzlected 
NLicnell, Thc Nc\\ -, oclal Comrýict- pp. 4-10. 
I 
. )66 Choi, On 
I () C) 
These routines may only be coercive inter alia, that is, between those who coninlit 
themselves to the belief that by sticking with them the problem will be solved. Routine" 
may be efficient in dealing inter alia with a particular "class" problem which would 
otherwise increase the uncertainty of entrepreneurs. This keeps the expectations of hoth 
parties within certain bounds. Beyond those limits, howe-\,, er, firms may find OppO1-tL1111t1(-- 
to discover new information through competition to fill emerging gaps of informatwil 
which have not been addressed in the prevalent routines. These gaps are the rcsLill ()I 
informational changes introduced into the system; they induce entrepreneurs to devise 
and implement new ways of solving any problems created. Competition enabic. " 
entrepreneurs to "co-ordinate" themselves within respect to profit opportunities, thus 
revealing gaps of uncoordinated information. Those gaps represent instances \N11cl-c b t-D 
unsatisfied customers are awaiting improvements in the quality or price of the products 
traded. Successful solutions create new knowledue, hence new routines, which 11-c b 
imitated by other entrepreneurs. In this way, through the process of buildincy, new 
routines, knowledge is disseminated throughout the system for the benefit of all. 367 
It may be that the old routine prevented entrepreneurs from either discoverin- ilc\\- 
opportunities or reaping the profits from discoveries already made. The gap hem, m) 
actual and potential (i. e. neglected or impossible) opportunities widens over time, i'ý the 
gap becomes wider it is easier to see it. 368 Over time, this process will encouril, L'e 
entrepreneurs to deviate from the conventional rule, and outdo others in findinc, a 11c\\ Z7ý 
routine first (i. e., solution) for successfully addressing the problem created hý tile 
informational change. Of course, entrepreneurs departing from the conventional solution bb 
are frequently regarded as deviants by the rest. Any policy intended to enhance the 
entrepreneur's discovery process must ensure that individuals are not forestalle(l in lhciiý 
367 We have already seen that due to the endogenous nature of changes in tile systern under tile 
institutional paradiam, a new solution to a problern of knowledge inevitabi creatc, ý ncý% t7 
y 
problems. (See section Ib above in this chapter) Choi argues that the "llon-conforrill"I lendenc 
is ever present" due to the different perceptions people hold about similar events 111d 
(Choi, On Negflected..., p. 12. ) 
308 Choi, Oil Neglected.... pp. 13-14.111 Lcilewl, , cc Y. B. Chol, ParadlLnis ind 
, 
Pecision- Making and EntI-q)I-CIICUr,; hIp. (Ann Arbor The Uii'\, ci-,, *t\ ot \lichi- Uncertaigly II 
Pre""', 1993. ) 
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endeavours lo narrow the gap, should they realise its existence. This is ", h\ -h-cc 
competition, " understood as freedom of entry into the market, is a concept that hears 
little resemblance to "perfect competition" which is related to permanence in the rnirkcl 
at any cost, even if that frustrates plan co-ordination. 
Similarly, in a dynamic. process, r1wilry to discover knowletýýc gtil)s cannot br 
isolated. from the conventions that give rise to them. New discoveries accruinL, from 
entrepreneurial rivalry where each anticipates other's behaviour, are the consequence of 
gaps left because no convention can possibly forecast all possible contingencle" that ]I , I\ 
arise in the future. 
To sum up, competition and co-operation amonerst entrepreneurs are inextricably 
linked. To express the complexity of this phenomenon, it is useful to detach the tcriii 
I 
"competition" from its colloquial use, i. e., that it Is exclusively about "rivalry" between 
entrepreneurs involved in similar activities, and to see it in conjunction with the co- 
operation that firms engage in to further their discoveries of valuable information. 309 
Adaptable institutions emerging out of this interaction between competition and co- 
operation play a key role in facilitating exchanges that take place between individuals. b 
Perhaps this is most clearly seen in the realm of market functioning. Here, the role b 
of business organisations is essential through a wide array of different arrangements 
which entrepreneurs implement in order to achieve their particular goals. 
369 Using a neologism, Nabeluff and Brandenburger refer to this phenomenon as "co-opetition". r-1 týl See B. Nabeluff and A. Branderiburger, Co-opetition, (New York: Currency Books, Douhle(im 
1996). In this work, the authors indicate: "Business entails co-operation when baking -i cake and 
competition when it will be sliced. In other words, business entails both things: war and peace 
( ... ). The -oal is to obtain some 
benefit. Sometime,, it is achieved at the expense of other". 
sometimes it is not In business, someone Is succe,,,, does not demand that others fall. , ince 
there may be multiple winners". (pp. 4,5) 
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THE ROLE OF ORGANISATIONS IN ECONOMIC OPEN-ENDED SYSTEMS. 
Organisations are clearly essential for making It possible for entrepreneurs to 
undertake activities that they cannot pursue in isolation. 370 However, conventional thcorv 
does not acknowledge this fact. For a long time, the theory of the firm could not render ý1 
plausible explanation of the firm, which remained confined to a "black box". 371 Industrial 
organisation approached markets and firms as opposing entities, regarding the latter with 
suspicion for bringing about inefficiencies to the social body. However, in the real world 
there is no such division between firms and markets. Instead, there is a continuum passinc, 
from transactions, such as those organised in the commodity market where co-opcration 
is negligible, through intermediate areas where there are linkages based on goodwill, to 
complex and interlocking clusters, groups and alliances, which represent fully developed 
co-operation. How do these organisational forms emerge and why! Mainstream theorics 4D 
370 Organisations are here taken as encompassing any form of inter-firm co-operation among I-- tý 
entregreneurs, regardless of whether they are formalised into explicit arrangements or not. They 
include a vast array of corporate structures, business practices and patterns of regular behaviour. L_ 
371 Neo-classical theory was never interested itself in the nature of the firm, which was re-arded as ý7 
a sort of "anomaly" in the market system, whose emergence did not fit into its basic preilli"ICS 
about the interaction between the forces of supply and demand. It was Ronald Coase who ri-iii(le 
the first important attempt to clarify its emergence within the market system. In The Natitre qf 
the Firm, Coase described the firm as an institution that emero-ed whenever usinc, the market 
price system was more expensive than planning. In such cases, there were costs of doill- 
business ("transaction costs") which forced entrepreneurs to choose hierarchy and planning 
rather than resorting to market exchanges. (R. H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm", 4 
Economica n. s. [Nov. 1937], 386-405. ) Coase's work persuaded economists to 1-Coard 
transaction costs as a determinant factor in the emergence of firms; however, he himself "t1il 
contended in the 1970's that his paper had often been quoted, yet little understood. (See, Cozrc. 
"Institutional Structure of Production", p. 5. ) In fact, the neo-classical theory of the firm doe.. ý, 
not examine its nature and therefore leaves many aspects in the dark. Neo-classical theories do 
not explain how inter-firm division of labour comes about. Instead, they a,,,, ume 
W"/ production functions" which represent the ina-villitlill Outplit obtainable froin dil ( clit I. lipifif 
combinations. Thi,,, representation of productive possibilities neglects the role. ý 
ki . ioit, ledge, experience and skills. Yet, production has to be undertaken by human organizatiow, 
embodying appropriate experience and skill. Firms carry out an indefinitely large number of 
activities related to the discovery and estimation of future wants, research, development and 
desi-n, marketing and transformation of physical goods. These activities require the appropriate 
knowledge, experience and skills: command of a particular technology, skill in rnarketinL, or 
reputation in a particular market. (Richardson, "The Organization... "). These are essential to L- 
understand why firms sometimes co-operate and why they sometimes act as rivals. It Is also 
important in understanding why they develop new products, innovate and make irnproveiiient,,. 
which is out- goal. 
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do not acknowledge this problem seriously, thus hindering a fuller unclerstandint! ()I' the L- -- 
cLtusc,, for the growth offirms. 372 
Antitrust analysvý Suffers from this inability to understand the nature of fll-! Il" Thý', 
it condernns several forms of market arrangements to heing, branded a,, "anticornrctitivC'' 
restrictions which deserve surveillance. However, under an alternativc approýich \\hicli 
erriphasises the evolution of market,,. "restrictive" contractual arrangernerits mid 
I 
corporate arrangernents that managers normally adopt in their activities reveal mail, \' 1110'"C 
efficiencies than antitrust scholars are ready to concede. This is not howevcr 
reallsed unless we abandon the heuristic equilibrium models of neo-classical vintage. This 
is what we have emphasised in the previou,, section, and we will now apply it to thc 
analysis of market functioning. 
Thus, in this section we will explore how, under an alternative Institutionill 
viewpoint, market arrangements currently prohibited or restricted by antitrust ,, tatutc. " 
appear to be the vcry cxpressi . on of different cle, grees of co-ordination, the efficlencN, of 
which becornes evident in the long-run. This could provide a good measure from which Z: ) 
to consider the legality of these contracts and business Linde rtak in gs. This scction \Al zn t7l 
show why these conducts should be preserx, cd. provided they reinforce cntrcprencur,, ' 
expectations within the market. 
2.1. - The co-ordination problem of entrepreneLll-S in decentrallsed market setting"': 
conipctitivc and complementary investments. 
The transmission of information is decl,, ive in the functioning of dcccntrali,, cd 
i-narket systems, hecausc only in this way can individuals co-ordinate their activiticý, 
', Liccc,,, sl'ullv. In niarket cconornies. individuals mv independent ot' centi-al directioll. \Cl 
More recent , tudic, in the field of industrial or-anisation regard the firm as a structure creýdcd Z- 
i- 
[or the solution ()I' the incentke problem cicited 11%, the agent-prmcil)ý11 reLitioný'hip. I II- Z7 111 
these improvement,, of the conventional \, Ic\\, still pre,, cm a faultý explanatorý ba,, i,, liw 
appraising the subjectke nature of the kno\\'Ic(h-, c held hy those interacting within firm" 'Ind 
market See N. Foss, On the iclation,,, Mween l`\()ItmOmir\ mid Contraclual 
Thcoric,, of' thc Firin. DRUID Working Papci No. 97-4. Department of Indwtrial 1-, 'onomiclý 
and Strate(i\ , 
CopcnULen BLISHICY, School. CopcllhaLml. 1997. 
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their activitie,, are interrelated by a network of orIganisations which allo\\ transmi.,,, ý, 'Ojl 10 
occur throughout the -sy,., tem. 373 I-- 
In order to make information available, firms engage into a variety of "re,,, trictive- Z- 
conventions, either in contractual form or simply as self-imposed routines. Thc""- 
i'estrictions provide mutual boundaries aimed at providing some chance of predicting the 
conduct of other hLISHICSSeS with success. The,, e N)Undaries ak() lea\e ()I)cn Ilic 
possibility for husines,,, cs to reconsider their respectivc position,, shoi-ild ne\\ prohlen", 
ýtrise. In this way, partics Live tentative assLirances ahmit their commitment,,. 
Any forecast of future levels of demand is inevitably imprecise, but that doe', not 
relieve firms from committing themselves to investments today to meet future demand. 
Because of s heer uncertainty, firms must develop devices to reduce their Lincertainiv to a 
level where they will have sufficient confidence to make investments. This is irnportaill 
l'or firrns because once an investment is niadc, it is unlikely that the investin, -, firm c. m 
withdraw without suffering losses. Hence, managers must be certain that other firills al-C 
committed to what they believe are their commitments; in other words, that thcIr 
expectations will not be frustrated. As Schumpeter contends: "Enterprise would in most 
cases be impossible if it were not known from the outset that exceptionally favorable 
,, ituations are likely to ansc which if exploited hy price, quality and quantity i-nampulation 
will produce profits adequate to tide over cxceptionally unfavorable , ituations provi(lccl 
these are similarly manao-ed. -374 Organisations sprin, -, either in the I'Orni of sclI'-Inip(). sCcI 
routines or through contractual commitments ensuring that vital inforniation i,,., enc, e(l L- -I at 
ýind passed on to all those involved thus creating such "exceptionally fi'Livourable zn 
SItUatiOIIS-. 
73 ) Richardson clearly states this point, which ne, -flected 
hy neo-classical "ornniscient" modeký 
what commonly fails to be recognized. i,, that the possibilm of formim-, ichahle I-- 
expectations is not independent of the particular market conditions which define the model 
employed. [On the contrarv] it Is the avallabilitv to Cillrepreneur,, of thi,, information wilk-11 
Is If ic ol-Tallisat loll ol' SY"teill withill ." unction of the nature of the particular form of econorni 
which thev are presurned to operate. [Therefore] the extent to \Oich an entrepreneur can obtain 
market information can be shown to depend on the nature of the prevailing economic 
organization". Richardson, Information ..., pp. 
29, ')0. 
C, 
)74 ScIlLifilpeter, Pp. 89-90. 
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Firms must know that such favourable conditions will be "there" when the time 
comes, otherwise, they will refrain from investing. Anticipated knowledge in the forn-i ot' 
reliable expectations is essential for establishing the present level of investments that firmý, 
are willing to make today to meet future aggregate demand. But such knowled0c doe, 
not relate to "objective" future circumstances which, after all, are pure speculation-, H 
relates to the subjective perception of the investor that other market participants \\'I II havc 
a certain set of beliefs about what the future will bring* 
The volume of investments will ultimately depend not so much on increa, ýes or 
reductions in future aggregate demand (a fact that only a prophet could predict) h. LIt oil 
the volume of both competitive and complementary investments that each finii hop('ý 
others will commit todqv. Entrepreneurs don't know for sure what these volLinics al-e. 
Even if t hey communicated their intentions to the rest, others would have to trust them 
and align their conduct accordingly. However, trust is not built on mere communication, 
for entrepreneurs may be tempted to cheat to obtain an advantage. 375 Something else is 
necessary. 
Entrepreneurs speculate about the levels of investment other firms will make in the 
event of a foreseen -increase or reduction in 
future aggregate demand. For this reason. 
they must identify the mýinimum. amount of information required, and the different 
conditions which permit access to it. 
The devices which entrepreneurs employ to gather information may take multiple 
forms, but what they all have in common is that they consolidate the expectation', of' 
i-narket participants by reducing their uncertainty to tolerable level,,. Noticc t1wi 
formalities represent a mere additional consideration in the process of building business 
trust. Explicit arrangements through which price information js made available (() 
)75 This is the classic Prisoner's Dilemma situation where some parties seek to gain advantage" hý 
cheating the rest-. these situations call for intervention to discipline members of the groul). (See tý - 
A. Dixit and B. J. Nabeluff, Thinking Strategically, W. W. Norton & Company, New York. 
1991. ) The application of game theory models in the law is, explored in D. Baird, R. GCrtner and 
R. Picker. GameTheory and the Law, (Cambridue: Harvard Unversliv Press, 1994. ) 
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entrepreneui-, rnýiy take several form,, which ai-c cithur , tructured Ii-ito 
arran-cments or not. Thus, the form adopted hy organisations does not, in principic, rel-N 
upon the legal form chosen by entrepreneurs. Rather, it depends on the position ftit eýich 
rnarket actor holds vls41-vis the rest (both competitors and cwtorner, )). The -, oal i. 1-1 to 
adjust cx-ante to the behaviour of other fii se po ,ic -ms in the system in order to minIIIII 
losses resulOng fron-i misleading interpretatiow, of the content of the con-ii-ilitilICIII., 
iiegotiated. 
-nent caii take alternative forms, depending on the kind of relatloiiship SLIch adjusti In 
that the entrepreneur concerned has with the others. It is possible to distinguish hct\\, ccn Z-- 
the aqjustrnent that rival firms seek to make with respect to their share in all LHICCI-tall-I 
future level of ao, <Yrecate demand, and the adjusti-nent that firms seek with their custonicr" bb b 
and suppliers to ensure a minimum level of commitment in response to such an uncerlaii-i 
aggregate demand. In this respect, firms rnav he placed either in a conipetitivc or a 
complementary relationship. 376 
Firstly, firms may be put into a compcotive rclationshil). In this case, cowsumcr., ý 
i-e-ard the commodities they offer as simllai- products, or more technically, eflective 
', uhstitutes, in this cýi,, c, the profitability of the inve,, tments of one entreprenew- will hc 
i-edUced by the investment plans that others implement. Therefore, he will be induccd to 
entei- into more oi- less formal communlcýitlon with hP,, competitoi-,, to ýtvoi(l making 
nilstakcs on the amount of resources he devotes to production. Underestimating othcr,, ' 
capacity oi- willingness to invest may result in excessive future output and waste for all. 
At the same tirne entrepreneurs are guided by the opportunities in sight to attempt to 
ýtttýun the highest possible level of investments in order to maximise profit,, Lich 
cntivpi-eneur will bear an internal tension betwcen following, the rule or routine !, ild (1()\\ ii 
hv all, which would pvc everyone (including him) more certainty. and breaking the ailc il' 
thiit , liould cnsui-c him ýi bcttei- chancc oI' mii\hiwýing pi-4it,, 377 'Flici-ck', i-c. thc- I 
37 Richardson, inforniation and Investment, pp. 49,87. 
3FI rm: Sonic Indications, of RUle-Foll(ml )77 J. Kaisla, Market Process and tlic___ , nL, - ýmd 
Fntreýireneui ý, hip under Genuine Uncertaimy, DRUID \Vorking Paper No. 98-IT Department A 
Industrial Economics and Straten, CopenhaLcn Bu,, ýln, ýss School. Copenha, -, cil, 1991N' tý- -- 
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1, rcement, ) and ieex , ag -outine,, do not ensure that entrepreneur,. will not viol, it th m ((), c pCCi 
others to violate them) should the particular circumstances dictate it. 
Secondly, firms may be placed in a "vertical" or coinpleinewary relationship. I lcrc. 
the profitability of one investment is increase(I by making another: for example. whcrc the 
incrca, ýed availability of one product inci-cwc,, thc (ieniand 1'()i- anothcr, m- whci, c illic 
OUtpUt of one firrn provides an input for the nianufacture of another. I-Ike firni,, niAmLY 
cornpetitive investments, those making complementary oncs must have injorniiiion Z71 
availahie in order to he encouraged to invest. In other words, the entrepreneur has to 
deternilne th e rninimurn amount of information required, and the different condition. " fto 
would permit access to it. 
In this case, investors need to be , sure 
ftit ()thcr entreprencut-s will conlillif Li 
niinii-num volume of complementary investment. Here, the entrepreneur willing to sati"Iv 
ýt predicted demand for the production of widgets by seizing a profit opportunltý, 
require complementary firms to make a i-niniMLIIII investment for the production of some 
required inputs. However, firms in one industry may not be prepared to expand without 
the assurance that others will follow suit, and even where no explicit ýI-SSLWMICC I'-' 
ýivýulýible, there i-nay be ýt strong presumption thitt the necc, ý, ýýti-y investment will IA'c 
PLICC, In the ongoing pl-()C, C", s of informationýil changc. cntreprenCUrs Must havc to t) -I 
the information necessary to ad ust production to market changes succssfully, 
so ýis to 
pýti'ticularisc. a general profit opportunity into profit opportunities for each of them. Thesc Z7) 
condition,,; rest on the premise that everybody else will behave as expected. 
In addition, firms may be competitors in respect to one product. and complemelit 
cýich other in rcspcct to another. Firms that \vci-c Initially competitors in one markct mýtý 
develop some differentiation, making their respective product,, scem Icss like sLibstitutes t: 5 
III the CVCS Of COIISLIIIICI-',, and eventually not ýi,, mtcrchangcAfle. 
The distinction between competitivc or simikir investment,,, and complenlental-% 
L- I ivc arrangc ones is cssential for identifying the sort and varicty of re.. "tricti ments 
thm firm, 
I 
seek in order to reducc thcir uncertaintv about fUtLli-e market condition,,,. and In PaI-tICLIlL'll-. 
-e 
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the futurc volurne of im-cstments that other firms niýiv makc. The ncxt c,: t'(),, w, 11 j- 
with the variety of these arrangements more exten,, ively. 
2.2. - Organiisatimnal variety and the co-ordination Of DI-OdLlCtlOIl. 
Entrepreneurý, uct the information to inve"'t oil the ba""I" 01 
approximations and -educated guesses" based on the conduct of those they interact \\ ith 
(competitors and clients) and the kind of procitictivc ictivity 11111t the\, 1111011,1 
Lindertake. There arc several signals they look for in order to form reliable expcctation, ý 
about the conii-nitments of firms making complementary and competitive investnicnt,, b 
For example, they may rely upon the expectation that the status quo of their tradiiiL, 
relations wilt remain unaltered. They may be pci-suadcd that competitors will not niakc it 
rnove unless circumstances change; or that such moves, if they should happen, will follow 
it pattern. (For example, seeking to enhance production to retain the sarne market shiirc). 
Also, they may rely upon an appraisal of the feasibility of competitors scizin'-, "Llch ý111 
opportunity. If they know that competitors will be unable to seize the opportui-IM' I'm 
CCOI10I_nIC purposes, it will be as if they had ncvcr known. Finally, they may rely upon lhý, 
level of perceived loyalty of their consumers, or of their competitors. TO ild. 11_1"t their 
offers to future demand, entrepreneurs must protect their markets froin any undcrcuttin, L, 
by potential competitors. Consumer loyalty is c.,, sentlal III this calculation. this 
-1111 1)urpose, they may devclop it differentiated product, based on the repUtation 01' PL LIL11 
itttributes of the (Toods thev sell, or on lowcr transport costs. or on the location of the Z7ý - 
(Toods or services 11-tcy provide. They may also develop a particular "goodwill" which 4 
differcritiatcs the quality of the service they providc, as for example, treating 1()\iil 
customers bettcr, oi- offering rapid delivcry' scrvicing facilitics, policic,: ý (4 
custorner treati-rient, ctc. Another strateov may be to ri-iaintain prices irrespcctkc (4 
chitnoes In demand. If prices are flexible, it is not possible to ascertain the IM12111tUdc of 
the demand changes foi- which producers should plan. In connection to this. wititin, _! 
11"Is. 
ý0\, ýincc orders and Other similar phenomena arise its it result of price ri, giditv. but (to not 
llcccssýirilv entail inefficiencies. they may kvcll be indicative of future sitlcs- 
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At times, however, entrepreneurs may hýive to entcr into a varlety of lll()I, c 1,01,111tIl 
restraints of differing strengths and duration, which ýkould restrict thcir frecdom 
action. These arrangement,, may take two forms: Firstly. entrepreneurs may endeav()ur to 
secure then-individual investments by entering into agreements with their competitoi-,. L- L- 
These arrangements may take the form of price alignment', market sharino agreernent., -,; or t:: ) L- C, 111 
tacit Understandings to avoid ruinous competition in a particular line or product. L- 
Secondly, producers may increase the SCCUrity of' their individual n1vc. "tillent", h\ 
developing special link-s with their suppliers or clients. For example, they may entcr into 
exclusive dealings to ensure custom for the entire future period. Where raw materials are b 
involved, it is difficult to develop goodwill or product differentiation. In thesc casc". it 
may be better to ensure trade by contracting a quantity of the commodity for sale at a 
fUture date and at a fixed price. 
In this regard, Richardson classifies oroanisations on diffci-cnt lc\cl,,, i,, follo\\,, ý Z: ) Z--ý 
firstly, a trading relationship between two or more parties, which is stable enough to 
i-nake demand expectations more reliable, and thereby facilitates production plannin', 
This is the simplest form of inter-firm co-operation. In this case, the relationship 111il\ 
acquire its stability through goodwill or rnorc forrnal arranaements such &, loiio-tcrni t) L_ Z: 71 
contracts or shareholding. The selection of any of these arrangements is a matter ol t_ý 
qLialitative rather than quantitative co-ordination. The habit of working with models that 
assume a fixed list of goods may be responsible for the neglect of consideration ot 47) Z: ) 
qUalltative co-ordination in terms of the balancing of quantities of inputs-outputs. Z: ) 
Secondly, one firrn may subcontract another by outsourcing. This niodality i.,., 
heconiing quitc popular for co-operation hci\vccn firni,, located in differciit countric, 
SUbcontracting docs not in itself imply much co-operation-, and may be the I-CSLIh 01' 
conipetitivc bidding. Stability ariscs fron-i the [ýict that , ubcontractors assume the n, "k, I 
inherent to tbeir narrow specialisation in skills and equipment-, and fi-oi-n the t'act that it 
Perinits continued co-operation between thosc concerned xith the c1cvelopillclit of' 
speci ficat ions, processes and designs. Z--) 
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Thirdly, co-opcration between firm,, relying, on cach other for nianLlfýICWI-C M- 
niarketing. These relationships may entail complex patterns of co-ordinated acti\ ity. 
ranging from quantities demanded (promoting quantitative ad -nent of suppIv to Z-7 Z7 'JUStl 
demand), to qualitative standards involving, proceoýc,,, or products. 
Firially, co-operative arrangements specifically contrived to pool or 
technology. 'These a-reenients are commonly based on the licensing or poolin, ot'patcnt, t7l t__ 17, 
hut they provide for the provision or exchan-c of know-how through the tran"fer ol' 
know-how, personnel, drawings and tools. They are normally associated \\'ith price 
agreements, market sharing and the like. 378 
To sum up, organisations adopt their particular shape as ýi result of conclition,, ý 
imposed on thern by the market in which entrepreneurs operate. They do not necc,,,, arll%/ 
stem 1'rom the "intention.,., " of entrepreneurs to cn(gagc in unfair restrictive trade practiccý,. I I- 
Rather, the choice of these arrangements depends on the level of information thc\1 
ýirc supposed to convey, which is contingent with the perception that each entrcp1_C1-1CL11' 
holds of those others whom he deals (trusto and with the complexity of the prodLiCtive 
processes involved in the particular activity. In other words, orcyanisationai choice iý' 
constrained by the length of the relationship (as new circumstances ernerge) and 
cornplexity of knowledog (as knowledge of other realities enCOL1ra, _, cs the revision of 
initial plans). Information costs in this subjective scnsc are therefore essential in shaping 
the particular organisation sought by entrepreneurs. The optimurn size of a firm will not 
he determined not so much by the scale of economies associated with any particular 
operation, but by the number of complcmentary operations requiring planned Co- 
ordination. The length of time required for productive purposes and the con1plexiLy of 
production are UltIrnatelv responsible for the size and shape of inter-firm co-opcration. 
') 7s Richardson, "The Or,, 7,,, tnizýition 
-1 () () 
rganisations dealing with the complexity (A. a) The role of mutual trLISt in shapung o Z- 
L 
-pg- produc-lLion 
in evoly nig-setti s. 
An effective level of trust between entrepreneurs is cssential in encouraging, thern to 
make complenicntary investments. The intcii,,, Itý of Lornmitinctit which NA, 111 ijový 
willing they are to integrate their activities for the common interest, will depcnd to ýi lai-LC I: _- Z7. 
extent on the length of time that both parties cnvisagc their relationship to last. 17, 
In principle, mutual trust depends on the length of time within which both partle, " 
, ire certain about the commitment of the other. As wc have Indicated above, colitractual 
fori-nality is contingent with the level of certainty and the length of tirne that pm-nc, ý, can 
foresee it lasting at the present time. 
In this context, the form of organisation chosen by entrepreneurs will depend oil tile b 
opportunity to frame the conduct of each participant, without losing the flexibilit\ level of t-1 
needed to adapt to unforeseen changes. The longer the period envisaged, the 111ol-c t-1 -- 
flexible the investment programme. But the longer the contract extends into the fUtL11-C. 
the more likely it is' that uncertainty is increased due to unforeseen event,,. Thl,, Is 
likely to restrain the entrepreneur from niodifying his plans to meet unexpected 
dc%, cloprnents. The point will be reached %vhcrc the ,, ireater predictability ylcldc(l hý! 
contracts does not justify the loss of flexibility involved, for this reason, co-ordination 
through market interaction can never be peýtect and firms will inevitably engage in forrn,, t, Z7) 
of vertical integration. The unavoidable imperfection of economic information will r-1 
therefore limit the willingness of entrepreneLit"; to enter into contractual arrangenient" ftii L- C, 
COUld increase the SLIPPIý' of market information. 
Hiti-epreneurs caimot rely on the wording of a contract, and must therefore rely mi 
aii arialysis of past behaviOLII', which involvcs kiiowledge that cannot be quantificd. Tlic zn 
condition,, for SLIPPIN' (qUallty, qUantity, spec i I-'i cations. etc. ) cannot be fully specificd. and 
t1lei-cfore cannot replace goodwill and reputýition. Thv, information carinot be complctck 
c\lircssed tlIOLI(TII COMI%WtLial arranac rn ent,,. 
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Thu,,, where parties are unwilling to acccpt obil-gatIons with respect to thcIr future 
behaviour, co-operation cannot take place. Iii these cýi,, e,, market transaction,,, replýicc C()- 
operation. Here, there is no continuing association. 
It may be difficult to arrange a prospective return thl'OLIgh loncy-term conti'act" III 
proportion to the risks that parties are assuming if such risks, relating to class pi-ohlcnis. 
are unknown. For example, one party may be required to make heavy iiwc.,. tincnt,, m 
exchange for a return several years ahead. III this regard, loiio-term conlracts are oiil\ mc 
way to ensure control of the firm responsible for complementary investment. There 111ay 
be other ways of ensuring compliance and further control, such as establishing special 
price conditions. 379 Another solution, when the risks are high (say, due to faulty 
contractual enforcement procedures), is to set Lip a 11101-C intimate form of co-opei-ati0ii 
than a contract. The two companies might form a subsidiary in which they both po,,,,, c,,,,, 
equity interest, or might decide to mer-cye. 380 With regard to this, Fukuyama arl-I'LIC', tllýlt 
firi-ns may resort to alternative "unofficial" alliai-Ices, such as family bonds, to Increase the 
level of trust that cannot be aained throuah official channels in "high trust" societics.. ')x I t) Z-) 4D 
379 Klein and Leffler hold that there could be risk,, of non-performance where the co,, t,, ot 
withdrawing from a transaction are low to one party and high to the other. One solution these 
authors propose is to increase contractual prices. A necessary and sufficient condition f0i 
performance is the e\ktence of prices sufficiently above salvageable production costs "o that the 
nonperforming firm loses a discounted streýim of rents on future sales which is greater than the 
\ýcalth incrca, ýc from non-performance. Another solution. when determining the rkk" Imolvc(I 
in the long-run proves difficult, is to merge both firms. in this way compliance is ensured 
common , iock and the expectation,, of the firms invoked will not 
be diminished. (Sec 
B. Klein and K. Murphy. "Vertical Restrýunts &,, Contract Enforcement 31 
Journal of Law and Economics [19881- 20ý-21)8. Also, B. Klein and K. Leffler. "The Role ot 
Market forces in A, SUI-1111-1 Conti-actual Performaricc". X)9 Journal ot'Political Economic', II9, N 11: 
615-641). 
-P 
380 Obviously, under this corporate form parties would ýtlll be related under a contractual bond. but 
, ýuch a link WOUld tie more complex 'in nature, and regulated under more ý, e\crc condition, than C7 
a simple contract. 
Ix F. Fukuyania, T-I-LPt: The Social Virtue,, ýind the Ovation ot Proyei-M-, (Londow Hmmsh 
Hamilton, 1995. 
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For this reason, the longer the relationship is hetween investors, the morc imporiam 
the links to eliminate uncertainty are because the parties will have more ti-()Liblc 
identifying possible changes. 382 
NLItUrally, an effective level of trust i, ý, not determined by a I'L -)tjjcj. actor. ( Z--I 
t actors come into play which influence the level of rell III that entrepreileul. " C III 
i-easonably expect fi-on-i each other. Amon-st these factors, the number of altcrmIt1%C 
, suppliers or customers is paramount, as this will Live participants a measure ot actual or 
potential contract alternatives. Entrepreneurs acquire information about other 111arkel 
participants from several sources. In the first place, they look at their numbers. If. for 
example, entrepreneurs have fewer clients, their need for evidence of cornmitniciit,, i,, 
likely to be stronger-, therefore, they tend to integrate vertical]), in these c! i, ýc,,. B-ý- 
contrast, with larger groups, firms tend to rely on the aggregate supply of complenlentar\' 
investment to influence their investment decisions. If an entrepreneur fails to make it dcal 
with one participant, he knows he is likely to find another participant to deal with. For 
this reason, . the extent of co-ordination of complementary activities depends oil thc 
degree of development of the country within which they are undertaken. In a more 
advanced country, with a large manufacturin2 sector, the output of one industry is llkcl\' 
to have a large and varied number of outlets so that there is no need foi- all ýIculc ln 
complementarity between the investment decisions of any particular units. In less 
developed countries, with fewer firms, any increase in output would have to be 
by a small number of complementary firms. Complementarity would be strong, and 
profitable investment by one producer might depending on the expansion of the others. 
38-1 Klein and Murphy argue that vertical restraints are means which ensure compliance t'n)m 
dealers when written contracts are not economically feasible because they would ha\c to cmer 
every possible contingency. Manufacwl-Cl-s use VCI_tICal restraints to reduce the s1101-1-1-LI11 L'; 1111 (hV 
limitim, non-performing dealers' ability to expand output) and to increase the lono-run gain ()I L_ C- C7 
performinc, dealers (by creating a quasi-rent strearn). To induce a desired retailer heha%'I0UI* 
whenwit is not feasible for a manufacturer to \vrite explicit, court-enforceable contract, ý \\ Hli 
retailers for the supply of particular services. the only mechanism is to increase the dihcci return 
which retailers receive from consurnel-S When th0IC sCI_V*ICC`, are ',, Upplied. Reale Piiýc 
Maintainance increases this return by increasing the retail margin, thus creatinL, an incentive toi- 
ge iIII ICCII individual retailers to enga in non-price competition and supply the desircd ser\ i 
Exclusive territories increase the direct return h\ climinatiriL, neal-h%, retailer, ( Klein ýmd 
Murphy. "Vertical Restraints... ", pp. 205-21), ý)ý 
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b) The variety of or(Tanisational forms &, a consequence of production rocc -- ID - -- 
A second factor determining an entrepreneur's choice in favour of a -, i\-en 
organisational arranocnient is the complexity of productive activities which &vA()j-ic(! L) L- 
through Joint action. L, JI 
Firms perform a myriad of productive activitics. including nianui'acturin, -,, mid 
scl'Vices, consLimer support, research and development, and so forth. All these actlvfflcýl 
reqLIII-C "capabilities", which may be undertaken by ýi single firm or by scvcral firms 11111\Cd 
together with contractual bonds. 383 In the face of uncertainty, firms create 1. rcscrves- ai-id 
develop "capabilities" of skills and knowledge, which enable them to cope Lindcr ally 
Unexpected circumstances. Under this perspective, and Adarn Smith's idcýis on the 
division of labour, firms tend to specialise in the activities for which thcir capabilities offei- 
comparative advantage. b 
The nature of productive activities exploited by entrepreneurs will detei-11161c 
whether certain capabilities held by a single firni will suffice for this purpose. In othcr 
cases, it may be neccssary to contract other firms which possess different capahilitics m 
order to exploit the activity successfully. Thus, firms develop around clo,, civ 
cornplernentary capabilities, and inter-firni outsourcing subsequently result,,, 11' thc 
ýictivitics involved are "dissirnilar". Entrepreneurs cntcr into (_'()-()pcrý,, tive relatiow, t() (_, (iin 
ýicccss to upstream or downstream activities because the activities concerned are 
complementary. Indeed, in these cases it would not be convenient for a firm to undertake 
"dissirriflar" activities because that would bririL, diseconoi-nies of scope and/or fflcrcýi"cd 
informational costs. It is preferable to develop co-operation through intcr-firill 
int ventures, licensing a(_-cements, and ýo arrangernents Such as Iong-term contracts, 'o' 
011. 
The capabiliticý, theor\ contrasts with the contractual e\planation follmýcd h\ neo-clav'ic, d 
-\ of the Firm, Danish Re,, cLirch t'nit fo, - III(IL, IIILII AlthOI-S. (N. Capabilities and the Theoi 
DviiamICS. Work-ML, Paper No. 96-8, Cope n hagen llii, ýInes,, School, Copenha. -en. 11)90. ) 
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Also, capabilitic,, evolve on an ongofflL, thu.,, changim-, the (A . C()- 
operation agreement,.,, firms and markets. 
hiltially, firms comprise undifferentiated capabilities, but entrepreneurial 
eventually leads firms to a variety of markets and product lines. 384 Aniagination. rathei 
thaii inforniation in any ordinary sense , is what entrepreneurs require In order to d1-, L'()\ c" 
iiew ways of corribining, resources so as to meet consumers' desircs. production hll-1010111S 
exist unknown to entrepreneurs only in the that Musical tunc,, a\\ ait di,, co\ cr\ -. in 
either case originality, rather than the posscssion of 'Information', as cowldcrccl 
exclusively hitherto, is what is required for successful new combinations to hc 
produced". 385 Therefore, the variety of production lines is inextricably linked to thc 
cliscovery process that shapes competition: "the scope of entrepreneurial, or conipetitivc 
activity, is therefore rnuch greater in reality than in the so-called purely conipctinvv 
nioclel". 386 
The activities of firms trading in apparently different activities may be more similm- 
thail they appear. At first sight, a firm may seen-i to be acquiring another which is engýiggcd zn L- 
in different activities, but the activity could be interpreted as similar if the firm P, bouaht L- 
to restore et It icient management before resellin,,. Management would be the particular Z-) I- I 
capability in this case. 
Therefore, firms' capabilities determine the diffci-cm dircctions in which compamc,, -, 
,, row. depending on whether they (the capabilities) expand and alter. However, random 
1'ýtctors also have an InflUence: in these cases, a firm's motivation for taking up an activilý, 
i,, not determined hy the prior possession of an appropriate capability. bUt hy chew. -) 
ýicquisition. 
t7 III Z-- , ector expand into other 384 U. Menoer c\plains how firms initially undertaking activitics 
in ýi given 
,, ectors by concentrating on what they are better able to perform. (C. Menger. The Principle,, of' 
Monopoly Trading in "Principles of Economics- (Ncw York: Nc\ý York Univcr, ýIt\ Pre,,,, 198 1 
385 Richardson, Information .... p. 
105. 
38o I d. 
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New pr()dLICtS frequently ernerge fi-om the conihination of different capahllltlcý, Mid 
skills. Inter-firm co-operation enables these capabilities to combine and create llc\\ 
products and services. Hence, complementary activities become the -source of Co- 
operation among firms, the less complementary they are, the more likely firms are to 
conipctc for a bigger share of the undifferentiated '%iggrc. gatc- dernand. Iri this cýiý, c, pric,, 
competition will often he the prime element ol' differentiatiori betwccii thein. hut ilic 
scope for competition is very limited, as it will be constrained hy price reductiow-. 
As, surriirig that producers choose to make the sarne con-in-iodity with , iniilar prodLiciii(M 
pi-ocesses, competition between them is possible only as long as costs are reduced. Such 
reductioris will consist of minor improvements to the prodLICtion process. Howcvcr. 11' 
producers devise new "production functioris", conibining, resources in different way, ', to 
make the same or different commodities, the field for active competitive warfare is (-, rcatl\' 
enlaraed Lind there is widerscope for innovatiori. z:: ) 
Conve; -sely, the process of competition and exploiting comparative advanuu-'c" lililv 
develop particular lines of products which could turn formerly similar activitics into 
complementary ones. This process explains why former rivals may -find it desirable to co- 
operate in developing new products, by Mutually exploiting their respcctivc 
complementary capabilities. It also explains why, durin- their initial , taoes, markcr'ý' tend 
to consist of fcw firms, each holdin- a stron, ', ', position. A.,, time mk)rc 
entrepreneurs become capable of seizing profit opportunities by imitating Successful 
entreprencurs. Consequently, rriarkets become lc,,, s and less concentrated a,,, tcchnoI(), _, iC.. " 
spread out amongst producers. 
This could happen in markets where cornpentivc entry IS LUSSUred. Regl-Ctftlllý'. 111C 
I'OCLIS Of MItItI-LISt enforcement has been misdirected into other matters, a,, excc,, sivc 
eniphasis ha, ý been placed on market power ýtttaincd, particularly while the market is in 
the initial sta-cs of its development. This is clearly cNIdent in the special focus placed on 
I)ricc considerations as the expression of such "power'". -)87 
ý)87 Schumpeter criticlsed this cxavcerated 
focus of economists on prices as variables ofcoillpetjtlojlý L- Cý 
"JAs a result of the alternative institutional analy,, isl the first thing to is the traditional 
conception ofthe modits- operandi of competition. F'conomlst,, arc at long la, ýt cmer-Lln-l-ý from ilic 
stage in which price competition was all tlic\ , a\\ - A,, ý, oon a,, quality competition and 
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To suni up, firm,, will tend to develop closely complernentary activitics thcm,, cIvcý,. 
and leave dissimilar activities to outsourcing. Also. they will leave those transactiow, in 
which they feel that there are sufficient alternative providers for markets, whereas 111cv 
will attempt*to inteurtic those areas in which they are required to hold hialler IC\Cl" ()I L- II It, 
trust, due to the featurcs of the transaction concci-ned. This happens. either because of thc 
need for endurance of the expectations of transacting parties over time, or due to the 
fCatures of the activitics that they engage in. 
In the light of these considerations, Richardson distinz(--)-Lilshes three modes of co- 
ordination of complementary activities between firms. Firstly, entrepreneurs nwv ,, cck 
coordination through "direction", where single control fits Into a coherent plan and is 
undertaken by one or. ganisation. Direction within a firni is possible where economic,, of 
scale exist, and where cornplementary activities are possible: the larger the organi, ýation, 
the greater the number of capabilities with which it may to be endowed, and thus the zn 
, greater the number of complementary activities SUbj rdination throu2h direction 7) ject to Co-o II 
it is likely to undertake. 
Secondly, entrepreneurs may coordinate their activities through "co-operation", L- 
where independent orcyanisations agree to match their plans in advance. Co-operation 
arlses where there is reason to believe that individUal COMPOIlentS (I. C. the intcraciivc 
parties) of demand are more stable than aggregate demand considered "as a whole". In 4: ) Z: ) 
this case, the individual parties would seek to match their investment and output plaris cx- 
effort are admitted into the sacred precincts of theory, the lirice varwWe is mited from its 
dominant position. However. it is still competition within a rigid pattern of invariant cmidmollN. 
methods of production and forms of industrial organization in particular, that prýictlciill\ 
monopolizes attenlion. But in capitalist realit\, iiý, (11, stinguished from it,. tc\tho()k picture. it i,, 
nol that kind ofcompetition which counts but the competition from the neý\ conimodllý . thc Ile\\ 
technologv. the new ýýource of supply, the ne\v type of organization (the unit A 
Control, for instmice) competition which command,, ýt decisive co, ýi or quality a(kamýqL'e mid 
which ,, trike,, not at the margins of the profits lind the outputs of the existing firm,, but at their Cý C7 
I, Ou lldýt lolls and their \C]-\, lives. Thk kind of competition is &, much more effectl\C th, 111 the 
-Cl d door, and do much more important thail other as a bombý, rdment is in comparison with I'Ol L 
it becomes a matter of comparative indifference whether competition in the orchmir\ 
functions 11101, e Or lc,,,, promptly: the powerlul le\cl that In the long run e. \pand" OLIIJ)Ut ýIlld Z7 
hi-Ings down prices i.,, in all\, case made of othei , tuff. " (, 'ý, chumpeter, pp. 84-85, ) 
alite. They have to match "closely complementary- activities. rather than undifferentiated 
"' ilar" aggregates. Co-ordination is undertaken either through close co-opermon. hy Imi Z: ý Llý t) 
institutional arrangements. by firruted shareholding, or by other forms of affiliation. 
Matching is not only quantitative in this case, hut also qualitative. The personal element iý, 
decisive-, thus, prices are to sorne extent Irrelevant. in the sense that their , tA-)IIH\ (1()(,, 
not tell anythin(g in it,,, clf about the value attached the part' (I Ic", Lo lilcil- u1IL_iCrMII, _, 
1-clationship. 
Finally, the co-ordmation of complementary activities can be done through 111i'll-ket 
transactions. Here, the benefits arise indirectly from successive interactive decision,, taken 
in response to changing profit opportunities. In this case, the estimates that firm', 1111'cl* 
Frorn the conduct of other firms are not based on the individual conduct of particular 
firms, but on their actions when considered as a whole. In this case, the crucial element 
for reinforcing expectations is not based on the conduct of the firms concerned, but oil 
their particular features or pattern of activities, which are diluted in the presumcd 
ýu-)(Tregate output of all those firms considered to be working together. Firms will prefcr 1,7 b tý' tý 
to rely on these market outcomes, rather than seeking to co-operate with a IN1111CUL11- Z7) 
firi-n. Therefore, co-ordmation through markets occur,.,, whenever there is reason W 
believe that aaarecate demands are more stable than their component elements Wc. 111c 
parties involved). Thus, parties rely on having, enough customers to cover the potcntial 
cancelling o6t of random fluctuations in their separate demands. )88 
Thesc considerations allow a clearer Understanding of the position in , vhich the Z-- 
entrepreneur is placed when deciding which arrangernent he will engage in. VerticalIN, tn C) Z: ) b- 
intelarated firms coordinate closely complementary activities. whereas horl/ontal 
ali, grinient should be expected amongst entrepreneurs whose activities ýirc competiti\, c and 
where the products and services offered thus require some de,. -, i-cc of hornoc'enization. 
Lct 
Lis takc a look at this problern in more detail. 
388 G. B. Richardson, The Organization of IndustrN. in "Firms. Orga ni zat Ions and Contrici, ". 
Bucklev and . 
1. Michie (e(k. ). (()\foi-(i: O\ford [! nl\cr,, Itv Pres, ý, 11972] 1996. 
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2.3. - An alternalive normative -III appraisýll of "()Il-om*c-ol-ý! ýtil'ý, ýlt, ()Il- 'Ind 111,11-kc, 
'ing I _Qmpetition: 
Does organis, 
-production re-strict-econom'c 
freedom 
In the light of the ideas outlined previously, one can conclude that mutual ti-LIt ýInd 
productive complexity fix the lirrýts of business conduct and oqaanisational sti-Lictui-e. 
Consequently, al-aUing that entrepreneurs impose these restrictions on othei-, io ichicNc 
some monopolist purpose through market power seems out of focus. Indeed, the 
conventional explanation of market power (that is, the feasibility of iii1posin, -, il 
nionopolistic price on consumers or of engaging, cxclusionary conduct 
coi-npetitors) becomes dubious as soon as we realise how irrelevant it is in the v1cw of 
conipetition as a process. 
In such a process, the position held by a firm at any given point in time docs ll()t 
prevent other firms fi-orn operating freely. In other words, it does, not give thcni any 
"dominance" or "Power" in the market. The suspected monopolist may have the intention 
of gouging out additional profit due to his pre-eminent position in the market, but that 
intention is only produced by his expectation that the profit opportunity P; there for 111111 
to reap. He may well be wrong. Indeed. the fact that information ahout thcsc 
OPPOrtUnities is subjective and the position Of Our cnti-epreneLil- is pervaded hy ,, Iicci- 
ignorance affects hirn too. As Kirzner states . ..... no one 
knows, and no one can po,, s1l-)1Y 
know, in advance, whýit 'the' market price 'OLI()-ht to he'. once it is i-ecoonizcd that no t, Z71 
one docs or can know the 'correct' price, it becomes apparent that a price disci-1111111ator 
is simply 'feeling' his way, by grasping (or rather, by attemptine, to grasl)) profit 
opportunities he believes available to him. "389 Therefore. the firms' incentivc,,, to 
compete in the market are not determined hy how much market power incumbent firms 
c\ci-cisc cither on thosc firms attempting entry or on established firms. 
Sim and pre-erninence in the market arc not important factors a.,, sooll w, \ýc 
cow, ider the avidiability of capital markets to alert entrepreneui-s. Of course. the 
Kirmer, The Goals of Aiititrust: A Cri(iMue, ArtIcle prepared for Informacl(in Conici-cial 
Es pa Fio I a, Nc \\ Yo rk LT iiIvc rs ItN, Se pte iii be r, 11) p. I ý8- 
ýIý 
1)(),,,, c,,,, Ion and ownership of productive resource,,, C-'jves econornic power. But thl. s powci 
does not become an essential factor in forestallinL, the freedom of other entrepreneur" II 
competitive entry is ensured. To understand this issue properly, let Lis examine the naturc 
and effect of freedom of entry in more detail. 
ttive. cntry as the determiniiig factoi '0 Compet of market competitivcnc,,,,. 
The crucial factor of market competitiveness is competith, c entry, naniely. the 
awareness that institutional rules are sufficiently flexible to give anyone interested a 
chance to challenge established industries should the occasion arisc. Competitivc ciiti-y 
will be a sure deterrent to any entrepreneur atternpting to lower the quality or the 
prices of products or services sold. 
Competitive entry ensures that any firm, regardless of' , ize, or any entrepl-clicul'. 
regardless of their ownership of productive factors, will be able to enter into the i-narket. 
should incumbent firms decide to raise prices beyond normal levels. It disciplines thosc 
entrepreneurs who attempt to restrict investments in order to maintain a rate of prof-ill 
which is permanently excessive. In this case, alert entrepreneurs erode the position of the 
incumbent firm by exploiting those gaps of int-Orniatiori discm, cred. 
Competitive entry requires that no incumbent firm holds privileges which exploi II tn I it 
productive activity. These privileges arise mainly from government fiat, as well as froni 
private arranuements bearing sirriilar effects. For example, laws, regulations, decrees. and 
other le(-, al instruments belong to the first group. whereas arrangements adopted by trade 
L- I PS not to or husiness associations (e. (,., the cartellization of an industry, which 
be 
Corifused with collusion among competitors) belonc, to the second. Indeed, the vIrtUal 47) b 
effect of theýe private arrangements is virtually to function as a statute would, since their t-I - 
cffccts extend over a whole industry. 
These privileges prevent entrepreneurs from exercising their alertne,, ý, in the 
discovcrv of i -r arrangernents they pci-cc, fittio-c profit opportUnities, through whatev( Ivc to 
be neccssary in order to selzc these OPPOI-tLillitIC, mid co-ordinatc the , ocial , \,, tem h\ 
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elirniriating gaps of (thus creating new) , ocIally valuable InfOrn-latio". Therel'orc, 
competitive entry has little to do with the pl-ioi- ownershIp of resources. Inequallty 111 
resource ownership and in the power that such ownership provides- is irrelevailt to HIC 
ongoing process of discovering future profit opporturilties. At is superior enti-epi-clICLII-1,11 Z: ) 
perceptiveness and prescience alone which is ncccssary and sufficient for the 
Pure profit opportunities". 390 Even those firms commanding, large volumes ol' rc,, (mrcc,, I t) 
ii-iust depend on their entrepreneurial foresitght to find ways of deployinto thosc rcsoui-cc,,, 
hwovatively. Otherwisc these resources will siniply continue to be used conveiinom, 111y. 
until shrewder and more innovative entrepreneurs bid them away from larger but lc.,,., 
entrepreneurial firms. 
It soon becomes apparent that market power is non-existent in a changm(i L_ I 
environment as long as competitive entry remains unblocked. In this case, the relcvant 
problem is not how many firms interact within the market, thus enabling then] con-iniand 
of productive resources, but whether those within it will be threatened by the entrv ()I 
others, and whether those outside will be allowed to erode the position of incumbents. 
Thanks to the flexibility of the institutional framework market, actors posscss 
II reedorn to conipctc. Notice that "competition- in this sense has little connection with, 
and even contradicts, neo-classical perfect competition. Indeed, the rneaningful question Z: ) 
is not whether firms want to eliminate their capacity to compete, but whcthei- dicy will hc 
able to do so indefinitely, thus imposing an absolute and unwanted restriction on 1'reedoill. 
Antitrust policy does not always make this distinction clear, as it confuses the nUniher of 
competitors with their ability to compete. 391 It is clear that in the long run, absolutc 
Kii-/, iiei-. The Goals pp. 10-11. 
Machlup explains the sources of thl., ý terminological confusion: "The COIALP, 1011 1, 
understandable: \\, here there are maliv sellers alreadV, wh\1 ýhould there not ea,, 11v he morc 
sellers when profits lure? In actual practice easy enti-V into a trade and large numbet-, in the 
trade -o well tooether". However, "even if a laroe number of sellers and an al. 1-mentable 111.1111I)CI Z7 Z- 
of sellers seem to he closely correlated, logically the two thin-s are completely divorced from 
each other. And, it will be seen, [they are concepts] of verv different nature, indeed. theY belmig 
to (fifterent S/)/Icrc. ý of thought" (Author',, italico. Machlup. pp. 1-2. See stIL'Icl. 
Nlcrnojr. s.... pp. 92-93), 
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restriction on freedorn in flexible institutional frameworks is impossible, due to niarkci 
sclection Lind discipline imposed over conditions of competitive entry. 
In a j1'ee n7arket, new entrants will seek to imitate forniedly established 1-11111.1s, 
therefore redLICing thcu- profits. For this reason. a firm can fi-eely expand output \VItIIOLlt 
the threat of' excess competitive supply, bLIt will have no protection agam,, t tile ultimitte 
encroachment of more innovative rivals and no opportunity to maintain profits Lit ýi 
permanently abnormal level. If entry is free, , ome barriers would persist while ollicl-, 
I 
would disappear as new entrants erode the position of IIinL, firms, thus render' - 
any artificial restrictions useless. Therefore, under competitive entry indefinite inarkct 
fI oreclosure is impossible. 
b) The Ion -term efficiencies of organisational arrangements. 
The former considerations tell us that social rules should not condemn market 
organisations as potential sources of undue i-narket foreclosure. Exclusion or liniitatioiv-, 
of rivalry in a market may be necessary to ensure that a profit opportunity will he 
discovered and exploited at all. It may seern ironic (but no less true) that the more 
ii-iforination there is available about these opportunities, the lc,,, s likely it 1,, thLit mivoiic 
will sCIzC it. 
Successful co-ordination of investment plans to reap profits requires the existei-icc 
of certain natural or contrived restraints on freedom to seize shares in the profit 
0I)POIJI-1111ty. Natural restraints differentiate products and markets, thus makino It 
possibic 
I 
for sorne entrepreneurs to seize profit opportunities by displacing others. Thcy ýIrc the 
I-CSUlt of differing natural conditions imposed on different traders which are the crcýition 
ofthe StrUCtUral conditions of the market concerned-')()2 By contrast, contrived ivstraim,, 
Natural restraints comprise, for exarnplc. restraints on production such as econornie" of "Calc in 
production. It nwv not be profitable for a newcoillcr to penetrate an indu,,, trý it the minimmil 
efficient ,, calc producc,,, additional output sufficient to caLIsC ý11 Llrl-e fall In Price. dC"j)1h" its 
apparent hiLfli levels of profits or low efficicricy levc1s. Howcver, rather than ýIckýML, thern a,, 
entrv barriers In the Conventional sensc of pre\criting indi\iduals from attaining Miat I,,, in am 
ca"ýC' all unatlainah1c Pareto ideal, econorn1c,, ot' ýcAc are re(iarded ýis inevitable limimnow, oil 
the production possibilities -, Iven the state ot current technolop'. 
In addition, therc tic d, () 
Z7 III eir output, \, L i-cstraints limiting tile ability of 
firnis to increase their , ýilcs, rather than th i Lich Is tile 
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ýirc caused hy the purposeful action of entrepi-cwurs. and are relevant for the pLirpO,, c,, ()i 
our normative study. Therefore, it is important to examine their relationship with Hic 
creation of informational conditions appropriate to Successful coordination adjustnicM. 
Do antitrust tools allow a better coordination anion-g, entrepreneurs, and thus creatc thc 
inStItLItJOIIZIl erIVII'OIIMeIIt I'01- IMproving social coordinative efficlency? 
Let LIS exan-nne how some contrived restraints ýicquirc a benign outlook undcr 
i-narket process perspective. 
i) Prohibition against collusion arnong competitors. 
Collusion among competitors is outlawed because it appears in a com, ciltional Z-) 
perspective to impose monopoly-price dominance over consumers. It ehi-ninates iwcr-firni 
price cornpetition. However, as long as freedorn of entry is allowed, such an arrangc1licilt 
should not affect the competitiveness of the market concerned. 
Attei-yipting to raise the level of prices beyond competitive levels leads to ml 
invitation to ncw competitors into the industry. 01'coui-sc, collusion will limit or eliminate 
the fluctuation of prices among firms participating in the ai-rangement, but that should not zn zn 
Lii-idermine the capacity of third parties to decide their counsc of action. Ailtiti-u, ý, t 
Ic-*slation generally regards collusion as a particularly harmful sort of bus, I Z-- L- II 111c's" 
an, ano, ement. However, from an institutional econornic viewpoint it does not niattci, t) 
whether price inci-eascs are undertaken unilaterally or collectively. As long as competitivc 
enti-y is ensured, the existence of the gap between the price charged as a result of the Z: ) 
collusion, and the price consumers are really \ýJlling to pay (other conditions being stahle) 
WIII C1'CatC ý1 PrOft OPP0111.111ity for third parties to ,., cizc. 
"ooodwill" or reputation of certain firni, ý enabling the attachment of cu,, tomer,, which de,, erve ii 
sinillar treatment. Moreover, location Or transportat] Oil co,,, ts may also permit Inefficiem-N or 
deliberate supply restriction. Similarly, the legal protection afforded to trademarký, or brand 
name,, may ci-eate inevitable difficulties for other firms when placing their competing product,, 
in the market. Similarly, albeit to a lesser extent, product \arletý inay dispewe some protection. 
though not much, , ince the nature of cowurner deniand changes. 
Natural re,, trIctI()n" ýýill 
-Imisk impede competition. On the other hand, they do not need to niake intorniation seldorn sci 
, ivailahle. thu. s the,, CM1110t "'Liarantee to promote ciTicicnt adju,, inient. 11: 1 
-) I () 
Perhaps the conventional view against Collusion is severe because its bencfijciýd 
effects are not readily seen under the conventional appraisal of economic theoI-\. The 
historical experience of the destructive economic effect of cartel,, encompassing \\, IioI(, 
industries (which should be distinguished frorn the naked price fixing conclenincd I-)\- 
antiti-LISt policy) has played a persuasive role over antitrust scholars. Con\, cntMiwI 
economic theorists regarded these arrangements as departures from the ideal of pci-I'm 
competition, thus seerninc, to confirm a similar resultino economic loss to tho.. ý, c caricl. " 4: ) Z7 
which encompassed whole industries in the 1930s. 393 
However, in an evolutionary perspective, thin,,,,, look dift'crent. Nakcd pricc 
, acyreernents, like other orcanisational forms, are the spont(incolls outcollic of c0jjjpcji(i\(-, L- t) 
'es: Competition makes it possible for entrepreneurs to innovate, tlic\ can process 
eventually become the only suppliers of the new product they have decided to introducc 
onto the market. Later, successful entrepreneurs are imitated by others, increasingly the 
hornogenisation of production. Production is in a constant state of unstahic 
diffei-entiation-hoiiiogenisation efforts on the side of entrepreneurs. Different corporatc 
StI'UCtUI-C, S or orgyanisations are devised to meet the deniands Of COIISLH-nei-. " for 
differentiated or homogenised goods, while the level of technology remains stable. 
In other words, the optimum degree of diversification (or conversely, tý 
homogenisation) cannot be decided in advance by an orn-niscient authority. Firstly, 
reducing the degree of differentiation does not mean that 11 is necessary to reduce thc z:: ) L- 
11LInibcr ol'producers. If it could be proven technically optimal to have one type of gooci. 
I. I does not. 1ollow that it is optimal to haiw on/N' one producer. A cartel or i 
In facl, the introduction of antitrust policy in sorne key countries, like Germany, wx., -, 
addressed to preýent the re-ernergence of Industry cartels, which %vere fi-equentl\ ,, ei up in that 
countrv before the Second World Wai- to undertake iovernment planning goals. The\, werc lI Zr ,- 
rightly regarded these scholai-, as threatenHiL, the emergence of a market economy in thi, 
country. See K. W. N6rr "Law and Market Organization: The Historical experience in Gernianý 
From 1900 to the Lýiw ALainst Restraint, ý of Competition ( 1957)-, 15 1 /1 JOUI-MI1 of ln,, iitutionýd 
and Theoretical 1. conornics [1995] 5-20. AIso. W. N]Wchel, "Competition trom an ()i-kl() Point N 
Vic\v", in German Neo-liberals and the Social Market Economy, A. Peacock and H. WIII, _, crodt 
(Eds. ), (Ne\,,, Yorký St. Martin',, Press. 1989). pp. 1-42-159. 
v 
-ý 
producer can equally do the 'ob. A cartel 1,, is efficient as a single producer in soki I In, -, 1 4: ) 
,, 'Lib-additlvity problerns. Secondly, one cannot know in advance whether an activitv 
deserves homogenisation because sub-additivity problems have to be solved. Thk hii,, to Z-- 
be discovered by a trial-and-error process. Indeed, sub-additivity may change ()\-ci- time. 
and a,, new technologies are discovered, the position of the cartel may change o\, cr time. 
ending the need foi- homogenisation, and requiring product differentiation in,, tcad. A,, tý t-- L- 
Earl contends, this may have to do with the stage of development of the niarkct 
concerned. 394 
For this reason, Salin concludes: "It Is preferable to abandon the definition of ýi 
cartel as an agreement between firms that intends to exert a restrictive action or any sort 
of specific action. The actual intention of participants is not relevant. Any action results 
from an intention, but the content of the intention does not matter frorn the market polill 
of view. It may be that an entrepreneur enters into an agreement with some sj)cCII-Ic 
intention, but the outcome of the agreement is not the one intended, but another onc 
which appears as beneficial, so that the agreement will be maintained. What is importal-it 
iii a cartel is that some rnix of coordination-cooperation efficiently blurs the fronticr,, -, 
between organizational processes and market processes. "395 
))4 In his words: "[Price competition] will vary depending on the stage of development of 'i market. 
In early sta, _ýcs in a market 
life-cycle, buyers may be poorly Informed about the point of havin! _', 
the product and concerned about its likely reliability. and whether or not it is likcl\, to 
become obsolete due to design improvement,, or clue to its failure to be accepted a,, the III(ILIS11A 
standard. Later on, when the product has become increasingly homogeneous and Mien 
information about Its deslan and manufacturinL, proce.,, scs has leaked ow and bccornc \vIdel\ 
known, brand names may count for little as si,, _, nals of quality and reliabilit\, and lirice 
competition may indeed be important. Even at this stage, it may still be questionable whcther 
makes sense to think of firms a,,, enjovino L,, i\, cn demand and co, ýt functions, for chan, _, C, in 
income level,, mav still be , oing on, and manufacturei-, of rival product types may be Corning LIJ) 
with \vays of \vInnin. " customers back (as \vIth the development of multiple, \ theatres 1)ý' cinerna 
ch; tins, in the face of competition from the well estahl is' lied home video and cable television 
inarkets)". (Earl. p. 149. ) 
. )95 Salin, p. 42. 
Rothbard, "Monopok ... 
" pp. 572-573 3 
-) -) I 
ii) Mergers between competitors. 
Again, mergers and acquisitions of firms by the] itors appear as reductiow, r compet 
iii the degree of competitiveness within the market concerned. Industrie. " conlpri. "Cd 01 Z7) 
fewer firms, once mer(-, ers are undertaken, are placed further away from the 1cleal ()I- 
equilihnum compared to those with numerOLIS, S11LIller fIrMS. 
In our vision, however, mergers are strategies aii-ned at achieviner entrv into a 
particular field of production on a quantitative scale hitherto unattempted. Guided hy the 
lure of making a profit, entrepreneurs seek to lower costs of production, i-namiucillent. 
rnarketin,,, and so on, by acquiring another competing firm. These profit OPPOrtUnItIeS 
rnay be sensed by alert entrepreneurs whenever already deployed productive assets are 
not fully exploited by less entrepreneurial competitors. This could occur if benefits from 
the use of those assets were improvable through a better managerial policy, 1-)ý! the 
exploitation of potential scale economies, or by an improvement in the coordination ol' 
resources. If the activities performed by the firms involved are closely similar, the firm 
interested in mergin- would have to incur no extra costs in adapting its capabilitie,, to the L- 117,4: ) 
ýtctivitles undertaken by the firm subýject to merger. The administrative costs of ali-nin(I L- ý71 1ý 
competitors to achieve this coordination could be ýivoided by subjecting them to a sing1c 
command. This would open up a gap which could, in turn, be wide enough to encouragc 
inore entrepreneurial firms to buy less entrepreneurial ones. 
iii) Vertical integr ition and mergers between non-co titors. 
Different levels of vertical intearation simply reveal the extent to which the 
ilctIN'llics of the firms involved are complementary: the more complementary, the morc 
integrated. Exclusive contracts can be similar to full vertical integration, where 
A\, antages for the co-ordination of complementary activities are obvious. EXCILIsIVC 
deLdings simply require a more reliable business environment within which to distribute 
,, oods or services to certain Customers. Similarly, exclusive Supply contracts may require 
ýi reliability In SLIppk' 01' I'CSOLli-ces. Whenever the r1sks Involved in the acti\'ity rcquii-c it to 
he .., o, entrepreneurs can 
be inclined to Pursue a more stable relationship hy acquiring the 
nianagei-nent of a firm in an upstream or downstreani market. 
As loncy as competitive entry to third parties is not blocked, these will put pre. 'ý. "'Liiv L- 
on integrating firms to he competitive and avoid "abusive- business behaviour 
conSI-Imers. 
iv) Price discrimination and other barriers- -toentrry. 
Price discrimination is impossible in markets characterised by perfect competition. 
where products are homogenous and demand functions are identical. Hence. 
entrepreneurs who engage in this type of business behaviour in "imperfectly compctitivc 
niarkets" are seen to force some customers and clients to pay in excess to what tho" 
"should", aided with the market power to impose such conditions. Similarly, antItIll'A 
condemns strategies oriented to raise "barriers to entry" (e. (,., advertising carnpai-w, to it) t-- Z:! > Z71 
develop business reputation) which are aimed at differentiating markets. 
In an ongoing sItUation, price discrimination may be a sensible stratep, to 
differentiate between different sorts of perceived uninsurable risks. EntreprenCUrs are 
faced with the fact that their ignorance on future conditions affecting their pre',, ent I- 
investments makes thern uninsurable. It is a risk that cannot be insured, since it is the 
I'CSLI]t of sheer uncertainty and as such cannot be ClUantified. 
The only way to provide for an uninsurable risk may be to adopt a strategy that 
would appear illegitimate to a conventional appi-aisal &,, for example, the entrepi-cilcui, 
has to make allowances to cover any unexpected contingency. However, "Incc 
L111111SUI-ahIC nsk cannot hc quantified, it cannot be included in costs. Foi- this i-eam)i-i. the 
ciitrepreneur has to charoe a price that appears to be above cost, but which simply i-c\'cal,,, 
the fact that lie lacks the information necessary to offset such unexpected contingency. 11 
he did possess it, there would be no reason for him not to charge a lower price, ýi 
condition that would cnsure a better chance Of 1, LICCCCS,, vis-tý-vis his competitoi-,,. 
2 
In fact, some industries require conditions of "structural" imperfect competition to 
exist, because start up costs are so high that limitations to entry may be necessary to 
justify the investment made. For instance, variable sales may also require profit ()\, Cl- a 
short-term period to cover losses over another short-term period. In other words. Perfect 
col-npetition would lead to zero output. 
Business reputation, on the other hand, provides useful information to t1lo"e 
uninformed customers about the benefits of the product or service offered. This Could hc 
important in markets where the goods traded are "experimental", that is, where the 
customer can appraise the full qualities of the good once it is acquired. 
v) Tying arrangements. 
These arrangements entail commitments to buy and sell goods, at agreed prices, for 
a stipulated period of time. By guaranteeing a definite market to one producer, It 
therefore becomes closed to others; thus, the force of automatic selection is temporarily 
suspended. However, entrepreneurs are afforded predictability for future sales without an 
inipaii-i-nent to the other requirements for efficleiicy. Sometimes these agreernents cover i 
variety of coods, in such cases, the conditions for automatic , election iMIV hC 
contravened, since a customer may prefer to buy elsewhere if free to do so, Lis in the cx"c 
of tying arrangements. This is sirrular to a multi-product firm, which is able to practice 1 4: -) 
internal subsidisation, and which is not subject to automatic selection in terms of each ol 
its activities taken separately. 
c) The balance of public policy analyýjjs between ý, hort-term restrictlow, and 
term innovations and econornic growth. 
The restraints produced by organisational structures appear on the surface to he thc 
\, cry antithesis of the sort of freedom that drives unsuccessful entreprenew-, out of 
hUsincss-, vct it is undeniable that they play an important informational role. The centi-al 
clLiestion, thereforc, lies in determining %vhethei- thei-c can be a cornpi-onilse bcI%vccn the Z: ý 
[Linctionino of these resti-aints, and the conditions of "fivedom" which ensure niai-kct I- 
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discipline and the selection of productively efficient firrns. -ý)c* 
Public policy ha,, i tradc-off 
to i-nake between the restriction introduced which Ili-nits both market dl.,, clplliie and 
efficient selection in the ý, hort-term, and the information that the arran, -, cment,, hnnL, 
about in the long-terni, which will encourage productive investments. PoIlc\, -nia1\cr,, ýire 
thu,, confronted with the question of whether the cndurance of these restrictWill. P, 
justified over time, given the economic landscape of the industry in which tllc\ . -irc 
implei-nented. 
It is necessary to reallse that these arrangements cannot be considered "restrictiom, L- 
of freedom" as such. Freedom is only obtained when entrepreneurs have a1tcrnat1N*C 
courses of action available. In the conventional appraisal there is no such 1'recdoill. 
Forcing the entry (or endurance) of more firms into an industry than it can naturalk 
tolerate with the aid of regulatory devices would do away with the freedoin of tho, "e 
affected by the prohibition placed on their actions (to buy and sell, sct whatever prlcclýl 
they reý, ard as convenient, insure their businesses frorn unexpected risks, and ,o oii) mid 
would not compensate those firms which have suffered any loss of freedom. Indeed, thesc 
Would have no more freedom to decide any (, iven course of action. Any decision ývouid 
now depend, not on their own will, but on the existence of the regulation imposed. 
For this reason, Salin believes that the usc of the term "restriction" for such harrwr, ý 
or impediments to competition is misleading. because it compares them with a noll- 
restrictive standard, which in this case is impossible. In an imaginary world this , tandard 
would be the existence of perfect information arnong producers, which would allow them 
to avold inconvenient restrictions on their freedom, otherwise necessai-V to overcome ýiriv 
problems in obtaining information concerning future dernand. 397 Thus, when the time 
Lictor is considered, present contractual (or formal) constraints over future actioii camim 
6 
In the words of Richardson: "There would , ecni to be a need that the markcl, ý of jnd, v, dLi, il 
producers should he both secure, in order to LI\, c them the confidence to invest, and at the , amc 
time vulnerable, lest their policies are inefficient or restrictive. MUSt we admit this 
incompatibility to hc genuine and ineluctablc'. ) Is it possible to find a compromise hciýýcen the 
conflictill(I requirements, an optimum degrec ()f inertl. t or re', traint, which will bc,, t li\()Lii- 111C 
proccs', ot resource allocation taken ýis ýi wholc'. '- (Richardon, Informat](m .... p. 
120. ) 
397 sa Ii 11,11.3) 4. 
be seen as restrictions on competition or on 
. 
11-ecdom, but as ineaus ensuriii,, 
expectations and ensuring access to valuable information oil 1)1-ofit Oppol-tunities. 
For this reason, these seeming "limitations on freedom" which enable some firm,, to 
seize profit opportunities, cannot last indefinitely in it \'(fluntarily negotiated hi 
sUch aii evolving settirig, the restrictive effects of these arrarigernerits arc irrelc\mv 
because they create the conditions favourabic for their own elimination. As timc 
iiew circumstances render these agreements obsolete. This erodes thell' Use a,, -, con\c\, ()r'-ý 
of useful information on how to meet consurner demand (and therefore. how to make 
some profit). Knowledge gaps resulting from the obsolescence of former conventiolls- 
Solutions will encourage alert entrepreneurs to make new ones, and thus seize thc ncw 
profit opportunities created. 
Different organisational forms enable information to reach soine niarkct 
participants, at the expense of restricting the freedom of the participants, but at the sallic 
time, enhancing their possibilities for them to receive such profits from others. Therefore, 
it will encourage them to make further investments. In the words of Richardson, -tile"C 
market connections, whatei, cr the additiolUll 0/? /*CCthWSfi)/- WhiCh the. ), are dcsi, ý/Icd, (110 
ffiects, do afford entrepreneurs a more secure market for theii, whatei, er their indirect c 
individual prodUCts. They serve, in other words, as a means of increasing the amount ol' 
inarket information in a decentralised economy, or, in other words, of increasing (11c 
predictability of the entrepreneurial environment". Thus. "the availability of [the] kind ol 
information related to competitive production depends in particular on the existence of 
i-estraints which, in varying degree, reduce the freedom of action of Individwil 
entrepreneurs". (Authors italics)398 
For this reason, they can be regarded as efficient in the sense that they ensurc 1-irlill-I 
ýi profit which would otherwise be impossible to achieve for anyone, and would thcrcforc 
be lost. Again, a profit rnade available to all is lost by everyone. lVithout them, market ,g 
01-dillation li'0110 be impossible, and producer, ý would certainly be prevcriteci froni 
198 Richardson, Intormation p. 68. 
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imikino new discoveries, innovation, and related i improvements which in the end benefit 
consui-ners. In other words, these advantatges would accrue only If we allow a particukir 
entrepreneur to restrict his freedom of action so as to enable everyone else to have some 
predictability about his future actions; a condition which, under a static appraisal, appcarý, 
to be a restriction on rivalry in the market. 
Only in it Iong i-Lin can one clearly see that the, ýc organisational forms ai-c con,, imitl\ 
thi-eateiicd by innovation from other firms pro\, ldhip substitute products. Inno\, ýttloii itself I 
is triggered by the promise of receiving profits foi- creativity, which leads to Output 
expansion in the lone, run. Clearly, remoi, Mg all prqfits it, oidd be e ffic .)I 
equilibrium pohit of' i, ien% bui would threaten imioi, atimi mid so ii, ould be Icss efficicill 
in 1he long run. Innovation has transition costs, and i-estrictive policies with the old 
product or -technology may ease the transition and spread the costs (retraii-iiii, -,, 
wierriployrnent, etc. ) over time. In a lono terni appi-alsal innovation, will render tlicsc 
ai-rangements obsolete. 
The difference,, ý in foresight, or the capacity to increw)e production that enahIc Z: ) 
entrepreneurs to gain an advantage over their competitor, ý are transitory. In a (i\, naniic 
"the impact of new things - new I instance setti rigg, technologies for i on the existino 
structure of an industry considerably reduces the long-run scope and importancc of 
pi'actices that aim, through restricting output, at conserving established position,, and Lit 
inaxii-nizincy the profits accruing from them. We must now recognize the further fact thýit L- Z-n 
i*estrictive practices of this kind, as far as they are effective, acquire a significance which 
thCY Would not have in a stationary state or in a state of slow and balanced growth. "399 
Ohviously, under a perspective that vl, ýuallse,, markets as something static, where L- 
I-esourccs m-C ()I\, Cll and no discovery arisc, -, all tllc,,, c tcchnique,,, itppear to hillit th'- 
Opportunities open to entrepreneurs for takin, -, -in dependent" paths. and indeed In thl, -, 
sense. dicy are "restrictive". In the process of ensuring customer loyalty ell tl-el)l-el]C U I-S L- - 
I'llav attempt several stratecries which third parties (i. e. antitrust authoritic,,, ) Could I tn 
'199 Schunilictcr. 1). 87. 
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interpret, t ollowing a stnictio-al logic, as "market foreclosures" imposed again,, t ()thei- 
competitors. Similarly, a structural logic would condemn the strategics aimed at , cckin2 
information from other competitors because this would align everyone,, conduct, tIm" 
reducing theý number of effective rivals within the market. But ýtgain, this i,, -, a rnattcr of 
the perspective endorscd. As Lepage contends, --a number of husincss COIIdLI(-TS 
traditionally regarded as 'restrictive' and deerned incompatible with the needs of a healthy 
competition are nothing c1se but private contractual arrangements purporting to inipi'mv Z- zn - 
inarket functioning (partICUlarly to reinforce the loyalty of the j-)articipants in die L- - 
transaction) [and coi-npetition]". 400 Under a conventional perspective, the c,, scntial 
question concerning the co-ordination of entrepreneurs (both competitors and clients) to 
rnake future information (as yet unknown) avallable and to forestall future losscý, 
from forecast eri-ors is totally neglected. 
Hence, implementing a policy designed alone, those principles Would inliihil 
entrepreneurs from undertaking investments, developing innovations and crealin, -, b tn I 
economic growth. Evidently, this is particularly relevant to the design of public policic,,, in b t) 
developing c ountries -such as those 
in Latin America. Intervening in the conventional way C, b 
would destroy the growth of knowledge that the system would otherwise prodLICC. That ZD 
i-neans products will never be created, markets will never be developed, johs will hc 
t-'oreaone, business opportunities missed, etc. L- 
Similar i-easonin, cy justifies organisational structures which restrict short-term rlvalrý 
to enhance long-term discoveries. Thus, appraising the proper length of these 
arran-cments is crucial. The question, Of COLIrse, Is can a third party (i. e., a policy-makcr) 
identil'y what short-term restrictions should be challenged and what should he tolerated in 
order to Pursue lono-term, soc ially-valu able discm, cric,, " L- 
400 H. Ldpage, La nouvelle &onomie industrielle, Plurlel On6djt), Hachette-Librairle Gýn&itlc I- - -- Francaise, Park, 1989, p. 231 (unofficial translation). Lepage also adds: "Cc clue Flý. tat 
consl&re -, Cneralement comme 
des entrave,, ou des atteintes ý la concurrence. le plu,, 
SOLIVC11t Clue IC I-CS1.11tat des proc&lures Litlll,, Ccs par Ic marchý pour iv,, oudre pr&],, ýmcnl Ic,, 
proWmes d'efficlence et de lovaute qui , cr%cnt de motif It on inter%ention". (Lcpýqgc. Li 
now-clic.... 1). 
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Pi-obably not. Only the entrepreneur, s subjective appraisal of the prodUCtiVe dCtI\ IitV 
concerned is capable of determining whether the kind of or., ganisational , tructui-e.,, 
negotiated extend beyond its proper limits. Thus, iI it is not possible for anyone out,, iclc tile 
ti-ansaction to identify the boundaries of the firni objectively. Only those entreprcneLll'ý' 
involved can do so, and at the risk of being wrong. Government rules ,, hould not atienijýi 
to discover what these "proper" limits are, but leave individuals to find thern, at tllc pel-11 
of rnakin. g their own imstakes. 
Therefore, in the real world, which is the world that policy-making is supp(), ýcd to 
address, it is necessary to acknowledge that it is not possible to determine which busine,,, ý, 
activities should be sub* I *cal inicgration. ject to rivalry and which should be subject to vern 
Only entrepreneurs can have different opinions about the de., -,, i-ee to which an ccononiic 
activity is complernentary or competitive. 401 ThLI. S, they are able to develop subjectivc 
-ket participants, at times identifying them as collipetitol- 1111Cý, appraisals of mai II L- ýIllcl at ti 
seem,,,,, them as potential customers or suppliers. As the process of competition P, airned at 
increasing information and knowledge, this sometimes leads to rivalry among markct 
participants but in other cases it leads to co-operation. 
Puhlic policy should instead define those instances where entrepreneurý, arc 
prevented from voluntarily defining the limits of market organisation. This could happcn, b Z7) 
401 Thcrc k no clear-cut distinction between competitive and complementary investments. In the 
end, it is the consumer's subjective perception based on their preferences, which detel-111111c" 
what entreprenel-11', 'ý will come to regard a,, complementary and what as competitive. Neo- 
ckrssical demand theory assumes tL COnSurnel Can ot -S - -der their preference,, as different 
combinations [rorn a fixed list of commodities, the logic of choice. Entrepreneurs, ho\\cver, ha\c 
to determine what combination of quallt]CS 1200(k MUSt possess; therefore, the model ot 
consurner behaviour does not suit. (Earl, pp. 144-155. ) Certain commodities may 
atJVC LISCI,, which consumers must decide upon. Preference. ý, between various coninioditic" alterm 
are not 
_just 
I VC 11 1 to a conSUmer; they have to decide hy weighing Lip the contribution,, made h\ 
each of them \\ith their own objectives. It ],,, not preference,, between (-ýood,, but , tahilm orcr 
tl'ine which characterlses, the various desires that -, oods meet- ý()rne 
desires demand chan, iL g 11 1 
coni modi ties for their satisfaction (novelty)ý deslre,, Lds'o require social distinction hecýiwc the 
pos,, csslon of a commodity offers prestige when confined to a few people. Consumer,, I-, uy 1ý1 - because of the preferences they expect to , 7, ct. 
It is a trial-and-eri-or process. In ', 1101-t. C0111,1-1111CIs 
are endowed with a set of desire-, and form their preference,, for cornrnoditic,, on the hask of 
tlicir imperfCcl knoMedge of the power that tile conirnoditic,, have to , ati, ýJ'\ tlic-, c de,, irc,. 
Fritreprenew-, are constantIN' try1r)(1 to HIC Opinion, and L11dC,, ()i Con', L)HICI -,. 11) ORICY (0 L- I 
point their acnvitiieý, in a partICLIlar direction. 
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J'or instance, if a gap in the legal protection of these rights or defectiýc official 
enforcement encourages other entrepreneurs to missapropriate business reputation (i. c.. L- 
violation of copyrights or trademarks). More significantly, government regulation', coulcl 
distort the (Y III growth of economic organisation by dictating entrepreneurs ho\A, to hc1jjIVC i 
the market. Public policy which aims to preserve competition "hOLI]d focu,. " on cithcr 
cliallenging market restraints, which are sustained hv a lc(, ýý] source or chal1cn(-, Jn(-, the 
le(, al source itself. 
Hence, it is possible to conclude that In a dynamic evolving framework, rivalry and 
co-operation, do not really "oppose" each other, but form a complex game in which 
managers sometimes engage in rivalry and sometimes co-operate, according to the level 
of differentiation they observe in the activities, products and services offered by ý1 
particular cluster of firms within the market. Only in a static framework does it appear 
that both forms of relationship between firms and markets are contradictory and 
incompatible. In a dynamic framework, what appears essential is the competitive entry of 
any entrepreneur to be ensured, by elinlInating all soui-ces of leoral privileocs preventin" 
ýiccess to the market. 
In conclusion, individuals exercise their property rights and freedom of contract h\ 
arraiiainc, their affairs and entering into associatioii with other individuals thus CI-CM1111-1 L_ tý Z7,1 
ide ai iness practice,,, set up to meet their oh' \\' I -ray of corporate structures and busi I ACCtives 
and cnhance their mutual business expectations. If not constrained by cmernal 
interference -and legal privileges, these structurc. s' represent the best possible staic ol 
al-Tairs to their members, within the lirnýits of their acccss to knowledue and avallabic L_ 
teclinology, and their functioning leads to the efficicncy ofthe spontaneous market ordcr. tý - 
d) Some-cnTirical evidence about the informatiomd role of 
ma no The Lal I -nerican experience. ., em, ents n 
Ai 
The Latin American experience cleady 1, LIPPOI't, the theoretical appraisal outiMed 
ýIhm, c. The available cinpirical evidence highli. (-, Iit,, how the official coristraim, " placcd ()ii 
HIC ("I-OWth Of hLISIIICS,, ýIS a result of clevc1opmcnt policics induce firms to iml)lcmcm L- 
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subtle II orms'and strate(6es of management co-ordination. It also shows that the realit", ()I 
Latin American domestic markets, frequently small and with little purcha"In-, -ý capcitV. 
induces firms to seek strategies and arrangements that may seem, in principle, SLIsPICIOU. 's 
to an antitrust authority. 
Since economic reform was launched in the 1980s, numerous Industi-1c,, havc 
suffered a -managerial revolution". Apertura has prompted the emergence of innovativc 
hrrns in the region, despite the appearance of increased concentration in some rnarketý,. In 
the words of G6mez: "For Latin America, these are revolutionary time.,,. Market-orlenicd 
policies are breaking down barriers that until recently enclosed weak, undersized, uid 
heavily rcgulated economies. Privatisation, deregLilation, and rcduced trade re.,, triction,, N 
are replacing state monopolies and private cartels. Foreign investment drawn froni 
OLItside the region being, matched locally by Unpi-ccedented flow.,, of capital ýt', 1, ýItill 
American firms purchase their neighbour country companies, enter new rnal-kct. ", and 
forue networks of strateo'c alliances throughout the hemisphere. Information technology, 
combined with the privatisation of state monopolies in telecomm un ic at ions, is boosting Z7 
the flow of data ti-looering linkages between financial markets across countrie,,,. For the Z17t, tý t) 
first time, concessions and other market mechanisms are being ernployccl for manacring 
port facilities, building new highways, expanding airports, and upgrading lonc, -nc, 21cctc(l Z7 t) 4: ) L- 4: ) L- - 
in frastruct Lire. To be sure, progress varies from one country to another-, but history iniiN tl - 
well mark the 1990s Lis the decade when Latin America pulled itself to(yether". 4021 I Ic b 
concludes: "What clearlv stands out in assessing the growing internationalization of' Latin 
Arnerican firms is the innovative approaches that many employ". 403) 
In this respect, the INTERMAN Management Innovation Programme has identified L- 
sc\'cral featores that sunimarise many of these new and innovative forms of cl()IIILI I 
busli-icss in Latin America. These features have evolved out of the in"titutional 
LHICCI-taintics Surrounding business activity in the region, which in part ai, i,,, c.,, fi-oni I-- 
PI-ObIcnis created hv the lack of infrastructure for trade in Latin Anierica. In pai-ticulai-. 
402 Gilliczý P. 
403 , G(iniez, p. 245- 
:I 
the lack of -Iobal channels, favourable lo(, i., -, Iic,,, and inforniation jecilljol(w\ 1(), - c! L7 L- -- cc 
firrns to seek ways to overcome these constraints. Gomez comment,,: '*In Latin A111criCa. 
securing adequate di,, tribution for consurner products can represent a chalicn( ing 
rnanacyernent* task-, locistics represent more ()I' a barrier than a driving forcc-, ind L- L- t, 
inforniation technology, including communications, has only recently be-Lin to ContribUIC 
to internationalizing the region's business". 404 
Furthermore, the lack of certainty and reliable expectations about legal re, -, ulatloll 
has often made Latin American firms tuni to alternative i-neans of enhandlitc-I thc1l' 
expectations than those conventionally acknowledged in business practice elsewhere. The tý 
problems of currency volatility and about-turn,, iii economic policy experleiicccl M thc 
i-egion have frequently caused havoc in the management of multinational firms. Foi- thc,, c b Z71 
reasoiis, to offset the i-mcertainties of official decisions, firnis in Latin America rc,, ()rt to a 
variety of devices to ensure their markets. For example, they use family ties In 
seek more flexible manacternent, use informal links, and develop a managerial capacit\ for Z7) L- 
influencing official institutions to create more predictable and reliable Govurinicill 
decisions. 
For example, family links often provide a reliable source Of MLIUKII trust in busmc,,,, -,. 
As Ddvila and G6mez Samper argued in Lt study they conducted on Latin I Icall b 
management: "[the mLprity of Latin American-owned innovative firms are medium ýi/c 
(i. e. employ from 300 to 800 persons), are often family run. and have proven pi-oactivo 
vis-ý-vi, s the region's cconomic, social, and political turbulence". 405 
Making business relationships flexible, so as to "open" them to changing, 
circumstances, has also proved efficient in this context. G6mez explains the conclu,, iow, 
Ot' ýI StUdy on highly successful Latin firms, which revealed a deorree of inforl-nality in 
maiiapcment styles m some Brazilian, Colombian and Venezuelan organisatiow, \\111cl, I- I 
404 ]d., p. 234- 
405 U. Davila and H. G(imez, "Innovative Management and Organizational Development in 
Allierica, 30 The International ExCCLltl\'C [ 19941. p. 675. 
cliffered fron-i the explanations formulated by conventional theories. The inforniality i,, 
related in these casc, ý to "novel property and organisýational , Iructures, ef , lcc(l\, c I- 
empowerment ý,, tratecyies, unconventi t-- onal orig: Wizational missions, and deliberatc effort,, 
to build on culture-specific idiosynci-asics .. . 4(k) 
[J'sing informal link,,, has also become important in reducuil-I Uncertainty. -For , onv 
Litin American firm,,, making good use of the informal market became a way of builciiiiL, 
the home market as well as export sales. Canels, for example, has become Me. xjý"() 
laraest chewing-gurn manufacturer by focusing its distribution effort largely on the 4: ) :nz: _- CIN - 
informal sector. Leonisa, a Colombian linuerle manufacturer, came to dorninatc the Z-1 
market with its product line in nearby countries chiefly by building, and carct'ullý 
i-nonitoring, in each country, its informal -sector wholesale and retail network". 407 
Moreover, leading firms have in some cases developed alliances with countcrpart Z: ) 
firms in neighbouring, countries as a way of breaking into each other's market. FOI- Z7) 
example, multinational companies frequently buy local firms with an established customer 
base. Switzerland's Ncstlc recently acquired VcnczLieIa',,, Sai, ()Y. ýt locA hiriii ýý 11h Ii 
17ii-i-n reputation in the Venezuelan confectionery market. All-fina, a Colombian firm, 
initiated exports of its dairy products to Venezuela by reachincy a mutual mal-kcI111L, L- 
acyreernent with Pliunro, ve, a Venezuelan meat processor. Commentino on this opci-ation In 17, 
G61nez contends that "both firms produce premium quality product, ý, and both bencht 
h-orn the aureement by relying on each other's extensive retail distribution network. Z: ) t75 
i-endering channels more efficient by addin, 2 new and complernentary linc,, -. -tox Oncc t, - 
established, they thcn expanded their operatiow, in the iicw market. AII)IIIa ýICCIL111-C(I ýI 
iiew plant after obtaining consumer acceptance. In another case, Mtwesa, a VcneZIIcI; III 
I'Ood processor, and Colombia's Noel, followed a similarstart-up stratcu\/. 
406 1). 244. 
407 1cL. P. -' 
') 4. 
408 Id.. P. - -,. I 
ý. 
Another exampie of developing business iink,, with local partnei-, v, ý'kv biiiii 
Ainerica LLC, a regional satellite television enterprise based in Miarrui, Mlich 11C L- 'I, 
developed joint ventures, with firms like Organi, -, (tcocs Globo in Bi-azil and 
Telcvisa S. A. of Mexico in order to gain a foothold in thc, ýe t\\, () Litli-i countneý, Thl, ki, 
beeii taken as a fii-,,, t step towards the expansion within in the region with the ain-i thlit S4 L- 
wd/ evcntually outdo its competitor -and leader in the market. - Gallaxy Litm Amerw(l. 
Ski, has created independent operations in each country, leaving rnarketin, -, ýind 
sti-ategies to its local partners. -Im 
Prolife. rating mergers and joint ventures are not necessarily the result of' a man, Ic,, t 
(or implied) intention to monopolise regional or local markets. There are two rcasonahlc 
explanations for such operations. Firstly, there rnay well be a need to overconic dic 
uncertainty of investino in the newly emerging markets of Latin America. This need 111a\ 
induce firrns wishing to take advantages of the liberalisation in the region to forgc clwcr 
business ties with other firms, offerinc, them tacit and subjective knowledae of the 11cv\ 
rnarket, which they would otherwise require years to develop. Secondly, thesc 
concentrations may occur because of the need to ensure sufficient econornies, of to 
i-nake the invcstment profitable. Indeed, the size of domestic Latin American nim-kct,,. 
independently considered, may not support investments above certain levels. 
For example, the Sindicato Antioquci-io, a Colombian group representing , onic L- I 
hundred independently-owned firms, and including some of the country's largest and 
iiiost advancled retailers, joined Holland's Macr() and Venezuela's Polar in order to hi-111 
about Venezuela's lar-cst chain of superniarkets (fifty Cada outlets) and departnient I- 
stores (ejcyht MaxCs storcs). The new chain Of supermarkets and 
department storc, _I. 
to(, cther with the Macro bulk retail outlets that are expanding rapidly in WnczLicla, 11 Z__ -I 
provide a powerful, ready-made distribution channel for the Sindicato's wide ranuc 
inanufacturing firms, including Noel. Once on the brink of bankruptcy, these firms havc 4n 
been revitalised by the new capital and "knowledge" provided by their new partnei-s. The 
old mvners, the Cisncr(). ý- Group, divested thenisclvcs of both the Cada C-ind Alax-N`. ý icliil 
409 T. Sullivan, -U Destfio de Coiiipetli-",. '\lllcl-iclt 9 April 1998. P, 5-4ý 
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iietworks in order to raise the vast amount of capital required for flicir hemisphcrc-ýý id, - 
entry hid into satellite television. 410 
Corporate restructuring may prove decl II idly chanc HI 111c, "', -api ve naiZ, IL bL s 
environment. The exaniple of Grupo Hermcs pro%lides clcýir c%'Idence of thi,,. Thi,, 
formerly protected Mexican industrial group sur%ivcd the 1994 rcccs-sion and i't)icigii 
competition by selling its interests within the rnanufacturing scctor and focusInL, on the L- L- 
energy . -, cctor and teleconimunications. The group is now the niain , hýireholder ()I' ( ; rttp, t7l - 
CerreNl, which produces energy plant containers. By this, the group wa,, able to huild on 
its previous manufacturing experience of automobile parts. 411 
For cornplementary investments, some local multinational cornpallie" contract the 
services of domestic firms ("outsourcin, -, "), rýithcr tliýiii (JcvclopML, Internal uiiw, 1)r II 
vertical integration. By doing so, these fil-111S ý1CCjL111-C the know1ccl"ic and cxpci-tisc 
develop cxport sales. For example, Cartoiwjcs Esirclla, a leadiii(-, cartoii niakcr iii) 
Mexico, obtained a contract to supply cups to McDonalds and soon afterwarck bcgari 
-ervic*na the firm's needs in Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Ar(yentina. Another carton 
SLIpplier, Coinei-mcx. also supplies McDonald,, as well a, " KFC, Dornino), Plzzýi alid 
other fast food suppliers in Mexico and elsewhere in the region. As G6rnez indicatc,,,. I)v 
scrving as local Suppliers of multinationals. these Mexican firms learned ll()\\ to Catel- 10 
CLIstoiners that demand consistent quality, low priccs and large Voll-1111C. -412 Aiiotlicr cii, ýc 
is the experience of Alicol-1), S. A., a laroc Peruvian food manufacturing conipam'. Tlirl 
company regards its distribution network systeni, based on effective outsourcin, -,, a,, 111c 
key to its success over its competitors. In 1993 the company began an ao-resskc 
exparision plan. which included buyincy its tx\,, o rnost important rivals, thus redLICHILI Co,, Iý, 
-pavroll was reduced hy 43clc-, and devcloping a reliable distribution network. The 
I'C, SLIII. S. In 1997 the coinpany's turnover was estimated at US$600 nullion a \c, ii. 
conipared to USS 120 million in 1993. Outsourciii(-, enables Alicol-1) to i-cach cliciiis tliat it I 
410 Gimez, p. 2235. 
411 ýI Sullivan, p. I- 
Gomez. P. 
would otherwise he too expensive to serve, because it,, dl,, ti-ibutors have 1()\\ci- coý, t 
structures. In this relationship, Alicorp provides its distributors with capital, know-11m, \ 
and access to its network of clients. 413 A -, imilar husiness strate2v explain,, the , ucce, ", (, f I. 
Polar, the largest VeneZUelan brewery. which has survived apertura aild h)rciiii 
competition because of its excellent distribution nctwork systcm. 
The pressure of internationalization h&, forced Latin firms to either ýcck alllanceýl ()F 
integrate in order to meet the challenge of international competition. A good cxaniplc ol 
integration is the Mexican cement industry, k)i-i-nerly dominated by dozen,, of 
owned companies spread across the country. Once trade barriers came down, si-nall 
cornpanies were absorbed by Mexico's Ceincx. This company I,, now on ýi pLir with the 
three Swiss, Italian and French multinationals that, together with Ccincx, dorninate the 
world cement market. By contrast, steel producci-, 1)rovide an cxarnple of ýilliancc. Firni,,, 
in this industry have remained largely indepenclciit. hLIt thi,, hýis not prevented theni froni 
developing strate Tic alliances for solving specific problems, such ýts the impo,, ition of t: 5 9 Z-: ) 
dumping duties in foreign jurisdictions. Steel producers frorn Brazil and Chlic \\crC t) tl 
brouaht into a newly privatised Argentine firin to crcýitc Accro. s Paranti, the fir.,, t , tccl- b t) 
prodLICing firm to form part of a regional 2R)LIP. In Mexico, Tanisa entered ýt , tratcgic L_ . t_ II 
ýilfiance with Argentina's Sitlcrca, which is pýirt ofthe Parami cornplex. Z7) 
On other ocasslons, rather than keeping the cash from official dcvalLlatl0lI, 111-111s 
have chosen to invest it in non-depreciable assets. Unilever, for example. acquired scvcriI 
Mexican firms, boostinc, its sales from USS80 million in 1985 to US$610 rnillioll ill 
1992.4! 4 Sometimes, stroncy investments in technolo, -, N, rnav be necessarv to reduce 
kthour 
costs, as the exaniple o( Coinpanhla Textil dc Mina, s Germs, S. A. (Coteinintro, it 
Brazilian textile nianufacturer shows. An imcstincrit of' US-, )450 inillion In iiiachmci\ 
criýihlc(l this firrn to conipete successfulk? with L\slýin rjvýils, \\ ho,, c kihmir cost, ýire 501 
lower. 41 5 
413 50. 
414 T. Brýldickc. "Comprar Mucho. Vender NILk". Aiiiýrici Fconom ()93-94) S'pcclal 1""tic. p. 
41 ý S11111%, 111, P. 
G6mez vividly describes the challenges which lie ahead in the pi-occ,,,,,, ofcorpor, tc 
integration in the region: "Early in the coming century, [it ],, ] conceivable [that I the food 
rnarketer's dream could well come true: rnilljons ofconsurners throughout Latin Arnerica. 
prorripted by a region-wide, satellite -be arned advertising carnpaign. hegin cach day t) tý --- 
drinking the same brýind of*juice (or soft drink) and the , anle hreakfa,,, t ccrcal! "4 i 
Finally, in order to rernain efficient (i. e. adapted to the Latin American "citin I LT 
these forms of co-ordination have encouraged firms not to grow too fast or too niLich. Z7) L_ 
and not to adopt values which run counter to conventional business. As an example of the 
first situation, Dýivlla and G6mez relate the cii,, c of Fkare, a Venezuelan children'.,, ho()k 
publisher, which has attained world-class stature based on the excellence and onginalm I- 
of its product brought about by avoiding excessive growth. To explain the scomd 
situation, they quote the case of BICE, a medium-sized Chilean bank, which is part ol I ii 
powerful business group has become a leader in fiercely competitive corporate and Ln 
institutional banking. The success of this bank, in their opinion, is based oil locýll cultur; 1I 
values; In partiCUlal-, a personal selection PrOCCSS hL111t Oil family Linity and rcllýolmt" valLic" 
that Would be considered "unthinkable" in a modern business setting. 417 
To SLIM Up, the evidence presented ahovc -, Llp])Ol'tS the concILISion that 
regard predictability as essential in their transýictions. As a result, they attempt to increa. sc 
their certainty, even at the expense of restricting the possibilities foi- action, it' thit c. iii 
enhance their expectations of the reliability of the n-iarket where they are plannin(-, to 
invest. One should not fOr2ct that market arrangements are shaped hy the sti-Licturitl 
conditions of the markets involved, and that these conditions (the technolodes involvc(l. 
legal rules, CLIStOnIS, cconornies of scale, and others) cannot be dismissed in the appral"iii 
of' SUCII restrictions. 
416 G, () IIIeZ, 1). -, 
4 
-,. 
417 Olivila and (ioniez, 1). 057. 
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DEFINING THI- Fok THF, PROMOTION ()I-- COMPETITION PIMUFSSF-S 1ýý I 
AMERICA. 
I. - The role of governments in promoting competition se, jLioceý, 
The next question to be addressed i,, whether public policv fulfik thc i-()Ic ()I 
enabling the procesý, of di,,, covery of valuable lnkwiiiaýlon. To be, in \ýah, 
should create the conditions necessary for the growth of creative entrepreneurial talcm L- 
and the development of new products and markets, which is what cornpetition is about. 
Hayek gives us a first appraisal of how governments should proceed to ach'cVc Z: ) Z7ý 
these aims: "'Policy need not be guided by the striving for the achievement of particular L- 
results, bitt Iwo, be directed towards seciiriiig (m abstract oi, crall order ()/ such 
character that it vi, il/ seci ire ft)r the inembers thc best chance ofachieving their dit ' .. 
/( 'J -C 17 1 
and largel-N, unknoit, n particular ends. The airn of policy in such a society would bvc to 
be to increase equally the chances for any unknown member of society of pursuln- with 
success his equally unknown purposes, and to rc,; trict the Lisc of coercion (... ) to the 
enforcement of such rules as will, if universally applied. tend in this sense to improve 
everyone',,, opportun i ties". (Our emphasis)4 ], ý) 
This HIStItUtional appraisal defines a two tier level of rules, which emergc ýit zlý 
different speeds: firstly, there is a level of social rule,,, which provide a stable shelter of 
predictability within which entrepreneurs may adapt their particular hLISiIICs,, Cs ýIIICI 
sccondly, there is a level ot rules that emerges from the commercial routines and 
of'immediate market interaction. The responsibility for keeping the first IC%ICI UINIACCI dIld 
ýAiptahlc to market needs is essentially (albeit not exclusively) in the hands N 
(love rn me nts, whcreas the sccond is essentially defined by entreprene(-11-, 'ý, in their 
Chan(, mg circumstances make the second level hound to experience more frecluci-it 
changes, as cntrepreneurs develop and adjust the boundaries of their relations with othcr 
cliti, cpreneurs, both at a competitive and complementary level. By contrast. the le\, cl ()I 
418 1 'bci-t\ - Thc \111-,, Lc ()f jtp, I ý, -ýi\\' I "'ý' 1,1,11 ]()1-)- aild-1-1 --. 
'- 
---- 
J 
-,,. 1). 
1 14. 
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cleneral rules tends to evolve at a slower pacc. since its material I , ýItl oil depcild. " oil th- 
cumulative s. ocial learning process brought about by failures and successes of particul. ii 
experiences. 
Therefore, striving for the accomplishment of partICLIkIF -social welfare" 
the first level of general I-Ules is in fact a difficult, if not impossible, ta,, k to achicvc. 
Institutional "efficiency" lies elsewhere, i. e., in the coordination that social rulcý, bi-im-, 
about through the cumulative learning experience that they entail. 
The problem, once again, lies in the informational limitations of distant U10101-ItICS, 
compared with the ability for closer appraisal posscssccl by thosc parties actually im ()I ý cd 
in the transaction suýject to regulation. This appraisal is an entirely suh1cctivc 
approximation to reality in the hands of enti-epreneurs. 
As we have indicated in the previous chapter, the mathematical tools used by 
regulatory authorities to quantify objecthw cost-benefit appraisals of the reaulatiow, thcv b t) - 
implement are useless for giving informatim (m the legal rules of "opei-i-ended" mi; Ict Z: ) C, 
order. By contrast, individuals are always perlectly awarc of the (SUbjective) opporwilil\ 
costs involved in a particular situation, even if they cannot quantify the magnitudc, " 
involved. 419 
This is not to say that general rules can eventually achieve an "optimal" point of 
efficiency in this task. Indeed, in deciding which organisational structures they shoul(i t-- Z7 1 
choose to meet their needs, even they do not know for surc wilca activilles ti1c), IICC(l III 
order to integrate with other individuals. or I(), - how 1011a. Managers arc 11citl1c]. tn Z-- L- 
419 As, Mayer contends: "In essence there I,,., an Immanent. more or less disguised. fiction Lit the 
heart of mathematical equilibrium theorics- that ],, ý they 
bind to'-MlIff In 
L_ -I qUence as if equations, non-simultaneous ma-riltudes in Lc nedc -causal se 
these existed w, _, cthci 
at the same time. A state of affairs is synchronised in the 'static' approach, wherex, in ic, ilit\ \\L, 
are deallm-, with a process. But one simply cannot consider a generativc process ýv, i 
state of ithout eliminating preci, ýcly thm which makc, it whm it i, ý- Scc. H \hver. "I 
Coanitive ValLic of Functional Theories of Priccý Critical and Posime 
the Price Prob1crn". in Classics in Austrian Econornicsý A San lim-, In the HI,, tor\ a 
Tradition, 1. Kirzner (ed. ). (London: William Pickering,, 1901), p. 92. 
-) 
omniscient decision-makers, nor immune to mi *stakes, they are "ubject to the 
limitations of human knowledge. However, it is still easy to see that entrepreneur" ý)rc 
better suited to appraise the particular circumstances involved in any given tran, ý, inoii. I 
The closer individuals are connected to the situation whose uncertaum, the\ \\i,, Ii to 
control, the more likely they are to succeed. 42() 
Evidently, this is a question which depends upon the subjective perccptioii of the 
individuals concerned. The closer individuals are to the -situation at 
hand, the moiv tlic% 
will know about it, and the less "open" the rules will therefore presumably be. Oil III(, 
other hand, if individuals are distant, they will obviously have to leave their commitment" 
more 6ýopen" to incorporate any new knowledge, which is unavailable at that particukir 
time. There is no way in which governments can acquire sufficient information to dccidc 
the "right" size or composition of markets. As Fo, ý,, ar(pic,, -it i, -, not po'ý, ý11, lc to 
discriminate among different kinds of economic organization on grot-inds of cfficicnc 
under full information and no uncertainty-, one kind of economic oruanisation is as 'good 
(efficient) as any other kind. -421 
The virtues of aeneral rules lie in the accumulated knowledce that thev ci-eatc. 
which enables the authorities to decide, without being constrained by their knowledgc. 
the limitations of a particular situation, simply because the specifics are circulll%, cn1c(1 in 
the decision making process. As Rizzo predicýitcs: "The need for rules is predic; iw(I on 
our ignorance Rules must therefore be applied in particular cases regardless ot' tile 
hypothesized or 'guessed-at' consequences. The very unpredictability of thc,, c 
consequences requires adherence to the given rule. If the law cannot systernatlcýllly 
achic\; c specific social goals, then the best it can do is provide a stable order in which 
in(lividUalS are free to pursue their own goals. 'File unpredictability ()I a rule',, c['1cct in ci 
420 A,, Hayek contends: "If we agree that the cconomic problem of ociety k majnlý onc ol 
adaptation to chanLc,, in the particular circumstance,, of time and place, it would "cem to 1(flim\ 
that the Ultill"late (ICLTS1011', must be left to the people who are familiar with these ch-cum, "tance", 
who ýnow directIN, of the relevant chamx, ý and of the I-Cý()M-CC, immediatelý i\ailahle to meel 
them. - (HaN cL "The t fsc of Kno%\-Ie(i, -, c ...... pp. 
83-ý84. 
4-)l p. 
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concrete situation is the price we must pay to achieve the predictability of tllký Llhý,, tl, tcl 
order". 422 
At the same tirne, following a set of general rules does riot subject the wliolc "y"tcill 
to stagnation. The cumulative learning process embodied in emerging general i-ulc,, iic%'cr C) Z: ) 
ends, due to the very essence of the discover-y process. They provide a stable slIeltcr ol 
pi-edictability within which entrepreneurs may adapt their- particulai- businesse,, but \\ liicli 
acts as a shelter in constant flux as well. 
9 
By contrast, purposive "convention aF reOUlati 1 1. b ion, which assuille", thc JLJJj 
knowledge of the decision-making agent (whether the authority t) I or the entrepreiicui-), 
neglects the possibility that these decisions may fail to achieve their goals due to 
ignorance and insufficient information. Individuals may come to realise ex-post that the 
information they had, which induced them to adopt a certain Course of action, 
insufficient or misleading. But the possibility that individuals realise their failure ex-posi 
Justify ex-ante government regulation of the econot-nic activity coiice! -iiec]. T(, does not * L_ 1-: 1 
begin with, processes of trial and error merely provide a hint about wýich ', OILM011'. C, 111 ZI) 
be successful in the future; they never provide full certainty. Once more, uifl-owscC11 
events may arise at any time which render fornicr solutions obsolete. Therefore. cx, iiitr 
regulation will inevitably be too rigid to address unforeseen circumstances. b 
Governments should therefore acknowledge these limitations by eiiabliii(I 
individuals to negotiate freely the institutional arran2ements which they believe \vIII b- 
i-educe their uncertainty. M this way they caii do a oreýtt deil for iiiipi-oviiig hi"tiniii0iiiii 1ý - 
conditions which introduce unnecessary curtailments of social knowledge, thus CMIN1111-1 
fli-i-ns to be spared frorn these. 
Individuals interact in the market through complex corporate forms, which co- I 
ordinate their activities to achieve their production ý, oals. H-cedom of' conti-act cliahic" 
them to arrancre their affairs as they see fit, giving, rise to firms of \,, ii-ying ýhapc,, ýind 
Rizzo, "RLilc,, p. 873). 
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ýizes. Contractual fi-eedom enables to creýite whatev corrm-, Itc form 111Cv 
con,, ider necessary to achieve "institutional efficiency I -C thC_V C(III I-eth '/1 117( 
I. ndividual goals through a mixture of rhulry and c"-ol)eration. This provides them ýý Ith 
the best information they can possibly have to arrange their affairý,. 
Public interest in the context of open-ended economic systerns require, tile 
I'Llifilment of the economic expectations of market participants. This does indced requiic 
oovei-ni-nent intervention, but intervention with a slan that I11 Z: 7 -I- 
it is different fron-l the 
conventional one. Government initiatives should ensure that pattern co-ordination c%, ()I\, cs 
along its natural course, and that individuals are not forced to take 'ýpecific route, ', which 
they would otherwise rather not to accomplish their efforts at discovery. In other word,,, 
cyovernments should refrain from setting up legal 1111Cý that undermine the expectatloný, of 
those better placed to process the complex body of information generated by the 
system, or challenge whatever arrangements they envisage will allow such inforn-lat loll to 
be gathered most expediently. Of course, other values may also guide the enacti-i-lent of 
laws and policy enforcement, but that is quite a different matter. 
In the realm of competition policy, settin, Lip the rio-ht Crarnework for SI)OIAL111COLIS Z-71 47) 
pattern co-ordination to stimulate free competition requires fulfilling two essential 
conditions. First, policy-makers should acknowledge the institutional efficiencies broLight 
about by restrictive arranuements aimed at finding disperse information in the sy,, tcrn. 
These arrangements generally aim to make information available that is nece"'sarv to 
irnprove social welfare and promote competition pi-occ,,,, scs. Therefore, a policy ali-ned at 
enhancino competition should certainly not challenge or undermine these arrangenient, ',. 
hLit should confine itself to condemn arrangernents that are solely based on the intention 
to extract rent from consumers. However, this Is not an easy task, as Wiseman ohscrves: 
"... the fact of uncertainty makes the association of competitive behaviour and profit 
illaxii-nisation, on which the market-economy model depends, less generally acceptable. Z-1) 
The desire to reduce uncertainty by gaining control of the uncertain variables rnLi,,, t he mi :n tý 
1111POrtant rillotive in attempts to eliminate competition. Uncertainty thus implies the need 
1,01. positiVe 1-10VC I'll Illent policy to ensure coinpctilivc behaviour In PLII-', Lllt Of III-011-1! 
rnaxii-nisation, siricc only such behaviour condiicc-ý to ý,, n efficient di, ýtriNwi()il, ol 
-)4-) 
iv,, ources. The dif icitliN, *n J' III aclorý I raming such a policv 1'es ii, distingu'sh *ng thasc 
ývhich (ire the inevitable accompaniment (ýfigiiomnce cind uncertainty antl tho. s-c ii, hich 
arisesimply out ofti desire to maximise net rei, cutte in an clij, ji-onmew charactcrise(l by 
these things" (Author's Italics). 423 Consequently, if the goal is to enhance the Ic%cl of' 
cfficicncy of markets, measured in terms of new discoveries of valuable inform. ttion (I. c. 
innovation, technological progress, etc), then the legal system must be "Upportivc of' 
individual decisions to develop particular "rules". "patterns- or "institutions", -corpoi-, ilc 
forms" or "levels of contractual integration", which enable the process to unfold as much 
information as entrepreneurs are capable of discovering L- * 
However, as we shall see, many of thesc arrangements Lire prohibited undcr Latin 
American antitrust statutes. Secondly, pollcy-makers should eliminate any rc. Lulatorý 
constraints placed upon society on the basis of utilitarian goals, such as maxii-iiising zn I 
efficiency. Such regulations may erect contrived barriers which prevent firnis I'roni 
discovering valuable information. 
Attempts to impose a particular social welfare measure are 11kcly to dimillish 111C 
efficiency of each individual, and consequently the efficiency of the system in geiierA III 
achieving social goals. Imposing interpersonal values as measuics of social welt'ai-c, wiiio t) I- 
lecislation as an instrument, will simply distort the "order" created, thus reducin- Ilic In Z71 
performance that society could otherwise achieve. 
Routines, rule.,, irid other fori-ris of ()I-I-NIIIISýIHOMII 'ýtl-LlCtLlre cx, r)rcss. iii difCcrow 
terms, a similar appraisal of economic systems. This is a role inherent in the functiori that 
rules perforrn in elirninatirig, uncertainty which would otherwise obstruct the invc, -'Irrieiitý, I- 
iieeded to foster future exchanges. We adhere to rules because, given the impossibility of 1: 5 Z: ) - 
forecasting the fUtUI-C, this is the most efficierit course of action. Firms adopt Rlle, ý mici 
routines in order to enhance their chances of actirig, efficiently on an ongoing basisý withiii Z-- L- 
i-cality. Orcyanisations fulfil the crucial role of providing entrepreneurs with sufficicrit Z: ) tý 
foreslpht to enable theni to adapt to the cVOILItIOMII-N' , cttinc, whcrc the\, are requircd to 
4 2, ý' \Vvcman. P. 234. 
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make their investment decisions. In short, social institutions, such as the complex weh ol 
shared information that we know as "the market", allow entrepreneurs to reduce thell, 
sheer uncertainty to a point where they will feel encouraged to tir prope ri y r] L, h 1,, rade the' 
as essential factor in fostering econon-fic development. According to Hayek, legal 
certainty is probably the most important requirement for the economy of a socletý, and hýl, ý 
contributed much to the prosperity of the Western world. 424 North agrees that 
institutions are essential for promoting economic development. 425 Policy-makers also 
acknowledge the positive effects on economic performance of reducing the -cost, ý', of 
doing business". 
Markets emerge spontaneously as an integrated network of rules devised by thch, 
participants, whose existence is justified by the need to find solutions to the ne\N" alic] 
recurrent problems created by ever-changing information. Such changes in the SLiblcctl\'C 
perceptions of entrepreneurs enable them to see knowledge gaps unseen by other 
entrepreneurs, and to therefore forecast profit opportunities, which they attempt to sel/c 
before the others. These gaps encourage them to compete as long as they feel they can 
outdo their rivals, provided they are sufficiently alert. Whenever an alert entrepreneur 
discovers an information gap, thus identifying a profit opportunity, profits may not 
rnaterialise (in which case, it is as if no discovery has been made) unless our singIC 
entrepreneur seeks co-operation with others. Finally, these gaps can sometimes be seized 
and exploited only if firms give out alternative choices to those with whom they 111u, "t 
trade in order to make the opportunities real. 
For these reasons, comdemning organisational structures embodied in hLisinev, 
strategies because they restrict rivalry in the market could be a mi Judgement of the],, sJ 
economic rationale. This could also lead governments to impose losses on socicty, Z7) 
424 F. A. Hayek, The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law, Fiftieth Anniversary Coillnieniol-ýItloll 
Lectures, (Cairo: National Bank of Egypt, 1955). p. 36. 
425 D. North, "The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development-, in The , \, e\\ 
Institutional Economics and Third World Development, . 1. 
Han-Us. J. Hunter. C. i. 
(London: Routledge, 1995), p. 18. Also, D. North, Institutions, Institutional ChanLc 1-tiid 
Economic Performance. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990. ) 
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hecause It COLIld Induce them to prevent (or make costlier) the exploitation of \alLiahle 
information, and distort fLiture processes of information di,.,, covery. 
As a i-eSLIlt, one should not draw hurriccl conclu,, Ions fi-on-i the varic(l arrýinLcnicnt, ý 
which comprise markets without understand, nu, the context ofeVOILItionary and chanLtnLy 
information within which they are placed. By as,, un-iin, -, perfect knoNxlcd, -, c. ilic 
conventional paradigm assurnes away the main problem faced by entrepreneurs, which 
their decision to integrate and cooperate with many "restrictive" forms in order to 111, '-ILII'C 
thcni against the fýtctor of sheer uncertainty. By adopting an evolutionýiry institutional 
perspective, these arrangements appear as the outcome of differing and unavmdahlc 
levels of knowledge handled by different entrepreneurs. 
The need to develop regulations which fit the needs of entrepreneurial disc()\, cl-\ iI-I 
all the more important if one considers the need to ensure effective compliance with thCnI 
by those who are subject to them. This is particularly relevant in the casc of tllo,,, c 
countries possessing weakened official institutions Incapable of cffectively L- 
conipliance with the ruics laid down by the Authority. 
As we have indicated above, 426 ignoring or neglecting official regulations is tD 1- 4: ) b L- 
entrenched in the CUltU1-C of Latin American effective institutions. It is therefore essential 
that policy-i-nakers do not attempt to curb market functionin(z on the basis of ainlino to (D Z- 
achieve outcomes which, as we have seen, are not even subject to commonly agrecd 
standards. It is not only a question that policy-makers will be uncapable of definiiig , ocial 
welfare aoals accepted by all, or even that they will he misled by their clo, ýed-end 
apl)raisal of market interaction. Optimal regulation will never be so if it cannot achicvc its L- 
alms due to the resistance of those subject to it. This is, again, all the more important in 
Latin America, because of the cultural values impinging upon the enforceability of official zn L- 
I'Ll I (, s. 4 -17 
4 20 Scc Chaptcr I scctlon 1.2. above 
427 Oil this question, %'Oi'-'t cillphasiscs the ,I "III fic'mce (d "Preconstitutiolial" \,, lues III 
effective credibility ot constitutionai i-ulc,,. He claims that thi,, Is a factor absent fi-om the I alin 
American realitv. thus leading these countries to disregard the rule of la%\, Milch lead" theill 
into economic hackwardnes,, See S. Voigmý "MakmLl Cowstltutlon,, Woi-L Conchnow, 1"oi 
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If competition is designing incentives to Put firms under the constant threat of hc'1'L' 
driven out of the market ifthey fail to discover Or CXPIO]t useful inforimition. compcimorl 
policy should ensure that firms are not prevented from making their own disco\, crie" and L-1 
exploiting opportunities whenever they have the possibility of doing so. t-- Z-- 
Clearly, a policy committed to these ioals should take account of the need to 
i-naintain business expectations which are immune from the distortions of Bip, Pki\-ci-ý, 
within the system. For diis purpose, two conditiOll's ý11'c '111k)"alk)II 01 
property rights must he improved, so that economic agents -ain cffecti\c acce, )ý, to ', ocial L- Z71 
resources. Secondly, political actors must be Subject to effective control and 
accountability to enSUre that their activities do not erode the property rights alrcad\ 
allocated. We now turn our attention to the,, c problems. 
3.22. - S-ettinig-the , genda for the iwiot ion ofcompetition. ag- -P 
Eliminating all sources of disruption to market order vs fundamental t'or enhancim-, Lý I 
the ccrtainty of entrepreneurs about the i-etuni of the investments thc\ make in the 
market. The need for "legal certainty" in the market pi-ocess requircs conti-ol ol' 
unpredictable political processes which could cause possible distortions in the system. It 
also requires control of the business practices that diminish those expectations. 
There is a growing consensus that "conipctition advocacy" may become mi effmcw t) L- 
tool for proilioting, the functioning of ii-iarket,,,,, at least on equal terms with com, critiomil 
alltitru'4 intcrvention. 
Current literatUre defines the role of competition a1vocacy narrowly a,, it 
i'ange of activities \vhich complement the core of antitrust activity. circuni,, crihcd io 
derc,,, ulatlmý the harriej,, ý to competition creatcd hv ýmte intervcntion. In th,,, 
Con1poltion advocacy almost appears as an addendLim to the fundamental activit\ cari-Icd 
NI, untainino the Ru Ie of Law"'. 18 Cato lourna L( I 99('ý, ): 19 1-207. Z, -- 
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out by antitalst acencies, mostly oriented to the prosecutimi of anti-competitive 
conduct. 428 , 
This appraisal should come as no surprise. Competition advocacy has alwa\-' heell 
ol'marginal importance to antitrust enforcement compared with other area,, ot tile polic) . Z-7 - 
clue to the practical difficulties of fitting it into the neo-classical clo,, ed-end lxii-Aigiii- b- 
This logic invites authorities to concentrate on the "failures" detected in market I'Linctions 
resulting from business conduct; official barriers are only considered when the\, incre&, c 
entry barriers. The analysis seldom adopts a more all-embracing appraisal because It Is 
assurned that busine,, ses, rather than governments, are the causc of monopolktic 
behaviour in the marketplace. 
Not surprisingly, conventional antitrust legislation is inadequate for addressing the 
kind of questions raised by the promotion of corripetition in an institutional way, airned ý11 
ensuring the legitimate integrity of business expectations, which is essential for 
competition to blossom. 
The powers of competition agencies to carry out such activitie,, are limited to the 
nlere formulation of recommendations and sua(Testions to law-making bodies, which call Z75 CIN Z: ) 
easily be turned down or disregarded. These activities do not amount to a full protectioll 
of econornic rights to trade. For example, Article 24 of Mexico's Lev Federal dc 
Conipetencia Econ(jinica states that the Commission may provide an "opinion" oi-i thc 
programmes and policies of other public agencies when their effects limit competitioii, or 
whcn requested to do so by the Federal Government. However, the same provisloi-i Litcr 
-, ten, competition advocac\ I.,., iwt ýIdds, "tile opinion", ý\ III have no legal effecl". Vci, ý, ot 
428 Kheinani, The Role.... Sometimes, special con, Iderat lolls arc made for developing counti ics. A, 
Curiel ar, _, Lics: "Many times it 
has been sald that antinionopoly policies may take tv"o trýick.,, ý 
1111litillL, II nat 1011 aillOng existing conipetitor, ý, and maintaininL, ea. "v entrN foi- ne\\ 
competitors. This might be true for advariccd cconomics, but it k insufficient in Ill 
the nildst of consolidatiriL, liberalisation procc, ý,, cý,. To cconoillic" in transition. It seclll, ý (Ill"Icad) 
that certain cxIstint-, rcsidual regulations deLiN or pre\cnt the entry of firms ill ccitain 
(C. Curiel, Elemcntw) jvra la aplicaci n dMoliticasdc competenciaen econoinfa, " 
1_1 I'Apericlicia Cil Venezuela, Paper prc,, entcd at the niceting, dc Compelencia en 
Alll&icýi Latimi v el Caribe". Superintendencla Pi-()-Coiiil)eteilý-'Ia-t'\'('T,. \D, 
October 1995, p. Q. ) 
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even con,,, Idered in the respective statutes but has to be deduced frorn general lcg-ý] 
principles and výque appeals to the *'spirit of the Ltw- in enacting a poIjC\ for thc 
prornotion of competition. This is the case of Venezuelan Superintendencia Pro- 
Cotiipetem, wi, whose advocacy powers relý, on persuasion and institutional &,.,, -Ciidiincý 
rather than on legal powers. Furthermore. even where the statutes oblige 
authorities to prevent restrictions on competition, their guidelines generally onlý- applý 1() 
new regulations, or to rules enacted by administrative authorities, and are "c1doni 
ýippficable to legislation passed by Conei-csL.,,. L- 
Despite thcsc technical difficulties, competition advocacy ha,,, ý, pontancously 
flourished among competition agencies in the i-e, -, ion, even in the absence of forimil 
advocacy powers conferred by statute; this is howcvei- unlikely to continue into the 
future. Firstly, the interest in advocacy matters arises partly because, during the initial 
stages of implementing these policies in countries with no previous tradition, the nc, xly tý t7l 
appointed teams of antitrust officials are not empged in intense prosecution activities (itic 
to their natural lack of experience in antitrust enforcement, and to their 111tcl-cst In 
Providing businesses with a period of adaptation to the new rules. Hence, competition L- 
'11-Ithoritics can direct more resources into advocacy. 
Sccondly, advocacy activities are generally intense at the beginninL, due to the lack Z: ) t)i I- 
of effectiveness of policy enforcement in curbing perccived restrictions on competition. In 
the early days of the policy, courts often frequently turn down antitrust decisions cithei- 
hecause they are unable to follow the structural logic behind them, oi- they see the matter 
ýis excessively technical. 429 Last, but not least, antitrust authorities tend to behave 
leniently towards enforcement activities in the first stages of implementing the policv 
I)CCUISC this ensures thcni a quota of legitlinticY (or ascendancy) over business throu, gh 
429 Jatar and Tineo m-Lue: "Jantitrust] cases. foi- the mo,, t part, end in the courts of. ju,, tice. where the 
cvertisc to judLC Competition issues is limited. ThI,, brings the likelihood oI ruling" on a non- 1 C7 - 
Substantive and apart from the intere,, t of the COWUmers" (latar and Tineo. 1). 1 9). For INS 
rcýison. the), add ýomewhat puzzled: "Since [Venezuela', ý] Superintendencia Pro-ConipetencKi", 
first decision back in 11)94. almost all the dccimns in\ olving 1)()\\ erful finw, have hecti appcýdcd 
before the courts ofIl'u,, tice. At present. 1 22 important ire pendinL, 
for juclicwl re\ ic\\ The 
first two decision,,, came out of the courl,, in 1997. Both overruled Superintendcilcia Pro- 
Competcncla's decisions due to lack of , landards. " (1). 29) 
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the negotiation of a new status quo. Indeed, under the new legislation maný type" (d 
conduct formerly praised or even encouraged by governments appear thereafter ý1. s c-, 
restrictions on competition. This encourages antitrust agencies to make compromises and 
reach consent agreements in place of aqjudication. An example of this is found in the 
Colombian Superintendency of Industry and Commerce, which has focused W, 
enforcement on reaching consent agreements, rather than on adjudication. 430 As a result. 
there is a tendency to rely on advocacy activities, which in addition provide competition 
agencies with an excellent opportunity to set their agenda for public opinion. 
The elin-fination of legal barriers in Latin America is especially important. Pmctlcýd 
considerations have prevailed over theoretical constructions, so although it is not eýls- to 
reconcile standard antitrust enforcement with the need to eliminate legal obstruction, 
Latin American antitrust agencies have spent considerable resources and time i1i 
advocating the elimination of legal rules which restrict competition. For exarnpic, 
between 1993 and 1995, Venezuela's Superintendencia Pro-Competencia devoted il 
significant share of its work to activities related to competition advocacy-, more recelItIv. 
this trend has tended to consolidate. 431 In addition, amongst the five most significant 
areas of policy action of Mexico's Comn-iission (mergers, public bids, ex officlo 
prosecutions, private disputes, and legal opinions) those pertaining to the use of -noll- 
enforcement" powers clearly predominanted. Similar considerations apply in otliel- 
jurisdictions. 432 
I 
430 O. A. S., Report on the Development and Enforcement of Competition Laws.... pp. 69-81. 
According to Jatar and Tineo "consent agreements have yielded a number of benefits in the 
Colombian transition process. They have minimized the impact that sanctions may have had ill 
the economy. They have also provided the agency and firms with a mutual understanding of thc 
laws and markets. This, in turn, has contributed to creating a competition culture anion" the 
participants as well as the conditions and expertise for a stricted enforcernent of the law. So far. 
the Superintendency has reached consent agreements with powert'ul industries like cement. hcci- 
and health service providers. The agency has also dealt with abuse of dominant position ()I 
important state-owned companies such as railroads, oil, and energy. According to tllc"(, 
, settlements, the industries have pledged to ýtop the alleged anti -competi ti ve practicc,,. hcinL, 
warned that further violations of the agreements will be punished. " (Jatar and Tineo, p. 13. ) 
431 Curiel, Elementos, p. 16. 
43)2 A. Rodrfguez an(] M. Williams, Economic Liberalization and Antitrust in Mexico, Re\ 1"lil de 
Amilisis Econ6niico, 1995 (Forthcoming). 
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It is unlikely, however. that limiting competition advocacy to prex, clitivc anci 
corrective dereaulation can provide the necessary predictability required foi- dcvelopi Z__ -l 11112 
business activities in the long run. Firstly, this fin'i-itation leaves out niany instancc,, \\! here 
it is not only desirable, but peremptory that government,,, efinuinate obstýtclc,, to 
coi-ripetition, by for example, providing a rellable systern of dispute scalenient. Sccomfly. 
it also distorts the real nature of competition promotion, which extends beyond the 
superficial task of persuading government agencies to follow competitive standards whcn 
enacting their own rules, but encompasses the full protection of individual ccononiic 
rights by challenainu any initiative aimed at creatino privileacs and nionopollcý, through I 
L_ L_ 
- Z! 7' C) 1 
the "public interest" clause. Instead, competition advocacy demands rnuch niorc 
commitment to clarifying social rules in order to make them predictable. The irnplications 
of this proposal are profound and go far beyond the finiited realni of conventional 
of competition advocacy. 
This section explores how competition advocacy could involve practical fornis ot 
policy action compatible with our particular concept ol' competition. In particular, wc 
develop some initiatives here for the priorities which competition acFencies should C- 
consider in their efforts to develop a more effective protection of market order. 
Competition advocacy should take place in the setting of the "institutional" 
auldelines outlined in previous chapters. Following these standards, it seem.,. -,, 111orc 
I- the appropriate to define competition advocacy broadly. A committed policy foi 
promotion of competition in Latin America should focus on shiftinc, the functions of Latin zD 
American oovernment a0rencies towards improving the predictability of entitlenicnts 
traded in the market, which in the last instance is what encoui-a,, c,, -,, entrepi-ciicurs to Z71 
compete. 
POlItiCal aLlthorities can foster several pro-active initiatives aii-ned at rnakin, -, the 
husiness environment clearer and more predictable, the goal is to create a favourahic 
settinL, \\, here ii-iaiiagcrial innovation, creativitv and the eniergericc of \ýiluahlc nidi-ket II-- 
iii[orniation (: an dcvclop in the I'orm of impr()vcrneiit,, to knowled-c. tcchnolo, -, 
ic" and 
pi-oces, se,,,. In order to achie\c this goal, it is ncccý,,,, irv to eliminate all illegitirnate , ouiveý, r-I I 
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of interference in the exercise of individual entitlements. The effective protection of th(-, - 
entitlements defines the extent of the activitie,, of' market participant.,, and thcii- Li,, c ol 
social resources. Such an obligation would alm) extend to the transmis,, ion ()f right.,, 
i-elated to entitlements by contract. 
These obstacles could imPose severe inefficiencies on society through thc 
rn i sal location of social resources; and even more importantly through interference with 
the emeraence of valuahle new knowledge and Only hy clearký definlnL, 1he 
realm of individual appropriation of social resources and the conditions for the transfer of 
appropriated goods arnongst market participants can businesses maintain toleral-fle L- 
expectations which encourage them to invest. 
Effective "competition advocacy" could gain much institutional transl)(trency hy 
defining the real sphere of appropriation of , ocIal resources. But "appropriation" is not b 
only the possibility of cxci-cising effective control over a given resource in the prcscnt-, it 
also encomp asses the likelihood of future control. 
Therefore, two conditions are required: firstly, a more effectivc definition ()I 
individUal rights which tells firms the extent of their present access to social reSOL11-CCS. 
Entrepreneurs MLISt have reliable expectations about the conditions under which thcy can 
acqUire property ri,, -, 
hts. 
Sccondly, a propcr delimitation in the ,, phere of Individual rights would not onI\, 
enihi-ace transparency. but also produce clear rule,, on the transmIsslon of the,, e rights 
the future. In other wor&,. entrepreneurs must also possess reliable expectations J)OLIt 
future conditions under which they can tradc their property rights under Contractual 
arran(Tcrnents. These conditions, namely a clearer definition of propert\ and C011LI-actL1,11 
rights, would enable entrepreneurs to forrn relationships in an "open " way. and thus be L- 
niore adaptable to unforeseen changes. 43', 
433 Sec In ý-, eneral, Epstein. "The Static Conception I 
-)ý I 
In addition, making such protection effectk, c entail,,, a clear statutor\, definition oI 
property rights and the conditions for their transfer. as well as the al,, Urance thA a"V 
potential dispute about the interpretation of the extent to which partic,, are IeLitiniatc 
owners will be resolved through adequate , ettlement mechanisms. Thus. loN, cf-1111-lent 
intcrvention to protect dynamic competition and innovation should focw, on pi-otccI111L, 
the content of individual spheres of action in cascs where initial entitlement is challcil'-, cd 
by insufficient transparency in the assignmcnt, which ha. " Caused two oi- inoiv 
entrepreneurs to hold legitimate expectations about the extent of their ivspective 
entitlernents over a disputed social resource. An effectivc competition policý ,, houl(I 
ii-nplei-nent efficient dispute settlement mechanisms, which allow the elimination ol' aný, 
source of interference and uncertainty in the initial allocation or transfei- of i-1cht,,,. An 
efficient dispute settlement mechanism would solve ex-post conflicts over the use of 
resources resulting frorn poor identification and assignment of ri(jhts tD Z: 5 11 
In this light, the goals of institutional competition policy are comprised of two Ki,, ic 
initiatives: Firstly, in a negative sense, the competition authority should inhibit otlicr 
(roverni-nent auencles frorn interfering with econornic rights. This would rcquirc 
competition aclencics to exercise technical and political accountability in relation to the 
interpretatioi i of the "public Interest" clause, which dominates almost every re, -, ulatorv 
initiative in Latin America. "Official" institutions should then allow restrictions on trýi(lc 
only when special political considerations prevail, and are known by everyone. This could 
wstrain oovernments 1'rom making a clarit'ication or firri-itation of conditions, tlius 
triaoerina the alibi of "public interest", which has always been an excuse for ObStrUCtIVC 
government. I- 
Secondly, competition agencies should undertake positive initiatives to overconle 
the deficiencies of Latin American institutions in providing effective relief froni th,, - 
distortions of niarkct cxpectations introduced hy economic aiciits. These distortiow, 
OCCUI-, in part, because of the slowness of other governn-ient bodies in dealing %\, Ith them. 
Iii this regard, "Infornial" Institutions such ýis custon-is and social convention'., must follo%v 
standards of ", -ood falth" in the trading process. Governments should provide individuals . Zl- Z--- 
x\'Ith effectivc redress \\, hcn the integrity of their rights is impaired hy certain Illegitirnatc L- L- -- 
bUsiness practices. Government Intervention should ClISUre that market ýIre 
not adopted under conditions of violence, dLli-e,.,,,, or fraud. 
For this reason, it is necessary to ensure that individuals preserve their cxpcctatioiiý, 
about the identity of their trading partners and the products and servIces they trade in. 
This is the rationale for pursuing a policy Ligainst any conduct which i,, re. (ýardcd , i,, ým 
"unfair" expression of competition, in the sensc that it n-usleads market partic'Pant. ". i"Id 
the puhlic in general. This type of conduct comprisc,, beha%, Iour such as denigrttlon of a 
competitor, false advertl,, Ing, violating copyi-i(-, ht,,, or trademarks, and so on. L- 
Preserving legitimate market expectations also gives a rationale for improvi IinL, 
dispute settlement mechanisms thus enabling individuals to clarify the extent oi' their b 
entitlements in case of conflict. 
We will now examine these areas of possible action more closely. 
a) The amendment of official regulations affecting economic exchan,,,, c throulqh 
Johbying administrative agencies and the Cabinet. 
Defining the political interpretation of the "public Interest" clause. 
Legal privileges and monopolies in Latin Arnerica have been granted by cxcluding, t-1) L- Z: ) I 
or limiting individual economic rights in specified -,,, trategic- sectors or "public intercý, t- L- In 
clauses within economic activities. 
Naturally, the vagueness of this "public interest clause" encompasses a wide range zn L- 
of possibilities for government intervention which represent an effective exclusion of L- 
competition hy private business. 
Generally, the definition of public intercýt Icgislation which limits or exclude,, 
economic riohts is made through legal statutc,, passed hy Conoi-e,,,, and co%ci-,, mam 
economic areas, and takes many forms. 434 Very frequent]. \,, LatIn AnIer]CM] 
dealing with the economy do not exclude individuals from certain economic ý, ector,, 
themselves, but subject their entry, permanence or exit to numerous conditions based oll 
grounds of "public interest. Generally, these statutes follow the technique of leaving tile 
administrative agency free to determine, either through more detailed regulations- or oil ;I 
case-by-case basis, how the activity might be undertaken without violating a condition of' 
public interest. 
Overall, regulations enforced in the shadow of the public interest clause range fi-oni 
conditioning business activity and ensuring certain requirements are met, to the outl-], (-, ht 
exclusion of private competition in sectors deemed "strategic" and as such, sub' ject to 
nation alisation. 
How does one define public interest? Iii principle, it seems reasonabic to allow 
collective interest to predominate over individual interests. However, Parliaments ofteii 
434 These privileges relate to different areas of "public interest" regulation: 1) Authortzatioli. s, 
subjecting firms to government permission to undertake certain economic activities in a givell 
sector, sometimes for renewable periods; 2) Concessions, whereby goverments subject the 
exercise of economic activities to specific conditions (time, geographical space, etc. ). 
Concessions differ from general authorizations in that they are more specific about the way 
firms must behave in the market; 3) Special rules for. f6reign im,, estnients. These rule,, irriliose 
special exclusionary conditions on firms regarded a,, "foreign". Until recently. Latin Ailici-*C, 111 
countries were prolific in raising barriers to foreign investments-, however, most of these are 
gone today; 4) Labour rules regulate, in detail, competition in the labour market. Normally. 
collective bargaining is organized by legislative flat, and therefore excluded from labour 
competition. These rules grant legal monopolies to trade unions in relation to labOL11- I-Clatl()1111ý 
wages, social security, holidays, retirement, and so forth. Labour-intensive firms may fincl ii 
impossible to innovate in such rigid labour environments; 5) Health standards require firms to 
follow standard procedures in the production of goods, particularly relating to public health. 
These standards frequently prevent innovation and entrepreneurship in the production of iic\ý 
drugs and products initially regarded as hazardous by overzealous regulatory agencies: 6) 
Evchange regulations subject firms' activities to a particularly harmful form of administrative 
discretion, namely, access to foreign currency. This barrier may be formidable to firms operatirlL, 
in foreign rnarketsý 7) Fiscal policies that impose discriminatory taxation on firms: 8) Trade 
pol/cY that discriminates against foreign competition. Particularly disturbing in this field are 
rules that clearly do not meet informational standards such as antidumping and countervailing 
policies; 9) Credit PolicY. The provision of preferential credit on certain firms inhibitý 
competition by firms not favoured. This is frequent in the agricultural sector; 10) Price Polic , 1'. Competition is inhibited if governments impose price controls. There is ample experience (fl Owl-, 
in Latin America, where some sectors deemed "essential", are still subject to price controls-, II) 
Privati7ation. If the conditions under which privatization is undertaken favour specific Lrroup,,, 
then competition may be unfairly distorted. 
" 
redistribute wealth across society by using legal statutes to convey these -social ordcr,, -- L, I 
to do so, they must grant privileges which conflict witli market order and the promotion 
ot'competition. 
The desirability of ,, uch redistribi-ItIOns, P, i political matter on which compe,, itinn 
policy can have little influence. In any case, the law-making authority must clearly idcnti I-% 
who would benefit, as Rizzo has noted. 435 
This is an 11-npOrtant point. The crucial element Is to determine whethcr IIIc 
governnient possesses sufficient inj6rmation to devc1op weltare svstems in javour of 
, yecial groups identified (is 
disabled or in need. 4)() Like economic market, ý, who,, c 
I'Linctioning, depends on the information available to all participants, political niýii-kct,, al,, () 
work better when there are mechanism., -,, to dispkiv infori-nation about the relativc value of 
the needs of all participants. 
Of COLli-se, the requisition of more InfOl"'hition about the winners and of 
certain policies from those who draft legal i-ulc. s in Parliament may I)c a FormickthIc task. 
but it would increase then- political accountability to then- constituencies. For politicA 
reasons, there could be a periodic review of the desirability of these legal rules accordim-, t:: ) I 
to clianging circurnstances. This would determine, for example, whether some ,, cctoi,,, 
should no longer be considered as "strategic", thus allowing private firms to compctc on Z: ) Z-ý Z: > 
an equal footing in the market. It would also provide political g-rounds for supporting ilic 
privatisation of nationallsed industries, or deregulatingy certain activities. zlý - 
This is a task ýxhlch competition aocncic,,, could perform hy tdvising km-imikmL, 
hodies, and cven appealin. g to public opinion when required. For instancc. III VC11CILIA1, 
one of' the recent ýtctivities of Superintendeiicia Pro-Competelicia has been to clevc1op 
public policy reports. These reports contain the barc cs,,, ciinals of policv IlIeLISLII'C', thý[[ 
435 NI. RI/10, "RUIC. ', Cost-Benefit Analy-as ...... pp. , )'05-884. 
I- I. IPL ic 4 1). Andcrson, fi()\\ can we Discharge mir Ohl'L, ýiti(m, to the Poor". in "Religion ind Publi 
Life-, 1). Cohnsherhok and D. McLellan (e(],,. ). St. Nlartin',, Presý,. Nc\ý )'()i-k, 1992. pp. 9ý'ý- 1 W) 
need to he impiemented in specific sectors to proniote competition and equm. Studieýl 
have been conducted in the agriculture, teiccommunications. electric' ýn I Itv. trall ", P()I'tlt wil. 
cducation and other sector,, 
Competition laws could provide agencies ýxlth effecti 11 Z7 ivc pow, ci-s foi- thk titý, k mcl 
even modify the formal institutional framework of market exchangc, ý by eliminating rule,, 17 I- 
that create legal monopolies and privileges. 
Sometimes the power to deregulate I,, found in cxistinL, Latin American antitrivt 
statutes-, but as we have already stated, these powers are very limited and restricted to tile 
formulation of mere recornmendations to other executive agencies. However, mo,, i recciii 
Latin American antitrust statutes attempt to extend these powers; for example, 
Rica's Ley de Promoclon de la Competenciti Y Defý, nsa ýfecth, (i del Consumidor 
establishes a detailed regime of deregulation and competition advocacy. Article 3 , ct,,, 
forth guidelines for oovernment agencies on the control and regulation of the econoniv. 
This provision also applies to existincy reoulations. Howe\, cr, these guldefilics Cý11111()I L- Z71 tý 
overrule restrictions on competition and freedorn of trade imposed under -, ýpccial 
statutes", -international aoreernents", and in general provisions required to prcscrvc 
health, national security, the environment, or standard procedures. 
Similar considerations apply to Article 4. which enables the ComisiOn to rnake ýi 
cost-benefit analysis of regulations restricting competition. It Is difficult to scc liow the 
Conwsl6n can comply with this mandate, given the impossibility of appraisin. g, the , oclal 
cost-benefit referred to above. In addition, despite the apparently broad powers of the 
Comisl6n to make the analysis and challenge legal rules which conflict with the l'ormula. 
the power to remove the obstacles ultimately remains with the Cabinet. 
Articles 5 and 6 set forth the conditions on which the Cabinet may eliminate price 
control,,,, or other restrictions on trade. Thc, ýc j-)rovkions are ýupplemcnted in Arliclc -7 
which establishes the conditions for the provision of sci-vice,, related to trade, and Artlclc 
S. which c,, tablislics the conditions for the functioning of standard-, ctlim-, hodic,,. \11 
-) -ý (I 
these provl,, Ions either confirm the general coiAtions , ct forth in Articles 3 iiicl 4m 
particular areas, or supplement the system I-)\, lavln, -, down specific rccluiremcnt,,. 
u) Giving ompetition agencies powers to undertakc competition Ltdv()cctc\ 
activities. 
Thesc powers are still too lirynted to allow a successful deregulation procc,,,,. 
because the ultimate Source of power to efirninatc restrictions on trade hc,, ývlth t1l,,, 
legi,, Iative branch, and not the competition agency. I-- 
Hence. political obstacles to competition UltIMately sprin-a- from the limitations 011 
ýtccountability resulting from the constitutional division of powers, and the t'UIICtI()IIý, L- 
developed by each branch of government. Most Latin American antitrust a(, cilcic", ýIrc Z: ) 17, 
ýidrninistrative bodics that lack the formal legýil power,, needed to repeal 1-c,, tl-lctl\'C ý7' 
rulings, regulations or decisions made by other authorities in the public administration or 
executive branches. At best, they may offer advice about the effects on competition of tllc 
adoption of legal rules at other government levels. 
Most of their competition advocacy activity is spent in arduous negotiation,, with Z: ) 
other cyovernmental agencies, which are Ultimately trUltleSS (as these agencics normally zn Z7) - 
I)LII'SUC IlItCJ-CStS that do not involve preservino competition). Competition ýigciicic,, mv Z7,1 
iiot even granted lcoal standing to challenoc these decision.,, III LhC CoLII'L,,, [,, all Z: ) t- t7l 
Ombudsman of economic riahts. Thev MLI"t thcrC1,01-C I-C"ort to lobhving the Cahinct. \\ Ith 
little chance 'Of SUccess. 
Although thesc provisions are limited, thcy do have the VIIILIC Of f0CLlslnLl oil the 
need to control government acts which generate restrictions on competition-, for exampic. 
, Article 3 of Costa 
Rican Law entrusts the Comisi(in Nvith powci-s to ovcrsee the ex-po,,, t 
stification for tho,, c effects of regulations on economic activity and evaluate the U, 
i, estl, ictioll., oil con1petition hased on health, envirom"c"t. ý'Mlr ItV and quallt\'- 
v 
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From these provi, -, ions stems a clearer conccptual'ý'ation of the prohleill ()I 
promoting competition in developing countries. w11 11112 z: 1 hich is not based solely on challeng' - 
the restrictive activities of firms, but also on suhjectinL, Go\1ernment activity to technical 
SUper\'1s1on and political accountability. In the 1JLht of Latin Americýin traditional support 
for restrictive trade nicýisures, the Costa Rican competition advocacy provision.,, 'ire ýi 
ciear step forward, and are a very welcome legislative initiative. Another example is 
Panamanian Ley No. 29,1996, (Articles 238 through 241). 
b) Reforming mformal institutions by eliminatim I ID -ic, 
illegitimate bLts*iic.,,,, oh,, tadc,, t-o 
t. rade(wifair competitiOli). 
A second area of policy which promotes competition dcals with business practicc. " 
that erode the effective use of legitimate entitlements by other market participants. 
As stated earlier, the rationale for authorlsing restrictive business behaviour is that 
it allows intervenincy parties to enhance their future cxpectation,,. Th-i,,, rationaic justific" 
the condenination and prosecution of business activities aimed at erasing sucli 
cxpectations, in the hope of engaging in rent-scckino activity at the expense of tlic 
victirn's rights. The possibility that property rights are poorly drafted due to the inherent 
difficulty in assigning, them individually allows rent-seekers to appropriate them. The 
effect of such conduct diminishes the expectation that market participants have of real)im-, 
the full rewards oftheir investments. 
It is therefore essential to guide and constrain informal, unofficial institutiow, 
cmergino fi-om , ocial interaction, in order to prc, ýcrvc the transparency of hwýimc, ýý, L, !:, - 
condUCt and "good faith- ýis the basis of bLIS111CSS transactions. 
The legal system may have difficulty in Identifying the private property ric"Ilt, ovc 
ý: crtaln goods whosc I'latUre It is difficult to dcfine, but the decision to invcst rcý, ourcc.,. I.,,. 
no less crucial. Coninici-cial reputation and (-, ()()d wIII are CLISSIC CXý1111PICS. but 11()t 01C I 
only mics. Thcre arc clear problems in defining, effective wýtv,, to prevent thc,, c I- 
f'rom being misappropriated by illegitimate third parties. t, L- 
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Thv, problern 1,,, ýit the heart of corriniercial traiisýtctlon,, which custorri. tradinnii. 
and gcneral trading cxperience have conic to re, -, ýird 1', . -LIFIfilir" husinL-, I-, Tlio\ 
erode transparency in the allocation of property i-l, -, 
ht. s. thus inviting illeg-itiniite di!! -d 
partie, s to rnisappropriatc them. Clearly, it i,,, i-iot cýisy to identif'v them, becim"c the 
collective Understanding of the sense of "unfairness" may change over time, ýiiid 
technological progress rria improve the identification and private assigmment of forillcrlý t7) y 
public goods. For these reasons, the classification of acts of unfair corripctitioll 11-1 
PI-Lidently broad, enabling their interpretation to be n-lade on a case by case basis. 437 2D 
Breadth, however, is not necessarily a synonym for "vagueness". Market 
institutions are built on the fact that individuals are able to rely on them in their Lradiil,, 
exchan(-, cs. Trade Is fundamentally possible because of a favourable Institutional 
frarnework, which is based, as we have seen, on positive mutual expe, 2tations about thc 
ability to achieve individual goals in the future. Market participants have a ', Llt)jccti\'C 
perception of these expectations and goal,,. which are in a constant procc, ýs of 
redefinition. 
Combating unfair trade practices means endowing competition agencies with the 
capacity to effectively prosecute trespassers and ad'udicate rights efficiently. The existim, 
bodies and tribunals are poorly suited for this task, particularly in the weak Latill 
American context. 4)8 
437 The classification attempted by legal scholars is sornewhat arbitrary as it does not follow a clear 
pattern. Nevertheless. they generally relate the "unfairness" in trade to the confusion created 
about the identity of firm, the nature of the product traded, the nature of the , crvice, the 
reputation of the trading firm, and in general. the "subjective" bond linking the perception of 
consurners to the quality and reliability of a given firm. The literature about "unkill, I- 
competition" is vast, and we cannot deal extensively with the subject here. More c\tcnsivc 
studies are found in Allart, Trait6 de la concurrence deloyale, Parfs, 1892- U. Navarrin]. Trattato 
te6rico-pratico di Diritto Commerciale, fistituto Ed. Scientifico., Milano, 193) 1 and T. Gon/, dc/,. 
La Conipetencia Des'leal, Universidad Central de VeneZUela, Forum Editores, 1992. 
Finally. A. Coriat. 1., t Competencia Deslc-ýil cn la Propicclad Industrial. in -Propledad filtelcCiL1,11 
v Desarrollo Monte Avila Editorc,,, I()() pp. 109-1 
438 In the context of Institutional reform. particular attention has been pald to the 1111pol-tallt role ot 
the 
-Judiciary 
in (41'ectively sustaining the Feform,,. Reforming the Judiciary covers ýi broad area 
ranging from the question of independence from other branches of Lovernment to le(-, al I- Zý -- 
C(ILICatlOn. It is lar too complex a sub , 
ject to he dcýilt ý% ith hcre. Sce in M. Daký)lixs, 'I ii,, 
ludicial Sector in Latin America and the-CLivibbean. 'World Bank Technical Paper ')19 
c) ShOLIICI antitillst enforcement exlst"ý 
These considerittiow, sutgto; est that the , cope of present antitru, ýt ýictivme, ý \v()uld 
have to be reduced significantly under the institutional framework proposcd for Ilic ýn 
promotion ofdynarnic competition. But should th. il memi outi-Ight elli-nimition" I 
However, these considerations do not question the practical use that some M1t1t1'L1., t 
principles could have ýt,, a deterrent for certain illeginiTiate market restrictions cnL, ýwcd n 
by businesses that enjoy indirect form of "official" or "quasi-official" protection froni 
open competition. This is frequently the case in the telecommunications, railroads. 1ron 
ore, and other -strategic industries", and sinillar privatised sectors. In thc. se 
privatised firms sometimes hold some form of legal protection frorn open 
under transitional arrangements. Similarly, business trade associations attempt to maintain 
established trade practices, implemented in the context of former development pollclclý- 
which granted them quasi-legal status. These provisions frequently have a similar effect to 
regulations, since they cricourage the cartelisation of men-ibers, a, -,, regulations did in the Z"ý 17 
past. Certain basic antitrust provision.,, likc price-fixing prohibition,, could tcl i, ý ,i 
deterrent to thesc conducts. 
In these cases. the effect of legal rule,, (or quasi-legal rules) Is to "close" the opcn- L- Z7) 
cnded nature of ri-iarket interaction. Consider the rules enacted by trade associatiow, to 
subject their members to "codes of conduct" or "ethical standards". Generally. thesc 
arrangenients conceal price fixing, market allocations and similar practice,, ", which are 
binding on members who suffer retaliation ifthey act independently. Industrial and trýOc 
or proicction 'issociations in the region fi-equently emerged as organised lobbies pleading t 
Croni competition thl-OLIgh official prices and sirridar restrictions. It is not surprisim-, ftit 
today they tend to resoi-t to these anticompetitive practices as a way of resui-ning thctr 
fornicr lobbying activities, albeit without official conscnt. 
(Washin, -, ton. D(': 
Thc World Bank, 1996). Ako, M. Rowat. W. H. \Ldik and M Dakoh&, 
Judicial Reform in Latin America and thc Garibhcmi. lltocccdiiiL,, ý_ oia World-13,1ilk 
Conicivnce, World Bank Technical Paper No -"ý() (W&, 
hiný-ton, DCý Thc World Bank. 1005. ) 
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By effectively enforcing these self-imposed re-gulations. economic a-, -, cntý, behit\-c &, 
if the open-cnded conditions of market interaction were subject to narrower I)OLMds. FOj- 
example, decisions taken by the board ol' a business trading association COLI]d ha\c a I- 
similar effect to that of a law enacted by Congress, in the , ense that new cornpetitoi-, are 
effectively restricted frorn entry. 
These practices reduce the flexibility needed to adapt to unforeseen circurnstancel-, 
by curbing the capacity of cartel members to act freely. Firriv, will not attempt to cxploit 
new opportunities, simply because opportunities will not arise. Instead, lllcý' \vIII 
concentrate on obtaining captive rents from other individuals by obliging them to ýicccpt ýi 
forced transfer of resources performed by the Iceal regulation. or quasi-legal nicýt,, ure. In 
these cases antitrust measures could provide -cornpensator\, relief' for tho"c 
adversely affected by these forced transfers of wealth. 
It might be useful to grant some power,, to administrative hodics, ., 'Llch I,,, 
competition agencies, to challenge these agreerrients. since lobbying ]aw-rnakmL, hodics tý' --- 
could take sionificani time and effort, and court,, in Latin Arnerica mv cleariv inclTwicni. L- - 
Such provisions, however, should be exceptionýil. That is, they should he w'ed olll\' 
III(-, Oil when a legal restriction is found to be directly linked to a business restrIctIon. Relyi It) I 
legal evidence in this regard (i. e. the existence of a trade association agreement) CoUld L- r-1 L- 
bring a IIII-Ich required clarity to the analysis. A legal approach would al"() I-C"ll, itin 
unchecked discretion by determining the "proper- economic conditions for establishing 
(lie monopolistic intention of restriction,, undertaken hy firms icting, under the 
conventional, analysis of antitrust policy. For this I'CWS011. Cilforcing, antitrust policy III 
these cýiscs is only second best to dercl-11-datiOn, hCC, 1L1SC It %vould be subject to all the 
ahove-nientioned cavciits. 
Rýithcr than challcril-ing our general prcrnI,, c ftit antiti-LISt , hould focu, ý on , pccific 
instance,,, where clem- legal or quasi legal rule,,, prevent market actoi-s rrom hchýi\ im-, 
fl-ccIv, tlic,, c cases reinforcc the idea that finkim(i the Ic(Tality of husinc,,,,, arranLcmeniý, to II-I 
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the analysv, of structural economic market conditions. as antitru,, t I-CLILII, 111011'ý do at 
present, would inevitably have undesired effect,, on the institutional frarnewm-k. 
4. - INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE PROMOTION -OF 
COMPE-TITIoN. 
1 .- Institutional I'CýItLll-CS neces"ary I'm- coilloctitioll ýIdwcýlcý , 
Kelly highlights the inherent difficulties of the auent-principal relationship hct\\, ccii 
regulatory agencies and governments in the implementation ot' succc,,,, ful regulation. 4.,, ) t) I 
Competition agencies are no exception in this case. Indeed, the depth and breadth of thc 
responsibilities entrusted to competition ýtgciicic, -, clearly illustratc, \, the 
enforcing competition advocacy. Successful cornpetition advocacy requirc, " ccrfaill 
institutional features unlikely to be found anywhere within the three branches ()I - pmvcr. 
On the one hand, it is necessary to ensure that cornpetition agencies enjoy sufficicnt 
credibility to regulate i-narkets, which may require that they be bound to transparcrit ruic". 
On the other hand, competition agencies should ha\, c enough flexibillt\, to clisurc 11wt 
their regulations adapt to changing circurnstances. To achievc these -oal", 011-cc 
conditions have to he I'Lilfilled: 
Firstly, an important degree of technical expertise and flexibility must lic III the 
hands of regulatory agencies. ThIS IS important in order to identify and as.,, css the t) t-- 
problems brought to their attention, and strike a balance between all interests cornmatcd 
to the forMI-Ilation of alternative public policy solutions. 
Secondly, an important degree of clTective independence and political 1,, olatioll 
fi-om the pressure,,, of government, is necessarv to enhance their credibility ii,, hliparnýd 
i-caulators before , ocictv. tý - 
J. Kelk ý 
Como crcm-- Ilistitilciolles I-el2LIlWtOl-1,11, ý11.11[6110111. ýIs -, 111 11101,11, - 
ell, Cl intelil(). J)ýIpcl 
pre"Cli I cc] A the "c III III ar "I [Is It It ucione,,. RCL'Ll h Ci6ll ý la NLIC\ I Econow. fa". II loher I 
IFSA. Cm-acýr'. 
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Finally, it MUst have political clout and effcctivencss in implementim, -, J-)()Iic\' 
recommendations. 
a) AdequLite technical expe tilse for balanci , competillL, Interest". rt IIIL 
The regulatory structure must he capable of halancinc, competin(-, th,, ii Z7, ý7 
aftect niýirket access. The convenience of setting, pi, otective 1711CýIsUres , Lich as non- 
tariff barrler. ý, regulations and price controls has to be exanuined in the light of Compellim-, 
interests within society. Thc opinion of those that fýivour deregulation ind the climiiiýition 
of these obstacles should also be taken into ýiccount. To strike this halance imj)ýirliýilk, ý 
technical expertise is essential. 
There are several ways to ensure a minimum level of technical expertise ammic'st 
competition officials: high salaries; special standards in the selection of persomiel, L- 
accountability of decisions adopted by an independent internal or external body, to iiame 
a few. 
Other initiatives nwy comprise the structure of the agency itself. For 1w)IMIcc. L- 
collegiate decision-making bodies are preferable to single-person hocllcý,, hccau"c z: l -- 
dccisions t4en ýirc appraised by more people. 
Finally, technical expertise may be used in different ways. Sharing, infornlittioll 
concerning the making of a particular guideline ot- rule could be important. This could hc t) Z7) 
done hv incorporatin, (,, the technical views of those affected by the rule. In , onic countric".. 
the technique of advancing "guidelines" through "white papers" is useful for framing rule,,, Z7 tD r-, - 
agi, ccd hy both reoukitors ýind regulated firni,, 11 
h) Effective indepenciencc from political intert'crencc. 
Credibility ako reqUires competition agcncics to be perceivcd as illdcl)clldcllt 
dccislon-niakcrs, Polatccl f'rom the political intcrferencc exci-ciscd. mo,, i ofton. hy 
oovernments. Independence may not be cffectivc if there vs , onie dcgrce of control b\ an 
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"Outsider"; either an official body, or ) 
iii group,, from the private ,, cctoi,. 
The independence required for the administrative activity of competition acTencic, " is 
dual: firstly, financial *Independence needs to he ohtailned h, \ fundInL' I'l-0111 ýI \CII-ICI\ ()I, 
sources, including private-sector or non-g(wcri-imental organisat ions. N"los, I-atin 
American ýipencies arc tied to the aencral state hudget, hence, fliev b\c IIn-iItcd 
independence with respect to hiring speciallsed personnel, and developing programme, of 
training and education in the goals of competition in market economies, 
Secondly, competition agencies require functional independence to allow tlicill 
follow whatever course of action they consider neces'sary to promote competition "'ithoul 
external Interferencc. Because of the technical naturc of their dccisions they -ýhould not I-v 
subject to political review by the minister of the area, the Cabinct, etc* thLl',, 
'ýhould he limited to 1 1011- Judicial review. In this context, the transparency of the decki 
rnaking process may play an important role, for which consultations before bringim-, trial Z: ' -- 
cases, or enforcing a rule may be useful. Latin American experience in thi" m-ca 1" 
generally similar: most countries allow administrative review by the enforcement agcncic,,, 
thernselves, which are seldom subýjeCt to OLItSide administrativc control. 
Independence k also strengthened 1) ()the]- Incall", Such Ll", Stabilit\ III 111C 
appointment of officials, transparent procedures and more informal arrangeniews. I 
iricluding the seeking of alliances with stralcgic ýcctors in socicty (I. e. COI1SLII11CI' 
base from which conipeti I ". issociations), which may provide an important I t, on ý1(-, Cllcies can 
act independently of political directives. 
Finally, independence from the inflLICIICC of regulated firms shOUld al"() he zn 
preserved. RLIleS to prohibit officials fi-oi-n working for investigated conipanic,, afici L- 
leaving the agency could he an important disincentivc in this regard. 
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c) Effective-4)owers of advocacy. 
Lack of political interference should not hC ('()IlfLl. ', CCI Witil -lSOIatllII-I'* COMI)CIIII(W 
agenclc,, fl-om society. On the Contrary, one cý,,, cntlal condition for theii, ill 
promoting competition is that they are endowed with effectivc powers to he ahle 
undertake advocacy activities in favour of competition. 
This entails legal powers to bring cases before the courts that cannot be dcclde(l Z: ) 
internally, because they involve the activities of other government agencies. It niý hc 
necessary to vest competition agencies with the power to ýict L-rs public pro-, ('(-'LltoI-', M 
order to identify and challenge such interference befOrc the courts. Z: ) 
4.2. - Bodies respon-sihle for enforcing institutional conVetition PaWc-y- 
The conditions necessary for successful competition policy could be implerneilted 
by setting up two separate agencies to develop these activities: an administi-atk! c trihmial, 
mid a Public Ombudsman, differentiated as follows: 
a) Administrative tribunal for the promotion of cOmpetition. 
Firstly, it could he convenient to ý, ct Lip a specialised administram, c tribmi'd 
designed to sub 
'. 
ect rnaFkets to public scrutiny and control, Such a tribunal would hc LI 
comprehensive in naturc. It would supervise the conditions Linder which individLials havc 
access to markets, for cxample, by reviewing and ýmthorislng intellectual propci-ty righl" 
(trademarks, patents, etc). 
The Jýusive cxcrcl,, c of these rights could all'cct the entry of potential compctitOi,, -.,, 
therefore, their proper delimitation would improve the transparency of the legýil 
ýis it would define the identity of market traders and their products. Thr, i,,, an 
condition for irnprovin, -, the predictions of economic ýictors. 
becau,, e it allo\\, ý, theni to 
c1cariv deflne the scope of their business I'CI)Lltlt]Oll wliwli, ýi,, we have ýtatcd i 
\\, ýiv ot'dcveloping infornial institution,, arnong, i-narket a(Icilts. 
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These added powers would provide the competition tribunal \ý ith "Lifficlelit 
financial , LIPPOI-t fi-om applicants for patents, copyi-ights and trademarks to pi-()\ jdc thc 
agency with much-needed financial independencc from the state. 
The tribunal would also have jurisdiction over business practices which ci-()de,, the 
transparency of property rights assigned to victim firms. This would include the whole 
arrq of conducts deemed to be "unfair competition" which are exercised ipmi,, t i 
competitor: product simulation, fraudulent imitation, erosion of the reputation ol' ý1 
competitor by illegitimate means, and others identified above. It would also includc the 
whole array of conducts that adversely affect the rights of consumers, and erode the 
transparency of market transactions; for instance, refusal to comply with contractual 
conditions agreed at the time of sale, such as guarantee clauscs, servicing or maintenancc 
of products. It would also cover cases of misleading advertising, which erodes thc 
reputation or properties of products sold by competitors. 
An ad. ministrative tribunal would also be entrusted with powers to encoura, -, C 
deregulation from within the executive branch in order to facilitate entry and exit fron-i the 
i-narket. 
Such a tribunal would ensure the proper combination of independence, promptlicss 
and prudence in the decision-making process. It would also have several advantages over Z: ) 
other forms of institutional arrangements. Firstly, it would be independent of the Cabinet, 
while remaining within the executive branch of government. Secondly, it would possess zn zn 
hroad powers to request information from rnýirkct participants. and enforce its decl, ýion, ý 
Thirdly, it would be a collegiate body, makmg it-, decisions more balanced. Fourtlilv. a 
tribunal could appoint its own personnel (essentially attorneys and economists) and 
function effectively with a relatively small staff. Fifthly, it would enjoy budgetary 
independence, as well as funding from other SOL11'CC. S. Finally, as a tribunal, it WOUICI hC L_ 
Much more 'sensitivc to the problem of eliminating legal rules that distort cconomic 
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h) Public OrnbUds-man for the protection of economic rights. 
It may seem obvious that courts should be effective in controlling and preventina 
possible encroachments on individuals; yet in the ozýise ()I' Latin Amerilca, thk P, it rclc\ ýint 
rs,, Lie, given the poor performance of the Judicial systems in delivering effectivc an(I 
proi-npt JUStice. 4-m For this reason, it is iniportant to create a public agcric\' to act ()n 
behalf of the victirn, and as a guarantor of the public interest to protect property i-*, -, Iit,,, 
and niake thern Lis effective as possible. 
An appropriate figure would be a combination of public prosecutor aild 
ombudsman, whoý, e activities protect individual cconornic rights which may be inipairccl 
due to the effect of lecal rules or, more specifically, government intervention hased oll 
such rules. This agency would also encourage deregulation from outside the exccutilv'c 
hranch; for example, by challenging legislatioi-i restricting competition in the L 
Courts. 
The OrribUdsman would act as a third party interested in the protection 0' 
competition, joining private individual actions ýw, ýunst government encroachment on ý7 
economic riol-its in both the executive and le(Tislative branches. In some jurisdictiow, the 
role of the "ombudsman- is to join claims made by privýttc individuals against -()\crnmcnt 
cncroachnient on their rights. 
This task require,,, extensive powers (hy action or iRlunction) to restrain legal ruIcs 
that ohstruct competition once competition ýticncics have deteri-nined their restrictivc 
cffect on i-narket transactions. Competition auencies would have to adopt the form of 
tHhUnals vested with Judicial powers, including, the power to review the substantlVe 
content of any administrative act that challenges histitittional efficiency, and which i,, not 
jLP., tified on strictiv redistributive grounds. Z: ) 
44() The low le\, cl,,, of performance of the judicial , cctor III Latin America have been empha"I"cd 
icccilt1v M BLI, ', CýIý-'lia and Ulen: see BuscaLdia and Uen. Op cit. The importance ol 1*1.1(110ý11 
reform III reforming economics has been , tre,,,, ed hy , c\crýil author,,. See M. A. Dakoli, 111. 
-, Strýitc, n- for Judicial Reform: The FArci-Micc in Latin America". ')0 Vii-Linia Journal ()I 
Interp. momil [19951,167-231. 
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5. - CONCLUSION: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF RFGULATION IN THE PRONIO'l-l()N ()I 
ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. 
The idea that the only way governments can effectively shape markets and promote 
competition is by intervening has to be dispelled. 
In our institutional proposal, competition policy would involve a proacti\'c PUhlic 
policy by government, it would not imply a do-nothing attitude in the face of re,, trictiow, 
and distortions that affect competition. It would differ fi-orn the failed intervemloii"', 1 
policies of the past that attempted to control market transactions. And it would bc vci-y 
different froui the antitrust enforcement used today to promote competition. Its proactIVc 
character would require public agencies to take particular care in defining and enforcinL, 
clear auldelines and standards so as to ciihaiicc the expectations of all market aociits. It 
Would therefore pay cornparatively little attention to the relative size of firms within the 
market-, instead, it would ernphasise a transparent legal setting that preserves the 
legitimate expectations of all, regardless qf their relative 
This proposal acknowledges the need for governments to adopt a proactive attitudc 1_-:, Z7) 
to challenge the entrenched rules and institution., -. that hinder competition in 1, ýmn 
America. Deregulation and trade liberalisation are not sufficient alone to achieve thc,, c 
ends. The promotion of competition must also encompass other initiatives. 
However, to identify these policy initiatives, the substantive principles guidmL, 
policy actiori have to be defined. Under our institutional framework, public policy would 
cifliance the OPPOI'tLIIIJtIC. -, for individuals to ýicccs,,, to uscl'ul iiiforniatioii. c\cii il' iii 
so doing Output IS temporarily restricted and potential competitors are excluded fron-i the L- 
iiiarket. 
The conventional assumption that Output restriction always operates, again"I I 
consumers 1,,, refuted by considering the costs that voluntary agreements savc for the 
partics invoived, in obtaining information they would othei-wl,, c have had to , cek in the 
2ó 
market. Even neo-classical scholars increasingly acknowledge this. by progressivck L- Z-- L- - 
discoverinc, new justifications for allowinc, restrictive arrangements arnong, 111arket 
participants. For example, the exclusion of competitors is no longer seen as an evil in 
itself. 
It is essential that the efforts of firms con-Irnitted to making investnicnt,, ýire Z74 
i-cwarded in the marketplace, particularly in their development of "public" and -priv. itc- 
Z()ood,, that 
lack a cleýir assionnient of rights. Aii exan-iple of' thi,,, iý,, dic Jcvclopinciii uiti 
spread of inforniation Into the market system. To do this, public polic-y should all(m 
individuals to make arrangements aimed at eliminating the opportunism of potential h-cc 
riders and exclude them from appropriating "public goods". It should also let Individual, ', Z: ý 
punish any attempts by their contractual parties to reduce their legitimate expectatlowý, *. 
this is an cssential condition for reducing the natul-al Uncertainty of the niarket. 
As these examples show, the entitlements that Institutions provide are effectivc 
because of the assurances they give to those who hold then-i, not because governrnent,,, 
formally declare their existence and establish mechanisms of redress (formal institunkm"). 
Individuals may develop ways of attributing parallel effectiveness to such entitlements 
(informal institutions). However, governi-ncrits can enhance or undermine tile 
6. substantial" efficiency of formal entitlemerivs. Antitrust policy is merely one casc whcrc 
(Toverni-ricrits reduce the expectations of individuals with regard to the real extcrit and 
effectiveness of their entitlements. 
For these reasons, public policy should attempt to reinforce those links and 
niechanisms that firm. s, Li,, c to reduce their uncertainty. This is not a matter of nierek, 
1)UNIcisina the recTulations. It also means adapting PUMIC P011CIe', to rules W1t11 tRIC Z7ý Z-- t7l 
le(6tiniacv, which arc not necessarily fornially bindin(g,. bUt which are thwc 1111C. ) 
ivcocynised as such by society. L- I 
Givcn the obvious practical problems in identifying these rules, the most reasonahle 
coursc of action Is to allow individuals to detcri-ninc thern hY their own experience. and to 
xhicvc their -oals thl-OLI, -, h the mechanisms at hand. Public policy should nici-cly dcfinc CI- 
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which individuals can trade; (that is, assign propert-y ritghts) and clearIv detel-11111le dic 
rules governing such trade, so as to reduce the uncertainty for all parties involvecl. Thesc L- 
rules should prevent individuals from taking a free-ride on the efforts of others. alld 
obtaining an undeserved value for their exchanges (for example, fraud). Undcr,, too(! iii 
this way, free-riding is not a phenomenon attributed to distrihution contracts, but oiic 
phenomenon which affects all social life. Instead of regulating free ridim-, and -I- -- 
behaviour, public policv can clearly assign propertv ri I Ino HIC11%idual", I() whil-st allow 
g arranue them so as to prevent these practices. 
This is why our approach to promoting competition focuses on the idea of reducing Z7' I 
(or at least not enhancina) the costs of uncertainty for those making transactions withm 
the market. For this reason, we criticise antitrust policy insofar as it enhances SLICII COSI, ', 
through unchecked administrative discretion. 
The economic costs of the legal framework are extremely difficult to rneaSUI-C, sincc 
they depend on countless variables. They are related to the expectations that individuAs 
have of the circurnstances surrounding their futui-c. ývhich IS ý1 Subjective variable who, ýC b 
effects are impossible to quantify through empirical analysis. This is whV wc havc 
developed , cneral approximations showing the possIblc effects of uncertainty bl-OLIght 
ýihout by antitrust regulation. Z-- 
I-iI- of how much Although certaintNI appears to be a pooi indicatoi 
-V-- 
desirable, it cleark, sho\vs the direction in whicli public policies should progrc, 'N in m-dci- 
to enhance wealth. In other words, it is useful to establish the quality of "tate 
intervention, which is the central concern of this work. Schola I-s are now developiný-, thi,,, 
answer, leaving aside the discussion of quantitatily, Intervention. (Which practice,, ýhould 
hc regarded as anti-competitive? How should we improvc enforcement'. ' etc. ). Tlicy ýirc 
now focusing on the institutional incentives that are needed to promote development. In 4: ý 
term,, of competition policy, this new approitcli iniplic,, that we ýire dealing \\ Ith the kiwl 
0! *PLII-)IIC policy that needs to be implemented to C1111ancC Competition. 
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These new policy standards shOUld reco"nisc that contracts arc I 11"stru 111C nt.,, 
eaotiated to enhance the smooth runnin-, -, of market relatIonshIps. Thc-%- are hasicalk n -0 1 
intended to reduce uncertainty-, or in other words, t() enable individuals to gaiii 
knowledae about their environment, and consequently help them dl'ýco%'C" 11c" tn 
opportunities. While ýillowing individuals to co-operate, contracts are legal HISHIMIC111" 
designed to enable them to compete. 
Therefore, a normative goal for public policý, which iý, Lidapted to real ni, irkct,, ý i, ý 
that it should enhance the predictability of market relationships. Above all, competitioii 
policy must enhance predictability among individuals, it should not prohibit agree"Ie"t,,, Z-- 
entered into by parties to enhance their fl-ItUre cxpectations. Nor ýhould It entall 
unwarranted discretion, which diminishes the predictability that individuals have ()%'cl- 
I 
their own property rights. t-- 
In Latin America, any attempt to identify an appropriate policv to proniotc 
competition has to acknowledge the need for reforni of the institutional frainc\vork. 
Guided by the substantive principles outlined above, such a reform would have to tack-Ic 
the limitations of both formal and informal rules in encouraging competition. FirstIv, tlie 
suffocating presence of the state in every area of business activity could be reduced h\ Z-D - 
extensive dereaulation and further liberalisation of trade. So far, the results in thv, regard 
have been satisfactory. Secondly, the informal rules cnihodied in convý--ntion,,, 
traditions, custorns ýind the like, which at present repre,, ent an obstacle to freedoni ()f 
trade, could be challenged by the effective protection of Individual rights. Thk protection L- L- 
would incorporate "Unfair competition", which can be understood as any attempt to 
erodc a per4on's rights to trade by undermining the certainty of the legitimate mvner Is 
entitlement to them. This could be accomplished hy a more effective Judiciary, hy 
diversifying rnechanisrns for dispute settlement. and by preventing, dispute,,, through i-nore t) - 
cffectivc property recyrstric,, - Z: ) 
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('1JAPTER V. CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING PRO- 
NIARKETREGULATIONS IN LATIN ANIIERICA. 
'Ac cs sential poilit to grasp i. s that in dealing with capitali. mi we are dealiiig with 
em evolutiotiary procc. ýs. 11 
(J. Schumpeter. CaL) Ltalism, sociallsm and DemocraQ,, p. 82. ) 
"The lawination with Pareto optimality mid perle, ct competitimi is a major obstacle 
to miderstandilig ccmiomic development. " 
(B. Loasby, EqL LiliNjurn and Evolution, p. 25) 
I. - LATIN AMERICA'S INSTITUTIONAL TENDENCY TO PERPETUATE OLD SLJBST, \\'('I- 
THROUGH NEW FORMS: THE CASE OF ANTITRUST POLICY. 
The ultimate goLils of institutional reform in Latin America are entreprencurial 
polic\-niaking acti\iI\ ', 1101.11d creativity, innovation and economic growth. Consequently I 
-ing thc,,, c , ()a],,,. judged by how effective it is in fostei be Z7, 
However, the goals of antitrust policy seern to be linked to a particular forni ol 
resource allocation which may run counter to these objectives. ReLardless of whether 
sucli an allocation pursues Pareto efficiency and perfect competit on, o- oth r , () 11e ý7' 
as the protection of . snial 
I firms, or the preservation (4political values rc garded &, ly 
valuable, it entails a departure from the spontaneous niarket outcornes that would occui 
kvithout interferencc. 
-it Indeed, antitrust policy is essentially not much different fi-om the othei- policics th. 
ha\, e characterised government intervention in the region in the past, which in the rianic of' 
promoting econornic growth led to market restrictiotis and econornic priviiegc,, at cvcrv 
, step. Compared to flicse, of' course, antitrust presci-its itself' as a policy which pci-haps 
possesscs a flormativc appraisal of policy-making hased on a conventionally acceptcd 
theowtical fi-arnewoi-k. Ho\\-c\, ei-, its does in I'act produce S11111lar I_CSUlt,. 
These practical results should come as 110 SLII-PI-j,, e. Regarding markets ,., I. M/wr/ccl 
structures or states of affairs, incapable of reaching an ideal normative standard, dchncý, t 
special mind-set or logic in policy-making that alwýiy,, leads to the same conclu"lor), 
regardless of the particular social welfare standard sought, narnek/, that govcnimcni t) C-1 -- 
regulation pivposii)e Could improve market Outcomes. Such an appraisal of regulatioll. C! 
based on a misleading closed-end perception of market phenomena and a utopicýll \, Ic\\ 0 
regulation, is ultimately responsible for leading many earnest adN, ocatc,, of economic 
development in the region, both before and after apcrtitra, to proposc illex"Llf-C. " 
inconsistent with market development. 
Parallels can be drawn between the views of those who Vle%V PLII-POSIVC JIIIC]-VCllll()P 
as a means of "improving" markets and those who view it as a means for replacing theill 
with government fiat in the opinion of one of the staunchest advocates of socialism In this 
century, Oskar Lange. He contended that "the possibility of determining the distribution 
of incomes so as to maxinuse social welfare and of taking all the alternatives Into the 
economic account makes a socialist economy, frorn the economist's point of vlc\, ý, 
s-uperior to a competitive regime with privatc ownci-ship of the means of' prociLictioll 
with private enterprise, but especially superior to a competitive capitalist econoni. y wherc 
a large part of the participants in the economic system are deprived of any pi-ol)ei-t\, (A 
productive resources other than labour. However, the actual capitalist system is not onc 
of perfect competition', it is one where oligopoly and monopolistic competition prevail. 
This adds a much more powerful argument to the economic case for soclail. "111. The 
wastes of monopolistic competition have received so much attention in recent theoretical 
literature that there is no need to repeat the argunient here. The capitalist systen-I iý, fim- 
i-ci-noved frorn the model of a competitive econorny as elaborated by economic thcory. 
And even if it conformed to it, it would be, as we have seen, far from maximizino, social 
welfare. Onli, a socialist econoniv can 11111' satlsft the claim made by inany econonnsiý, 
Irith regard to thc achiel, eincia qffree coinpetition. " (Author's italics)441 
4.41 0. Laiwe, On the Economic Theory of Socialism (Ne" York: Mc Gra\ý-Hill, 190-1). pp. M6- 
107. Of course, Lange assumed that in operational terni, ý ýLich a ý-, oal could onk, he achle\ cd 1)\ 
nationalising, production and giving the reslicctive orders to public official,,, in charLC of I-Linnim-, 
state-owned cnterprisc,, in order to achieve fi-cc competition. III the ah,, ciicc ()I' c\ti-cmC 
government intervention, there is no question ftii he would have ýecn in antitIll"I P0IIC\ J 
perfectly logical device to achieve the socialist allocative goals he advocated. hy pr(),, CcutinL, 
firms unwilling or incapable of behaving a,, soci'al ýrellare diciates. Cleark, ftoin the I-)()Iic\ 
viewpoint the underlying logic in both ca,, 'es is ýIni)lar- -overnnient,, must intervene III order tý, 
achieve the optimal resource allocation impeded hy market failures such Lt,, tho,, c arlin. L, 
fr()w 
For this reason, it is necessary to appraise the logic of antitrust policy moi-e cloý, clv 
before endorsing the contention of so many Latin American scholai-s that it is cc p) -1 al IC )I 
PLI]fing the region out of Interventlon'sm, thereby creatInzg,, cap'tallst habits. This ", 11" 
necessarily the case, as empirical evidence shows. 442 Advocates of antitrust pollc\ 
have a misconception about the particular nature of markets and the role of entrepl-encUl", 
which could distort and possibly delay genuine initiatives aimed at introducinL, new 
markets in Latin America. 
There is a clear risk that antitrust enforcement could reintroduce fornici 
government' interventionist policies, albeit in a disguised fashion. In thi gIII is respcci, 
Rajapatirana provides us with an interestinc, study on the effects of trade liherallsatl(m In 
policy in several Latin American countries. She shows how the effectiveness of the"C 
policies has been firnited by the reintroductioii of many trade restrictions under iic", l'orms 
and disguises. 443 
This is not to say that competition policy is unnecessary, or Indeed, harniful. 
Rather, it suggests that the promotion of cornpetition and entrepreneurship in Latin 
America deserves wholesale reconsideration from the very outset. Governments ma. y 
adopt active policies for the promotion of cornpetition, indeed, they ought to do , (). 
monopolistic competition. 
442 Sec i6 general, F. McChesney and W. SIILIL11ý11-t (cd,,. ). The Causes and Consecluence.,, 
Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective, The University of Chicago Press, Chica,,,, (). 1995. 
443 The study referred to here, conducted in Argentina, Chile, Colombia., Jamaica, Ui-u, -, uay and 
Trinidad -, ives an explanation based on the approach of the 
School of Public Choice for the 
reasons that led these countries to slow clown the pace of trade reform in different 'ii-ca,, ind 
levels of economic activity. The conclusions hiol-ilight the real problems that the promotion o! ' 
competition t1ices in the region. In particular. Raýjapatirana argues that "despite trade 
liberalizations, ,, ()me sectors have continued to receive protection [and] there have beeii attempis 
to introduce ineasures to 1)rovide rell'el to activilies which have been N'111)ject io i. 11creased 
colnj)etition fi-orn iinl)orts, oil the gi-ound of [unlaiti-I trade I)ractices". Although the stud\ 
explains the Latin American rent-seekin,,,,, behaviour in the field of international tradc. it,, 
conclusions can be eas1k, extended heyond. into trade in general. Sec. S. Ra'apzitiranýi. Po"i 
Trade Liberalization and Institutional Challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean. internal 
paper, Finance and Private Sector Development Department, World Bank. Wa, 4-iinytoný N' 
109ý' pp. 19-20. 
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However, the basis of these policies has little to do with antitrust enforcement. who,, c 
prlnclple, ý may subvert rather than promote compet0ion. 
It scerns that the I'Lindamentals of antitrust policy are oriented towards rc, ýtmnL, ()Id 
-nent customs of rearranging market OL]tCoIIIC',. condemning ccrtain markcl pri ý(-loverni t) 2: ý 11 ICCý, 
on considerations of fairness, and judging whether certain levels of output are ",, ocialk, 
convenient" (i. e. optimally efficient). 
There is no question that meaSLII'eS tO COMM] mergers, challei-ioc, markc( 
arrangements that directly or indirectly set "excessive", "i-nonopolistic" or "unfair- price,, L- 
and prosecute unpopular dominant firms are closer to the old-style closed-end i-egulatoi-v 
policies practised in the region, than to the mai-kcts. 
Rather than opening up spaces for enterpreneurs to display their talcrit mid Z7) 
creativity, the investioative activity of antitrust aaencies concentrates on Illeasul-111, -, 
markets, deferi-ninino the i-ight levels of market concentration; establishing the propcr 
degree of "contestability" in suspected iiidLISOWS; COLItiting the anproph . ate 11LIniher 0' t) L- I 
firnis*, nieaSLIring the right size of the relevam iiiarket, aiid , Imilar '-. t I'UCtLI ]', [I eIidciiV()ur,,. t, 
They simply dismiss the analysis of entrepreneurship, innovation and economic 
that competition processcs spur (which are crucial for developing countries to uiiderstaiid ZD 
and exploit), and the arranocrements that make thern possible. 
In fact, antitrust scholars would regard many of thesc arrangernent, ý as incontcstahic C) L- 
en, ipirical evidence of* businesses' intention, ý to manipulate rnarket, ý in fiwmir of 
monopolistic conduct. For example, Jatar and 
Rodl-fgLIC7 M-Mie ftit -the 
(justifyinp, antitrust intervention) arise from acknowledging that the principles embodied 
in fi-ec and open mai-IlIcts are novel and run counter to established business practicc,,, 
institutions and traditions The historical feedback between (10VCFnments and privatc 
- of individuals deciding Sector is adopted within a setting in which the small numbei I 
on political and economic matters are acquaintance,,,. friends and hLi\c deep [per,, omill 
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relationships, often strengthened by family links These traditions ( ... ) illav "upporl 
the creation of anti -competi ti ve alliances". 44-1 
Not surprisingly, gulded by this advice, Latin American antitrust enforcement liýr, 1ý7 
begun to challenge rnany efficient arranaernent,, and rnarket undertaking, ý on the 0 L- Z7, - tý - 
their alleged restrictive effects. As we have II nsistecl thk work, antiti-LISt POI'('\' 11d, I)CL-11 
dorninated by a conventional paradigm that regards these restrictions as nianifestations ()I 
attempts at i-nonopoly. An alternative appraisal would judge these a,, an efficient 111cans ot 
conveying information to all entrepreneurs hý Iii-niting thc arraý, of 1)().,,,,, Iblc of 
action that would accrue if they could undertake alternative investment initiativc". In fýlcl. 
they allow all concerned to maintain their expectations ahout the conduct to be cxl)cCtcci 
from everyone else. 
By adopting the simplistic view that competitiveness in markets is dependent (m the 
closeness of their resemblance to the "perfect competition" model (or a substitutc one, 
such as "workable competition"), antitrust theory cannot satisfactorily explain, belvon(] 
the niarket-monopolization argument, how it is possible for firms to co-operate. Instead, 
it draws cx-ante standards defining the -social costs" alleaedly imposed hy cci-win Z: ) 47) - 
corporate and other less stable forms of co-operation, which eludes the problem ot' why 
co-operation occurs at all. It calls for a moralistic judament based on the idea of niarkcl 
"failure". 
Antitrust enforcers employ ready-madc assumptions which link certain Icvels ot 
coticei-itratiori to anti -competitive results: single firms in the market produce less Lit highci- L- - 
prices, fewer firms iii the market will be proiie to cii(_, ýIoe M (fligopolistic beha\ lmii-l Ilic Z7 Z7) 
xquisition of competitors occurs because a firm wishes to gain market power apillst 
competitors ai-id consumers. 
444 A. jatar and A. F. Rodrf, -, uez, 
Elementos de-una )Aftica de competencia Imra Hondurd", 
Inforille preparado par'l Management Inicrtiational, D(', -Scpteillher 
1). 
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Ultimately, the lack of clarity in the adopted regulation is linked to a parlwtilýir 
understanding of the world, which rn' 91 isconstrues the arran ernents entered int() h\ 
entrepreneurs in order to solve their lack of certainty about the Institutional em""On"IcIll 
where they must invest. Therefore, a wholesale reappraisal of markets and regulation. 
which conventional epistemology is unable to dellvcr, may be nece,, 'saý-y before 
the optimism of regulatory reform in Latin America. 
By comparmo contradictory paradigms for an understanding of market intei-ýtction Z7 Lý 
and cornpetition, this work has aimed to show how scientific truth in the realrn of social 
science is rel. ative to those values and perceptions of the world. Therefore. the paradigiu" 
which compete for an appraisal of social interaction and which are based on different 
rnethods of scientific inquiry lead to different \, ieNN,,., concerning public policy, individual 
rights and public law. 
This work has shown how our perceptions of social phenomena, rnarket mterýtclion, 
Lind de,; Irable regulation are closely related to this particular understanding of "oCial 
I ity to a particular vision or "pal-adigm" is useful science. Linking the analysis of social reali 
because it dispels the assumption, shared by many scholars in this field, that thi,, polic\, i. I., 
the expression of final and objective truth about the behaviour offirms and markets. Such 
recounition highlights the operative limitations of the policy in achievincy Ws proposed 
,, Yoals. 
Logicýll positivism obscured this important caveat, because It lured scholars to the 
rniraole of hoping to discover an impossible "objective" truth in social science. It %vas 
concerned with dcvcloping a value-fi-ee sciciicc. which iniplicitly prescnted scholai-, ý w0h I- 
ýi false dilenin-ia, narnely, that of choosing between applying the oNective methods of L- t) JI 
MItUral scienccs or relinquishing all endeavOL1rS to make social science objectivc. 
I 
The possibility of olýjectivity in social inquiry daunted scholars and made them 
prone to belicvc that cconomic aiiaiv,,, ].,, could dcll\, ci- a faithful and reliable picture ol 
markets tlll*OLIILIII which corrective measurcs could bc deviý, cd in casc of mal I-Linct 11 
Unfortullatelv, till,,, 1", a premise based on wcA cpvtemological grounds, that i,,. the 
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ýISSI-Irnption Lit these models can appralse and provide Lin Understandim-, ot' the examwcd 
i-eality. In fact, these models denied its evolutionay ndfUre. In this , en,, c, McNulty arpicd- 
-That perfect competition is an ideal state, incapahle of actual realization, i,, Li I'arndiai, 
theme of economic litcrature. That for variow, reasons it would be than alto, -, ctlicr I 
desirable, even if it were attainable is also widely acknowledged. But that I)erlccl L- 
competition is a state of affairs quite incompatible with the idea of an,., and all conipctition 
has been insufficiently emphasized". 445 
Schoiars engaged in the study of antitrust policy seldom embark on HIP, line ol Z-1 - 
research. Instead, they tend to adopt partisan views devoid of meaningful , clentific 
interest. On the one hand, some scholars tend to endorse the policy at face value, oil tile 
basis of sorne form of "public interest". Thc\- are not ready to concede that the polIcY 
suffers from shortcommo-, in its enforcement, and they are much less willing to cluc-stioti 
whether there is in fact "public interest" 'ustil'yIng the policy. On the other hand, there are 
those who have failed to see the importance of the intellectual link from which antitru"t 
policy emerges. Their critiques go beyond the mere postulates of a particular theory to 
the paradigm as a whole. They have ill-Issed the mark- by ainUng their objections at 
particular formulations within the paradigm, not at the very positive descriptive apj)rýwal 
of markets conveyed by the paradigm itself, which in the end is responsible t'()I- tile 
policy's failure to prornote competition and entrepreneurship. Not surprisingly, both side,.,, 
have entered into a meaningless normative discussion about the which Cyoals the polIcV L- L- - 
should focus on, instead of questioning whether the policy is useful at all. Similarly, they 
have dra--cd themselves, into a futile dispute about the completeness and accuracy ol 
empirical evidericc. 410 
445 1'. McNull\, 'Econornic Thcoi-v and the Meaning of Competition', in The Conilletimc 
Econ6my, Y. Brozen (ed. ). (Morristown, New . 1ci-sev: 
General Learning Press. 1975). pp. 65-66. 
44() Adarn,, and Brock noted this in sarcastic terms. "Aficionados of the theatre of the absurd \vmild 
find the character of the [antitrust] debate intimately familiar. There is an ah,, cncc of 
comm Lin icati on, -a terrifying diversity of utterance, ý, with the actor, on ýtage 
listening orilý, to 
snatches and fraornents of the dialogue, and rc,,, pond1nL, as if the\, had not listened it ill. At 
times the dialo, -, ue consist,, of statements that are in and of thernsekc,, perfectk 
lucid 1111d 
lo, 
-, 1cal1% con.,, tructcd 
but lackin- in conte\t and rele\ance. At ()ther time,,, ah,, urd ideýi,, ii-C 
proJaimed i,, it' the\ wcre eternal truth,,,. In thi,, dialogue ()f the deaf, the lictor. -, are animated hy 
the certitude and unshakeable nature ot their ba,, ic &ýý, Limption, -()ne ýide relvim-, on the \\ imit m) 
ol, pa'st C\11crieficc. tile other Prepared to , \\ccp the bellet',, IhLit ha\c hcen tcicd and [011mi 
wmitim-', bcl'lcj',,, tile\ Consider illusion,, and cli-decciptiow, ". (Adarns and Bi-()()k, p. mi. ) 
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Rejecting ob' ii ej I Jectivism, however, should not bc interpreted as ar 'ection ()t'thc ncc"I 
for objectivity in scientific inquiry. 447 Rathcr. it shOUId be under. "'tood . 1'ý I crItI'(Juc ot . the 
duplicity of the positivist appraisal, which has claimed to preserve a value-neutral 
appraisal while in fact it contains a clear, implicit normative hias. As Berlin indicýited. il'ii 
positivist political science were in fact to becomc triumphant, the achievement \k()Llld no! 
he ýt victory for ob' i*d neutrality but for a particular belief. Jýs' jectivity an II zn 
Thcý; e argUment,,, simply show the need foi- 1()methin(-1, more tliýin a w,, iatcmýýw ()! 
the current paradium, and indeed more than a few mere amendment of the cul-rcrit i1co- tý, 
classical explanations of market behaviour. We need a new paradiam from which to 
derive a novel appraisal of markets and their implicatioiis. Rather than prescnlini2 iiev, 
solutions, a new- paradigm would force us to explore new questions, new problems and ail 
alternative way of looking at social phenomena. A,,, Schumpeter contends- -01-11- M-1-ILMIC11t, r: ) - 
framed to refute a prevalent theory and the inferences drawn therefrom abOUt the relation 
between modern capitalism and the development of total output. only yields aiiothcr 
theory, i. e. -another outlook on joicts and tinother principle by ývhich to interpret 
them. "449 It would call for a taxonomy, in the words of Addleson: "the economists' 
meaning of competition requires a taxonomy, not a definition, and a taxonomý i 
framework". -150 Wubben is even more assertive when contendinc, that what is needed is a Z: ý 
new episternology. 451 If criticising antitrust Policy must begin at the epistemological 
level, where the relevant questions are made and the premises of the analysis are lai(l 
447 Low-Hin, 1). 34. 1 
448 Jcj.. p. _, )(). 
in the post-empiricist era. "there ,,, an intrinsic connection 
bemeen fýict and \, due 
hLIllt into tile COIICCj)tLMl Stl-UCUII-es that we crect and that thrs msight ýipplie,, alm) io tllc edifiCk, 
of public law wc have hLlilt. " (Loughlin. p. 33. 
449 Schumpeter, pp. 
450 M. Acidleson, -Competition", p. 97. 
451 E. Wubben. -Awtrian Economics and Uncertaint% ý On i Non-Deternimi,, tic but Non-Haphazard 
Future-, in Nc\\ Pci, licctives on Austrian Fcotl()ilil(:,,. G. Nlcl'lci- (ed. ) (London: 
1995). 1). 1 
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down, it is necessary to define an alternative paradigm in order to understand mai-ket 
phenomena and competition. 
2. TOWARDS A Nl--, W APPROACH TO THE REGULATION OF_MARKETS: I. MPROVING FEASIRLF 
MARKET ARRANGEMENTS RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE IMPOSSIBLE NIRVANA 
STANDARDS. 
Our perception of desirable regulation depends upon our picture of reall(ý,. On the 
one hand, viewing competition as a structured closed-end order, where definite 0UtC0IIIeS Z: ) 
may be anticipated, inevitably invites us to reoard policy-i-naking and legislation as tools 
for influencing social order in such a way as to attempt to make it fit predeterilli lied 
desired results. By contrast, understanding competition as an onCoin(, 7, open-clIded 
discovery process whose merit rests on its very existence, rather than on its dellvcry of 
previously determined outcomes, invites us to consider policy action and legislation in 
completely different way. 
This was clearly noted by Schumpeter in his description of capitalism as a Creamw 
Destruction Process. In his opinion, viewing markets as ongoing processes affect, " the 
analysis in two ways: "First, since we are dealing with a process whose every clerricrit 
takes considerable time in revealing its true features and ultimate effect.,.,, there is no point t) 
in appraising the performance of that process cx visu of a given point of time; we must 
I ge its performance over time, as it unfolds through decades or centuries. Second, jud, 
since we are dealing with an organic process. analysis of what happens in any particular 
part of it -say, in an individual concern or industry- may indeed clarify 
detalls of 
rnechanism but is inconclusive beyond that. Every piece of business strategy acquire,, iv, 
true significance only against the background of that process and within the situation 
ci-cated by it. It must be seen. in its role in the perennial gale of creative destruction: it 
cannot be understood irrespective of it or, in fact, on the hypothesis that there j, -, a 
perennial 11.111. "452 
452 Schunipeter. 1). ý84. 
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Under a evol v in ga-process appraisal, therc is no point in identlfvlng the optimal 
states to he achieved, simply because there are no such states, but just a continuous t. IL Ix. 
According to O'Driscoll and Rizzo, It Is only possible to do so with reference to tile 
processes which those outcomes are the result of: "There are not competitive i, csultý, 
Liniess there is competition. Without competition, there is no reference point to which 
comparisons with real-world results can be niade. In the absence of cornpetitivC nial-kct". 
economic theory cannot tell us what is optimal. [1-hus] competiti,,,,, c values or allocations 
do not extst 'out there, ' independently ascertainable apart fi-orn actual market results-. 45'ý 
In Lict. "there are a few abstract distinctiow., that can be posited about the outconle" of 
i-nonopolistic as compared with competitive markets". 454 The assumption that firms in 
concentrated markets behave "badly" or that co-ordination is creates suspicion ftlt "onle 
despicable intention is being disguished, is a by-product of visualising reality thi-ough 
equilibrium models. 
For this reason, as Schumpeter suggests 'Jantitrustj economists who, ex v1su of ýi t-- ý- 
point of time, look for example in the behavior of an oligopolist industry and ()I-),,, ci-\, c 
the well-known moves and countermoves within it that seem to airn ai nothim, but hn-, I] 
prices and restrictions of output are making precisely that hypothesis. They ýicccpt the 
data of the momentary , ýituation as if there werc no p&, i or future to it and think- ftil Ilvv 
have understood what there is to understand if they interpret the behavior of those firm.,, 
by means of the principle of maxirrUzing profits with reference to those data. The usual t__ 
theorist',,, paper and the usual government commission's report practically never try 
sec that behavior, on the one hand, as a result of a piece of past history and, on the othel- 
hand, as an attempt to (ical with a situation that is sure to change presently -as an ýittcmpt 
hy those firms to keep on their feet, on c; round that is slipping away from under them. In Z7 
other \vords, thc lwoblcln that is iisnally being visitah, -. cd i's hotv calfitalisin 
(1-Visting structio'c's, whcrcas the relei, aw lwobleln is how it crewes and de, strov, s lhej)i. 
long as this is not recogni-ed, the inilestigator docs an wan ingless job. As soon as it is 
recogni-ed, his oittlook on capitalist and its vocial residis chaiigcs 
45 ') O'Driscoll and Rizlo. p. 143), 
454 Id-1). 144. 
considerabh. " (ALIthor's italics)455 And later he conclude,, "In analy/Ing , Lich 
[restrictivel business strategy ex visu of a given point of time, the investicyating economiý't 
or cyovernmont auent sees price policies that seem to him predatory and restrict]()",, Ot 
Output that seem to him synonymous with loss of opportunities to produce. He does noi 
see that restriction'. " of this type are, in the conditions of the perennial ifflcildcntý,, 
often unavoidable incidents, of a long run proccs.,, ofcxpansion Miich thc\ i'tithci- 
than impede. There is no more of paradox in this than there is in sayincy that niotorcai-s aiv 
travelling faster than they otherwise would because they are provided with brakes. "450 
It WOUld be easy to destroy the delicate balance of reciprocal expectations ci-catecl 
among market participants as a result of antitrust enforcement. Based on a contrivcd v1c\V 
of the world, and seeking to achieve impossible goals, antitrust policy clitall. " L- - 
unpredictable government intervention which runs coLinter to the ends sought hy playcr. " 
within the market. It is inevitable that its enforcement will lead regulatory agencies to L- I'-- 
challenue as "unfair" what the business world would consider to be a desirable coursc of t) 
action, namely, the reduction of uncertainty for investments. 
There is no way to distinguish the intention.,, of businesses because, contrary to dicir 
constitutive premises, production takes time and agents do not possess compIcic 
information about the range of prices available i. *1 known. The mere number of firms or 
other similar stationary variables cannot give any meaningful indication of their conduct. 
Even in crowded markets, entrepreneurs will behave as profit-maximising monopolists. 
Only by trial and error will they discover that the price-quantity combination maxinlisc, " 
the profits of their competitive firms. 457 The conventional paradigm is short-sighted in a 
literal sense because it emphasises the short-run allocation of resources to the detriment 
of Iong-run considerations of efficiency. From ýi long-term perspectivc. output restriction 
(i. e. firnitinc, freedorn) is not necessarily conipetition-reduc Ing, but competition- 
enhancino. $churnpeter contends that economists misinterpret the nature of restrictive I- 
455 Schumpeter. p. 84. 
456 Id., 1). 'ýýX 
457 O'Di-kcOll and Rizzo, 1). 145. 
market undertakings: "Practically any investment entails, as a necessm-\' complemcm ()I 
entrepreneurial action, certain safeguarding activities such Lis insurim, or hedgimz. Low-2- 
i'ange investing under rapidly changing conditions. cspecially under conditiow, tlicit 
change or may changc at any moment under the impact of new commoditicý, ami 
technologies, is hkc shooting at a target that is not only indistinct but moving, -and 
moving. lerkily Lit tllýLt. Hencc a becOll1c, '-, Lo i, 2sol-L to . -, Li,: l i pi kac,, iii 
Patents or t emporary secrecy of proce,,,,,, c,,, ()I-, III Cý['Scs, lom)-pel-lod colltl-, Iý t. " 
secured in advance. But these protectin,, ý device..,, which most economist,,,., acccj)t 1,, 
normal elements of rational management (Irc 0111N, spccial case. ý of a larger 
comprising m(iny others ii-hich inost economists condenin although thff do not diflcr 
jUndainenhilly jr'oin the recognized ones. "458 (Author's italics) As Hayek put It: 
"Competition is a sensible procedure to use only if we do not decide beforehand who \vIII 
do best. It will onlv tell Lis who did best on the particular ncca, ýions: not 
each did as well as he could have done". 459 
By challenging these expectations, antitrust enforcement inevitably clo, ýe, ' ariý 
possibility that firms can reducing their uncertainty, which is a sine-quo-non condition for 
them to compete in seeking new information. In other words, antitrust does not proi-notc 
but challenges innovation and entrepreneurship. The practical impossibility of gathel-111L, t) tý I 
all the relevant (i. e. perfect and objective) information to identify whether competition 
exists on the basis of their outcomes induces Lis to think that the conventional parad], -1111 
, SLIffer,, 
from scrious conceptual flaws. 
Why are scholai-s so inclined to follow the conventional appraisal, notwithstandin,, z: * 
its obvious limitations? Perhaps this is a con, ýcquencc of misunderstanding the sLihllccti\, c 
MItUI-C of' information shared within the social system, which is frequently assumed Lo he 
readily available to the observer. As Kirzner cxplains: "We very often take k-nowled, -, c foi 
,, ranted. Where the ohlective conditions exi, ýI tor a (-YallItUl OPPOI-tLinitv, we \, crv ()Ih, ii 
Unthinkingly assurne that all relevant parties are aw, are of these conditions. So wc jurnp to L- 
ý5 
8 SCIILI1111)etel'. 
459 Hayek, Lm. and Liberty: The Political Order ot'a Free People, pp. 07-68. 
It 
the conclusion that the -itin in fact e *oyed a,, ýi result of grasping that opportunIty 1", 
RI 
indeed to be attributed simply to the fulfillment of those conditions". 4oo 
By proposing an alternative view of competition, we have attempted to develop 
some ideas about the , ort of "public intcrcst- Icgislation that would prmllotc iý 
effectively. The essence of the new paradigm re. jects the Lrýe of static equifibi-IL1111 all(I 
perfect conipetition ýc,, heuristic tools to expLiin market phenoniena, hut iicithcr (kw, if 
conform to the dynamism of the conventional paradigm. It i,.,, c%ýolvin, -, in the sciise thm it 
ernphasises irreversible change. 
A new appraisal of the world where individuals interact, devoid of the ideallsilc 
premises laid down under neo-classical economics would give a better and riclier 
appraisal of the rules likely to develop in the course of social interaction. 4ol UII(JCI' NLICII 
aii appraisal, the goal of regulation should not be to reach some ideal optimum "tMc, 
which can never be achieved, but should be to improve social co-ordination. 
Understanding the substance of business activity is essential in formulating a 
competition policy aii-ned at boosting competition and innovation, which is the 1-cal task 
to be undertaken if Latin America is to be fi-eed. from poverty and underdevelopment. 
Such a policy should stress the bUilding up of trai-isparent institutions, which COUld CUI-Mil 
governnient discretion through properjudicial accountability, reinforce the arranoct-nents I t-) 
460 Kirzner, Discovery.... p. 75. Richardson al,, () argues. in a similar sense. that the neglect ()I 
informational aspcct,,, is due in part to a confusion of approach, which denotes "the failure to 
distinoulsh clcarIv between the point of vicw of the i-nodel builder himself and that of the 
creatures within the model. [Thus] for the creator, there is no problem of knowledoc, for ihe 
objective facts about the .., ystem appear aS Postulated 
data fi-om which could be deduced (or , (). it 
was believed) the equilibrium configuration. - (Richardson, Information.... p. 40. ) The [i,, c of L- 
methods of u,, ed in mechanics in the study 0 ýocial phenomena 1,, al,., () rcý, p)nlhle for 
this. (Richardson, Information ..., P. 
41. ) 
461 The economic understanding of these rules P, probably closer and more revealing of the 
compicx1ties of social interaction than the simplicity of the models developed in the field of' nc()- 
cla,, mcal "La", and Economic.,, ". An overvie\v of the tenets of the Law and Econornc,, clPciplinc 
IS 1-'OLIIICI In B. Sle,, an, "The Interaction of Econornlc, ý and The Law" The New Palgravc: Thc 
Im kible Kind, J. Fatwell, M. Mil(-, atcý P. Newman (e(l', '. ) (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989. ) 
s :,, vciinR. 
14. Coa,, e, I-aw and Economics at Chica- rcvic\\ of La\ý and Fconornic history 111 
254. o Journal (41-a\\ mid Fconon -c,,, 
[April 199', Jý 22N-2 
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voluntarily undertaken by firms through contract law, and clearly define property r1glits 
over social resources in order to dispel uncertainty in the future. 
In short, effective policy-malcing for the promotion of competition in an cvolvin(-, 
world should aim at irriproving existing institutions rather than attemptingy to crcalc 
Nirvana worlds. 
The analysis developed above centres its attention on comparing imperfect (hut 
capable ot improving) institutions which governs market processes, rather than focusilli L- t-I I 
on achieving impossible optimal market outcornes. These institutions embody the ruics 
that actually affect market exchanges and the behaviour of firms when interacting with 
one another. Far from being pessimistic, the appraisal brings a realistic approach to the 
complex problems posed by social interaction, whicfi arise frorn the 11-yipossibility ()I 
predicting the future with certainty in a world which is far from ideal. t) 
In fact, it is the existence of rules and conventions that ren-ýinds us of the 
impert I ection of the world, but they also tell us how to improve it. A comparative study of 
institutional settings, and the constraints they bring about with regard to incentive,, and b L- tl 
information as a aieans of testing their capacity to achieve their goals, is a morc 
meaningful endeavour because it offers the policy-maker an attainable task. At Icast, that 
is more meaningful than struggling with quixotic attempts to make the world resemble 
ideals that caricature i-eality and which are unachlevable in the end. 
Once the goal is made clear, obvious questions get asked: how does this analysr,, t: ) t) 
materiallse in practice" And how can existing institutions be improved" 
I 
_). - 
THE CREATION 
-OF 
A MARKET-FRIENDLY INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR C0%, I PI 
F-NTREPRENftJRSHIP AND INNOVATION IN LATIN AMERICA. 
The guidelines for institutional clesign can only arise through an alternativc 
economic and legal rcscarch project for the explanation of social rules, which Z-- 
conwntional legal analy,, vs cannot undertakc. Such a pl-ojcct lllvolvclý ýcvcral e\pkimo' ltý - 
ioilllý 
on the behaviour of firms, currently known a,, -i-narket process" theories. These theoric" 
based upon the evolutionary, post-Marshallian and Austrian , chools of economic thcory 
in the field of industrial organisation, market theory and the theorv of the firm. 46-2 L- -- 
They all emphasise the conditions neglected by conventional analysis: that market,,, 
I 
evolve in conditions of irreversible time and disperse knowledgc arnongst those who 
interact in the social system. They also acknow1ccige that entrepreneurship and iimovation 
are necessary conditions for correctino unavoidable errors committed in the light of ý, Iwci 
Uncertainty. 
Institutional rules governing market transactions enable individuals to reduce their 
uncertainty about the future. These rules are not devised by sorne enlightened authorit\ . Z7) - 
but instead evolve over time through a process where entrepreneurs therriselve,, choo,, c 
the rules that provide thern with greater assurance about what to expect frorn evcrýý()nc Z: ) - 
else. Sirnilarly, these rules do not necessarily cori-cspond with the positivistic scrIsc of' 
"law", whereby some enlightened ruler devi,, cs the -social good" WId 1111POSCS It Upon 
individuals from above. Rather, it is the other way round, authorities i-nay attempt to 
identify the ., rules 
that provide individuals with legal certainty and predictability. The 
fundamental fact is that entrepreneurs will oniv be willing to invest and compete vJicn 
uncertainty is reduced, and it is difficult to , cc how this can happen if the rulc,, clo riot 
have the consent of those who are supposed to comply with them. This is particularly 
relevant in weak institutional settings such as Latin America, where effective enforcement 
is always compromised. 
The Latin American development experience consistently shows a clear connection 
hetween cconornic underdevelopment and a kick of instItUtIOnal certainty in political and 
economic institutions. Latin American governnients rnay actively promote competition hy b- 
i-cinfOrcino the wel-) that keeps their institutions functioning, thus reducing the unccrtallltv 
40 sLininlarv of the literature on evolutionar\ economics. post-Marshallian and Austrian schook 
of ec6nomics is found in N. Foss. -Au, ýtrmn and llost-Marshallian Econornics- The Bridl-, mL, 
and Co-oldillation. Work of Cjeoi-Lc Richardson-, in Economic 01-L"1111/atioll. capabilicles 
ROLIlledge, London. 1998. 
280 
for individuals about the business environment in which they trade. Trade restrict]011ý 
emerge from government action, seldom from business practi is respect. Eitar In thi 
argues that while the policy in the United States evolved as a Government reaction to the 
formation of monopolies, in Latin America the policy is justified insofar as it challcm-'c" 
previous anti-coinpetitli)e behaviour encouraged by Governments themselves. 4o) t. 1.1) 
There are clear links between the stable and predictable institutional frarnewoi-k 
achieved by a systen-i where the rule of law, and Economic Freedorn prev. 61,, aii(l 
economic development. 464 The erosion of the rule of law and the subversion of ccollonlic 
freedom by unwarranted "public interest goals- declared by public authoritie" . cldonl. it' 
ever, favours economic development. 
That regulators seldom perceive this fact reveals their proclivity to be hauntcd h\ 
their own agenda, which is not necessarily in line with the "social good", and which Is 
based on very dubious epistemological grounds. b t) 
The next question, then, is how to improve institutions? How can one build such 
predictability and legal certainty? The answer involves the notion of "accountability". In 
short, antitrust policy, like any other, must be accountable. 
Unaccountable adrninistrative discretion diminishes the predictability of private 
entitle rrients to social resources. As a result, either public officials or (in the absence of mi 
effective institutional framework) powerful private parties tend to appropriate thesc 
"gaps" in the entitlements of social resources. The crucial aspect of all this is that it 
403 See A. Jatar, Competition Policy in Latin Aniej, jcý,, p. 4. She adds: "Decades of paternall,, rn 11, 
Latin America contributed to build an institutional and IeLal structure which is in clear conflici 
with competition s&indards. Thus for the iIIStItLItIOII responsible for prornotin,, -, competition in ýi 
recently liberalized economy, deregulating the economy and opposing past and prcscm 
t, overnmental action, which may collide with competition principles. beconies it vmtj()r 
(p. 14. ) 
404 See . 1. 
Gwartncv, R. Lawson and W. Block, Economic Freedom of the World- 197ý-191)5. Pic 
Fra, ser Institute et al.. Vancouver. 1996. For a rcccnt empirical reappraisal ot thk que,, tion. "cc 
H, GI-Libel. -1--conomic Freedom and Human Welfare: Some empirical findinL,,,, -. IN' Clito 
jotjrjjalý (1998)- 287-304. 
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ýiffect,,, not only the '"rii i sal location" of richt,,. but also introduce.,,, uncertaintv into the 
market system, which inhibits all attempts to foster innovation and i-icw idea,,. Ho\\c\, ci-. 
in the case of antitrust Policy it may be nece,, sary to note that Such Judicial accoLintahilit\ 
rriay prove elusive due to its nature. A rule-of-reason analysis, whereby antiti'Ll. "'I 
authorities attempt to distinguish "anticompetitive- from "efficient" firriitation,,, on 
conipetition, cannot provide any clear guidance, , Ince it i-s made with refcrencc to a 
standard ("social efficiency") that has little to do with the intention behind the 
undertakings actually entered into by real firms-, in the end, the Va(-ILICIICSS of thiý, , tandard 
invites the enforcement agency to impose its owii ethical vicws on social pohc\ 
Such policy standards are not accountable, as they represent the utilitarian view ot 
whoever is in charge of enforcing the policy. Tt is no wonder that judicial ýInd 
administrative decisions have traditionally been so) erratic when dcciding Miether ýi 
restriction should be i-coarded as prohibitcd per sc or subject to a Rlle-of-rciismi- 
analysis. Rothbard contend,, that findin- monopolistic restrictions depends on the 
particular arbitrary definition of competition and monopoly adopted: At is vain, however, 
to call simply for a clearer statutory definition of monopolistic practice. For the vag"Llerics" 
of the law results frorn the impossibility of laying down a cogent definition of monopoly 
on the market. Hence the chaotic shift of the government from one unjustifiable criterMil 
of monopoly to another: size of the firm, 'closeness' of substitutes, chargink, a price 'to() Z7) 17, 
high' or 'too low' or the same as a competitor, merging that -substantially les,,, cris Z7 L_ 
competition, ' etc. All thesc criteria are illeanill(IICss". 465 In his opinion, thcrc arc no 
monopolistic prices, but only free-market (i. e. unhampered) prices. 460 
Following similar considerations, Letwin underlines the subtle problems Z7) 
surroundiný, every antitrust determination in the realni of legal theory: CvClI C, L- 
-1 -en ,I sinipic economy niany other problems would ai se in 
interpi na the simple antinionopoly 
laýv. Grantcd that if any one i-rian quickly I)OLIght Lip all ten of the community), cloili 
405 Rothbard, Power mi( - 
I-Market: Government and the Ecoilomy, (Kansas Otýý Univcr, ýid Pre"', 
Syndicate, Inc., 1970), pp. 60-61. 
466 Rothbard, -Nlonopolý 
0( 
shops he would obviously have violated the law -that iý,. the intent to monopolize miglit 
fairly he inferred from his behavior, unless he could prove sorne other intent- still, wh; il if 
some man acquired only five of the ten? Judges might then reasonably disagree x-, to lio\\ rý tý I Z__1 
the law sho6ld apply: while some will contend that in prohibiting an end result the Lm 
implicitly prohibits steps toward it, others will assure that if the law implicitly prollihitc(l, 
any act that rrfight lead to an unlawful result the laws would be safe O'Llarding the public A t: ) t) 
the cost of paralyzing it. If a man known to hate his mother-in-law buys a rope. has Ile (); 
has he not (-, one far enouah on the road to murder ,, () that the 1ýtw , hoolcl , top limi. ' V1,,,, L_ Z7) 
the buyer of the five of the ten cloth shops corne close enough to monopolizing to hC 
stopped by the law? "467 
Ultimately, such accountability will depend on the prevailing legal cultuiv 
subjecting these interpretations to effective judicial control. The underlying principles ol 
the legislation could impose more effective limitations on the encroachment of individual Z7ý 
rial-its than written constitutions. In this regard. there is a new breed of constitutiomilism 
emerging in, Europe, which offers a promising outlook for the development of a more Z: ) b t- 
effective protection of individual property rights from government encroachmew. -W,,,, r) 
467 W. Letwin, Law and Economic PQIiU_1n Ajnerlcýi: The Evolution of the Sherman Arititrwi Aci. 
Whicago: The University of Chicago Pres,,. 1905), 1). 6. 
408 See, Lon. L. Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law -A Reply to Professor Hart", 71 Hat - ard 
Law Review [19581, pp. 630-672; also, U. Everling, "El Tribunal de Justicia de la" 
Cornunidades Europeas como Tribunal Adrn1n1strýit1vo-, in La JusticiaAdministrativa en cl 
Derecho Cornparado, (Madrid: Civitas, 1993), pp. 047 et seq. For example, Gerniam hi, 
attempted to develop a more ambitious judicial review. There, the emergence of the theor\ ()I 
11 essence of rial-its" is an attempt to provide more effective protection. This thcoi-\ 'i,,, 
complemented hy efforts to control the interpretation by public authorities of non-lelL, ýtl lenw, 
(e. g., "competition", "relevant market", "dominance", -i-narket power'"). These term,, d)(mid he 
interpreted in accordance with social conveimmis, not at the whirn of the Judge. Ho\ýc\cr. the 
way in which economic theories pervade -m)clal conventions- (its expressed 1_)ý' ', kIlUle") and 
their influence over the appraisal adopted by Judges when deciding legal cases is not clear. In J Z__ r__ z: 1 
other words. the legal doctrines developed to protect individual rights from L'()\C1-n111en1 
encroachment still only afford limited protection of rights in reality because thev do not 
challeril-Ic the pirýidlgm that supports conventional repilation. Indeed. understandim-, the 
interaolon between IeLal and economic theory is ýt fairly recent concern in Europe, ý: Onlpal-Cd 
with the development of Law and Economic.,, in the United State,, Consequentlý_ the li; icc ()I' 
-ol in these countries is still uneven and sometimes dominated by foririali,, rn. Thiý, k judicial conti 
the case. for example, in the French 'udicial revicw of administrative acts. As argued h\ Everlin. JC- 
"In France the Public Administration enjoy,, it considerable margin ot appraisal ... the court,, 
seem to let themselves become influenced hN the allegations of the Public Adminkiriiiion. 
presurning that it has appraised properly the relcvýtnt t'act,,. And of cour,, e, the% do n0i rc\, c\\ I-- 
those facts which require a technical or economic amilysis". (Everlin, Id.. p. 04', S. ) European 
2 
Perhaps the proliferation of "amparo" cases (ilterally, "constitutional protection") mi(I 
similar injunctions against government action, based on these legislative measure,,. iý, an Z-- 
expression of a renewed concern for protecting individual econornic rights ill tile 
region. 469 
Boettke's solution to this dilemma, then, is to isolate markets from the 1)(Altical 
rnanipulations that prevent them from materialising: "In order to correct the si loll -to tuat 
chart a new course- economic forces must be unleashed frorn political force,,,,, cvc1l 11' 
those political forces are democratic. The main failing of previous policy can be found in 4--l 
rules of the game which perverted the incentives to actors to discover and use economic 
information effectively. Competition among alternative market experiments is the best 
way to assure that new ways to satisfy market demand are discovered and that power is 
divested from any single entity in society". 470 In other words, it is necessary to ýct Lip 
reliable impartial institutions that offer an effective defence of economic rights, which 
constitute the very legal foundation of economic activity, and hence competition. 
Therefore, institutional reform in Latin America should not be regarded as a 111ý111cr 
of mere quantitative calculations as to the effect of the efirrunation of trade barriers and 
privileges that impede trade and competition. Although it is true that these reforms hýlve 
succeeded in fostering trade and investment opportunities by reducing oversca, " 
investment costs and enhancing the availability of foreign technological inputs. Thcsc 
factors, coupled with the reduction or elln-Hnation of government impediments to trýlde. 
such as tariffs, domestic discriminatory rules, non-tariff barriers and the like, have notahly 
unshackled the economics of reforming countries by introducing competition. 471 Soiiic Z-7) 
scholars highlight the diversity of national jurisdictions with respect to I udicial contro I; &,, an C\- Z-- 
Is area particularly that national judge of the European Court of Justice argued: "it is in thi 
interests show their differences". (Lord Mackenzie Stuart, The European Communities and the 
Rule of Law, The Rimlyn Lectures, Steven-, and Sons, London, 1977, p. 64. ) 
469 Brewer, Judicial 
470 Boettke. Why Perestrolka ..., at 
108. 
471 For an up-to-date review of international economic developments see Trade and DevelOpmeill 
Report, 1994, UNCTAD Secretariat report. New York, 1994. This study analkes the imp. wi oi 
recent developments in trade on developing countric, ý. 
No 
pi-()(, rc.,,,, has hccn niadc in this respect and II nternat onal org ýt n kat ions arc i, 0, tv 
acknowledging the need to consolidate thc wfornis achicvcd thrmll-'h 10112-WI-111 I 
institutional reforrn. 472 Today, more emphasis 1., ý placed on the institutional elenient,, tha! 
determine development: the assignment ()I' property r'z,:, hts, and the 11"Porta"ce of 
effectivejudicial and settlement agencies. 
A clear vision of the essence of regulation that could guide institutional refiwfil 1ý11 11 
-ýtlll i-nissin(-,. In this itccount, it is more iniporuint t(-) focus on the chýi1lcnLe,, io chinLc 
rather than endorsin old views about -niarket I'LinCtioning fa I res". It I cre thill u 
resistance is to be expected from vested interests. It entalls the difficult and challeng-in, -! 
task of making the political commitment,, necded to ensure that the reforill" inl(KIIIN 
undertaken to allow areater freedom (dereaulation, privatisation, open trade) do not 
collapse Linder the weight of inherited inefficient traditions, orcyanisational hack\\ t-1 
and private rent-seekin- behaviour. 473 It Involves a qualitativc analysis that P,, often full A- 
subtleties and complexities which hinder it.,., acconiplishinent. 
Particular attention should be paid to the web of informal arrangements that ha\c Z: ) 
developed in Latin America to deal with the Uncertainty of the "official" ,, cttin(,, and the 
ubiquitous unaccountable discretion that hý is always characterised L, ()\ c ni me ii t 
intervention in private affairs in the region. b 
Subtle forins of market co-operation havc emerged, which wcre civated to avoid 7 
the uncertainty which government intervention and political instability in the regWil 
constantly qeated for businesses. For example, extensive distribution channels. the 
presence of strong family ties in business operations. and widespread vertical intcgration 
are characteristic ot' Latin firms, and the procurement of special conditions which cn"Lirc 
the predictability of transactions illustrate thcir special concern with Arninaling the 
inefficiencies of the official setting Lý I 
47' Scc, for cxample. Holden and Rajapatirana. Unshackling 
473) Naim, Latin Amcrica',,. - pp. 
8-17. 
--) () I 
If any lesson is to be drawn from the Latin American experience, It Is that (1c"1111c 
the alleged effects of Latin American market concentration, dolninam jirm. s arc noi 
iiccessarilv povi)eýftd Oxhatever that may mean). On the contrýtrv. "the mult](110"Wmil 
business enterprise certainly has its place in Latin America and some of the iv, -, ion), 
largest firms provide examples of management innovation-, however, unlike the Inited 
States, they are not the most powerful institutions in the region's econoiny. Accoi-din, -, k. 
local models of best management practice must draw on a wider varicty ()I 
ot-Lýanizations-. 474 I 
The problem, therefore, is not one of market structurc, but of preserving, i-cliahic 
expectations , to invite cntrepreneurs to invest, ajid thus. to compete. 
4. - FINAL CONSIDERATION 
The purpose of this work has been to initiate i clucussion on what 1, ind ()f 
intervention Latin American governments should undertake to reinforce their 1'ecclit Z: ) 
rnarket reforms. In the process of adapting their rules and econornies to incrcirin- 
economic interdependence and market mechanisnis, developing countries niust hc awýiw 
of the consequences of the antitrust policies they are currently implementing Z-1) * 
This is a discussion which revolves around an analysis of social institutions and 
qualitative government intervention in market functioning. We have chosen antitrust t: ) Z--) 
policy as a case for exan-tination because it clearly show,, the divergence between \vhai 
claii-ned and what is achieved by public policy. Antitrust ainis to enhance competition: but 
in fact it is conceptually designed to redistribute resources an-iong individual,, in , (wiciv. t> -- - 
according to the Pareto efficiency standard oi- other alternative political stanclai-d,, ()I 
wealth redistribution. Its results are disappointing, therefore. as the redistribution r-- 
resources by. definition not only creates an undesirable interaction between polic\ -niakiii, -, 
and politics, but also hinders market functioning. inno\-ation and cconoi-nic th, wlilcli 
can only be achievcd through competition and bUS111CY, I-- 
474 Dýivila and G6mez. p. 674. 
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For this reason, rather than expressing a true niarket commitment, the iim-()t1iwiiO, i I 
of antitrust policy In Latin America shows ftit the nc\v ethos brought about hy 11-ic 
institutional reforms is far from reaching a definition, and that old fashioned way, ()I 
policy-makinO are at leýisl dormant, if not yet rehorn. Perhaps the lc,,,,, on to be Icarned 1"' 
that institutignal reform in Latin America may reqUire much more than the introduction ()I 
stral-l-itforward measures aimed at setting Lip nevv regulatory aoci-icle,,, thi-ou, -, hOL1t the 
region. It i-nay require a change in the philosophy that Inspires the policy which UnClcrlicl- 
them. 
In the rather pessimistic words of Veliz: "Despair and perplexity seems to be thc 
most obvious consequences of attempting to reform, modernise, revolt or transform Latin 
American countries in one way or another. I am convinced that this is a result ol' 
erroneously believing that the experience of Western European industriallsed CoLffltl_l('ý, 
and the interpretative models arising from their CXperIC11CC are appllcýfhle Oil the pcopk"' 
of the southern regions of the New World. I am also convinced that the prollfcration ol' 
authoritarian regimes a few years ago it i,, not a moral or political oddlt\' hut the 
expression of a style of political behaviour. a ýccular inclination of Latin Americ; in s(wwtv 
which, und& varied I'Ornis --of which the militarv mav well be the most transicrit onc will 
endure in our region for a while. "475 Similar caveats could be made with referclicc 1() 
other areas of social life, particularly the regulation of economic activity. 
The problem (icscribed above has ti-crncndous s], -, nificance 
for economic re! '()rill ir 
developing countries, which is currentlY the focus of ýi debatc on the nature and extcnt ()F 
government intervention under a new generation of InStItUtlonal reforms. In this work. 
have shown that antitrust does not share the implicit lo(-, ic of these in,, litutional ickvm" in 
Latin Anierica. Instead, it reflects the misconception that economic theory can hc Li,, (, (l 
\VlthOLl( 10 LIII&I'Stillid soclal phenonienit. Ictidim-, to iol puNlo. I 
475 VIZ, 
9 
policy. Godek has put it very simply: "Won-ying about antiti'LlSt ISSUCS 
unhealthy anxiety about the imagined ills of capital r,., m". 476 
476 P. Godek, "One U. S. Export Eastern Europe doesn't need", International 
September 199 1, p. '). 
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